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Introduction 
The thinking that resulted in this thesis has its roots in the first televised 
images that marked my childhood. The destruction of Beirut under the Israeli fire was 
the news item during my first school holidays. I was seven years old and I remember 
seeing Menachem Begin's impassionate speeches, thinking that they made sense. 
Knowing that Hitler was the ultimate evil, and hearing that Arafat was like Hitler, how 
could it be wrong to destroy him? But when I looked among the images of people in 
Beirut to find the Nazis, all I could see were people who looked poor, quiet or scared. 
Nothing like the tall and erect Nazis, shouting out orders in their uniforms and shiny 
boots. I was confused. And this confusion bred a lifelong interest in what was really 
going on in Israel. How could a people that had suffered so much cause so much 
suffering? Why were they telling the world that they were fighting the Nazis? And why 
did the world believe them? Years later I came across an article which seemed to 
answer my question. The author concluded with the following words: 
The inability of many Israelis to tell the difference between Nazis and 
Palestinians, and their inability to recognise their own military superiority so 
that they could understand that they are no longer a powerless people 
trembling at the threshold of the extermination camps of Europe is not a willed 
stupidity. It is, rather, a pathological distortion based on the trauma of 
victimisation not yet overcome. ' 
The project of this thesis started with a curiosity awoken by the idea that collectivities 
can suffer from the same pathological symptoms as do individuals. If it could be 
shown that a collective trauma indeed exists and unfolds within a given society in a 
way similar to that observed in individual trauma survivors, than the argument would 
hold a great interest for the study of international relations. I decided to pursue my 
curiosity. 
The questions that this thesis addresses are therefore the following: Is the 
Holocaust a collective trauma of the Israeli Jews? If yes, how does it deploy its 
' Lerner, M., "Psychological Dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" Tikkun 4: 5 
(September-October 1989) p. 44. 
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effects within the Israeli society? I was particularly interested in the impact of the 
trauma on the Israeli concept of security, which brings me to the central question of 
this thesis: What is the impact of the Holocaust on Israel's making of security? 
The choice of Israel as a case study came naturally. Not only because Israel 
kindled my interest in the first place, but more importantly because of the historical 
connection between the Holocaust and the State of Israel. The Nazi destruction of 
European Jewry represents the very paradigm of massive psychic trauma and its 
effects on the survivors and their children have been studied in great length by the 
trauma specialists, both in the clinical and in the psycho-therapeutic fields. 
Furthermore, the State of Israel has claimed a special relationship with the Holocaust 
and its survivors ever since its establishment in 1948 as shown in Tom Segev's 
major contribution to the history of Israel's dealing with the Holocaust., Thirdly, Israel 
has been exposed to a precarious security situation that reinforced the identification 
with the Holocaust victims and thereby facilitated collective traumatisation. And 
fourthly, Israel is a young country with a small political, intellectual and cultural elite. It 
has a strong executive with the Prime Minister often conjoining the function of 
Minister of Defence. The leaders are few and their personal histories often coincide 
with that of the state itself. That means that if some leaders are personally affected 
by trauma their traumatised worldview will have a greater impact on the country's 
foreign and security policy than in a country with more checks and balances. For all 
those reasons Israel is the most likely candidate for collective traumatisation. 
In this thesis, I will argue that the murder of European Jewry during the 
Second World War severely traumatised the Jewish people in Israel. Furthermore, 
this traumatisation had a profound impact on the young nation's conception of its 
security, both in terms of the perception of threat and the understanding of legitimate 
ways to counter the perceived threat. Consequently, I will maintain that any attempt 
to normalise the Israeli society will have to take the reality of its traumatisation into 
account. 
2 Segev, T., The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1993). 
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In order to sustain the above-cited argument, this thesis will draw upon three 
bodies of literature, which have not been combined in the study of international 
relations before: clinical and psycho-therapeutic research, history, and international 
relations. The clinical and psycho-therapeutic research into the post-traumatic stress 
disorders (PTSD) of the Holocaust survivors and their offspring provides the medical 
definition of trauma, a description of post-traumatic symptoms, and an outline of a 
recovery process based on years of clinical practice with the Holocaust and other 
survivors. History is crucial to retrace the narrative of events that provide the 
background to a particular stage of traumatisation or healing. I relied on recent 
historical accounts of Israel's relationship with the Holocaust and its survivors 
(namely those by Tom Segev and With Zertal3), but also on some primary sources 
(Eichmann's trial transcripts), biographies and memoirs of the Israeli leaders, and 
secondary literature that supports my case studies. Although the international 
relations literature in this thesis is scarce, the focus of my research remains firmly 
embedded within the outer confines of international relations, which I hope this thesis 
will help bring towards the mainstream of the discipline. 
The thesis is organised in six chapters and each chapter in two parts, with the 
exception of Chapter Three, which has three parts. Each part combines a theoretical 
discussion of trauma with an empirical illustration of the argument. The more detailed 
description of the chapters follows here. 
In Chapter One, I will seek to demonstrate the presence of trauma within the 
Israeli society. After defining and circumscribing the concept of trauma both on 
individual and collective levels, I will systematise the Holocaust-related traumas into 
a typology of Holocaust survivors' groups in Israel. The aim of this typology is to 
determine the traumatic syndromes on the basis of each group's experience of the 
Holocaust. Such approach will allow a much more refined analysis of post-traumatic 
stress syndromes than it has been previously applied to nations or other human 
collectivities. Moreover, the systematisation of trauma by survivors' experience of the 
traumatic event will be crucial for an accurate assessment of its long-term effect. This 
is because the processes of traumatisation and recovery vary between the individual 
3 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe To Power. Holocaust Survivors And The Emergence Of Israel 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1998). 
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and collective survivors' groups. The first part of the chapter will focus on the 
personal traumas experienced by individual survivors and their offspring. Based on 
clinical research regarding the traumatisation of the physical survivors and its 
transgenerational transmission, I will identify the' main features of post-traumatic 
syndromes observed in three groups of physical survivors (concentration camp 
survivors, fighting survivors and survivors in hiding) and in their children. In the 
second part of Chapter One, I will build upon Kai Erikson's research into the ways in 
which communities respond to the traumatic events to conceptualise the Holocaust 
trauma on the collective level. Given the distinct nature of collective traumatisation, 
the two groups of collective survivors - empathetic 'survivors' (members of the 
targeted community) and symbolic 'survivors' (the targeted community itself) - are 
affected both through a process of identification with the physical survivors, by the 
cumulative effect of individual traumas on the community, and by the overall 
destruction of the community's resources and focus of identification. 
On the basis of the findings in the first chapter, Chapter Two will explore the 
link between trauma and security as it translates into the Israeli reality. The first part 
of the chapter will introduce the concept of Jewish prism, defined as a traumatised 
view of the world, which distorts reality by overemphasising the extremes and 
underemphasizing the nuance. Formulated primarily around the lessons and 
understandings of the Holocaust, but also informed by the historical memory of 
Jewish persecution, the Jewish prism consists of six key elements: Zionism, 
pessimism / fatalism, isolationism, expressivist use of force, and humanism / 
criticism. The Zionist facet of the prism represents the State of Israel as the only 
shield against future holocausts; pessimism projects the threat of annihilation on 
almost every situation, and fatalism frames this threat within an inevitable 'reality' of 
millennial Gentile hatred of the Jews. Such an extreme and Manichean perception of 
strategic reality justifies an exaggerated use of force which also serves to assuage 
feelings of revenge. Humanism and criticism, expressed as identification with the 
suffering of others, reflect sharpened sensitivity and higher moral standards acquired 
by the experience of being persecuted oneself. However, given the decisive 
predominance of particularistic elements over universalistic ones, a traumatised view 
of the world remains essentially self-centred. The second part of the chapter will 
outline short portraits of Israeli leaders who had a significant impact on Israel's 
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conceptualisation and exercise of security in an effort to detect elements of the 
Jewish prism in their perception of the world and Israel in relation to it. 
The third and fourth chapters will revolve around the cardinal question of 
collective traumatisation of the Israeli society through gradual integration of the 
Holocaust trauma during the first two decades after the individual traumatisation took 
place during the Second World War. Based primarily on the scholarship of Israeli 
historians Tom Segev and Idith Zertal, Chapter Three will juxtapose the process of 
individual healing of the physical survivors with the first three phases of collective 
traumatisation: euphoria, encounter, and estrangement. Euphoria is the first 
community reaction to trauma: joy that part of the community survived and can be 
saved. The first part of Chapter Three will study euphoria in Israel during the period 
of clandestine immigration. The second part of the chapter will focus on the 
encounter with the physical survivors arriving to Palestine. During this second phase 
of collective traumatisation the first assessment of damage inflicted on the 
community and its surviving members is carried out. Consequently, in the phase of 
estrangement studied in part three, those who are not affected by trauma distance 
themselves from the survivors. The community reactions to trauma may encourage 
or impede the individual process of recovery. In the third chapter I hope to convey the 
mixed record of this individual - collective dynamics in the 1950s Israel. 
Chapter Four will focus on the crucial moment in the healing process - 
reconstruction of the narrative of the traumatic event. The first part of the chapter 
frames the reconstruction of trauma as the beginning of personal and collective 
recovery. At this stage, the individual survivors reconstruct the narrative of their 
traumas and integrate the traumatic memory into their life story. Through the same 
mechanism, communities reconstruct the narrative of communal trauma in three 
steps: reclamation of earlier history of the community, recollection of facts in 
chronological order, reactivation and verbalisation of emotional sensations of trauma, 
and reconstruction of a value and belief system that integrates trauma and provides 
guidelines for future behaviour. In Israel, such reconstruction took place at the trial of 
a Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in 1961. The second part of the chapter will 
analyse the construction of the Holocaust narrative during Eichmann's trial. Basing 
my analysis on the full transcript of the trial itself, corroborated with the accounts of 
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its chief protagonists, I will first situate the trial in its political context and identify its 
principal aims, before proceeding to an examination of how, to what extent, and with 
which consequences had these aims been realised. The third part of the chapter will 
assess the psychological impact of the Eichmann's trial on the individual survivors 
and on the Israeli Jewish community as a whole. I will argue that whilst the impact of 
the Eichmann's trial on survivors was highly beneficial, it finally traumatised the 
Israeli Jewish community through the process of identification. 
Chapters Five and Six will analyse the practical implications of the Holocaust 
trauma for Israel's security. Chapter Five will focus on the influence of the Holocaust- 
permeated Jewish prism that emerged from the Eichmann trial on the leaders' 
perception of Israel's geo-strategic environment during the Six-Day and Yom Kippur 
Wars. The first part of the chapter will study the discrepancy between the sense of 
impending annihilation preceding the Six-Day War and the scope of Israel's victory. I 
will argue that both the exaggeration of threat and the mystification of victory 
originate from the traumatised worldview informed by the lessons of the Holocaust. 
The Six-Day War was a reactivation of the original trauma where those in charge of 
Israel's security sought to apply the lessons of the Holocaust and use what was 
perceived as the 'second chance' to secure a positive outcome. In the second part, I 
will examine the incongruity between the extent of victory after the Arab surprise 
attack in 1973 and the subsequent representation of the Yom Kippur War as a 
failure. Based on the scholarship of the Israeli sociologist Charles S. Liebman who 
analysed the reasons for recalling the Yom Kippur war as a calamity, I will suggest 
that such conceptualisation of the 1973 war serves an inner need of the great 
majority of the Israeli public that was then unable to confront the reality of Israeli 
power and its consequences. 
In Chapter Six I will examine the critical juxtaposition of personal and 
collective traumas during Prime Minister's Begin's two terms in office. In the first part 
of the chapter I will seek to demonstrate that Begin's personal experience as a 
Holocaust survivor reinforced the particularistic elements of the Jewish prism. 
Building upon the findings of the clinical research, I will argue that Begin's emphasis 
on the expressivist use of force originated from a deep inner desire for vengeance. It 
was this fantasy of revenge that motivated Begin's decision to invade Lebanon in 
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1982 and to continue justifying the invasion even against intense international 
criticism and internal opposition. The second part will show that the excesses 
committed during the war in Lebanon precipitated a significant segment of the Israeli 
population into the next stage of recovery, that is, mourning. After reviewing the 
process of mourning from a clinical perspective, I will apply it to the analysis of 
Israel's identity crisis in the wake of the Lebanon war and argue that the twin trend of 
polarisation and radicalisation of the Holocaust lessons in the 1980s resulted from 
various strategies of resistance to mourning. 
In the light of the findings of the thesis, the conclusion will review the state of 
the collective mourning process in Israel and evaluate the results of the profound 
self-examination that has taken place among the country's elites in the past two 
decades. I will end this thesis by suggesting that the recent trends observable in the 
Israeli academia, literature, and politics have an incredible potential to resolve the 
fifty year old trauma of the Israeli society as long as its presence is acknowledged 
and its symptoms not mistaken for bad will or conscious manipulation. 
As the above outline shows, the thesis will contain three case studies and two 
mini case studies: 
> Clandestine immigration and Exodus (mini case study) 
> Eichmann's trial (case study) 
> Six-Day War (case study) 
> Yom Kippur War (case study) 
> Invasion of Lebanon (mini case study) 
The mini case studies will be used to illustrate or support a particular assertion 
within a given chapter, while the case studies will dominate the chapter and will be 
used to develop an argument rather than just illustrate it. The mini cases have been 
chosen according to their appropriateness to support a given argument. Thus the 
clandestine immigration and the story of Exodus offer the most suitable background 
to a discussion of the collective euphoria after the Second World War. Similarly, the 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 will best frame the discussion of collective mourning, 
different resistances to it, and the crisis of Israel's victim identity. The Eichmann's 
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trial has been chosen because it represents the turning point and the single most 
important event in Israel's dealing with the Holocaust. It was at this trial that the 
Holocaust narrative was first publicly reconstructed and the Holocaust survivors first 
acknowledged and accepted by the Israelis. The trial had vital political and 
psychological consequences including the completion of collective traumatisation and 
the beginning of healing. The Six-Day War is equally unavoidable because it 
represents another turning point - the 'Holocaust that did not happen' and a 
confirmation of the validity of the Holocaust lessons that emerged from the 
Eichmann's trial. At the same time, the Six-Day War begs the discussion of the 
Kippur war because the 'calamity' of 1973 shattered the promise of 1967, brought the 
nation back into victimhood, and thereby destroyed the healing potential of the 1967 
victory. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon is also a milestone event in Israel's history 
and a crucial stage in Israel's story of recovery from trauma. Lebanon is the major 
event during Menachem Begin's term in office as a Prime Minister and therefore best 
illustrates his worldview and his revenge fantasy. Concurrently, the ill-conceived 
invasion of Lebanon precipitated almost a third of Israelis into introspection and 
mourning, breaking the consensus on the meanings, understandings, and lessons of 
the Holocaust and thereby marking a new stage in Israel's collective recovery. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the field of International Relations by 
introducing a new, and in my view essential, dimension into the study of international 
relations - trauma. In the light of the recent fundamental change of security paradigm 
following the terrorist attack in the United States, I believe that massive 
traumatisations of civilian populations will require an approach to security that will 
take trauma into account. I also hope that the findings of this thesis will benefit critical 
scholarship by drawing attention to the presence of trauma and its symptoms in 
Israel, which in turn will alleviate some of the frustrations experienced by the critics 




HOLOCAUST AS TRAUMA 
Introduction 
On my left forearm I bear the Auschwitz number it reads more briefly than the 
Pentateuch or the Talmud and yet it provides more thorough information. It is 
also more binding than the basic formulas of Jewish existence. ' 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to define and unpack the concept of 
trauma, both on individual and on the collective levels, to systematise the Holocaust- 
related traumas, and to identify various groups of survivors in Israel on the basis of 
their war experience and the traumatic syndromes they developed afterwards. The 
organisation of the chapter seeks to disentangle the complex interweaving of 
Holocaust related traumas and survivors. The first part focuses on the concept of 
trauma with reference to individual survivors and their offspring. Based on clinical 
studies of survivors and their children, the section outlines the post-traumatic 
disorders observed in survivors as well as their intergenerational transmission. On 
the basis of their shared ordeal, three subgroups of physical survivors are examined: 
concentration and death camp survivors, survivors in hiding, and fighting survivors. 
Far from reflecting the totality of the Holocaust experience, this typology reintroduces 
two categories of survivors (fighting and hiding) that have been traditionally omitted 
from discussions of trauma, both because their traumas were considered less 
consequential and because they themselves rarely sought medical help. Among the 
subgroup of survivors in hiding, the exposure of hidden children to the Holocaust is of 
particular interest because the children were often traumatised twice: as survivors in 
their own right, and as children of survivors. Hidden children are also the youngest 
and therefore the last generation of physical survivors. The last group of this first part 
consist of the children of survivors who were born after the war - the so-called 
second generation. The intergenerational transmission of their parents' trauma is 
studied primarily with reference to the existing research on the traumatic symptoms 
observed in survivors' children. 
'Amery, J., At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980) p. 58. 
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The second part conceptualises Holocaust trauma on the collective level. 
Based on the scholarship of Kai Erikson, a Professor of sociology at Yale, a model of 
communal trauma is introduced. Unlike the individual trauma with its direct impact on 
the survivors, communal trauma is a secondary, derived trauma. Two groups of 
communal "survivors" illustrate the singular operation of trauma on the level of 
community: empathetic (members the same community) and symbolic (the 
community itself). Empathetic "survivors" are affected chiefly through a process of 
identification with survivors and victims who were members of their community. 
Symbolic "survivors", on the other hand, suffer primarily from the cumulative effect of 
individual traumas on the community as a whole and the overall destruction -of 
community resources. The conceptualisation of trauma on both individual and 
collective levels is crucial for an accurate representation of its the long-term impact. 
As the individual survivors deal with their own personal tragedies, they also 
participate in shaping the collective understandings and experience of trauma. 
Inversely, empathetic and symbolic survivors need the authentic narrative of the 
trauma in order to grasp the magnitude of disaster through the process of 
identification with its victims and survivors. With the passage of time, as those who 
personally survived the traumatic event age and pass away, the collective survivors 
became the primary carriers and defenders of the collective narrative of trauma. As 
the conclusions to this thesis indicate, it is very important that the essential stages of 
healing from trauma are completed while the authentic narrative of the traumatic 
event is still available and amenable, lest the trauma becomes collectively frozen and 
transmitted to the next generations unresolved. 
Individual Traumas: Physical Survivors And Their Offspring 
Introduction 
Trauma has the quality of converting that one sharp stab into an enduring 
state of mind. ... The moment becomes a season; the event becomes a 
condition. 2 
As Aaron Hass pointed out, "survivors of the Holocaust, particularly Jewish 
survivors, are often seen as a unitary phenomenon by both mental-health 
Z Erikson, K., A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and Community 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994) p. 230. 
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professionals and laypersons. "3 Yet their experience varied markedly, depending on 
the circumstances in which they survived: some Jews spent the war in hiding or 
posing as Gentiles, others lived in ghettos and concentration camps or were confined 
to labour camps. Some fought in the forests as partisans. The majority of survivors 
lost family members and friends and many lost spouse and children. They came from 
disparate backgrounds and the catastrophe hit them at different stages of their lives. 
Traditionally, the term "Holocaust survivor" applies to "those people who had 
physically survived the Holocaust - by hiding, by fleeing, by living under Nazi rule. "' 
Increasingly, the clinical scholarship revealing traumatic symptoms in the children of 
the physical survivors has been gaining ground and the children have joined the 
ranks of survivors under the heading of 'second-generation survivors'. 
Some survived the entire war hiding or posing as Gentiles and a small minority 
fought through the war with the partisans and underground movements. The majority 
of survivors, however, endured a combination of shocks so extreme that each one of 
them would suffice to traumatise a person ten times over. Countless survivors' 
narratives report a succession of traumatic shocks: rupture of daily routine; 
persecution and humiliation; life in overpopulated ghettos where starvation, disease, 
and death reigned; liquidation of ghettos; shooting or hanging of friends and family; 
hiding, solitude, and hunger; life in camps with their unique pattern of labour, 
humiliation, starvation, cold, and death; death marches; liberation and life in 
displaced persons (DP) camps; more transit camps for those who wished to 
immigrate to Palestine; and last but not least, rebuilding a new life in a country that 
was on the verge of war and at best ambivalent about the arrival of emaciated 
immigrants. The traumatic shocks endured by the physical survivors were not only 
extreme, multiple, and cumulative, but also continuous and repetitive over a period of 
time. Almost without exception, all Jews who survived the Nazi occupation in Europe 
suffered a loss of home, family and a destruction of a life, as they had known it 
before the war. They all faced constant threat of death, unabated persecution and 
permanent fear for the lives of their friends and family. Most of them witnessed 
torture, death, degradation, starvation, and destruction. In spite of this fundamental 
I Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
p. 7. 
° Fox, T., Inherited Memories: Israeli Children of Holocaust Survivors (London and New York: 
Cassel, 1999) p. 6. 
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similarity of experience, however, the impact of traumatic shocks varied substantially 
across the spectrum of Holocaust survivors. Hence the importance of the typology of 
trauma developed here. 
The individual personality characteristics and pre-war situation (including 
family background, education, profession, political ideology, religiousness, and age) 
sometimes played an important role in survivors' coping strategies and therefore 
precipitated one pattern of traumatisation instead of another. For example, most 
Jewish partisans and resistance fighters were young and active Zionists, most of the 
Jews who survived in hiding were assimilated adults or young children, and the 
majority of religious Jews from isolated shtetls ended up in concentration camps. 
However, the most powerful determinant of psychological harm resides in the nature 
of the traumatic event, and not in any individual characteristics. As Herman put it: 
"there is a simple, direct relationship between the severity of the trauma and its 
psychological impact. "5 Various studies have documented a 'dose-response curve, ' 
whereby the greater the exposure to traumatic events, the greater the percentage of 
the population with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (hereafter PTSD). 
With severe enough traumatic exposure no one is immune. Almost without exception, 
all categories of physical survivors suffered severe enough exposure to be 
traumatised. However, their traumatic response varied according to the 
circumstances of survival: concentration and death camps, hiding, fighting. Each 
context of traumatisation exposed people to a certain combination or pattern of 
traumatic shock and shaped a relatively concurrent set of lessons, meanings and 
understandings of the common experience. Before looking into the particular patterns 
of traumatisation, however, some general consequences of trauma - applicable to all 
three categories of survivors - are briefly discussed. 
In medical usage the concept of psychic trauma refers to the blow to the 
structures of the mind, "a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the 
range of usual human experience" and "would evoke significant symptoms of distress 
in most people. "" Although trauma is originally defined by the nature of the event that 
Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery (London: Pandora, 1994) p. 57. 
e Janoff - Bulman, R., "The Aftermath of Victimization: Building Shattered Assumption, " in 
Figley, C. (ed. ), Trauma and Its Wake (New York: Brunner I Mazel, 1985) p. 16. 
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provokes it, the latter is dependent on its capacity to cause lasting damage. In other 
words, in order to be traumatic, the blow must be so devastating that it would cause 
traumatisation in most people. This type of reasoning immediately blurs the 
distinction between the event that provokes a disorder and the disorder itself. For that 
reason, the focus of recent trauma research is increasingly shifting towards a 
definition of trauma based on damage done rather than the shock that caused it. 
Such a re-location of the concept's centre of gravity allows more space for study of 
trauma (in its second meaning) in situations where the shock is less sudden, less 
extreme, indirect, or even absent. In practice, clinical trauma comprises both 
elements outlined above: a blow so damaging that it "overwhelms the ordinary 
systems of care that give people a sense of control, connection, and meaning, "? and 
significant symptoms of PTSD. According to Green, Lindy and Grace, the events 
likely to cause lasting psychological harm include "physical violation or injury, 
exposure to extreme violence, or witnessing grotesque death. "e "In each instance, " 
stated Herman, "the salient characteristic of the traumatic event is its power to inspire 
helplessness and terror, "9 or as Andreasen put it, a feeling of "intense fear, 
helplessness, loss of control, and threat of annihilation. "io Exposure to extreme 
events and the subsequent experience of victimisation results in "a loss of 
equilibrium. The world is suddenly out of whack. Things no longer work the way they 
used to. "" In a similar vein, Herman argued that traumatic reactions occur when 
"action is of no avail" and when "neither resistance nor escape is possible. "12 
Traumatic events shatter the construction of the self, "undermine the belief systems 
that give meaning to human experience" and "violate the victim's faith in a natural or 
divine order. 9913 Victimisation destroys the basic assumptions about oneself and the 
world: the belief in personal invulnerability, the perception of the world as meaningful, 
comprehensible, and benevolent, and the positive value of the self. 
Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 33. 
8 Green, B. L., Lindy, J., and M. Grace, "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Toward DSM-IV", in 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, No. 173 (1985) p. 406 - 411. 
° Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 34 
t0 Andreasen, N. C., "Posttraumatic Stress Disorder", in Kaplan, H. I. and B. J. Sadock (ed. ), 
Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1985) p. 
918 - 924. " Bard, M. and D. Sangrey, The Crime Victim's Book (New York: Basic Books, 1979) p. 14 
12 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 34 
13 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 50 
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The experience of victimisation shatters the perception of personal 
invulnerability. As Wolfenstein wrote, a victim feels a sense of "helplessness 
against overpowering forces ... and apprehension that anything may now happen to 
him. He feels vulnerable. "" The victims' lost sense of safety and security is often 
accompanied by feelings of intense anxiety and defencelessness. Their new 
perception of vulnerability regularly manifests itself in the "preoccupation with the fear 
of recurrence. "15 Once the experience is "available" in the victims' imagination, they 
expect it to occur again. There is "a chronic apprehension of imminent doom, of 
something terrible always about to happen. "" This is because, as Abram Kardiner put 
it, "the whole apparatus for concerted, co-ordinated and purposeful activity is 
smashed ... perceptions become inaccurate and pervaded with terror, the 
coordinative functions of judgement and discrimination fail [and] the aggressive 
impulses become disorganised and unrelated to the situation in hand. "" After having 
been exposed to a traumatic event, the human system of self-defence seems to go 
on a permanent alert and "each component of the ordinary response to danger, 
having lost its utility, tends to persist in an altered and exaggerated state long after 
the actual danger is over. "18 Human-induced victimisations, of which the Holocaust is 
the most extreme occurrence, are particularly damaging to the victims' trust in other 
people, and according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 3rd edition (DSM-III), 
the PTSD is "more severe and longer lasting when the stressor is of human design. "19 
The victims no longer see themselves safe in a benign environment. Instead, they 
see the world as a malevolent and threatening place, inhabited by untrustworthy and 
ill-disposed people. Severe trauma also "undermines or destroys the ordinary sense 
of a relatively safe sphere of initiative, in which there is some tolerance for trial and 
error. To the chronically traumatised person, any action has potentially dire 
consequences. There is no room for trivia, no space for mistakes or improvisations. 20 
14 Wolfenstien, M. Disaster. A Psychological Essay (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957) p. 
159. 
15 Janoff-Bulman, R., "The Aftermath of Victimization" p. 19. 
'6Hilberman, E., "The Wife-Beater's Wife Reconsidered" in American Journal of Psychiatry 
137 (1980) p. 1341. 
" Kardiner, A. and H. Spiegel, War, Stress, and Neurotic Illness (New York: Hoeber, New 
York, 1947) p. 186. 
18 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 34. 
19 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd 
ed. (Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 1980) p. 236. 
20 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 91. 
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Both the constant expectation of danger and narrowed range of initiative are an 
expression of what Robert Jay Lifton called "death-haunted knowledge. " 21 The view of 
the world carved by the victims in the aftermath of their victimisation is profoundly 
pessimistic, as the following passage (excerpt from a Holocaust survivor testimony) 
shows: 
Yes it's always there; it's more a view of the world, a total world view... of 
extreme pessimism, of sort of one feels... of really knowing the truth about 
people, human nature, about death, of really knowing the truth in a way that 
other people don't know it. ... It's a complete lack of faith in human beings, in 
all areas you know, whether it's politics or whatever you hear one thing and 
you believe something else. I mean you say: 'Oh, well, I know the truth. '22 
The second assumption that is shattered by traumatic experience is that of the 
world as a comprehensible and orderly place. Before victimisation, the world 
makes sense. It is seen as just, controllable and therefore essentially benign. In such 
a meaningful world, "we know what to expect and why negative events occur. "23 A 
system where good, innocent people and children are starved, humiliated, tortured, 
and killed like vermin, destroys the basic assumption about the operation of the 
world. Leo G., a Holocaust survivor, expresses the untranscended loss of a world 
that once made sense: 
All this you lived through, all this you saw, and you go out and work for 
money, or you go out and drive a car or whatever ... How could you? ... 
Is 
should be as, you know, some people that turn away from life, because they 
found it's senseless, it doesn't add up. And I and the kind of people that went 
through it should know that it doesn't add up. Nothing adds up. It doesn't 
make any sense. Nothing justifies it. To go on after you know what the world 
is like or what it was. 24 
21 Lifton, R. J., "The Concept of the Survivor", in Dimsdale, J. E. (ed. ), Survivors, Victims, and 
Perpetrators (New York and London: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1980) p. 118. 
22Testimony of Irene W. quoted in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins Of Memory 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991) p. 59. 
23 Janoff - Bulman, R., "The Aftermath of Victimization" p. 20. 24 Testimony of Leo G. in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 147. 
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Finding a purpose in one's victimisation and survival is crucial for coping afterwards. 
The more victimisation is meaningless and survival arbitrary, the stronger the desire 
and need to endow them with meaning. The inability to make sense of the world after 
the Holocaust was particularly acute among survivors. Nevertheless, diverse 
meanings and lessons of the tragedy have proliferated since the war, frequently 
accompanied by a rage at oneself and the others for failing to prepare the victims for 
such a malevolent world. As Langer put it: "The generalised hostility against reality ... 
expresses a ... resentment toward a world that had betrayed the 
individual by 
promoting values that proved useless in the presence of catastrophe, "25 an attitude 
conveyed in the testimony of Bronia K.: "We were brought up in too humanistic a 
way. We learned how to love but not how to kill. And now we have to learn how to 
kill, how to fight. "26 For most survivors, presumption of human goodness was dashed 
by the Holocaust. Germany, the most civilised nation on earth and home to a rich 
tradition of Jewish culture, failed them. The world failed them. God failed them. 
Friends failed them. And in the case of children survivors, parents failed them as 
well. 
Related to the assumption of a meaningful world is the assumption of self- 
worth, equally pulverised by trauma. On more than one level, the experience of 
being victimised activates negative self-images in the victims. 27 They see themselves 
as weak, helpless, unable to defend themselves and the loved ones, frightened, 
needy, and humiliated. Death guilt is epitomised in the survivors' question: 'Why did I 
survive while they died? ' and it stems from the memory of the survivors' "inability to 
act in ways they would ordinarily thought appropriate ... or even to feel appropriate 
emotions (overwhelming rage towards victimisers, profound compassion for victims). 
Death guilt begins ... in the gap between that physical and psychic inactivation and 
what one feels called upon to do and feel. "28 "My conscience torments me, " one 
survivor said. "I left children on the way, and they fell into the hands of the 
25 Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 92. 
26 Testimony of Bronia, K. in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 100. 
27 Horowitz, M. J., Wilner, M. Marmar, C. And J. Krupnick, "Pathological Grief and the 
Activation of Latent Self-Images" in American Journal of Psychiatry, 137 (1980) pp. 1137- 
1162. 
28 Lifton, R. J., "The Concept of the Survivor" p. 118. 
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Germans. "29 In extreme situations victims frequently coped by morally compromising 
themselves, and the memory of what in normal times appears as a moral failure, 
resulted in deep shame, feelings of guilt and unworthiness. Shame was widespread 
among survivors and its intensity was proportionate to the size of the gap that existed 
between the acts committed during the period of traumatisation and the survivors' 
normal moral yardsticks. Since intense feelings of guilt and shame were particularly 
acute in the concentration camp survivors, this facet of traumatisation is examined in 
more detail in the next section. 
Concentration Camp Survivors 
We learnt that our personality is fragile, that it is in much more danger than 
our life; and the old wise ones, instead of warning us `remember that you 
must die, ' would have done much better to remind us of this greater danger 
that threatens us. 30 
Former concentration and extermination camp inmates have been the most 
studied and represented group of survivors, to the extent that the emaciated figure in 
striped rags behind barbed wire has become the single most circulated image of a 
Jewish Holocaust survivor. Nazi concentration and extermination camps indeed 
represented the most vicious source of traumatisation, both in terms of the duration 
of exposure to a traumatic event, and the intensity of harm inflicted upon the victims. 
Although most physical survivors suffered more or less severe traumatisation, the 
main difference between the concentration camp survivors and other categories of 
survivors resides in the fact that the former were exposed to a prolonged, repeated 
trauma that can only occur in circumstances of captivity. 
Studies and personal narratives of Nazi concentration and death camps31 
depict the most extreme situation of captivity, where the organised techniques of 
disempowerment and disconnection were perfected and implemented with 
unprecedented brutality. The methods of psychological control were designed to 
"instil terror and helplessness and to destroy the victims' sense of self in relation to 
29 Testimony of Hanche Sheich, quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 159. 
30 Levi, P., Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity (New York: Collier, 1961) p. 
49. 
31 See for example Gutman, Y. and M. Berenbaum (eds. ), Anatomy of Auschwitz Death 
Camp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Levi, P., The Drowned and the Saved 
(London: Abacus, 1999). 
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others. "32The fear was maintained by inconsistent, unpredictable, and totally absurd 
outbursts of violence, combined with capricious enforcement of petty rules, and even 
rare and unexpected expressions of humanity. The arbitrariness and inconsistency of 
the perpetrators' behaviour not only helped to convince the victims of the 
perpetrators' omnipotence and the futility of resistance, but also destroyed the 
victims' perception of an orderly and meaningful world. In addition to instilling fear, 
the perpetrators sought to destroy the victims' sense of autonomy by scrutiny and 
control of their bodily functions. The concentration camps were unique in the degree 
of assault on individual autonomy; the perpetrators supervised what the victims ate, 
when they went to sleep and when they woke up, when they went to the toilet and 
when they took showers, what they wore, and when they died. They deprived the 
victims of their identities, including their names. Continuous humiliation to which 
victims were subjected produced an attitude of unworthiness and self-hatred. Yet, as 
Herman observes "the final step in the psychological control of the victim is not 
completed until she has been forced to violate her own moral principles and to betray 
her basic human attachments. ... It is at this point ... [that] the victim ... is truly 
broken. "33 Countless survivors' testimonies describe being forced to stand by 
helplessly while atrocities were committed against people they love, or even to 
execute the ordeals themselves. At this stage nothing could preserve the victims' 
dignity, for it has been bent to the will of their enemies. The sense of shame and 
defeat comes not merely from the inability or omission to act but also from the 
realisation that their captors have usurped their inner life. Speaking of the extreme 
case of moral failure in Auschwitz, the acts committed by members of the Jewish 
Sonderkommandos (Special Squads), Primo Levi wrote: 
One is stunned by this paroxysm of perfidiousness and hatred: it must be 
Jews who put the Jews into the ovens, it must be shown that Jews, the sub- 
race, the sub-men, bow to any and all humiliation, even to destroying 
themselves. ... In fact, the existence of the squads had a meaning, contained 
a message: 'We, the master race, are your destroyers, but you are not better 
I Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 77. 
33Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 83. 
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than we are; if we so wish, we can destroy not only your bodies but also your 
souls, just as we have destroyed ours. " 
In 1964, after years of clinical experience with concentration camp survivors, 
William G. Niederland published a report where he proclaimed the existence of 
"survivor syndrome". He defined the latter as a combination of symptoms manifest in 
concentration camp survivors: chronic anxiety, fear of renewed persecution, 
depression, recurring nightmares, psychosomatic disorders, anhedonia [inability to 
feel pleasure], social withdrawal, fatigue, hypochondria, an inability to concentrate, 
irritability, a hostile personal identity, hallucinations and depersonalisations. "35 
Similarly, Leo Eitinger, a psychiatrist and himself a Holocaust survivor, observed: 
The most predominant sequel to the concentration camp activity seems to be 
the deep changes in personality, a mental disability which affects every side 
of the personality's psychic life, both the intellectual functions, and especially, 
emotional life and the life of the will, with the many facets of difficulties in 
adaptation ... Chronic anxiety states, ... chronic depressions of a vital type, 
inability to enjoy anything ... to establish new, adequate interpersonal 
contacts, the inability to work with pleasure ... in short, the inability to live in a 
normal way - are among the most characteristic symptoms of this condition. 36 
Both authors asserted that the concentration camp experience left lasting, possibly 
permanent effects on the survivors. Not only do all symptoms of PTSD persist for 
many years after the traumatisation (for example, concentration camps survivors 
reported tenacious and severe intrusive symptoms forty years after the liberation), 
but also their features are most exaggerated in case of chronic trauma. 
Herman defined a concept of "chronic trauma", as "insidious progressive form 
of post-traumatic stress disorder that invades and erodes the personality.... The 
victim of chronic trauma may feel herself to have changed irrevocably, or she may 
3` Levi p., The Drowned and the Saved p. 35-37. 
35Niederland, W. G., "Psychiatric Disorders among Persecution Victims: A Contribution to the 
Understanding of Concentration Camp Pathology and Its Aftereffects" in Journal of Nervous 
and Mental Diseases, No. 139 (1964), pp. 458-474. 
' Eitinger, L., Concentration Camp Survivors in Norway and Israel (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1964) p. 190. 
19 
lose the sense that she has any self at all. "37 After having been reduced to the goal of 
simple survival, the psychological constriction in every aspect of life became the 
necessary form of adaptation. Although this blocking out of all capacity for emotion 
was valuable in the camp setting, it leads to "a kihd, of atrophy in the psychological 
capacities"31 and "emotional responses of ... pervasively shallow quality. "39 The 
survivors were unable to reconstitute the kind of relationships they had before 
traumatisation, not only because their blunted ability to feel, but also because they 
viewed all relationships through the lens of extremity. Having witnessed "a morally 
inverted world where the righteous were destroyed, the survivors developed an 
intense distrust of human beings and human relationships. "40 They were also deeply 
ambivalent about emotionally reinvesting in relationships for fear of betrayal or 
another precipitous separation. Prolonged captivity in concentration camps produced 
"profound alterations in the victim's identity. All the psychological structures of the 
self - the image of the body, the internalised image of others, and the values and 
ideals that lend a person a sense of coherence and purpose - have been invaded 
and systematically broken down. "" "In the most severe cases, " Herman observes, 
"the victims retain the dehumanised identity of a captive who has been reduced to 
the level of elemental survival: the robot, animal, or vegetable. "42 Similarly, 
Niederland asserted that alterations of personal identity were a constant feature of 
the 'survival syndrome. ' While the majority of his patients complained that they were 
'now a different person', the most severely damaged stated I am not a person. '43 
Speaking of one of his patients, Paul Chodoff, observes: "At Auschwitz one of the 
things that had kept her going was a fierce resolve that she would live at all costs, 
that she would not notice or pay attention to what was happening around her. The 
price she seems to have paid for her determination to live was that living became 
simply survival and little else. "" 
37 Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 86. 
38Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 87. 
39 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 9. 
40 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 14. 
41 Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 93. 
42 Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 94. 
43 Niederland, W. G., "Clinical Observations on the 'Survivor Syndrome" in International 
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, No. 49 (1968), pp. 313-315. 
44 Chodoff p., "Psychotherapy of the Survivor" in Dimsdale, J. E. (ed. ) Survivors, Victims and 
Perpetrators p. 215. 
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Even after liberation, the victims were unable to assume their former identities, 
because whatever identity they adopted it was tainted with memory of their 
persecution and humiliation. Their self-worth was shattered by the experience of utter 
helplessness and a consciousness of having been diminished. In the aftermath of 
traumatisation, when survivors reviewed and judged their own conduct with reference 
to their 'normal' moral codes, "feelings of guilt and inferiority were practically 
universal. "' They were particularly intense when the survivor witnessed death or 
suffering of others and was spared himself; and they became unbearable when the 
survivor had actively participated in the death or suffering of others in order to save 
himself. 'Survivor guilt' is a generic term for a multitude of guilt feelings and self- 
incriminations observed in former concentration camp inmates: guilt for having 
survived while so many others (often perceived as more worthy of life) perished; guilt 
for not having suffered enough; guilt for not having gone to greater lengths to save 
others; guilt for compromising one's integrity in order to survive. The moral failures in 
a concentration camp setting ranged from relatively small acts of omission (failing to 
help a new arrival or to share half a glass of water)46, through stealing someone's 
shoes47 (and thereby possibly precipitating their death), all the way to horrific acts 
performed by members of Jewish Sonderkommandos. Although all those moral 
compromises took place against a background of "daily struggle against hunger, 
cold, fatigue, and blows in which the room for choices (especially moral choices) was 
reduced to zero, ""8 shame and guilt appeared as soon as the room for moral choices 
was regained. The guilt was particularly strong concerning the death of close 
relatives and friends but also with regard to the anonymous dead. Given the 
unpredictability and arbitrariness of one's own survival under the Nazi regime, the 
victims frequently appear in the survivors' narratives as those who died in their stead. 
The hair-raising survival stories are replete with examples of instances where the 
survivors witnessed annihilation of their fellow inmates, friends and family members, 
feeling responsible for their deaths by inability or omission to save them. The guilt for 
having survived in place of another has been poignantly described by Primo Levi in 
the following passage: 
4s Herman, J., Trauma and Recovery p. 53. 
Levi p., The Drowned and the Saved. 
47 Testimony of Hanna F., in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 139. 
4e Levi p., The Drowned and the Saved p. 33. 
21 
I might be alive in place of another, at the expense of another, I might have 
usurped, that is, in fact killed. ... Preferably the worst survived, the selfish, the 
violent, the insensitive, the collaborators of the 'grey zones', the spies. ... I felt 
innocent, yes, but enrolled among the saved , and therefore in permanent 
search of justification in my own eyes and those of others. The worst survived 
49 - that is, the fittest; the best all died. 
According to Janoff-Bulman, guilt should be understood as an attempt to draw some 
useful lesson from disaster and to regain some sense of power and control. To 
imagine that one could have done better may be more tolerable than to face the 
reality of utter helplessness. 50 Researchers noted that survivor guilt plays a central 
role in the development and perpetuation of the ensuing symptoms of social 
withdrawal, depression, preoccupation with the past, and fear of persecution. Refusal 
to mourn was often motivated by guilt, as the survivors felt that they must not let 
themselves mourn the victims, lest the future generations forget. Concurrently, 
survivor guilt might motivate an individual to bear witness to the Holocaust, 
continually remember those who died, and thereby 'atone' for their perceived past 
failings. 
After the war, a significant proportion of concentration camp survivors went to 
mandatory Palestine (later, Israel) and, as the next chapter shows, they were met 
with discomfort and ambivalence. Israel offered the survivors an opportunity to build 
positive self-images, as pioneers, kibbutzniks, and soldiers. The 1948 War of 
Independence, in which many participated, provided an outlet for repressed rage and 
frustrations. Forced to concentrate on the outside world and discouraged from 
recounting their Holocaust experience, camp survivors assumed a semblance of 
normality. However, the apparent normality resulted in isolation, loneliness, and 
mistrust of society, which made the task of public mourning virtually impossible. The 
only option left to survivors, apart from sharing their experiences with each other, 
was to withdraw completely into their newly established families. "Children of such 
families" states Danieli, "attested to the constant psychological presence of the 
Holocaust at home, verbally and nonverbally, or in some cases, reported having 
49 Levi p., The Drowned and the Saved p. 63. 
50Janoff-Bulman, R., "The Aftermath of Victimisation. " 
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absorbed the omnipresent experience of the Holocaust through 'osmosis. '" 51 The 
impact on the survivors' children is examined in a later section. 
Fighting Survivors 
Our brothers have gone to heaven 
Through the chimneys of Sobibor and Treblinka ... Only we few have survived 
For the honour of our submerged people 
For revenge and to bear witness. 62 
Although fighting survivors represented only a small minority of Jewish 
survivors, they monopolised the first decade of the Holocaust discourse in the newly 
established state. Most partisan fighters and resistance leaders remained actively 
involved in community and public life after the war. Many participated in the rescue 
attempts in the immediate aftermath and the majority of them came to Palestine, 
where they fought in the War of Independence and later became prominent figures in 
Israeli public life. In the eyes of the Zionist executive and native Palestinian Jews, the 
fighters embodied the 'right' and 'honourable' behaviour facing the extreme, and their 
lives and deeds were praised and publicly commemorated. Embraced by the new 
Jewish state as heroes, former members of organised Resistance enjoyed social 
recognition that was unique for the Holocaust survivors. They tended to set 
themselves apart from the rest of the Holocaust survivors "as if they belonged to 
some secret noble order". O Thus Warsaw ghetto uprising veterans created their own 
kibbutzim, namely Lohamei Hagetaot (Ghetto Fighters) and Yad Mordechai, each 
representing a memorial site with a museum, library, publishing house, and a 
Holocaust research centre. Unlike the majority of camp survivors, the veterans of 
resistance had been politically active in various Zionist movements before the war. 
They espoused Zionist ideology and the concurring image of a 'new Jew' as an 
upright, fighting hero. The fighting survivors were young, active, and highly motivated 
to fight. Having received some basic military and organisational training in various 
Zionist youth movements, their choice to resist was less unexpected. The following 
biographical sketches of two of the most prominent fighting survivors in Israel - Abba 
51 Danieli, Y., "The Treatment and Prevention of Long-Term Effects and Intergenerational 
Transmission of Victimisation: A Lesson From Holocaust Survivors and Their Children" in 
Figley, C. R., Trauma And Its Wake p. 299. 
52 Gedaleh's song, in Levi p., If Not Now, When? (London: Abacus, 1987) p. 127. 
Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 451. 
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Kovner and Zivia Lubetkin - illustrate the only acceptable survivor conduct in the 
early days of Israel. 
Abba Kovner (1918 - 1987) was the leader of the Vilna ghetto uprising and 
commander of the partisan underground organisation, as well as a poet and Israel 
Prize laureate. He was educated in the Hebrew high school in Vilna and he became 
a trainee in the socialist Zionist Hashomer Hatzair Youth Movement at a very young 
age. When Vilna fell to the Germans at the end of June 1941, Kovner was already a 
member of the underground organisation. After he became aware that the killings 
began in the Vilna Ghetto, Kovner urged Jews to fight against the Nazis. On 31 
December 1941, Kovner read the famous statement urging Jews to defend 
themselves with arms before the delegates of all Jewish Youth Movements: 
Hitler is plotting to destroy all European Jews. Lithuanians Jews will be the 
first in line. Let us not be led like sheep to the slaughterhouse. It is right, we 
are weak and without defence, but the only answer to the enemy is 
resistance! 54 
On 21 January, 1942, the "United Organization of Partisans" was founded in Vilnus. 
The new organization comprised all the parties and youth movements from the entire 
political spectrum in the Vilna Ghetto. Kovner was a member of the headquarters and 
later became the head of the organization. In the days of the last deportation from the 
Vilna Ghetto to the extermination camps, Kovner supervised the escape of the 
organization fighters to the woods. In Rodniky woods he commanded the Jewish Unit 
composed of Ghetto fighters and the "Revenge" battalion from the Jewish camp. 
After the liberation Kovner became one of the architects of the Briha escape 
movement and he was the spirit of the ""East Europe Survivors Brigade" - an 
umbrella organization of Zionist spheres, that called for the unity of all forces, a call 
based on the lessons of the Holocaust and the still precarious situation of the Jewish 
people. In July 1945 Kovner arrived at the Jewish Brigade group base camp in Italy 
54 Abba Kovner's testimony in The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Record of Proceedings in the 
District Court of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Keter Enterprises, 1962). Session 27. 
Internet edition: http: //www. nizkor. orq/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/ 
Last accessed on 13 September 2001. The expression `Iambs to the slaughter' is borrowed 
from Isaiah 53: 7. 
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where he addressed an assembly of Jewish soldiers with a moving speech 
describing the destruction of European Jewry and the Vilna uprising. In the second 
half of 1945, Kovner arrived in Palestine to solicit support for an ambitious revenge 
plan aiming to poison six million Germans. On his way back to Europe he was 
arrested by the British and returned to Palestine. After his release from prison, 
Kovner joined the kibbutz Ein Hahoresh, together with his wife Vitka Kempner and a 
group of former partisans. During the Independence War Kovner was an education 
officer in of the famous Givati brigade. At the end of the war Kovner returned to his 
kibbutz and dedicated most of his time to writing. He was a witness at the Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem. 
Like Abba Kovner, Zivia Lubetkin (1914 - 1976) was an outstanding and 
influential survivor. She was one of the leaders of the Jewish Underground in Poland, 
a founder and the only woman in the High Command of its fighting organization, ZOB 
(Jewish Fighting Organisation). She was also one of the founders of the first 
resistance group in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1942, which was organized after the first 
massive deportations began. She fought in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, spending 
the last days of the uprising in the command bunker at Mila 18, and escaping with 
other survivors through the sewers to the Polish side of Warsaw. Until the end of the 
war, Lubetkin stayed in hiding in Warsaw underground and joined the Polish uprising 
on the Aryan side of Warsaw in October 1944. Lubetkin's Zionist activities began 
while she was still a high school student. She was first a member of Dror, the Zionist 
pioneering youth movement, and eventually became a member of Hahaluts Halohem 
executive council. In 1939, at the age of 25, Lubetkin participated at the Zionist 
Congress in Geneva. Like many others, she chose to return to Poland rather than 
escaping to Palestine. After the liberation, Lubetkin became active in the Briha 
escape movement, which facilitated the movement of Jewish Holocaust survivors to 
Palestine. In 1946 she settled in Palestine as one of the founders of the Ghetto 
Fighters' Kibbutz. She held various leading public positions as the representative of 
the kibbutz movement and she testified at the Eichmann trial. 
Fighting survivors' lives, such as Kovner's and Lubetkin's, are inscribed in the 
heroic narrative of the Holocaust. Since the heroic account of the European tragedy 
was overly emphasised in the first decade of Israel, the former fighters enjoyed 
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considerable privilege over other groups of survivors during that period. The stylised 
image of a Jewish partisan or a ghetto fighter - proud, erect, muscled, holding a gun 
in his hand -obscured and denied the real persons' individual traumas. Almost all 
fighters abandoned their families and other loved ones when they chose to fight for 
their lives. Invariably, those left behind were killed, leaving the fighting survivors not 
only with pain of a loss but also with unbearable feelings of guilt. Although the 
fighting survivors epitomised the choice (as opposed to going 'like sheep to the 
slaughter') in the Zionist narrative, they experienced the same powerlessness and 
lack of choice, as did non-fighting survivors. Thus Benjamin, P., member of the 
Jewish Fighting Organisation in Poland had to watch helplessly while his mother was 
being burned alive: "If I took one step forward, I would immediately be shot. Should I 
throw myself on the fire? I just stood there. I sank into the ground. ... And the last cry 
from my mother: 'My child, stay alive. '"-r" Similarly, Abba Kovner described one of the 
many instances of utter helplessness when he was hiding in a niche of a stairwell 
and saw a woman being dragged by her hair by two German soldiers. At one point, 
the baby she was holding slipped out of her arms. One of the soldiers took hold of 
the baby ... raised 
it by its legs over his head ... and then he knocked its head on the 
wall, once, twice, and kept on doing it. "-r6 In spite of the horrors of their experiences, 
fighting survivors remained prisoners of the heroic narrative. Yet, their traumas 
transpired in other circumstances. Thus Yael Zuckerman, daughter of Zivia Lubetkin 
and Yithzhak (Antek) Zuckerman, both heroes of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, 
recounts: "Father and Mother spoke about nothing else.... They talked about it all 
the time. Every conversation, no matter how it began, would get to the Holocaust, 
sooner or later. "57 
55Niewyk, D. L. (ed. ), Fresh Wounds: Early narratives of Holocaust Survival (Chapel Hill and 
London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998) p. 130. 
56Abba Kovner's testimony in The Trial of Adolf Eichmann. Session 27. 
57 Quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 454. 
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Survivors in Hiding: Adults and Children 
So, I'm Jewish, I thought, without knowing what that meant, except, hadn't we 
killed Jesus? m 
C. Gwyn Moser59 compiled a list of 619 Jews who survived the war in Austria 
in hiding: they either hid during roundups and thus escaped deportation or went into 
hiding at the end of the war. In some instances these Jews passed by disguising their 
Jewish identity completely or faked their way into the category of Mischlinge. 80 Like 
the fighting survivors, Jews in hiding shared certain characteristics that may have 
aided their chances for survival. Among those were age, marital status, and level of 
assimilation. Two thirds of all Jews hiding in Vienna were between the ages of 30 
and 60 when they went underground. Almost two thirds of Viennese survivors in 
hiding were unattached and the others were divorced or widowed but childless, or 
childless with a spouse who emigrated. Jews who were attached when they went 
into hiding often hid with only a part of their family. Last but not least, finding a 
shelter, food, and a protector required a good network of contacts with non-Jews. 
Assimilation was therefore another prerequisite for survival. Almost half of the 
survivors in hiding in Vienna, listed by Moser, had either converted, were non- 
practicing, or were Jews only under the racial classification of the Nuremberg laws. 
Survival in hiding, like any other type of survival under the Nazi regime, demanded 
an abundance of ingenuity and luck. Some tried to hide by wandering the streets 
during the day and sleeping in train stations and other public places at night, but this 
strategy was doomed to failure, because living unregistered without ration cards 
made it impossible for them to support themselves. Hunger thus forced them back to 
the Jewish ghetto and its roundups. Successful hiding required self-imposed 
11 Melson, R., False Papers: Deception and Survival in the Holocaust (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2000) p. 150. 
59 Moser, C. G., "Jewish U-Boote in Austria, 1938-1945' in Simon Wiesental CenterAnnual, 
Vol. 2 (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesental Center, 1997). 
Internet edition at: http: //motlc. wiesenthal. com/resources/books/annual2/chaPO3. html Last 
accessed on 18 September 2001. 
80 Mischlinge (hybrids) were those who were not classified as Jews but who had some 
Jewish blood. They were divided in two categories: Mischlinge of the first degree were those 
with two Jewish grandparents; and Mischlinge of the second degree were those with one 
Jewish grandparent. The Mischlinge were officially excluded from membership in the Nazi 
Party and all Party organizations. Although they were drafted into the Germany Army, they 
could not attain the rank of officers. They were also barred from the civil service and from 
certain professions. 
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incarceration in a protector's home. For most Jews in hiding the period of 
confinement lasted at least three to four years. 
Some Jews lived in the open but concealed'the most important and the most 
dangerous aspect of their identity: their Jewishness. It goes without saying that this 
option was open only to highly assimilated Jews who spoke the local language 
fluently and without accents, and whose mannerism and appearance were not 
Jewish. For Jews who lived under false identity, innumerable dangers still existed: at 
any time, anyone from their past could have recognised and denounced them. The 
men still wore the indelible mark of Jewishness and as Michael Berenbaum put it: 
"The Covenant of Abraham, a circumcised penis, was a death sentence. "", Self- 
betrayal was also a danger: any expression of sympathy or interest for the fate of the 
Jews could give away their hidden identity. Despite the difficulties and the dangers 
involved in living under false identity, the Jews who did so throughout the war, 
suffered comparatively little. They usually had the same level of awareness of what 
was happening to the Jews, as did the local population. Describing the liberation, 
Bobi, a child in a family that passed as Poles, said: "One day whispering in the street 
said that 'they' had arrived at the railroad station. ... I went to the railroad station, 
where I saw a parade of strange-looking people. They were dressed in striped 
uniforms, but they looked like walking corpses. ... The square was lined with people 
but no one applauded. ... 'Lagers. Camps, ' people said. I had no idea what they 
meant. "' It is difficult to assess the level of traumatisation endured by survivors who 
spent the whole war in hiding. Most adult survivors in hiding eventually joined the 
resistance or were deported (in which case they figure in the other two categories). 
Narratives of adult survivors in hiding or passing as Aryans are rare and the reason 
for this absence probably lies in the public prejudice that survivors in hiding were 
"spoiled victims who, though they had endured self-imposed incarceration, hunger 
and exposure, and fear of capture, had nevertheless been spared the Nazi prisons 
and concentration camps. "63 They themselves often felt that since they had not 
suffered what the camp inmates had endured, they had no right to talk about their 
own suffering. 
61 Berenbaum, M., "Foreword" in Melson, R., False Papers p. xiv. 
I Melson, R., False Papers p. 141. 
1 Moser, C. G., "Jewish U-Boote in Austria". 
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Hidden children, on the other hand, have been the subject of much attention 
since their accounts started to appear in the 1990s. Because of their age at the time 
of persecution, child survivors "may make up the most vulnerable group of survivors, 
especially as they approach middle age. "" Kohn Dor-Shav's study demonstrated 
that "the younger the individual was at the time of traumatisation, the greater the 
likelihood of having sustained lasting psychological damage. "61 Similarly, Hass 
observed: "people who were children as opposed to late adolescents or adults during 
the war appear to have more internal obstacles to establishing emotional ties with 
others. A child personality was not only less developed in a global sense, lacking in 
adequate coping mechanisms, but that very basic establishment of trust that must 
occur in the first few critical years of life was retarded. "68 The experience of hidden 
children diverged considerably. Like the adults, children were either physically hidden 
or they passed as Aryans. Sometimes, they did both. Children who were physically 
hidden had to conceal their very existence from the outside world. They were either 
hidden together with their parents or confided to strangers. Whilst the children who 
hid with their parents frequently endured worse conditions (that is, they were more 
exposed to everyday hunger, filth, promiscuity, disease, and death), they never lost 
faith in their parents' love and protection. Some parents built a hiding place in their 
own house, but usually they found a hiding place for the family. The size, security 
and comfort of hiding places varied tremendously. Sometimes the children were 
hidden in small, dark, and uncomfortable places (an attic, a cellar, a hole under a 
barn, sewers, and so on). They had to be extremely quiet, move slowly not to attract 
attention, and they could never leave the confinement of their hiding place. Many of 
these children would go months, even years, without seeing daylight. The children 
represented a danger to their own safety, that of other people in hiding, and that of 
the protectors. In shared hiding places, for example within ghettos, children were 
unwanted, and unless they kept quiet, their family would be made to leave. Mothers 
with babies were often forced to make a terrible choice of either exposing the whole 
family to certain death or smothering the baby. Though the families initially brought 
food and provisions with them, nobody was prepared to stay in hiding for several 
years. When they ran out of food and water it was very difficult and dangerous to get 
"Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 13. 
1 Kohn Dor-Shav, N., "On the long-range effects of concentration camp internment on Nazi 
victims: 25 years later' in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 45: 1, pp. 1-11. 
I Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 13. 
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additional food. Most people were on rations and someone who was not supposed to 
exist had virtually no access to food. Getting fresh water was risky because it meant 
leaving the hiding place without being seen. Because of lack of water, lice and other 
diseases were rampant. Being completely secluded also meant that if a child got sick 
it could not be taken to a doctor. And if someone died, the body had to be disposed 
of secretly. All those daily problems were aggravated by the constant fear of being 
discovered. Sometimes the protector was denounced and arrested and when the 
information was passed on that their hiding place was known they had to leave 
immediately. When the Nazis discovered their hiding place they were deported to the 
camps or killed on the spot. Thus, children often witnessed grotesque death of their 
parents and siblings, a sight usually spared to those who were hidden by strangers. 
Children who were separated from their parents were sometimes physically 
hidden (in convents, for example) or they hid alone, wandering from village to village. 
In most cases, however, their parents found them a family who usually passed them 
for a Christian relative from another town. Because the benefactors wanted children 
that would represent the smallest risk for them, the young, and especially young girls 
were most easily placed. Young children were considered less aware of their Jewish 
identity and therefore both less likely to betray themselves or to object adopting a 
new - Christian - identity. Girls were preferred because they were not physically 
marked as Jewish. For the same reason, boys were sometimes forced to hide not 
only their name and Jewishness but also their gender. A child survivors recounts that 
experience: 
My fictional name was Marysia Ulecki. I was supposed to be a distant cousin 
of the people who were keeping my mother and me. The physical part was 
easy. After a couple of years in hiding with no haircuts, my hair was very long. 
The big problem was language. In Polish when a boy says a certain word, it's 
one way, but when a girl says the same word, you change one or two letters. 
My mother spent a lot of time teaching me to speak and walk and act like a 
girl. It was a lot to learn, but the task was simplified slightly by the fact that I 
was supposed to be a little bit 'backward. ' They didn't risk taking me to school, 
but they took me to church. ... In order to go to the bathroom 
like a girl, I had 
to practice. It wasn't easy! Quite often I used to come back with wet shoes. 
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But since I was supposed to be a little backward, wetting my shoes made my 
act all the more convincing. 7 
To appear Gentile, children had to go to church. Having never been to church, 
they had to learn very quickly all the right things, in order not to appear suspicious. 
They had to go to confession and some children who were the right age actually had 
to take their First Communion. As a result of hiding, many children were confused 
about their ethnic, religious, and sexual identity. Many had been acting Catholic for 
so long that they had trouble grasping their Jewish ancestry. These children were the 
survivors and the future - yet they did not identify with being Jewish. Some were too 
young to remember anything about their biological families. Others were too young to 
understand what was happening. They felt unjustly abandoned by their parents. 
Neither could they understand why they had to hide. Aniko Berger, a child survivor 
remembers: "I didn't understand the reasons that it was an embarrassment to be 
Jewish, but I had no doubt that something about me was repulsive only because I 
was Jewish. "' Jewish hidden children were sometimes beaten, raped and otherwise 
maltreated by their caretakers, especially when the latter hid them for financial 
reasons. This dark part of children's rescue emerged only recently. As Stein 
observed: "Until recently only those rescued Jews who had been privileged and lucky 
to find a benevolent and caring home came forth with their rescue stories. This led to 
the idealisation of all Christian rescuers of Jews. In the last couple of years, however, 
hidden children have told stories of abandonment, cruelty, selfishness and even 
abuse. "" 
Often, very young children were faced with choices and responsibilities that 
were way beyond their grasp and the consequences of which haunted them 
throughout their lives. Thus Ruth Kron Sigal sought to save herself and her little 
sister during a Kinderaktion in the ghetto by hiding in a closet in a benefactor's 
house. When the noises died down, Ruth judged that the soldiers were gone. She 
took her little sister back to the house, right into the hands of the Germans. The 
67 Marks, J., The Hidden Children: The Secret Survivors of the Holocaust (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 46-47. 
68 Stein, A., Hidden Children: Forgotten Survivors of the Holocaust (Toronto: Penguin Books, 
1994) p. 27. 
69 Stein, A., Hidden Children p. 30. See also Maya Schwartz's testimony on pp. 178-204. 
31 
benefactor intervened, but could only save Ruth, the older one. "I shall never forget 
the sight of my poor little sister with her arms stretched towards me and no one 
coming to her rescue, " Ruth whispered with tears choking her voice, "That vision has 
haunted me all my life, and it will never leave me alone. Because that was the end of 
my four-year-old sister, Tamara . "70 Last but not least, after the liberation, the children 
were confronted to broken parents they could for the most part not even recognize. 
The hopes of jubilant reunion that had kept those children going during their period in 
hiding were dashed when the parents returned. When Aniko Berger understood that 
the old woman dressed in a tattered black and white stripped dress with her coarse 
dark hair cropped close to the scalp was her mother, she was revolted. She refused 
to accept "this shell of a woman"" as her mother. Similarly, when Ada Wynston's 
father came to see his daughter after the liberation, the child refused to come out: 
"This man was an impostor. Her father was a young man with reddish blond hair. 
This beaten old man had a dirty grey mop on his head. "72 Sometimes, the liberation 
brought news of their parents' death or simply no news at all. It is difficult to say 
which case was worse. "For some, it was easier to adapt to a new life when neither 
parent returned and the child settled into a loving foster or adoptive family than to live 
with the grief of a broken father or mother. He or she returned from one or another 
killing field captive to everything that had been lost. In a very real sense, it was up to 
the fragile children to heal their parents' wounds. "73 The children usually proved to be 
good parents to their mothers and fathers. By taking up the burden of their parents' 
suffering, the children denied their own because in comparison with their parents 
their pain seemed almost perversely insignificant. Child survivors whose parents 
survived the camps are a unique group of survivors because they were both 
themselves survivors and children of often severely traumatised survivors. As a 
result, many of these children endured not only the trauma of their own survival, but 
also that of their parents' own personal version of hell. The overview of post- 
traumatic symptoms in the second generation in the next section therefore 
complements the discussion on hidden children. 
70 Testimony of Ruth Kron Sigal in Stein, A., Hidden Children p. 132. 
" Testimony of Aniko Berger in Stein, A., Hidden Children p. 44. 
72 Stein, A., Hidden Children p. 91. 
73 Stein, A., Hidden Children p. 98. 
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Second Generation 
Family stories are a kind of DNA, encoded messages about how things are 
and should be, passed from one generation to another. " 
One of the most potent coping strategies for concentration camp inmates was 
the hope of reuniting with their families. While some did find surviving relatives after 
the liberation, most learned that family members and friends perished. Thus a 
survivor named Saul recounts: 
Only when I returned home did I become aware of what I had lost. In 
Auschwitz I only suffered physically, but spiritually hope maintained me in life. 
When I saw that all hope was lost - no family, no wife, no child, no anybody 
anymore alive, then came the shock. 75 
Confronted with the task of rebuilding their lives, the survivors frequently entered into 
premature, hasty, ill-conceived marriages, called 'marriages of despair. ' Those 
marriages were formed on short acquaintance, which disregarded the differences in 
pre-war socio-economic and educational status, life-style, age, and other ordinary 
criteria for marriage. Recreating a family was a concrete act to compensate for the 
losses, counter the massive disruption and undo the dehumanisation and loneliness 
they had experienced. Many survivors whose families were murdered longed to 
renew their lives by bringing healthy children into the world. In many instances, 
survivors gave birth in displaced persons camps as soon as it was physically 
possible. The newborn children replaced those who perished. Since most survivors 
resisted mourning the first families that they had lost, the second family of children 
had to coexist with the first one. Almost without exception the children were named 
after murdered members of their family. As second-generation survivor and scholar 
Robert Krell explained: 
A complex of emotions accompanied the birth of children to survivors. These 
children were bound to be special. A child was a tangible evidence of one's 
survival and therefore incredibly precious. To some parents the child was the 
" Karpf, A., The WarAfter (London: Minerva, 1997) p. 17. 
75 Testimony of Saul, in Dimsdale, J. E., The Coping Behaviour of Nazi Concentration Camp 
Survivors" in Dimsdale, J. E. (ed. ) Survivors, Victims and Perpetrators p. 173. 
33 
representative or reincarnation of those who were lost; to some the child 
represented the ultimate defeat of Nazism -a life created against 
insurmountable odds. And to some, a birth was profoundly religious event, a 
precious gift from God to parents who frequently no longer believed in God. 11 
Several studies" showed that the survivor parents expected their children to give 
meaning to their empty lives, provide restitution for everything lost, vindicate their 
suffering, and "undo the destruction of the Holocaust. "7e Thus a survivors' child 
recalled his own meaning in his parents' lives: "We were supposed to be all the 
people who died. "79 Survivors' children may also have provided a justification for their 
survival and thereby expiating their guilt. Another member of the second generation 
testified: "We were my parents' reason for living. So Hitler would not win out. So we 
have their purpose in the world. "'* In his study of the impact of the Holocaust on the 
children of survivors, Alexandrowicz identified the need to discover, to re-enact, or to 
live the parents' past as a major issue in the lives of survivors' children. He wrote: 
"These children feel they have a mission to live in the past and to change it so that 
their parents humiliations, disgrace, and guilt can be converted into victory over the 
oppressors and the threat of genocide undone with a restitution of life and worth. "81 
Not surprisingly, parental expectations of, and demands on the child were 
great and remained exaggerated. The youngsters bore the great burden of feeling 
they had not succeeded and could never succeed in satisfying their parents' 
expectations. Thus a child of survivors remembered his parents' demands upon him: 
"There was an expressed duty to the brothers and sisters who did not survive. 
76 Krell, R., "Holocaust families: The Survivors and Their Children" in Comprehensive 
Psychiatry, No. 20 (1979), pp. 560-567. 
"See Barocas, C. and H. Barocas, "Manifestations of Concentration Camp Effects on the 
Second Generation" in American Journal of Psychiatry, 130: 7 (1973) p. 821; Sigal, J., J. 
"Second Generation Effects of Massive Psychic Trauma" in Krystal, H., Massive Psychic 
Trauma (New York: International University Press, 1968); Trossman, B., "Adolescent 
Children of Concentration Camp Survivors, in Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal, 13 
(1968) pp. 121-123. 
78 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 27. 
79 Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 66. 
80 Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 66-67. 
8' Alexandrowicz, D., "Children of Concentration Camp Survivors" in Yearbook of the 
International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions, Vol. 2 (New York: John 
Wiley, 1973), pp. 383-394. 
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Somehow we had to do better - both in accomplishment and morally. " 82 The children 
felt guilty: for not having suffered themselves; for not fulfilling their parents' 
impossible expectations; for hurting those who had already suffered so much. 
Survivors often aggravated those feelings of guilt by reminding their child of his or her 
good fortune compared with the deprivation and losses that the parent endured. 
Remembering his own survivor parents, Aaron Hass wrote: 
'For this I survived the Nazis? For this I survived the camps? ' This was my 
parents' anguished refrain - if I talked back to them or if I came home later 
than I said I would. ... It was as if they had injected guilt directly into my heart. 
... How could I answer them back? 
How could I be certain of the validity of my 
actions or feelings? 83 
The protectiveness that the children felt towards their parents reflected a reversal of 
roles that sometimes took place. Many children of survivors sought to shelter their 
fragile parents from emotional distress, as the following excerpt from Hass's own 
narrative illustrates: 
How could I cause them more grief? How could I electrically prod an already 
exposed, frayed nerve? How dare I risk the final straw, which might 
precipitate the ultimate psychological breakdown? T' 
As Hass observed: "Perceiving their parents as overly taxed and permanently 
traumatised by their losses during the Holocaust, children of survivors often refrained 
from relating their emotional difficulties. "' Most survivors needed to see their children 
permanently happy and any departure from this state had a devastating effect on the 
parents. On the other hand, the survivors' extreme experiences made them highly 
intolerant of any expression of weakness. They tended to trivialise the difficulties felt 
by their children by comparing them to their own past. 'Do you think that's a problem? 
Go through what I went through and you will know what real problems are, ' was a 
82 Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 66-67. 
13 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 51. 
84 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 51. 
"I Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 62. 
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common refrain in survivors' households. Anne Karpf reminisced about her 
childhood: 
For my parents the war was the yardstick by which all other bad experiences 
were judged and thereby found to be relatively good. Frustration, irritation, 
anger, disappointment - to them all these seemed trivial and indulgent, and 
so never could be freely vented. 116 
Like their parents, survivors' children could not express anger, albeit for 
different reasons. And like their parents, they turned their anger against themselves 
or transferred it to the first available outlet. Survivors' anger often manifested itself in 
their mistrust of the world, especially the non-Jews. The parents' traumatised views 
of the world and other people were transmitted to their children, who often reacted by 
developing excessive, unwarranted fears of their own. "The world, for these children 
of survivors, is clearly a hostile protagonist. ... Human nature is malevolent and this 
malevolence is especially directed toward Jews. "87 The following excerpts of 
survivors' children's testimonies show that they learned this lesson well: 
They (my parents) thought me not to trust people. ... The Holocaust has 
increased my awareness of regarding the dark side in us ... That it can and 
did happen leaves disturbing implications on my outlook on life. I cannot be so 
trusting or idealistic ... For the most part I have come to realise that you 
cannot depend on other people. 
The Holocaust has scared me, wounded me, at best. ... My mother ... 
instituted a sense of mistrust, that the world is a dangerous place. "' 
I'd consider myself a hard-core realist.... There is an ugliness to life that I 
understand ... I think the Holocaust has also contributed to a low-level sense 
of paranoia 90 
Karpf, A., The WarAfterp. 38. 
87 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 37. 
88 Testimony of Beverly, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 37-38. 
89 Testimony of Herb, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 38. 
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Our parents depicted the world as so unsafe that we gathered it was best to 
lie down and hold back: if you avoided attracting attention, you might escape 
a backlash. 91 
I live with a sense of doom; that something bad is going to happen. I don't 
trust anyone who isn't Jewish. 92 
You can't trust the non-Jews. Jews aren't in power. Goys don't like Jews. 
Things don't change. The Jew stands alone. 93 
On a more positive note, Hass observed two marked interpersonal qualities in 
children of the Holocaust survivors: compassion and resilience. Overly concerned 
with others and keenly sensitive to another's pain, children of camp survivors 
frequently entered the helping professions. Their testimonies express a high degree 
of compassion, on personal, social, and political levels. This compassion is mainly 
universal, although some participants in the survey limited their concern to the 
Jewish community. On the universal plane, the prevalent argument is that Jews 
must not remain indifferent to the suffering of others, a view expressed in this 
testimony: "If I hear about oppression in other countries I feel like it is my 
responsibility to do something because others stood by while Jews suffered. "94 For 
others, it is precisely the world's failure to intervene on behalf of the Jews that 
justifies their own circumscribed engagement: "No one is going to care about Jews. 
We've got to take care of ourselves. "95 Resilience in the face of adversity is the most 
common strength described by the second-generation children. This is a particularly 
strong feature in fighters' families, but also frequent in others. Resilience originated 
primarily in identification with this qualities in the parents ("My mother is incredibly 
strong and quick to take charge. I'm the same way"96), but also in the desire to please 
them, atone for their helplessness, as the following excerpts from survivors' 
children's testimonies show: 
91 Karpf, A., The WarAfterp. 13. 
92 Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 40. 
Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 109. 
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Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 46. 
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The Holocaust gives me strength to try harder, to do well - to honour people 
in my family whom I never knew but, I know, would have loved me a lot. 
My Holocaust background helps me to fight and do well because of what 
happened to them ... To prove that we are good. 
Wanting to make my mother 
happy ... I want to keep her going by my continuing fight. 97 
On the basis of clinical data, Yael Danieli made a classification of survivors' 
family patterns which takes into account the parents' war experience. "Although the 
survivor parent's post-war posture may or may not be identical with his or her war 
experiences" asserts Danieli, "most survivors who headed victim or numb families 
were former concentration camp inmates; most of those in the fighter category were 
partisans and resistance fighters during the war. "° Danieli distinguishes four 
categories of families: victim families, fighter families, numb families, and families 
who made it. 
The home atmosphere of victim families was characterised by "pervasive 
depression, worry, mistrust and fear of the outside world, and by symbiotic clinging 
within the family. "19 In victim families relatively harmless, everyday activities were 
perceived as lethal hazards and catastrophic reactions were common. Marsha, a 
survivors' child, speaking of her parents said: 
They overreacted to everything. For example, if someone stole a five-cent 
candy from their store, they became totally paranoid and hysterical. 
Everything was a matter of life and death. They were always waiting for the 
worst to happen. 10° 
Since they themselves had not been appropriately "prepared" for the Holocaust by 
their own parents, the survivor parents' made sure to avoid this mistake with their 
97 Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 46. 
Danieli, Y., "Families of Survivors of the Nazi Holocaust: Some Short and Long-Term 
Effects" in Spielberger, C. D., Sarason, I. G. and N. Milgram (eds. ), Stress and Anxiety, Vol. 
8, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). 
19 Danieli, Y., "The Treatment and Prevention of Long-Term Effects and Intergenerational 
Transmission of Victimisation: A Lesson From Holocaust Survivors and Their Children" in 
Figley, C. R., Trauma And Its Wake, Vol. 1, (New York: Brunner I Mazel, 1985) p. 299. 
100 Testimony of Marsha, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 59. 
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precious offspring. Children in victim families were "often trained to be survivors of 
future Holocausts"101 and their 'disaster smart' parents invested all their energy into 
protecting and controlling their progeny. Wide range of involvement in their children's' 
lives and overprotectiveness have been reported by a majority of children belonging 
to this category. Children witness: 
They were overly protective. Every injury or illness was a cause of major 
panic and turmoil in the house. 102 
Every time my throat hurt my mother was sure that I had cancer. 703 
Having lost so much in the Holocaust, the survivor parents had an inordinate fear that 
harm might befall their children. On the other hand, they were terrified of separation 
from their children. As Danieli observes: "Victim families insisted that the inside doors 
of their homes remain open at all times. Any assertion of healthy independence and 
privacy needs by their children threatened parents, who felt they were reliving their 
war experiences, when being separated meant total and permanent loss. "104 Parents 
found it extremely difficult to endure even the normal developmental disengagement 
that occurs between parent and a child in the process of growing up. Many survivors 
displayed "an acute lack of empathy for their children's problems and emotional 
needs, particularly as they compared them with their own. "105 The paramount concern 
in victim families' homes was security based on physical, nutritional and material 
survival. Children had do be fed and kept warm. They often described their parents 
as obsessed with food, cleanliness, and money. 
My mother's experience with deprivation has made her obsessed with food. I 
remember having eggs rammed down my throat and vomiting them up, and 
then having more shoved down again. My mother is always thinking about, 
talking about, cooking, freezing, or packaging food. 106 
101 Danieli, Y., "The Treatment and Prevention" p. 300. 
102 Unidentified testimony, in Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 57. 
103 Quoted in Karpf, A., The WarAfterp. 231. 
104 Danieli, Y., "The Treatment and Prevention" p. 300. 
105 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 61. 
106 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 61. 
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The fighter families' homes were filled with compulsive activity and an intense drive 
to rebuilt, to succeed, and to achieve. Pride and strength were the paramount values. 
Any behavioural expression of weakness, victimisation, or self-pity was countered 
with contempt. Even physical illness was only faced when it was already a crisis. Like 
the victim parents, the fighter survivors distrusted the outside world. However, 
instead of instructing their offspring to keep low profile, they encouraged them to 
direct their aggression towards the outsiders. "Family members were 'never again' to 
let another Holocaust catch them unprepared, " wrote Danielli, "Instruction for the 
offspring were clear: 'Stand on your own two feet and make it bigl Scare them if you 
like. But don't let them know if you are scarred! Never give in ... Never give up, no 
matter whatl'"107 In numb families, both parents were frequently the only survivors of 
their own families (which before the war included a spouse and children). They were 
truly broken people: lifeless, silent, depleted of all emotions, and capable of tolerating 
only a minimal amount of stimulation. The parents protected each other and the 
children took care of the parents and of themselves. Children often withdrew into an 
inner world and sought parental figures outside of their family. Alternatively, they 
adjusted by numbing themselves. The last category comprises the "families who 
made it. " Many of the survivors heading this type of family coped by fantasising 
about 'making it big' after the liberation, as a kind of revenge against the Nazis. 
Usually too young to marry immediately after the war, they often married non- 
survivors. They persistently sought higher education, social and political status, and 
wealth, both for themselves and their children. Outwardly, these families were more 
assimilated in their social environment than any other survivor category. The 
Holocaust was rarely discussed in these families and the 'normal' posture was 
achieved at the price of denial and avoidance of any remainders of the past. Children 
often found out about their parents' Holocaust past indirectly or much later in their 
lives. Some of the survivors "who made it" consecrated "much of their careers, 
money, and political status to demand commemoration of and attention to the Jewish 
experience during the Holocaust, and dignity for its victims. "108 
107 Danielli, Y., "The Heterogeneity of Post-war Adaptation" p. 118. 
108 Danieli, Y., "The Treatment and Prevention" p. 304. 
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Collective Traumas: Empathetic And Symbolic "Survivors" 
Introduction 
Jews of the world know that the destruction of European Jewry binds them in 
a shroud of grief and dignity to the Jewish nation. 'Jewish identity whether we 
like it or not is reinforced, cemented, locked into place by the six million 
dead. 109 
The Nazi concentration camps killed 72% of eastern and central European 
Jewry, that is, approximately 5 million people. 10 Of the total 8,861,000 Jews living in 
Europe prior to the Second World War, it is estimated that 400-500,000 survived the 
Nazi Holocaust in the underground, by hiding or escaping, in ghettos, or in slave 
labour camps, and no more than 75,000 outlived the Nazi death camps. "' Those 
former inmates faced total rule by hostile bureaucracy, filth, promiscuity, starvation, 
beatings, cold, fear, humiliation, destruction of values, status, society, and family, and 
the threat of impending death. Furthermore, the twelve years of Nazi regime 
destroyed hundreds of years of European Jewish culture, communities, schools, 
political institutions, and synagogues. 112 As Marc Ellis wrote: "entire historic areas of 
Jewish life vanished forever. "113 The magnitude of destruction and the vicissitude of 
its design and execution were beyond human imagination. For a number of reasons, 
including the non-negligible fact that Israel received most of the European refugees 
after the war (in 1961 - that is, after the absorption of Jews from Arab countries - 
their proportion still represented 25% of the total Jewish population14), the Jewish 
State was particularly affected by the destruction of European Jewry. I begin by 
examining the collective trauma thesis developed by Kai Erikson, before outlining the 
109 Roiphe, A., A Season for Healing: Reflections on the Holocaust (New York: Summit 
Books, 1988) p. 22. 
110 See Hilberg, R., The Destruction of the European Jews, unabridged version (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1961). 
"' See Epstein, H., "Heirs of the Holocaust" in New York Times Magazine, June 19,1977, 
pp. 12-15 and 74-77; Epstein, H., Children of the Holocaust: Conversations with Sons and 
Daughters of Survivors (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1979); Davidowitcz, L. S., The War 
Against the Jews 1933-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975). 
112 For detailed figures of destruction, see the testimony of Dr. Salo Baron in The Trial of 
Adolf Eichmann, Sessions 12 and 13. 
113 Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence and Redemption: Confronting the Holocaust and Israeli 
Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1990) p. 1. 
14 Of the total 1,939.400 Jewish inhabitants in Israel in 1961,490,595 were refugees from 
Europe. See Bachi, R., Population Trends of World Jewry (Jerusalem: The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, 1976) p. 66. 
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imprint of the Holocaust on those Israelis who were not directly affected by the 
events in Europe, as well as on the social, political, cultural, and psychological 
realms of the Israeli society. 
Erikson built his argument on the assumption that "one can speak of 
traumatised communities as something distinct from assemblies of traumatised 
persons. "15 The author distinguished two forms of communal trauma. "Sometimes, " 
he wrote, "the tissues of community can be damaged in much the same way as the 
tissues of mind and body. " 116 But "even when that does not happen, " Erikson 
proceeded, "traumatic wounds inflicted on individual can combine to create a mood, 
an ethos -a group culture, almost - that is different from (and more than) the sum of 
the private wounds that make it up. ""' The texture of a community is damaged when 
the blow hits its vital resources, such as a significant portion of its population, its elite 
and / or leadership, its spiritual or material centres, or a combination of the above. 
Unlike the sudden shock, which characterises an individual experience of trauma, a 
form of shock associated with collective trauma is "a gradual realisation that the 
community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that an important 
part of the self has disappeared. """ Put differently "the collective trauma works its 
way slowly and even insidiously into the awareness of those who suffer from it, so it 
does not have the quality of suddenness normally associated with 'trauma. '""" 
How do communities react to trauma? Erikson observed a tense co-existence 
of both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in traumatised communities. The 
former unite members of the community around the disaster that befell them and 
shared trauma serves as a source of communality in the same way that common 
language and common cultural background do. There is "a spiritual kinship ... a 
sense of identity"120 in this "gathering of the wounded. "12' The disaster is followed by a 
75 Erikson, K., A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and Community 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994) p. 230. 
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"stage of euphoria""' characterised by the community's whole-hearted mobilisation to 
rescue the survivors, renew old pledges of fellowship, and dress the wound as soon 
as possible. In Erikson's words "they are celebrating their own rebirth. ""' On the 
other hand, however, traumas "often seem to force, open whatever fault lines once 
ran silently through the structure of the larger community, dividing it into divisive 
fragments [and] the fault lines usually open to divide the people affected by the event 
from the people spared, "124 exactly the opposite of 'the stage of euphoria' described 
earlier. "Those not touched try to distance themselves from those touched, almost as 
if they are escaping something spoiled, something contaminated, something 
polluted. "125 Yet, once the traumatic experiences work their way into the grain of the 
affected community "they come to supply its prevailing mood and temper, dominate 
its imagery and its sense of self, govern the way its members relate to one another 
... the shared experience 
becomes almost like a common culture, a source of 
kinship. "" 
Given the complexity of the gradual integration of the Holocaust into the Israeli 
reality, the rejection and acceptance phases of Israeli society's dealing with the 
European tragedy are studied in detail in subsequent chapters. The emphasis here is 
the result of this process - that is, the creation of "common culture" by means of 
identification with survivors. Encouraged and perpetuated by the consecutive Israeli 
governments since the beginning of the 1980s (by means of school curricula, state- 
sponsored trips to concentration camps in Poland, and other Holocaust educational 
projects), identification with the Holocaust survivors is very high among not directly 
affected Israelis. The section on empathetic "survivors" analyses the nature and 
symptoms of the communal trauma experienced by this group, as well as its origin 
and means of transmission. The second category of communal "survivors" comprises 
the Jewish people and their territorial embodiment of sovereignty - the State of 
Israel. Those symbolic "survivors" endured great casualties: the Nazis murdered one 
third of the world's Jewish population, destroyed whole communities and their unique 
122Anthony F. C Wallace, quoted in Erikson, K., A New Species of Trouble p. 235. 
123 Anthony F. C Wallace, quoted in Erikson, K., A New Species of Trouble p. 235. 
124 Erikson, K., A New Species of Trouble p. 236. 
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culture, and plundered inestimable amounts of Jewish property. 127 Likewise, the 
Jewish State in the making lost its main resource of human capital, that is, the east 
European Jewry. As Ben Gurion wrote: "Hitler harmed more than the Jewish people, 
whom he knew and hated: he caused damage to the Jewish state, whose coming he 
did not foresee. He destroyed the country's main support and central force. The state 
appeared and did not find a nation that had awaited it. "128 
Empathetic "Survivors": Israeli Jews 
My mother's mother was from Cracow, thirty miles from Auschwitz, and I must 
assume that if she ... hadn't ... sailed to America, that I'd have been sent to Auschwitz in the early 1940s. I'd have been twelve years old. I'd have been 
wearing a drab grey suit and a flat grey 'golfer' cap, and I'd have stepped from 
the train with my mother, father, and freckle-cheeked sister ... and onto the 
concrete platform inside the Auschwitz wires. 1n 
In a 1992 study of Israeli identity among college students revealed that close 
to 80 percent of those asked identified with the statement: 'We are all Holocaust 
survivors. "' This unparalleled level of identification with survivors' experience reflects 
the equally novel contours of Israeli identity. As Chapters Three and Four of this 
thesis show, the integration of the Holocaust into the Israeli identity was a long and 
painful process for all parties involved. Starting with the reconstruction of the tragedy 
at the trial of a Nazi war criminal, Adolf Eichmann, the non-fighting Holocaust 
survivors slowly gained their place in the public discourse. Until the Eichmann trial, 
native Israelis could not imagine something like the Holocaust happening to them: 
"no one could have slaughtered us in the synagogues; every boy and girl would have 
shot every German soldier. "131 Therefore, they blamed the catastrophe on the 
passivity and the meekness of the Diaspora Jews. Agonising personal narratives that 
emerged from the witness stand, brought the Holocaust closer to the average Israeli, 
and the gap between the Jewish (that is, Diaspora) and Israeli identity progressively 
narrowed until the two virtually merged, as "part of Israeli ... identity and self- 
127 Beker, A. (ed. ), The Plunder of Jewish property during the Holocaust (New York: New 
York University Press, 2001). 
'28 Ben Gurion, D., "Eternal Israel" in Government Yearbook 1954 (Jerusalem: Government 
Press Office, 1954) p. 37. 
1 Sack, J., An Eye For An Eye, (New York: Basic Books, 1993) p. ix. 
130 Oron, Y., Jewish-Israeli Identity (Tel Aviv: Kibbutz College School of Education, 1992) p. 
58. 
131 Quoted in Teveth, S., The Road to lyyar (Tel Aviv: Hakibbuts Hameuchad, 1986) p. 229. 
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perception have come to be connected to suffering and to the Holocaust. "132 It was 
reported at the time of Eichmann trial that "many of those not affected by the 
Holocaust, amongst them particularly Sephardic Jews, reacted more violently to the 
33 horrors told at the trial than those directly affected. "' The story made the rounds that 
when a hangman was sought to hang Eichmann there were many more Sephardic 
volunteers than Ashkenazic ones. This anecdote confirms the findings of the study 
according to which, by the late 1970s, the Holocaust became an event common to all 
citizens of Israel, independently of their origins. 134 
In their 1993 survey of the perceptions of the Holocaust in Israel, 
psychoanalysts Rafael Moses and Yechezkel Cohen identified a selection of 
reactions observed in individuals and groups who were not directly affected by the 
Holocaust: feelings of guilt and shame, identification fantasy, sense of entitlement, 
anger, fear and sense of vulnerability. Unlike the survivors' guilt examined in the 
previous section of the chapter, the feeling of those not directly affected is "guilt for 
not having suffered, for not having been part of an experience of suffering, which, 
looked from an Israeli vantage point, was very widespread indeed. "135 Shame was 
particularly intense in the first fifteen years after the war when most Israelis reacted 
to Holocaust survivors by distancing themselves. They felt that the Diaspora Jews, 
not only went "like sheep to the slaughter, " but by doing so, brought shame upon the 
whole Jewish nation. After the Eichmann trial, feelings of shame regarding the 
survivors virtually disappeared. However, the memory of this blow to the national 
pride makes Israelis very sensitive to any action or utterance that might be 
interpreted as disrespectful or insinuating weakness. It is not surprising that 'freier' 
[sucker] is one of the worst insults in the national lexicon. Like the opening quote of 
this section, identification fantasy is an attempt to imagine oneself in the shoes of 
the victims; persecuted by the Nazis, in a concentration camp, hiding in the forest, 
and so on. 'What would I have done? How would I have survived in a camp? How 
11 Moses, R. and Y. Cohen, "An Israeli View" in Moses, R. (ed. ), Persistent Shadows Of The 
Holocaust: The Meaning To Those Not Directly Affected (Madison, CT.: International 
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would I have behaved? What might I have done to stay alive? Identification fantasy is 
often generated by exposure to Holocaust-related books or films, in Jews and non- 
Jews alike. In Israel, however, identification with survivors was actively encouraged 
by the leadership through the Holocaust education programs in schools and 
elsewhere. The history of Jewish suffering, culminating in the Holocaust, created in 
Israelis a marked sense of entitlement. The latter is expressed in a claim to ethical 
indulgence and sympathy owed to those who suffer. On the other hand, it is also an 
entitlement to any action that serves Israeli needs, "as if moral laws of behaviour 
towards others were suspended because of the Holocaust: as if inverting Rabbi 
Hillel's famous injunction, they now feel entitled to do unto others what was done 
unto them. "136 Feelings of anger and vengefulness are both intense and diffuse. 
Since the cause of the tragedy no longer exists, the anger is directed at other 
enemies and bystanders. In his discussion of Jewish revenge against the Nazis, 
Berel Lang identifies a displacement effect, defined as "the appearance of revenge in 
other guises. "137 Filtered through displacement effect, "revenge would have been 
silent, deliberately not announcing itself. "'38 Lang attributes a number of Israeli 
attitudes and deeds to a displaced revenge: for example, "the continued (potentially 
limitless) ascription of guilt, " both towards Germany and the world; trial and execution 
of Adolf Eichmann (as opposed to simple assassination in Argentina); and above all, 
Israel's representation of the Arabs as successors of the Nazis. Lang thus argued: 
At least to a degree, certain disfigured representations of Arab character and 
rights - and the expression of self-assertion and force directed against those 
representations - reflect an emergence from powerlessness that in recent 
Jewish history was epitomised in the Shoah and that has since found in the 
Arabs an available target for compensation - that is, for revenge. '1 
In Israel, external danger has been omnipresent ever since the establishment of the 
state. The Holocaust made Jews conscious of their vulnerability. It is therefore 
understandable that the reaction of many individuals to what is perceived as a threat 
11 Roiphe, A., A Season for Healing p. 177. 
137 Lang, B., "Holocaust Memory and Revenge: The Presence of the Past" in Jewish Social 
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of extinction would immediately connect to the Holocaust. The analogy provokes both 
genuine and exaggerated fears. Genuine fear is an actual, inner response to what is 
perceived as a real threat. This leads to fear that once again, the Jewish people are 
threatened with extinction. As Chapter Five of this thesis shows, such reactions were 
particularly strong during the 'waiting period' before the Six-Day war, and to a lesser 
extent during the Yom Kippur war. The exaggerated fear is a traumatic response to 
anxiety, mostly present in the physical survivors due to a reactivation of their past 
experiences. And finally, fear is also sometimes "called up partly deliberately and 
partly half-consciously, both for inner political purposes within Israel and for external 
political purposes outside Israel. "140 Unlike the traumatic symptoms observed in 
physical survivors, which are direct and constant, those enumerated above, come up 
on occasion and rarely as a central theme in the lives of empathetic 'survivors. ' 
"Rather, " the authors claim, "[they] surface at times in relation to stimuli which may be 
either internal or external. "141 
The question remains, however, how and why has the Holocaust become 
such an integral part of Israeli identity? In his discussion of Israeliness (defined as a 
cultural entity, a set of attitudes, a state of mind which shapes the responses of the 
Israelis), Akiva Orr argues that the identification with the Holocaust resulted from a 
state-designed and promoted boost of 'Jewish consciousness' among Israeli youth. 
The history of Holocaust education in Israel reproduces the pattern of Israeli society's 
dealing with the issue. The first fifteen years of the state were marked by an almost 
total absence of the topic from Israeli school curricula. For many students and 
teachers of that period, the Holocaust was a personal trauma and "the memories 
were too harsh, too close, and some of the questions were too distressing to 
discuss. "142 On the other hand, the teaching of the Holocaust was a political problem. 
In those years, Israeli schools were associated with political parties, which made it 
even harder to design a common curriculum. During the Eichmann trial in 1961-62, 
"educators suddenly found themselves sharing the surprising discovery that the 
Israeli educational system had not fulfilled its duty in teaching the Holocaust, thus 
leaving the Israeli student unprepared for the confrontation with the problems and 
740 Moses, R. and Y. Cohen, "An Israeli View" p. 135. 
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revelations raised by the trial. "143 Eichmann trial (analysed in Chapter Four of this 
thesis) was not only a historical, but also an educational turning point. "In preparing 
for the trial", assistant state prosecutor Gabriel Bach later recalled, "the prosecution 
set itself the goal of inducing Israeli youth to identify with the Holocaust's victims. 
This identification, it was hoped, would replace the arrogance that had, up until then, 
been the main component of the attitudes of young Israelis to the survivors. "14' 
Ruth Firer researched the way in which the Holocaust was presented to Israeli 
pupils and students in textbooks and teaching programs. She reviewed three 
different types of textbooks'45: Mikra'ot (readers) for children between the ages of 9 
and 14, history textbooks for upper elementary grades and high school pupils, and 
research textbooks for university students. What follows here is an attempt to retrace, 
on the basis of Firer's research, a standard Israeli child's / youngster's exposure to 
the Holocaust. "Every Israeli child is born as if already crucified by the burden of the 
Jewish historical experience, " states Firer, "From infancy he is faced with the siren 
that pierces every home in the country on the morning of the Day of Remembrance. 
Embraced by his parents, the toddler experiences the first collective terror while 
standing at the memorial to six million Jews who were massacred during World War 
11. "146 In the years that follow, the child gets an explanation from parents and 
kindergarten teachers. Thus, the majority of Israeli children know more about the 
Holocaust before they even start school than many adults do elsewhere. Until the 
fifth grade, the Holocaust falls within other chapters (for example in 'Ingathering of 
the Exiles'). From fifth grade onwards, a specific chapter is consecrated to the 
Holocaust and it grows in size with each grade. The Holocaust chapter is usually 
found after the Passover and the Independence Day chapters, which fits the Zionist 
narrative of the Exile, with its culmination in the Holocaust and redemption. "' In the 
Mikra'ot, the child is the protagonist of the Holocaust, a didactical approach that 
143 Schatzker, C., "Holocaust Education in Israel" in Levine, E. (ed. ), Voices From Israel: 
Understanding the Israeli Mind (New York, London and Toronto: Herzt Press, 1986). 
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facilitates the Israeli child's identification with the Jewish child during the Holocaust. 
The usual themes are the following: spiritual resistance and maintenance of human 
image (the child is struggling for survival yet he remains loving, human, and 
courageous); armed resistance (the youngster is ä messenger or helper, usually in 
Warsaw ghetto setting); vengeance and the vow to remember (the child is directed to 
sublime his vengeance and fulfil his vow by building and defending his homeland); 
and inevitably, the imaginative escape to Israel that provides both the consolation 
and the happy end. The Mikra'ot presentation of the Holocaust aims at forming an 
"Israeli Jewish adult who is sensitive to human values and a keen Zionist as well. "148 
It is worth noting that until the 1970s many Mikra'ot hardly included the 
Holocaust, and others spread the subject across different chapters. The same trend 
can be observed in history textbooks. Until 1980, the Holocaust had not been a 
mandatory subject for secondary schools, and when it was taught, three to four hours 
a year were considered appropriate. Only since 1982, have teachers been obliged to 
consecrate thirty hours a year to the Holocaust, with the latter appearing in final 
examinations as well. During the period 1948 - 1977, the main theme of the history 
textbooks regarding the Holocaust was 'a proof of Zionist truth. ' The gist of the 
Holocaust message during this time was that the Jewish nation, because of their 
illusions concerning Jewish emancipation in the Diaspora failed to understand or 
refused to accept the truth of Zionism. The Final Solution destroyed all these illusions 
and proved Zionism right. The catastrophe ended with the miracle of Israel. The 
issues of shame and honour that plagued the Israeli society in the first decade of the 
state found their way into the history textbooks. Since Jewish resistance was seen as 
"a compensation for the shameful surrender of the Jews who were transported to the 
death camps"19 its role was overemphasised. The majority of textbooks devoted 
twice as much space to the description of the armed resistance than to suffering, 
destruction and spiritual resistance. The connection made between the ghetto 
fighters (who are called 'Hebrews' or even 'Israeli youngsters') and the young 
Hebrew pioneers "may create an impression that Zionism fought against the Nazi 
148 Firer, R., "The Holocaust in School Textbooks" p. 174. 
149 Excerpt from a history textbook, quoted by Firer, R., "The Holocaust in School Textbooks" 
p. 181. Italics supplied. 
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regime, and won by building the Jewish State of Israel out of the ashes of the war. "150 
As the Chapter Four shows, the Eichmann trial represented the turning point in the 
Israelis' perceptions of the Holocaust and its victims. It also provided an impetus for 
the revision of history textbooks. The new approach, abandoned the presentation of 
the Holocaust as "an apocalyptic war between Zionism and Nazism"", and focused 
on the crisis of the individual in the modern totalitarian state. The authors of those 
textbooks sought to understand how is it possible to turn a civilised person into a 
murderous beast and to draw universalistic lessons from the tragedy. Yet, those 
`humanistic textbooks' did not last long. It was judged that they lacked national- 
Zionist angle and that their humanistic-universal message "could not in itself be 
relevant for the Israeli pupil. "'52 The first-time victory of the right-wing Likud party and 
the consequent Premiership of Menachem Begin set another order of priorities: 
inclusion of Sephardic Jews into the Holocaust (which was seen to be an `Ashkenazi 
affair') and attempt to draw some useful lessons from the tragedy. 
Apart from the changes in school textbooks, the 1980s also brought another 
educational novelty - trips to Poland. Zevulun Hammer, a religious Minister of 
Education introduced organised school tours for eleventh and twelfth graders from 
Israel to the Nazi extermination camps in Poland. "Nothing better illustrates the 
change that has occurred in Israel's attitude toward the Holocaust, " commented Tom 
Segev, "than the journey of these students, members of the third generation, to 
Treblinka, Majdanek, and Auschwitz. ... A single generation after the founding of the 
state, Israel was sending its children to the Jewish past abandoned by its founding 
fathers. ... The young people were sent out to seek what secular Israeli society was, 
apparently, unable to offer them: roots. "' In 1990, Segev joined a group of 150 high 
school students from seven schools on a trip to Poland. For two months prior to the 
trip, all the participants had taken part in an orientation program, which included 
reading books, viewing films, visiting memorial sites, and meeting survivors. They all 
received a special booklet put together by the Ministry of Education. Among other 
things, the booklet also contains the Prayer for the State of Israel, the Blessing for 
the Soldiers of Israeli Defence Forces (which should be recited at Auschwitz), a 
150 Firer, R., "The Holocaust in School Textbooks" p. 181. 
15' Firer, R., "The Holocaust in School Textbooks" p. 190. 
"Firer, R., "The Holocaust in School Textbooks" p. 191. 
153 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 488. 
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Yizkor (the Jewish memorial prayer), as well as the following message for the 
teacher and guide, which deserves to be quoted in full: 
As we stand beside the death furnaces in the extermination camps, our hearts 
fill with resentment and tears come to our eyes for the horrible destruction of 
European Jewry, and Polish Jewry within it. Yet while we weep and suffer 
pain and sorrow over the destruction, our hearts fill with pride and 
contentment at the great privilege we have of being citizens of an 
independent Israel. At the sight of the flag of Israel flying high above the death 
pits and furnaces, we stand straight and proud and murmur. 'The people of 
Israel livel The eternal one of Israel will not fail us! ' We swear before our 
millions of murdered brothers, 'If I forget thee, 0 Jerusalem, let my right hand 
lose its cunning! ' And it is as if we hear their souls crying out to us, "In our 
deaths we have commanded you to live. Preserve and defend the State of 
Israel as your most precious possession. ' Then we answer, with a full heart, 
'May the State of Israel live forever. 1"154 
During the eight days of pilgrimage to the death camps of Treblinka, Majdanek, and 
Auschwitz, "the students endured emotional extremes - sharp swings from outbursts 
of elation to attacks of weeping, to the point of hysterics. "'ý Most of them wore an 
outfit created specially for the trip, a purple sweatshirt with a large white Star of 
David, with the word Israel written inside it. Some of the students, reports Segev, 
frequently walked in formation, waving the Israeli flag. "They did this, they explained, 
so that the passersby in the Polish cities would know that there is life after the 
Holocaust. It was their revenge as Israeli emissaries. "156 Again and again, the 
students were reminded that the Holocaust meant that they must stay in Israel. The 
tragic irony of this message resided in the fact that this particular trip took place in the 
middle of the Persian Gulf crisis, and a few months later the students endured the 
third war of their young lives. Waiting for the flight to Warsaw at Ben Gurion airport, 
"inevitably, one of the teenagers ... quipped that he had no reason to worry - when 
Saddam Hussein's missiles hit Tel Aviv, he would be in Auschwitz. "11' 
1541 Seek My Brothers: Youth Trip to Poland (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 
1990). 
1-'5 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 497. 
156Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 498. 
157 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 487. 
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The teenager's utterance reveals a contradiction that is even deeper than the 
incongruity of feeling safer in Auschwitz than in Tel Aviv: the fact that fifty years after 
the Holocaust, the independent Jewish State aimed for (and largely achieved) an 
almost complete identification of its youngest generation with the helpless, stateless, 
victims of the Holocaust. When most individual Holocaust survivors have well 
advanced in their process of recovery or even successfully reconnected with the 
outside world, the youngest generation of Israelis was being traumatised again. 
Following Kai Erikson's observations, it can be stated that the traumatic shock 
endured by the generation of Israelis educated in Israel during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, was particularly insidious. It consisted in a guided collective emotional 
identification with the Holocaust victims. The beginning of this section outlined the 
major post-traumatic symptoms observed in those Israelis who spontaneously 
empathised with the survivors, either through distant personal connections to the 
Holocaust, or through the Holocaust narratives that emerged during the Eichmann 
trial and afterwards. The youth that grew up during the 1980s, however, represents 
the first entire generation of individuals with more or less standardised and regulated 
experience of the identification with the victims. The effects of this education have 
been unfolding since the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, and many, including 
Holocaust survivors, denounced an education that re-enacts the very experience of 
trauma in all its emotional intensity, rather than perpetrate and honour the memory of 
its victims. The concluding chapter of this thesis returns to the major pitfalls and 
concurrent criticism of the Israel's Holocaust education. 
Symbolic "Survivors": The State of Israel 
This country was founded on a silver platter made of six million bodies. '" 
Three years after the war ended in Europe, the Declaration of Independence 
of the State of Israel was signed in Jerusalem. Its text included the following section: 
The recent holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in Europe proved anew 
the need to solve the problem of the homelessness and lack of independence 
of the Jewish people by means of the re-establishment of the Jewish State, 
"General Yossi Peled, Holocaust survivor, quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 513. 
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which would open the gates to all Jews and endow the Jewish people with 
equality of status among the family of nations. 1 " 
Yet, the Zionist solution came too late for the millions of East European Jews, who in 
1939 still constituted one half of world Jewry as a whole. The Holocaust represented 
an awesome blow for the new state and its leaders; "it destroyed at a stroke the most 
important single reservoir of future immigration - the great nucleus of East European 
Jewry with its cohesive sense of Jewish peoplehood, its cultural creativity and 
background of Zionist hachshara [training]. "160 The destruction of European Jewry 
also severely affected the social, cultural, educational, and ideological composition of 
the State of Israel. In the absence of young, healthy, enthusiastic East European 
Zionists, Israel had to rely on the exhausted, broken 'remnant' to settle in the country 
and fortify its army against Arab threat. Furthermore, the Holocaust dictated a new 
attitude towards the Jews of the Arab world, until then considered "mostly as subjects 
for historical and anthropological research "161 rather than a legitimate reservoir of 
immigration to the Jewish state. "The Jews of the Arab world were brought to Israel in 
large numbers and at a rapid rate, with no selection, and before anyone had any idea 
what to do with them. "162 The chasm between the Jews of European descent 
(Ashkenazim) and those who came from the Middle East (Sephardim), and the 
tensions between the newcomers and the native Israelis, put a tremendous strain on 
a society already overtaxed with wars and the absorption of immigrants. When 
something was needed to unify the Israeli society on the verge of implosion, neither 
Judaism (which was incompatible with secular Israeliness) nor the Zionist ideals of a 
model socialist society (which contradicted the predominantly religious identities of 
the Sephardim) were up to the task. The only thing that both groups shared was a 
memory of Gentile persecution of the Jews. As the debates preceding the Eichmann 
trial demonstrate, one of the aims of the trial was also to provide all Israelis with an 
identity that would eclipse their differences. This identity consisted of double-layered 
identification: with the victims and survivors of the Holocaust, and with the State of 
159 "State of Israel Proclamation of Independence" in Laqueur, W. and B. Rubin, The Israel - 
Arab Reader. A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 
1995) p. 107. 
160 Wistrich, R. S., "Israel and the Holocaust Trauma" in Jewish History, 11: 2 (Fall 1997) 
p. 16. 
161 Eliyahu Dobkin quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 121. 
162 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 122. 
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Israel. The previous section showed how this goal had been achieved with regards to 
the former, whilst this one analyses the roles and value of the State of Israel for 
secular Israeli Jews. 
Since the Eichmann trial and even more so, since the Six-Day and Yom 
Kippur wars, "the Holocaust had come to replace the founding myths of the Jewish 
State as the major source and its raison d'etre. ... The notion of Israel as the 
guardian and heir of the Holocaust memory has steadily gained ground as the new 
unifying myth. "" As a state, Israel claims a particular relationship to the Holocaust. In 
the 1950s, Mordechai Shenhabi even proposed a law according to which every 
Holocaust victim would be retroactively granted Israeli citizenship. He argued that 
"The loss of millions is ... a direct loss to the State of Israel. ... The extermination of 
each of those millions, from the point of view of the Israeli state, was like the 
slaughter of a 'potential citizen. ' The State of Israel, as the national expression of the 
dispersed Jewish people, will bestow its citizenship on the fallen, thus upholding their 
memory and honour. "'" The idea was debated extensively by the Israeli government 
and abandoned only when it turned out that it was legally impossible to grant a 
citizenship retroactively for a period prior to establishment of the state to someone 
who did not apply for it. The Holocaust memorial authority, Yad Vashem, offers 
certificates of honorary citizenship at 12$ each, but according to the staff, they are 
not in great demand. This tragic-comic episode illustrates the observation made by 
Moses: "Israel views itself as an heir to the Holocaust. It feels that it needs to 
represent, and represents, the victims and the survivors of the Holocaust: it 
represents them morally everywhere, politically in Israel and abroad, and serves as a 
vocal spokesman who will inform generations to come of the unbelievable, 
unimaginable events that took place during that time. "" Apart from its role as an heir, 
guardian of memory, and representative of the victims, the State of Israel also 
represents the core of Jewish secular identity, symbol of Jewish revival and 
vindication of the victims' suffering, and the guarantee that it will never happen again. 
163 Wistrich, R. S., "Israel and the Holocaust Trauma" p. 19. 
'I Quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 432. 
"Moses, R. and Y. Cohen, "An Israeli View" p. 129. 
54 
The fact that 'secular' and 'Jewish' are contradictory makes a 'secular Jewish 
identity' a rather nebulous concept. The first generation born and bred in Israel, as 
well as immigrant children, who received their primary and secondary secular 
education in Israel, were indeed a different 'breed' bf Jews. They were Israelis. They 
spoke Hebrew as a mother tongue, were atheist, modern, and without the inferiority 
complexes that characterised their ancestors in the Diaspora. To all intents and 
purposes, they were Gentiles who spoke Hebrew. Their identification with 
Jewishness was non-existent. This was the generation of arrogant youth that rejected 
the Diaspora and with it the Holocaust survivors who came to Palestine from 'over 
there'. In the 1950s, the Israeli government - composed of the founding fathers with 
a clear sense of Jewishness - became aware of the fact that the young, secular 
Israelis had developed a non-Jewish mentality. In order to rectify what was perceived 
as threatening to the Jewish character of the state, the government introduced 
special lessons on 'Jewish consciousness' into secular schools. As the previous 
section showed, those lessons consisted primarily of representing Jewish history as 
a history of persecution. According to Orr, the idea behind this volt face in the Israeli 
education, was that "those who no longer practice the religion will lose the Jewish 
identity, but as long as others persecute them because of their Jewish origin, they 
are forced to accept it. "166As a result of this boost of Jewish consciousness "the 
Israeli youth which before ... 
did not feel itself to be Jewish now feels linked to a 
history of persecution. It acquires a negative substitute for the positive religious 
definition of Jewishness, which it lacks, namely: 'I may not have a clear idea of what 
secular Jewishness means, but as long as I am persecuted by Jew-haters I am a 
Jew. 111167 Both 'Jewish' and 'secular', the State of Israel embodies the secular 
definition of Jewishness based on the history of persecution culminating in the 
Holocaust. Orr observed that most secular Israelis "identify their image - and self- 
image - with that of their state. "168 Furthermore their attitude towards the State of 
Israel is anthropomorphic, projecting upon the state an identity and a life of its own. 
Aided by a firm conviction that a disappearance of the territorial state would result in 
massive murder of Israeli Jews, the latter identify their own survival, and that of the 
entire Jewish people, with a continuous existence of the State of Israel. Elie Wiesel 
'66Orr, A., Israel: Politics, Myths and Identity Crises (London and Boulder: Pluto Press, 1994) 
p. 48. 
167 Orr, A., Israel p. 49. 
'68Orr, A., Israel p. 57. 
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described this osmosis between the Jewish people and the State of Israel when he 
wrote: 
The Jewish people would have survived for centuries to come, even if Israel 
had not been established in 1948. But now that Israel exists, our people is so 
linked to it that we could not survive its disappearance. 16' 
More than just a 'regular' territorial state, Israel is a symbol of Jewish 
survival and continuity. It also symbolises Jewish revenge against the Nazis and 
their accomplices, and represents a living monument to the Holocaust victims. In the 
words of Marc Ellis "Israel thus becomes a response, perhaps the response, to the 
shattered witness of the Jewish people. 11170 Israeli poet, Haim Guri expressed this 
sentiment in the following short poem: 
We have avenged your bitter and lonely deaths 
With our fist, heavy and hot, 
We have established a monument here to the burnt ghetto, 
A living monument that will never end. "' 
Within the Jewish community, Holocaust survivors are the staunchest supporters of 
Israel. The Jewish homeland resuscitated their pride and exclaimed their own 
presence. According to Hass, "most survivors experience an identification with 
Israel's ongoing struggle to overcome its enemies. As Israel is perceived as the 
bulwark averting another Holocaust, the outcome of that battle has very personal 
ramifications for the felt vulnerability of survivors. " 172 The existence of an 
independent Jewish state also provides survivors with a kind of symbolic 
compensation for all the losses they endured. Since revenge is not possible - 
"because nothing can be avenged. People are dead; even most of the perpetrators 
are dead; and even if they were not, what can be avenged? " - the State of Israel, the 
symbol of Jewish endurance and vitality, is the only metaphysical revenge of the 
169 Wiesel, E., "Israel Twenty Years Later" in Abrahamson, I. (ed. ), Against Silence: The 
Voice and Vision of Elie Wiesel (New York: Holocaust Library, 1985), pp. 190-191. 
170 Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 17. 
171 Guri, H., "From That Fire" in Readings for Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day 
(Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1975) p. 60. 
171 Hass, A, In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 140. 
56 
Jewish people. Revenge can also turn into pathetic absurdity, like the memorable 
Israeli - Polish soccer match for example. In 1995, Israel's national soccer team went 
to Poland to play against the Polish national team in the qualifying pre-European cup 
competition. Just before the game the team was taken to Auschwitz. That evening 
the visit was aired on the main news program. The young players wept as they 
spoke. "We are playing today on a soil saturated with blood, " said one; "our aim is to 
prove that we exist; " "On the field we shall give vent to all the pent-up emotions... " 
Another said, "Today I understand why it was so important to establish a Jewish 
state. S1173 The Israeli team lost 4 to 3. 
Last but not least, in spite of its perceived vulnerability, Israel is viewed as the 
only reliable safe haven for the Jewish people. As one American member of the 
second generation explained: 
Israel is very important to me. ... I think [it] is central to the survival of the 
Jewish people. ... If Israel were to go, I would feel extremely vulnerable.... 
And I see the possibility of destruction any time. The world is filled with 
Israel's enemies. Israel's enemies are my enemies. "' 
For many Israelis and Diaspora Jews the conclusions drawn from the Holocaust 
seem to be those of straightforward survivalism. Only a strong Israel can ensure that 
the Nazi horrors will not recur: "The determination to be a strong military power is not 
only a response to realistic Middle East conditions ... but it is also a commandment 
that rose naturally from the ashes of the camps. "175 
173 Quoted in Arad, G. N., "The Holocaust as an Israeli Experience" in Pennsylvania Gazette, 
95: 5 (June 1997). Internet edition at http: //www. upenn. edu/gazette/0697/israeli. html. Last 
accessed on 19 August 2001. 
14 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 140. 
175 Roiphe, A., A Season for Healing p. 175. 
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Conclusion: Community Of Fate 
Israel, a political state, a state like any other, was bom out of the ashes of the 
camps. The nations of the world had a second of pity, a moment of horror, 
and they made the state for the survivors so that the genocide could not be 
repeated. 1e 
The differentiation among various groups of Holocaust survivors, and 
particularly, the distinction made between the individual and collective traumas in this 
chapter, are significant, to the extent that the effects of trauma deploy differently 
across the various components of the Israeli society. Although the rest of the thesis 
demonstrates an essential similarity of mechanisms behind individual and collective 
healing processes, it is nevertheless crucial at this stage, to stress the major long- 
term implications of this difference. As the above typology of survivor groups showed, 
the most significant asymmetry between the individual and collective traumatisation 
lies in the immediacy of the traumatic experience and the controllability of its 
impact on the individual's quality of life and daily functioning. Those survivors who 
were closest to the epicentre of trauma, and thus most immediately exposed to the 
traumatic impact, had least control over the damage inflicted on their psychological, 
emotional and physical substance. Without a sense of control, the agency of those 
survivors has also been severely reduced. The above discussion of concentration 
camp survivors and some family structures they created after the war (numb and 
victim families) indicates that the survivors most deeply affected by the Holocaust 
trauma, that is, those who deployed the most comprehensive array of PTSD 
syndromes, quite expectedly, exercised a minimum control over their lives. Numb 
and emotionally depleted, they were often unable to act beyond their most immediate 
daily functioning. 
Moving away from the core of the trauma, as the controllability over its impact 
grew, the capability and willingness to act also increased. Even within the very group 
of physical survivors, it has been demonstrated that those who were spared the worst 
of the concentration camps and spent the war fighting or hiding, displayed 
comparatively more dynamism, even when the latter. was still confined to a relatively 
narrow sphere of initiative. Consequently, the greatest competence and motivation to 
vigorously react to trauma emerged in the periphery of the traumatic experience. 
176 Roiphe, A., A Season for Healing p. 23. 
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Energised by the guilt for not having suffered enough and the responsibility towards 
the dead, the individuals who were not directly affected by trauma (empathetic 
'survivors') often became the most efficient spokespersons of the survivors and the 
staunchest defenders of the Holocaust memory. The inverse ratio between the 
immediacy of traumatic experience and ability / willingness to act upon it, is crucial 
because it ascribes specific roles to different groups of survivors and thereby defines 
the relationships between them. The subsequent chapters illustrate the complex 
interaction between different groups of survivors at various junctions in Israeli history. 
As chapters Three, Four, and Six show, the physical survivors usually intervened to 
provide the legitimacy of their immediate experience of trauma to the collective story 
of the Holocaust. The following chapter indicates that it was the collective survivors' 
groups, namely the Israeli public and the majority of the leadership who were not 
directly affected by the Holocaust, who took up the task of applying the lessons of the 
Holocaust on a wider scale. 
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Chapter Two 
SECURITY AFTER THE HOLOCAUST 
Introduction 
Any principle that is generated by the Holocaust and to which Israel responds 
... becomes overwhelmingly normative 
for the Jewish people. ' 
In mainstream security scholarship, Israel has represented "an ideal example 
of a state behaving as realists expect states to behave, for they [neo-realists] 
assumed that state behaviour will conform more closely to their predictions when 
state security is at stake, and Israel's security was viewed to be highly threatened. "2 
Within the neo-realist framework, Israel presented the model of a small and 
vulnerable state whose security concerns drove its foreign policy. Israel's geo- 
strategic position has been consistently presented as the single major explanatory 
variable for its foreign policy. Many scholars in Israel and abroad explained Israel's 
state of being constantly at war or preparing for war with reference to systemic 
pressures "stemming from the geopolitical factors in the region. "3 A survey of these 
traditional approaches to Israeli security indeed yields a number of important insights 
into the material strains on Israeli security policies mentioned above: size, 
demography, and geo-strategic position. A neo-realist analysis, however, fails to 
account for the decisive link between the existing material circumstances and the 
formulation of security policies. The latter are designed as a response to the 
perceived threats from the strategic environment, and the assessment of one's 
capability to overcome those threats. This chapter addresses the following questions: 
How do different understandings of the history of Jewish persecution, especially the 
Holocaust, shape moral and psychological conditions of possibility for action in 
Israel? How do Israeli leaders and publics perceive security through the `Jewish 
1 Greenberg, I., "The Third Great Cycle in Jewish History" in Perspectives (New York: 
National Jewish Resource Centre, 1981) p. 22. 
2 Telhami, S., "Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal Type or a Breed of Its Own? " in Barnett, 
M. N. (ed. ), Israel in Comparative Perspective. Challenging the Conventional Wisdom (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1996) p. 30. 
3 Inbar, E., "Attitudes Toward War in the Israeli Political Elite" in Middle East Journal, 44, 
Summer 1990 p. 433. 
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prism' and what are the consequences of this departure from instrumental rationality 
in the field of security? 
Some of the leading Israeli security scholars draw attention to the fact that the 
perception of, and response to, threat in Israel includes a series of psycho-cultural 
elements grouped under the heading "Jewish prism. " Coined by Michael Brecher, the 
term denotes "the psychological predispositions rooted in the historical legacy 
through which images from the environment are filtered. "4 Although Jewish prism in 
its original formulation does not focus exclusively on the Holocaust, the latter's part 
has become paramount. In comparison, "other Jewish past experiences and cultural 
contents are given little importance. "5 For that reason, the systematisation of various 
components of the `Jewish prism" in the first part of this chapter draws predominantly 
on the lessons, meanings and understandings of the Holocaust. The second part of 
this chapter sketches a composite portrait of the Israeli political and defence elite, 
with emphasis on the leaders who had a significant impact on the Israeli concept of 
security. David Ben Gurion was certainly the single most important Israeli leader; 
founder of the State of Israel, twice its Prime Minister and twice its Defence Minister. 
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir were the longest serving Prime Ministers after 
Ben Gurion. They had both belonged to Revisionist right-wing underground 
movements in mandatory Palestine and spent most of their political careers in the 
opposition. Begin was a survivor of Soviet labour camps and both he and Yitzhak 
Shamir lost their closest relatives in the Holocaust. Yizhak Rabin and Moshe Dayan, 
on the other hand were native-born Israeli Generals, with no experience of Jewish 
persecution in the Diaspora. Other important leaders whose impact was intimately 
related to a particular event are analysed in the appropriate case studies (Levi Eshkol 
in the Six-Day war and Golda Meir in the Yom Kippur war). 
' Inbar, E., "Attitudes Toward War" p. 435. 
5 Inbar, E., "Jews, Jewishness and Israel's Foreign Policy" in Jewish Political Studies Review 
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Key Elements Of The Jewish Prism 
Introduction 
The Holocaust remains a basic trauma of Israeli society. ° 
In a 1972 overview of Israeli society, Amos Elon observed: "The Nazi 
Holocaust caused the destruction of that very same Eastern European world against 
which the early pioneers had staged their original rebellion, but to which, 
nevertheless, Israel became both outpost and heir. "7 Elon continued by identifying the 
features of "latent hysteria in Israeli life"8 that stems from Holocaust trauma. The 
latter, he claimed, "accounts for the prevailing sense of loneliness", "obsessive 
suspicions, [and] the towering urge for self-reliance at all cost. " ° Furthermore, the 
"memory of the Holocaust makes Arab threats of annihilation sound plausible" and 
"fears and prejudices, passions, pains, and prides, that spin the plot of public life and 
will likely affect the nation for a long time to come. "70 The elements of this 'trauma' 
are outlined below in form of different types of lessons and understandings of the 
Holocaust that shaped the worldview of Israeli leaders and public. To the Holocaust 
survivors those lessons emerged from a personal experience. The older generation 
in Palestine related to the Holocaust through their own recollections of anti-Jewish 
persecution in their countries of origin, whilst the young Israelis' attitudes were largely 
shaped by the state's educational system reviewed in the previous chapter. The 
majority of Israelis hold a combination of the features described below, although the 
trend has been clearly moving away from humanistic understandings of the tragedy. 
6 Elon, A., The Israelis: Founders And Sons (London: Bantam Books, 1972) p. 259. 
Elon, A., The Israelis p. 260. 
8 Elon, A., The Israelis p. 260. 
9 Elon, A., The Israelis p. 260. 
10 Elon, A., The Israelis p. 260. 
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Zionism 
The Holocaust proved Zionists right. It ended the discussion. " 
The Zionist interpretation of the Nazi murder of European Jewry is 
straightforward: the Holocaust proved beyond any shadow of doubt that Jewish life in 
the Diaspora is impossible and that, without a state of their own, Jews will always be 
at the mercy of others. This thesis figures prominently in the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence quoted in the previous chapter. The Zionist justification for the State of 
Israel unfolds both into the past and into the future. Since Jews were killed because 
they did not have a state, the argument goes, it is only logical that had Israel been 
established a decade earlier, it could have prevented the slaughter of European 
Jewry. This argument was epitomised in 1992 by Ehud Barak, Israel's former Prime 
Minister then incumbent Chief of Staff of its armed forces, who told Israeli television 
during a visit to Auschwitz: "We, the soldiers of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), 
have come to this place fifty years later, perhaps fifty years too late. "12 This 'failure' to 
prevent the destruction of European Jewry imprinted a moral obligation to build and 
defend Israel, because solely the continuous existence of the Jewish state 
guarantees the survival and safety of the Jewish people. The notion that "the security 
of the State of Israel is the only guarantee that'this [the Holocaust] would not happen 
again' is deeply rooted in every Israeli citizen. "13 The flip side of the Zionist lesson is 
thus a firm conviction, held by the majority of Israelis, that "any military defeat would 
mean the destruction of the state and would pose Israel's society with the danger of 
extermination. "" Since the State of Israel is represented as being the only shield 
against any future holocausts, it is not surprising that the willingness to defend it runs 
very high among Israeli public and leadership. Among motivational factors of Israeli 
soldiers, the Holocaust gets the top billing: "Every Israeli soldier, be he a Sabra, a 
Saphardi, or an Ashkenazi, carries with him the remembrance of the 6 million Jews 
extinguished by the Nazis. ... He clearly knows what he is fighting for. "15 The 
Holocaust education of the IDF soldiers and officers, as well as the symbolism of 
" Roiphe, A., A Season for Healing p. 177. 
12 Ehud Barak at Auschwitz, 7 April 1992. Quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 514. 
13 Gal, R., A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) p. 70. 
14 Quoted in Feldman, S., Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982) p. 88. 
15 Gal, R., A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier p. 70 and 146. 
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conducting the IDF basic training graduation ceremony at Yad Vashem, undoubtedly 
helped maintain this motivational conviction. 
Pessimism I Fatalism 
We cannot afford further failures of imagination. 16 
The pessimistic / fatalistic worldview can be traced to the experience of the 
Jews in the Diaspora and the transposition of this understanding in the Middle 
Eastern context. Traditional Zionism claimed that hatred of the Jews originated from 
their unnatural role among nations of the world as a weak and dependent group. 
Bring them to their own land, the argument went where these unnatural 
circumstances would no longer exist, and hatred of Jew would vanish as well. Anti- 
Semitism was seen by the founding fathers of Zionism as a direct consequence of 
Jewish statelessness. " Jewish experience in 1930s Palestine proved that the reality 
was different. In spite of Jewish transformation to a group that dwelt on land and had 
a normal division of labour, the Jews who came from Europe encountered a 
"behaviour of local Arabs [which] seemed consistent with the hatred which they had 
often experienced in the lands they left. "18 Out of collapsed hopes invested in the 
settlement of Palestine and the physical threat represented by Arab hatred emerged 
a new motif - the basic similarity of Jewish experience everywhere. The importance 
of the independent Jewish state was thus not in its mere existence (which proved 
insufficient) but in its military strength and self-reliance. The Nazi assault on Jews in 
Europe proved once again that "the world would do nothing to protect the Jews. "19 
Not surprisingly, fatalistic and pessimistic attitudes are most pronounced in the 
belief systems of Holocaust survivors and their children. The fatalistic lessons of the 
Holocaust reflect an attempt to make sense of the world as a comprehensible place, 
even if comprehensible means hostile. The search for meaning converges around 
the themes of betrayal and markedness: betrayal of the world and the mark of 
1e Rabbi Bernard Raskis, quoted in Lifton, R. J., The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and 
Nuclear Threat (London: Macmillan, 1991). p. 246. 
17 See contributions by Herzel, T., Pinsker, L., Nordau, M. and Y. H. Brenner in Charbit, D. 
(ed. ) Sionismes: Textes Fondamentaux (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998). 
1e Arian, A., "Perception of Threat in Israel" in Rattinger, H. and D. Munton, Debating National 
Security: The Public Dimension (New York: Peter Lang, 1991) p. 10. 
19 Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel" p. 11. 
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Jewishness. Hass, who is a child of survivors himself, reminisces on his own 
Holocaust lessons: 
The world, I learned, is divided in two. There are Jews and there are the 
Goyim. Goyim are different from Jews. They are brutish. We are sensitive, 
humane. They persecute. We study. ... Goyim are to be shunned. They are to 
be feared. ... We live 
in their countries and they hate us. And, sometimes, 
they decide to murder us. 2° 
Fatalism teaches the constancy of Gentile hatred of the Jews. Jewish history 
is presented as "a series of holocausts with only some improvements in technique. "21 
The Nazi murder of European Jews is seen simply as the most recent and most 
sophisticated of the Gentile assaults on the Jews. The certitude that anti-Semitism is 
somehow inherent in the Gentile mentality and that persecution of Jews is therefore 
an eternal feature of the world inhabited by Gentiles, is accompanied by an equally 
immovable conviction that nobody will ever intervene on behalf of the Jews. 'The 
whole world hates us' and 'A Jew always stands alone' are the two most commonly 
encountered phrases among the Holocaust survivors and their children. Most of the 
survivors believe in the possibility of another attempted mass assault on the Jewish 
people? The indifference of the world in such an occurrence is taken for granted 
("Goys don't like Jews. Things don't change. The Jew stands alone. "23 ). Thus, when 
asked about the lessons of the Holocaust, some survivors responded: "What the 
world learned from the Holocaust is that you can destroy six million Jews and no-one 
will care. "24 Most survivors communicated their deep-seated mistrust of non-Jews to 
their children whom they often prepared to be "survivors of the future holocausts. "25 
This mental outlook was continually reinforced by the children's constant exposure to 
other Jews with similar attitudes. Their survivor parents also taught them that since 
Gentiles could not be trusted, the Jews must be strong enough to defend themselves 
against all attacks. The presence of almost a million members of first or second- 
20 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 106. 
21 Aharon Appelfeld, an Israeli author, quoted in Jerusalem Post Magazine, 27 November, 
1987. 
22Krell, R., "Holocaust Families: pp. 560-567. 
23 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 108. 
24 Hass, A., In the Shadow of the Holocaust p. 75. 
25 Danieli, Y., "The Treatment and Prevention" p. 300. 
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generation survivors undoubtedly enhances the fear of the Gentiles and the ensuing 
Manichean worldview. According to Jay Gonen, the basic sense of insecurity 
provoked by systemic threats from Israel's environment has been further amplified by 
Israel's Jewishness, which preserved typical minörity attitudes. 26 Arian goes even 
further by saying that "even mainstream Zionist parties still tend to reject a 
geopolitical explanation of international conflict and persist in analysing the conflict 
between Israel and the Arab states in the spirit, and often in the lexicon, of the 
persecution suffered by Jews in most European countries . "27 Thus in 1988, when the 
panel of five international arbitrators awarded the Taba enclave to Egypt, Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Shamir exploded: "The UN, the world court, international arbitration, 
or international conference - is always against us. "28 
The fatalist attitude and concurrent 'two-camps' thesis are most visible in 
Israelis' attitudes towards war. The state of being at war or preparing for war was 
perceived by the Israeli political elite as "a decree of fate. "29 Thus Rafael Eitan, Chief 
of Staff of Israel Defence Forces in 1982 recalled in his memoirs an incident in which 
he was summoned from abroad to carry out a military operation. His reaction was: 
"Now I know that I have come home ... there is a war. I do not complain. Every 
people has its own fate. "30 Similarly, Amnon Rubinstein, leader of the centrist Shinui 
party, wrote: "It is Israel's fate to live in a hostile world that refuses to accept her. "31 
Some members of Israeli decision-making circles explained this situation with 
reference to systemic pressures in the Middle East. Most politicians, however, tend to 
see war as a "phenomenon forced upon Israel. "32Although the argument that war is 
inevitable is probably the most common justification for any war, 33 fought by any 
country, the concept of "no choice" (Ein Breira) in Israeli political establishment 
deserves a closer look. According to Reuven Gal, the Ein Breira concept is a result of 
26 Gonen, J., Psycho-History of Zionism (New York: Meridian, 1975), Chapter 2. 
27 Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel" p. 11. 
28 PM Shamir quoted in Kiernan, A., Israel and the World After 40 Years (Washington D. C.: 
Pergamon - Brassey's, 1990) p. 45. 
29 Inbar, E., "Attitudes Toward War" p. 433. 
30 Eitan, R., A Soldier's Story (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv Library, 1985) p. 117. 
31 Rubinstein, A., From Herzel to Gush Emunim and back (Tel Aviv: Schocken Books, 1980), 
103. 
32 Inbar, E., "Attitudes Toward War" p. 433. 
33 See Waltz, K., Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). 
Waltz famously argued that wars occur'because there is nothing to stop them'. 
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a combination of two Israeli collective memories: the "vivid memory of the Holocaust 
and the systematic extermination of 6 million helpless Jews" and the "realisation that 
the State of Israel, the only sovereign home for the Jews, is surrounded by Arab 
states, who are waiting to take advantage of any Israeli weakness. "1' The Zionist 
lesson that "between Israel and survival there is only IDF"35 takes yet a different spin 
when combined with a fatalistic or pessimistic assessment of Israel's strategic 
environment. Inbar observes that "many in Israel, including many in its political elite, 
... hold a Manichean 
Weltanschaung, in which the Jews alone face the hostile and/or 
untrustworthy Gentiles. " Seen though the Jewish prism, the world is divided into 
"them and us, goyim and Jews ... they, the predictable persecutors; we, the inevitable 
victims. "37 Viewed from Jerusalem the world is still 'a hostile place' and "nothing, not 
even statehood, has sufficed to change this basic condition, anti-Semitic prejudice. "38 
When the international community criticises Israel, a great many Israelis, including 
former Israeli President Chaim Herzog, perceive those attacks as an "irrational 
attitude of the Western world against Jews, Judaism, and ... the Jewish State. "39 
Isolationism 
When we looked out at the world we saw it divided between those who 
wanted to see us destroyed and those who would not raise a finger to prevent 
it from happening. 40 
The pessimistic woridview described above promotes introversion and self- 
reliance. As Aaron Klieman puts it: "it perpetuates the ancient themes of threat and 
persecution. It pictures Israel as alone and as friendless, with the possible exception 
of fellow Jews. "41 The sense of isolation implicit in the assumption of the world's 
hostility (or at best, malevolent indifference) was captured by Asher Arian in the form 
of a concept called the "people apart syndrome" which the author posited as "central 
3` Gal, R., A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier p. 146. 
3'Gal, R., A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier p. 146. 
1 Inbar, E., "Jews, Jewishness" p. 174. 
31 Marrus, M., "The Use and Misuse of the Holocaust" in Hayes p. (ed. ) Lessons and 
Legacies, The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing World (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1991) p. 108. 
31 Klieman, A., Israel and the Wortd p. 45. 
39 Klieman, A., Israel and the World p. 51. 
40 Eban, A., My Country (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972) p. 180. 
41 Klieman, A., Israel and the World p. 51. 
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in explaining the relations between perceived threat and policy position. "42 The 
"people apart syndrome", argues Arian, "identifies and sanctifies Israel as a people 
with unique challenges and opportunities. It is a secular nationalist extension of the 
biblical covenant of the chosen people ... the 'catechism of Israel's religion of 
security. "43 This belief system sets Israel as "a people apart ... relying on itself, on [its] 
military strength, on the Jewish people, and on God. "" Thus the two constructs - the 
God-and-us construct and the do-it-alone construct together identify the Israelis as a 
people apart. The organisation of attitudes that Arial calls 'religion of security' 
includes both instrumental and mystical elements. Thus a rational model of security 
policy that establishes predictable relations between means and ends coexists with 
irrational beliefs in historical determinism and divine intervention. As Arian put it: "On 
the symbolic and psychological levels, there are the Almighty and the Jewish people; 
on the level of rationality and professionalism, there are the Israeli Defence Force, 
the Mossad, the Shin Bet (General Security Service), and Israel's other security 
institutions. "' 
The passage in the Bible that assigns Israel to being an eternal "people that 
shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations" (Numbers 23: 9) is 
deeply rooted in the political culture of contemporary Israel and thus "isolation is 
immediately recognised. "16 For example, in 1974, Prime Minister Rabin said: "We 
should have no illusions and we should know that we are isolated in the world.... 
Israel shall dwell alone and only our military might guarantees our existence. "" An 
even more poignant illustration of this attitude is the fact that during the period of 
relative military superiority between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, when 
Israeli society was imbued with an entire repertoire of nationalistic songs, one of the 
more popular ones was entitled Ha'olam Kulo Negdainu - "the entire world is against 
us. " Kook states that the "enthusiasm" and "arrogance" with which the song was sang 
is symptomatic of the intertwining of the politics of uniqueness and the politics of 
42 Arian, A., "A People Apart: Coping With National Security Problems in Israel" in Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 33: 4 (December 1989) p. 606. 
43 Arian, A., "A People Apart" p. 611. 
T`Arian, A., "A People Apart" p. 606. 
45Arian, A., "A People Apart" p. 611. 
4' Inbar, E., "Jews, Jewishness" p. 175. 
47 Yitzhak Rabin in Ma'ariv, September 25,1974. 
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exclusion in Israel. 18 Uniqueness is a desired isolation, while exclusion implies an 
imposed isolation. Israelis' sense of entitlement and the concurrent claim to 
sympathy and ethical indulgence favoured uniqueness. Israel has always been seen 
as "a country that defines, and then plays, by its öwn rules, and which embodies a 
history that does not abide by the accepted conceptual and experiential categories. "", 
At times, it seems that Israel opted for uniqueness even at the price of exclusion. In 
an empirical study, Arian demonstrated both the importance of the feelings of 
aloneness and self-reliance that characterise Israel and "the generalised distribution 
of these convictions, regardless of class, education, age, and even of politics. "50 The 
"people apart syndrome" establishes identity by excluding the outsiders as well as by 
excluding oneself from the outside world. It thereby increases the cohesion and 
solidarity within the community. Although "the people apart syndrome may, " as Arian 
argues, "represent a tremendous strength for defining the community of the Jewish 
State of Israel, "51 it is also a self-fulfilling prophecy. Zygmunt Bauman saw this self- 
exclusion of the Israelis as the greatest posthumous triumph of the Endlösung's 
designers: 
They did not manage to turn the world against the Jews, but in their graves 
they can still dream of turning the Jews against the world, and thus - one way 
or another - to make the Jewish reconciliation with the world, their peaceful 
cohabitation with the world, all that more difficult, if not impossible. 
Expressivist Use of Force 
There won't be another Holocaust in history. Never again. Never again. 53 
In a 1986 samples' 82 percent of those questioned reported that they did not 
believe that a Holocaust is again likely. What is more important, however, is that this 
conviction is related to the belief in the strength and prowess of Israeli Defence 
'' Kook, R., "Between Uniqueness and Exclusion: The Politics of Identity in Israel in 
Comparative Perspective" in Barnett, M. N. (ed. ), Israel in Comparative Perspective p. 199. 
49 Kook, R., "Between Uniqueness and Exclusion" p. 199. 
50 Arian, A., "A People Apart" p. 617. 
51 Arian, A., "A People Apart" p. 622. 
52 Bauman, Z., "The Holocaust's Life as a Ghost" in Tikkun, 13: 4 (July/ August 1998) p. 37. 
53 Menachem Begin quoted in Shipler, D. K., "Begin Defends Raid, Pledges to Thwart a New 
Holocaust" in New York Times, 10 June 1981 p. 1. 
54 Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel. ' 
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Forces and not in their greater trust in Gentiles. 55 The strong feeling of mistrust 
regarding the international environment described in the previous sections, coupled 
with a "fundamental belief that ... if it depended on the world at large, the 
Holocaust 
could happen again"' engendered two lessons' about national security: military 
strength and self-reliance. Israel should always be prepared to fight alone (because 
nobody would come to its rescue) and still win (because a defeat would mean total 
annihilation). Thus the Holocaust provided both motivation and justification for 
Israel's acquisition of the ultimate weapon. It was, as Avner Cohen put it "the 
determination not to be helpless again" that "inspired his [Ben Gurion's] pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. "57 A 1988 sample58 showed that 58 percent were willing to use 
nuclear weapons in order to avoid defeat in a conventional war and 52 percent to 
save many lives. 96 percent supported the use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear 
attack. This brief example of nuclear weapons demonstrates the pervasiveness in 
Israeli approach to security of two seemingly contradictory elements: the perception 
of threat "reminiscent of the crusades, the pogroms and the Holocaust, " and a 
response which was now Biblical: "No longer passive and meek, the response of 
Israel and Israelis was one of armed power, retaliation, and retribution. "59 
Although Israel has often had to use force and has, in most cases, done so 
within the parameters of instrumental rationality, violence has also been exercised in 
order "to fulfil a deep inner need. "' Inbar identified this expressivist use of force as 
"not so much intended to influence the enemy as to give vent to the need to pay him 
back. "61 For the traditional Zionist ideology, the resurrection of the Jewish state 
marked the end of a long history of Jewish helplessness and persecution. In that 
context, the role of violence goes beyond the need to survive, it fulfils the need for 
"assertiveness and respectability. "62 In the words of Member of the Knesset (hereafter 
MK) Hanan Porat: "The days of pogroms, persecutions, forced baptism and blood- 
55 Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel" ft. 8. 
ý Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel" p. 11. 
"Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) p. 10. 
Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel. " 
59 Arian, A. "Perception of Threat in Israel" p. 11. 
60 Naor, A., Government At War. How The Israeli Government Functioned During The 
Lebanon War, 1982 (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1986). 
61 Inbar, E., "Jews, Jewishness p. 176. 
1 Inbar, E., "Attitudes Toward War" p. 438. 
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libels are gone forever. Now, since our return home to build the House of Israel, a life 
without shame and degradation, a life of honour, has returned to us. "63 In this context, 
a hesitation to use force has often been depicted as an expression of the "exile 
mentality" - one of the most serious offences for an Israeli. When attacking the critics 
of the Lebanon war, MK Geula Cohen began by accusing them of Diaspora mentality 
when she said: "Among a certain section of the critics ... there is also a Diaspora 
tone. They are only prepared for pogroms. When they are on the receiving end of 
massacres, then they are prepared to retaliate. They love to be massacred. They are 
not prepared to go out and prevent massacres. "6' Therefore, war does not only 
guarantee the physical survival, it serves, as Inbar put it, "to restore Jewish honour. "' 
The conviction that too little was done to resist the Nazis during the Holocaust makes 
Israeli defence establishment more risk prone. As Shai Feldman observed: "With 
memories of the Holocaust so vivid in the minds of Israelis, the prospects of military 
defeat are likely to induce even, greater risk-taking than would normally have been 
the case. "66Furthermore, the General Chief of Staff during the Lebanon war, Rafael 
Eitan, openly admitted "military actions have also served to assuage feelings of 
revenge. "s' Similarly, Ezer Weizman, former Israeli President, noted that the desire 
for vengeance was at the core of Israeli retaliatory policy: "During thirty years of war 
and terrorist activity there was created in Israel a tariff of retaliation and vengeance, a 
sort of commercial balance-sheet of the blood bank. Success or failure in actions and 
wars, the need to retaliate and to act or not to act, were also measured in 
accordance with the number of coffins on both sides of the border. "68 
61 Quoted in Inbar, E., "Jews, Jewishness" p. 177. 
" Parliamentary Minutes, Vol. 94 p. 2915 (June 28,1982). 
115 Inbar, E., "Jews, Jewishness" p. 177. 
68 Feldman, S., Israeli Nuclear Deterrence p. 88. 
67 Eitan, R., A Soldier's Story p. 163. 
68 Weizman, E., The Battle for Peace (New York: Bantam Books, 1981) p. 43. 
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Humanism / Criticism 
We did not survive the gas chambers and crematoria so that we could 
become the oppressors of Gaza. 09 
The need to emphasise by means of military power that a new breed of Jews, 
proud and erect, is creating a new Jewish history in Israel is "undoubtedly attractive 
among all shades of Israeli political opinion. "70 However, some voices of dissent drew 
attention to the dangers inherent in this emphasis on Jewish power, especially in 
combination with self-righteousness of an eternally persecuted victim. In a very 
influential article, a famous Israeli columnist, Boaz Evron interrogated the standard 
Israeli version of the lessons of the Holocaust. " The first sentence set the tone: 
"Two terrible things happened to the Jewish people this century: the Holocaust and 
the lessons learned from it. "72 The author began by challenging the thesis that the 
extermination of Jews was unique among Nazi crimes. He argued that "the Jewish 
monopolisation of the Nazi experience, by presenting the Jews as its almost- 
exclusive victims, separates Jews from the human race ... 
This causes a paranoid 
reaction among parts of the Jewish population, which feel themselves cut off from 
humanity and its laws. "73 Such disconnection, warned Evron, "might cause certain 
Jews, when in a position of power, to treat non-Jew as subhuman and, in fact, to 
repeat the racist Nazi attitudes. "" Evron further observed that "the continuous 
mentioning of the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and the hatred of Jews in all generations, 
has created in the Israeli consciousness a peculiar moral blindness, expressed by 
double moral standards. Because 'the world' was always presented as out to get us, 
we ourselves are exempted from any moral consideration in relating to it. "75 Evron is 
particularly critical of the inability (and sometimes unwillingness) of Israelis to 
distinguish between Arab hatred and other forms of persecution to which Jews had 
been subject in the Diaspora. Blurring the critical difference between Arabs and 
Nazis combined with a continuous reminder of the danger of the Holocaust "causes a 
69 Lemer, M., "The Occupation: Immoral and Stupid" in Tikkun 3 (March-April, 1988) p. 7. 
70 Inbar, E., "Attitudes Toward War" p. 444. 
71 Evron, B. "The Holocaust: Learning the Wrong Lessons" Journal of Palestine Studies, No. 
10 (Spring 1981), pp. 16-26. Originally published in Hebrew under the title "Holocaust: A 
Danger to the Nation" in 1980. 
72 Evron, B. "The Holocaust" p. 16. 
73 Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 19. 
74 Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 19. 
75 Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 21. 
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hysterical response from the average Israeli [and] freezes Israeli political 
consciousness at the pre-state level, so that it is unable to relate to real forces 
operation in the political sphere or to understand them. "7e Since the threat perception 
is totally divorced from reality and the "choices 'presented to the Israeli are not 
realistic, but only 'Holocaust' or 'victory'", Evron warned, "the Israeli becomes free of 
any moral restrictions, since one who is in danger of annihilation sees himself 
exempted form any moral considerations which might restrict his efforts to save 
himself. " Last but not least, Evron notes, the leadership itself "is no longer able to 
understand what is happening in the real world, and what are the historical processes 
in which the state is caught. Such a leadership ... itself constitutes a danger to the 
very existence of the state. "" 
Other critics were embittered by the fact that a nation as persecuted as the 
Jews is able to perpetrate immoral and cruel acts against another nation. The image 
of the Holocaust being readily available in the minds of Israelis, the plight of Arab 
refugees or the brutality of the Israeli response to the Palestinian uprising, 
spontaneously evoked parallels between Palestinian and Jewish suffering. Already in 
the 1950s some Jewish and Israeli critics lamented the Israeli behaviour vis-ä-vis the 
Arabs. They were particularly saddened by the young state's desire to dispose of its 
Arab minority by making them flee. Thus Nathan Chofshi wrote: 
The point that is usually overlooked [in reports that glorify Israel] is the 
tragedy of Arab refugees. Whatever the political and other causes which have 
brought about the mass psychosis of an entire people and made them run 
naked and barefoot from their homes ... the fact is that hundreds of 
thousands of people are now in want and suffer hunger, cold, and disease.... 
How can one remain indifferent in the face of such an awful tragedy? ... What 
did we use to say to non-Jews who remained indifferent to similar tragedies of 
Jews? " 
76 Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 26. 
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After the Israeli reprisal attack in the Jordanian town of Kibiyeh, which took the lives 
of more than fifty Arabs in 1953, Zukerman observed: 
The truth which a good many Jews have deliberately avoided facing is that 
the rise of nationalism has had the same effect on Jews as on most other 
people of our age. Together with the normal emotions of love for wronged and 
persecuted people, it has awakened also the feeling of group selfishness and 
chauvinism and has unleashed the latent forces of cruelty from which the 
Jews are not exempt. 79 
Humanistic dissent almost totally disappeared in the period after the Six-Day 
War, which for many represented a conversion experience of almost mystical nature. 
It was only in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the horrific massacre of 
Palestinian refugees perpetrated by the Lebanese Phalanists with IDF's knowledge 
at Sabra and Shatilla, that the critical outrage erupted again. When the slogan 'Death 
to the Arabs' gained currency in the early 1980s among the young followers of a 
racist rabbi, Meir Kahane, the Knesset member Haike Grossman, a Holocaust 
survivor said that "in her darkest dreams ... in the nightmares that pursued her for 
many long years, she never thought that such a thing could happen. "80 Similarly, 
Jacobo Timerman, who was a victim of anti-Semitism in Argentina, wrote in regard to 
the war in Lebanon: "In these past months I have left behind me many illusions, 
some fantasies, several obsessions. ... Among all those things there is one that 
shatters me beyond consolation. I have discovered in Jews a capacity for cruelty that 
I never believed possible. "81 This time the dissent went further than in the 1950s and 
turned the existing Holocaust discourse against itself by comparing Israel to Nazi 
Germany. The latter linkage - sometimes only implied, sometimes explicit - was 
even more often circulated during the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. 
Thus a leading public figure, Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz called Israeli policies in 
Lebanon "Judeo-Nazi"82 and a well-known songwriter declared "We had better start 
preparing ourselves and the glass booths in which we will sit when they judge us for 
79 Zukerman, W., Voice of Dissent p. 35. 
80 Quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 407. 
81 Timerman, J., The Longest War. Israel in Lebanon (New York: Vintage, 1982) p. 158. 
82 "Professor Leibowitz Calls Israel's Policy in Lebanon Judeo-Nazi" Yediot Aharonot, 21 
June 1982 p. 7. 
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what we did to the Palestinian people. " As Chapter Six shows, an influential minority 
of Israelis, namely members of Israel's intellectual and cultural elite, has espoused 
universalistic lessons of the Holocaust, teaching compassion and mercy for all those 
in distress. 
Jewish Prism Of Israeli Leaders 
Introduction 
Those with 'survival complex' devised the educational system; those with the 
'accomplished facts' mentality execute it. ... The products are to be seen in the third generation. 04 
The Israeli political and military elite consists of three generations each with a 
different socialising experience and mentality. Until very recent appointments of the 
first Sephardi Jews to key positions in the Israeli establishment (Chief of Staff Shaul 
Mofaz in 1998 and President Moshe Katzav in 2000), all posts of responsibility were 
occupied by Jews of European origin. The first generation of European Jews in Israel 
were the founders. Born between 1880 and 1918, the founders are those people 
who founded political Zionism and struggled for the creation of the State of Israel. 
After the establishment of the state, they moulded its institutions, politics, society, 
economics, and army. The founding fathers held key positions in the Israeli 
government and army until the 1970s and they determined the education of the 
young. They were especially marked by waves of persecution culminating in the 
pogroms that swept the Czarist Russia between 1881 and 1903. The pogroms were 
partly government inspired, partly ignored by the authorities. Jews were killed, 
maimed, robbed and made homeless from Warsaw to Odessa, "with a violence not 
seen since the Crusaders. "' As a result of this persecution, many Jews fled to 
America (and rarely to Palestine), others became socialist revolutionaries, and others 
again found refuge in Zionism. A few thousand Zionist pioneers came to Palestine 
between after the abortive 1905 revolution and the First World War. Among this 
second wave of immigration were also the sixteen-year old Shmuel Dayan, the father 
of General Moshe Dayan, and a young man from Plonsk, David Grien who later 
changed his name to Ben Gurion and became the founder of the State of Israel. The 
83Almagor, D., "I Regret" in Yerushalaim, 16 Dec. 1988 p. 23. 
1" Orr, A., Israel p. 37. 
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third wave of immigration followed the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the ferocious 
upsurges of peasant anarchism in Ukraine, which caused a series of pogroms 
resulting in numerous Jewish casualties. Members of the first three Aliyot (waves of 
immigration) were moved by the same spirit and the same values: to create a 'new 
Jew' and a model society based on social, economic and political equality. The 
chalutzim (pioneers) totally rejected the Diaspora and everything to do with it, 
including its social rituals, dressing codes, religion, and the- proverbial Jewish 
sentimentality. They sought to create the ideal of a 'new Jew: free, tough, 
unsentimental, proud, and always ready to strike back. They founded the collective 
and cooperative forms of settlement - kibbutzim and moshavim, respectively - in the 
spirit of egalitarianism and religion of labour. 
The children of those who left their countries and immigrated to Palestine, 
born or educated in Palestine under the British rule (1918-1948) constitute the 
second generation. Their experience was shaped by perpetual struggle against the 
Arabs and the British. Unlike their parents, this generation has no persecution or 
identity complex, and no memories of pogroms. They are the Sabras, the realisation 
of their parents' dream of a 'new Jew'. Generals Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin are 
typical representatives of this generation. The guiding attitude of the first generation 
of native-born Israelis is one of 'creating accomplished facts. ' The second generation 
does not identify with the Jewish people but with the Israeli state. Therefore, unlike 
Ben Gurion's or Golda Meir's generation, who consider the Arabs as yet another 
brand of anti-Semites, people like Dayan and Rabin recognise the Palestinians as a 
people fighting for a justifiable, albeit unacceptable, cause. Last but not least, the 
second generation are those people who were most critical of the Diaspora, even to 
the point of 'understanding' anti-Semites for hating Jews. Those are also the young 
men and women who rejected the Holocaust survivors with utmost arrogance, 
sometimes bordering on cruelty, as the next chapter shows. It was precisely the 
extent of this rejection of the Jewish past and the European refugees that horrified 
the founders. The latter sought to remedy this situation in the third generation (born 
after 1948), whose consciousness was moulded by the Israeli state educational 
system and five Arab-Israeli wars in which most would have fought. The effects of the 
Jewish consciousness education and its results were discussed in the previous 
chapter and are not repeated here. Only one Israeli Prime Ministers so far belonged 
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to the third generation - Binyamin Netanyahu. Nevertheless, this generation is 
crucial both to the extent that its members constitute the pool of future leaders and 
the active core of the Israeli public and its Defence Forces. 
David Ben Gurion (1886 -1973) 
The tragedy is deeper than the abyss, and the members of our generation 
who did not taste that hell would do best ... to remain sorrowfully and humbly 
silent. My niece, her husband, and her two children were buried alive. Can 
such things be talked about? 88 
David Ben Gurion was the founder of the State of Israel and its longest serving 
Prime Minister (13 years altogether). Born in Czarist Poland in 1886, David Grien 
was educated in a Hebrew school established by his father who was an ardent 
Zionist. He immigrated to Ottoman-controlled Palestine in 1906 at the age of twenty 
and took a Hebrew name Ben Gurion (meaning 'son of a lion'). Young Ben Gurion 
worked as a labourer in agricultural settlements thus putting into practice the Zionist 
philosophy of redeeming the land through labour. In 1912, he started studying law in 
Istanbul but was expelled from Palestine, together with other Zionists, in 1915. In 
New York, where he was exiled during the war years, Ben Gurion devoted himself to 
building the American wing of Labour Zionism. He returned to Palestine as a soldier 
of the Jewish Legion, a unit of British Army created by the Revisionist leader Ze'ev 
Jabotinsky. Maintaining his conviction that Jewish labour would provide the 
foundation of the Jewish state, he became the Secretary General of the Histadrut 
(the General Federation of Labour), a post he occupied until 1935. The Histadrut still 
provided the bastion of Zionist power a decade and more after the creation of the 
state. Ben Gurion also established Mapai, which became the ruling party during the 
first decades of statehood. In 1935, Ben Gurion was appointed to the key post of 
chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, the government of Jewish settlement in 
Palestine (Yishuv), a post he held until the establishment of the state in 1948. Deeply 
concerned with security, Ben Gurion worked tirelessly for the development of a 
Jewish defence capability in Palestine. When World War II broke out he encouraged 
Jews to fight for the Allies, while organizing an underground agency to smuggle Jews 
fleeing from Nazi-occupied Europe into Palestine. After the war, Jewish violence 
against the British escalated. While Ben Gurion supported the principle of armed 
86Ben Gurion quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 294. 
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struggle, he condemned Jewish right-wing extremist groups Irgun and Lehi (under 
the leaderships of future Prime Ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, 
respectively) that carried out acts of terrorism against the British. 
On 14 May 1948, as the head of provisional government, David Ben Gurion 
proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel and became its first Prime 
Minister and Defence Minister. Under Ben Gurion's leadership waves of mass 
immigration doubled the country's population. He directed absorption efforts, 
instituted universal education and the public school system, and built the state 
institutions. As Defence Minister, Ben Gurion dissolved all the formerly autonomous 
military organisations and carried out a nerve-racking integration of these rival 
factions into the Israel Defence Force. Ben Gurion moulded the structure and the 
character of the IDF, which remained his chief concern from 1947 to his last day as 
Defence Minister in 1963. For all practical purposes, throughout his years in office, 
the "army fell solely under the jurisdiction of Ben Gurion in his dual role of Prime 
Minister and Defence Minister. He exercised control over the defence establishment 
by assuming the responsibility for making the final decision on foreign policy matters 
relating to war and peace and by his power to appoint and promote top-level army 
officers. " 87 Apart from its obvious primary function - to safeguard the state - the 
army, in Ben Gurion's eyes had to fulfil other roles as well. He wrote: "It is the duty of 
the army to educate a pioneer generation, healthy in body and spirit, courageous and 
loyal, which will unite the broken tribes and diasporas to prepare itself to fulfil the 
historical tasks of the State of Israel through self-realisation. "88 In the realm of 
education, the army's mission was to integrate the wave of post-war immigrants from 
Europe and the Islamic countries who lacked the political dedication and 
organisational skills characteristic of those who came prior to establishment of the 
state. 
Ben Gurion's perception of Israel as a state with its back to the sea, 
surrounded by hostile Arab governments and indifferent 'world', favoured an attitude 
of self-reliance, especially with regards to weapon making. This policy required the 
87 Perlmutter, A., Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion (London: 
Frank Cass, 1969) p. 58. 
Ben Gurion quoted in Perlmutter, A., Military and Politics in Israel p. 66. 
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formation of "a sizeable industrial and scientific research complex which has 
developed weapons and techniques of warfare unique to the Israelis. "89 Weapons 
were produced locally even if that involved greater costs. It was the same fears and 
anxiety about Israel's security that led to the Israeli nuclear project. "Without the 
Holocaust, " noted Avner Cohen, "we cannot understand ... the depth of Ben Gurion's 
commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons. "90 Ben Gurion's preoccupations with 
security stemmed from his appraisal of the geopolitical reality of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. He knew that in spite of Israel's victory in the 1948 war, "the survival of the 
State of Israel was not assured. "s' Because Israel's survival was at stake, it could not 
afford to pass the opportunity to develop nuclear capacity. Professor Ernst David 
Bergmann, the founding father of Israeli nuclear project, shared Ben Gurion's 
conviction that the Holocaust justified Israel in taking any steps to ensure its survival. 
Although he rarely spoke about the Holocaust (as the opening quotation suggests), 
the tragedy of European Jews deeply influenced his outlook. He was quoted as 
saying: "I am convinced that the State of Israel needs a defence research program of 
its own so that we shall never again be led like lambs to the slaughter. "92 "Anxiety 
about the Holocaust, " observed Cohen, "reached beyond Ben Gurion to infuse Israeli 
military thinking. The destruction of Israel defined the ultimate horizon of the threat 
against Israel. Israeli military planners have always considered a scenario in which 
united Arab military coalition launched a war against Israel with the aim of ... 
destroying the Jewish state. This was referred to ... as mikre ha'kol [everything 
scenario]. This kind of planning, " concluded Cohen, "was unique to Israel, as few 
nations have military contingency plans aimed at preventing apocalypse. "93 
The same concern for Israel's national interest led Ben Gurion to put his 
political career on the line to obtain approval for the highly controversial reparation 
agreement with the German Federal Republic. The early 1950s were difficult times in 
Israel - the country was flooded with hundreds of thousands of new immigrants. 
Under the austerity program food and other necessities were rationed and 
89 Perlmutter, A., Military and Politics in Israel p. 73. 
90 Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb p. 10. 
91 Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb p. 13. 
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unemployment led to emigration. The reparations and compensation monies allowed 
Ben Gurion's government to offer Israelis more comfort and thereby make them feel 
better in their country. According to Segev, during the twelve years the reparation 
agreement was in effect, Israel's gross national product tripled. The Bank of Israel 
reckoned that 15 percent of this growth, and 45,000 jobs, could be attributed to 
investment made with reparation funds' On the other hand, agreements with 
Germany allowed tens of thousands of people to claim personal compensation. The 
reparations and compensation agreements issue illustrates Ben Gurion's pragmatic 
approach to a highly emotional issue. He had a vision and saw it realised. He 
pursued what he judged to be in the best interest of the State of Israel and he won 
the battle over negotiations with Germany. In 1953, Ben Gurion resigned from the 
government for two years and settled in Kibbutz Sde Boker in the Negev desert. 
Following the 1955 elections he returned as Prime Minister and led the country to the 
1956 Sinai campaign. In 1963, Ben Gurion resigned from the government thus 
bringing to an end almost three decades of leadership. After the 1967 Middle East 
war, Ben Gurion argued against holding on to Arab territory beyond Jerusalem. The 
fright that Israel was given in the 1973 war when the Arabs enjoyed success 
revealed, in Ben Gurion's view, a dangerous sign of arrogance and complacency. To 
a man guided by the ideal of hard work in the cause of Zionism, these characteristics 
were abhorrent. He died at the age of 84 two months after the Yom Kippur War and 
was buried in Sde Boker. 
Menachem Begin (1913 -1992) 
The lesson of the Holocaust - that compromise and weakness lead to death. " 
In 1977 Menachem Begin became the first prime minister who did not belong 
to the Labour movement and he was also the first European survivor to lead the 
country. He was born in Brest-Litovsk96 to a Zionist pioneer Ze'ev Dov Begin. He 
joined the Revisionist Betar movement in 1928. This movement abhorred the 
socialist ideology behind other wings of Zionism, and advocated strong leadership 
and discipline. Begin entered the law department at the University of Warsaw and 
94 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 241. 
95 Menachem Begin quoted in Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth 
of Redemption Through Return (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 
1985) p. 135. 
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graduated in 1935 as a master of jurisprudence. Just before the outbreak of the 
World War II, Begin became the commander of Polish Betar. After the Nazi invasion 
of Poland in September 1939, he fled to Lithuania where he was arrested by the 
Soviets for prohibited Zionist activities and sent tö a forced labour camp in Siberia. 
He was released in 1942 to serve the Polish army unit in response to the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union. His unit was sent to Amman and later to Jerusalem. 
Although Menachem Begin arrived in Palestine as early as 1942, the Nazis killed 
nearly all members of his family and there are many indications that he suffered from 
'survivor guilt. ' Survivors' guilt is more than just a sense of guilt for having remained 
alive; it is also the memory of their utter helplessness, of their "inability to act in a way 
they would ordinarily have thought appropriate (save people, resist the victimisers, 
etc. ) or even to feel the appropriate emotions (overwhelming rage toward victimisers, 
profound compassion for the victims). "97 The shame for failing to act according to 
their moral principles creates in survivors a strong "sense of debt to the dead and 
responsibility toward them. "' 
Begin joined the anti-British underground organisation Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi 
(Etzel) and became its commander in 1944. Under Begin's command, the Irgun 
carried out numerous acts of violence. In 1946 Irgun blew up a wing of Jerusalem's 
King David Hotel, the British government and military headquarters, killing 91 people. 
In 1948 Irgun and Lehi (the Stern gang) took part in the massacre of Arabs in the 
village of Deir Yassin in the vicinity of Jerusalem. According to his own account of the 
years in the underground, Irgun's terrorist activities were motivated both by survival 
guilt and expressivist use of force. Thus Begin wrote: "We were not spared in order to 
live in slavery and oppression and to await some new Treblinka. We were spared in 
order to ensure life and freedom and honour for ourselves, for our people, for our 
children and our children's children. We were spared in order that there should be no 
repetition of what happened there... "99 When he declared the revolt against the 
British Begin justified it with the following words: "This war [against the British] will 
demand many heavy sacrifices, but we enter on it in the consciousness that we are 
91 Lifton, J., "The Concept of the Survivor" Survivors, Victims p. 118. 
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being faithful to the children of our people who have been and are being slaughtered. 
It is for their sake that we fight, to their dying testimony that we remain loyal. "101 
According to Robert Rowland, Begin "dedicated ... his life to making certain 
that there can never be another holocaust. "10' The Holocaust shaped his entire 
political career; in 1952 he threatened Ben Gurion with civil war should he accept the 
reparations from Germany. Begins stance on the reparations issue clearly shows the 
failings of analysis based on rational argument. There is no question that it was in the 
immediate economic interest of Israel to accept German payment, but Begin rejected 
this aid "because he saw it as somehow absolving the German people of their guilt"102 
and thereby betraying the memory of the Holocaust victims. In 1965 he bitterly fought 
against establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic arguing: "It is 
up to us not to normalise relations, before the eyes of the world, between the 
exterminated and the exterminator. "103 He viewed the Arab mobilisation preceding the 
Six-Day War as threatening another Holocaust, 104 and he also justified the 1981 raid 
upon the Iraqi nuclear reactor as an action aiming to prevent yet another Holocaust. 
After accompanying President Sadat to Yad Vashem during his visit in Israel, Begin 
gave his guest the canonical Israeli version of the Holocaust's lesson: "No one came 
to save us - neither from the East nor from the West. For this reason, we have sworn 
a vow, we, the generation of extermination and rebirth: Never again will we put our 
nation in danger, never again will we put our women and children and those whom 
we have a duty to defend ... in range of enemy's deadly fire. "105 In a nutshell, Begin's 
interpretation of the Holocaust lessons was articulated around the themes of betrayal 
and indifference of the world, its subsequent loss any moral legitimacy, insistence on 
Israel's empowerment, self-reliance, and superior moral rights. 
On the eve of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Begin told the 
members of his government: "You know what I have done and what we have all done 
to prevent war and loss of life. But such is our fate in Israel. There is no way other 
100 Begin, M., The Revolt p. 43. 
101 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 58. 
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than to fight selflessly. Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided 
that there will be no more Treblinkas. "708 For Begin it was necessary to bomb the PLO 
camps. Like in the early days of the revolt against the British, through the raids Begin 
could again fight the ghost of the Holocaust and 'prove to the world that the Jews, 
although in mortal danger, will never die passively again and that Israel will deal out 
seven blows for every one it receives. In 1983 Begin convened the cabinet for the 
last time and announced his resignation. Five years later he supported Yitzhak 
Shamir's candidacy for Premiership at his party's (Herut) convention. He died in 1992 
of a heart attack. 
Yitzhak Shamir (1915 -) 
This state was born out of the ashes of the millions of Jews who died in the 
Holocaust. 107 ' 
Like David Ben Gurion and Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir originated from 
Poland. He was born Yitzhak Jezernitzky in a small town of Ruzinoy in 1915. His 
father was also an ardent socialist Zionist. The future Prime Minister of Israel 
attended Bialystok high school and like Begin entered the Revisionist Betar 
movement at the age of 14 and studied law. Shamir left Warsaw in 1935 for Palestine 
where he joined the Revisionist underground organisation, the Irgun. Unlike Begin, 
who was a commissar rather than a fighter, Shamir participated in retaliatory 
operations against Arab rioters. In 1940 Shamir followed a more militant faction of 
Irgun led by Avraham Stern that had broken away from the larger body. Stern's Lehi 
(Lohamei Herut Israel - Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) rejected Jabotinsky's call 
for a truce in the anti-British activities while Britain was fighting Nazi Germany and 
even made overtures to Hitler and Mussolini. Thus a representative of the Stern gang 
(as Lehi was also known) met with German foreign ministry official and offered to 
help Nazi Germany in its war against the British. 108 Shamir, however, has always 
claimed that he did not support Lehi's attempts to forge this link with the Nazis. After 
Stern was shot dead by the British police in 1942, Shamir took command of Lehi as 
part of a leadership troika. He coordinated organisational and operational activities, 
including the assassination of Lord Moyne, Churchill's representative in Cairo, in 
106 Naor, A., Government At Warp. 47 if. 
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1944 and that of Count Bernadotte, the Swedish mediator appointed by the UN, in 
1948. After having been captured by the British in 1946, Shamir spent two years in 
exile, in British and French jails, returning to Israel after its declaration of 
independence. Only then did he learn about his family's tragic fate. His mother and 
sister were murdered in Treblinka. His sister, brother-in-law and their children were 
killed having been betrayed by the Ukrainian business partner who had promised to 
hide them from the Nazis. And his father, who had succeeded in escaping on the way 
to Treblinka was murdered by his Polish neighbours when he asked them for help. 
Thirty years passed before Shamir would talk about these events publicly. "Shamir's 
Holocaust lesson was, " wrote an Israeli journalist, "that, to survive, the Jews would 
have to learn to be tougher than their enemies, more resolute in pursuit of their 
interests, more stubborn, pig-headed and uncompromising, too, if necessary. "109 After 
receiving the prestigious Israel Prize for life-time contribution to the society and the 
state in April 2001, Shamir expressed his woridview in a nutshell when he said: "The 
creation of the state turns us from a persecuted nation into an independent one. 
Jewish history has returned to this land and what happens here influences Jews 
everywhere. ... The fight 
for Israel still continues and our enemies are still great. ""' 
For ten years after the creation of the state, Shamir dropped out of the public 
eye. He first entered the business world before being recruited by the Mossad in 
1955. There he allegedly ran ad hoc operations including assassinations. "' After 
resigning from the Mossad in 1963, Shamir joined Begin's Herut party where he was 
responsible for the operation aiming to bring Soviet Jews to Israel. He was first 
elected to the Knesset in 1973 and after Likud's victory in 1977, Shamir was 
appointed speaker of the Knesset. Three years later, he was promoted to Foreign 
Minister and he succeeded Begin at the post of Prime Minister in 1983. Despite their 
common ideological background and their past in the underground movement, 
Shamir and Begin were as different in their approach as two men can be. Whilst 
Begin invoked the Bible and the Holocaust promiscuously, Shamir seldom mentioned 
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either. He was a very cautious and unadventurous Prime Minister who unlike Begin 
resisted the pressures from Ariel Sharon and kept Israel out of war for the longest 
period of time in its short history. As a Likud minister explained: "It is a difference in 
mentality. ... Sometimes he [Shamir] tries to use , 
big, Begin-like gestures in his 
speeches, but he doesn't like it. He looks ridiculous to himself. " Yet, as the same 
minister concedes "the difference is more one of style than ideology" "I because 
Shamir was no more likely than his preachy, charismatic predecessor to yield an 
inch. Yitzhak Shamir's second term as Prime Minister (1986 -1992) was marked by 
two major events: the 1991 Gulf War and the Middle East peace conference in 
Madrid that inaugurated direct talks between Israel and the Arab states, eventually 
leading to the Oslo Agreements. On the domestic front, Shamir's government carried 
out two major immigration and absorption efforts since the 1950s: the emigration of 
450,000 Jews from the Soviet Union in 1989, and the 'Operation Solomon, ' which 
brought 15,000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel in a massive airlift. On this occasion, Prime 
Minister Shamir reiterated the moral justification for the existence of Israel : "The 
State of Israel's highest obligation is to stand ready to defend the Jewish people 
anywhere in the world where evil has come upon them. ""' After his party lost the 
1992 elections, Shamir stepped down from the party leadership and retired from the 
Knesset in 1996. 
Moshe Dayan (1915 -1981) 
Millions of Jews who were killed because they had no country now gaze at us 
from the dust of Israeli history and command us to settle and raise up, once 
again, a land for our people. I" 
Moshe Dayan was born in 1915, on kibbutz Deganya Alef, near Lake Kinneret 
to parents Shmuel and Devorah. According to Dayan's own account his parents 
never suffered personal persecution in their native Russia. They came to Palestine 
"as young idealists""' and settled on the kibbutz. At the age of fourteen, Dayan joined 
the Haganah, an underground organization that defended Jewish settlements from 
Arab attacks. The Haganah decided to enrol the youngsters after the Arab massacre 
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of sixty-seven Jews in Hebron. Sixty others were wounded, synagogues were 
destroyed and Torah scrolls burned. "The Haganah was determined, " writes Dayan, 
"that isolated Jewish communities ... would never again be helpless, unarmed, or at 
the mercy of Arab extremists. "' 16 When the British outlawed the Haganah in 1939, 
Dayan was arrested, together with 42 of his comrades and sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment. Released in 1941, he joined the British army, where he served with 
the forces that liberated Lebanon and Syria from Vichy France during World War II. 
He was wounded in battle in Lebanon and lost his left eye. He began to wear the 
black eye patch that later became his trademark. He remained active in the Haganah 
until 1948. 
During the 1948 War of Independence Dayan commanded the defence of 
Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley before he was appointed commander on the 
Jerusalem front in August 1948. He was appointed chief of operations at General 
Headquarters in 1952, and in December 1953 became Chief of General Staff, a post 
he held until January 1958. Dayan became Chief of Staff during a time of severe 
Arab belligerence. Despite the military armistice of 1949, the surrounding Arab 
nations remained hostile, maintaining a maritime blockade, reinforcing an economic 
boycott, promoting political and propaganda warfare and supporting terrorism in 
Israel. The Israeli government was unable to contain the terrorist violence. Dayan 
insisted on strong retaliation operations. His view was that the Arabs saw terrorism 
as a stage of war, and the longer the terrorist attacks continued, the longer the Arabs 
had to build up their military strength. He wanted to force the Arabs into open battle 
before they gained full military power. Under Dayan's command, the Israeli military 
launched raids in Gaza and other retaliatory missions, causing heavy casualties to 
the Egyptians, Syrians, and other Arab populations. On October 29,1956, Dayan led 
Israel's Suez campaign, an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula after Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan signed a pact stating as their goal the destruction of Israel. 
Dayan left the military in 1958 and entered politics. He joined the Labour Party 
and was elected to the Knesset in 1959. He served as Minister of Agriculture in the 
government of David Ben Gurion from 1959 until 1964. With the buildup of tension 
I" Dayan, M., Story of My Life p. 38. 
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between Egypt and Israel leading to the 1967 war, Dayan was invited to join the 
national unity government as Minister of Defense, in which capacity he conducted the 
Six-Day War. After the war, Dayan was in charge of the territories occupied by the 
Israeli Army. He opened the borders for Arab residents of the territories to travel to 
Arab countries, while at the same time maintaining order and security in Israeli-held 
areas. Moshe Dayan kept his position as Defense Minister when Golda Meir 
succeeded Levi Eshkol as Prime Minister in 1969. If 1967 was Dayan's finest hour, 
the Yom Kippur war tarnished his prestige. When the Egyptians attacked on October 
6,1973, Israel was unprepared for the surprise attack and unable to repulse it 
quickly. The nation's lack of preparation was blamed on Defense Minister Dayan and 
an outraged public demanded his resignation. The president of the Supreme Court 
set up a commission to investigate the performance of generals during the war. The 
commission recommended the resignation of the Chief of Staff, but reserved 
judgement on Dayan. The press and the public, however, condemned him. After 
attending a military funeral at which bereaved parents had called him a murderer of 
their sons, Dayan submitted his resignation in 1974. In 1977, newly elected Likud 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin offered him the Foreign Ministry portfolio. In May 
1977, Dayan began the negotiations leading to Camp David Accords of 1978. In 
1979, he resigned as Foreign Minister. On May 14,1979, Dayan was diagnosed with 
colon cancer. He died on October 16,1981 in Tel Aviv. 
Yitzhak Rabin (1922 -1995) 
The analysis of the facts proves that essentially what has assured Israel's 
existence and will continue to do so, in the face of the hatred around it and 
the will to destroy it, is primarily Israel's comprehensive power, with military 
might as the decisive element. "' 
Yitzhak Rabin was the first Sabra who became the Prime Minister of Israel. He 
was born in Jerusalem in 1922 into a zealous Zionist family. His father had 
immigrated to Israel from the United States and served as a volunteer in the Jewish 
Legion during the First World War. His mother was one of the first members of the 
Haganah, the pre-state Jewish army. After completing his schooling at the Kadoorie 
Agricultural high school, Rabin joined the Palmach - the elite strike force of the 
Haganah. During his years of service in the Palmach, he distinguished himself as a 
117 "Interview with Yitzhak Rabin" in Bamahane, 28 December 1965 p. 4. 
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military leader. With the dissolution of the Palmach and the creation of the IDF after 
the independence, Rabin began his long career in the army. By 1962 Rabin had risen 
to the position of Chief of the General Staff and was promoted to the rank of 
Lieutenant General. He developed the IDF fighting doctrine based on swift movement 
and surprise, which was employed in the Six-Day war, the finest hour of Rabin's 
military career. In 1968, Rabin retired from the IDF and took the post of Israel's 
ambassador to Washington. During his mandate, Rabin played a major role in 
securing massive American military aid to Israel. Yet, despite his commitment to 
friendly relations with Washington, Rabin was averse to transforming the special 
relationship with the United States into a formal alliance. Rabin returned to Israel just 
before the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and in 1974, he defeated Shimon Peres in a vote 
for a Labour leader to replace Golda Meir. During the period of Rabin's Premiership, 
just after the Yom Kippur War, special emphasis was placed on improving the 
economy, strengthening the IDF and restoring public morale, which had been badly 
affected by the war. In July 1976, the government headed by Yitzhak Rabin ordered 
the "Entebbe operation" - the daring rescue of Air France passengers hijacked by 
pro-Palestinian terrorists to Uganda. 
Rabin's coalition fell apart in 1977, and the subsequent election brought the 
right-wing Likud bloc to power. Following the elections, Rabin served as a labour 
member of the Knesset in opposition, and was a member of the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee. He filled these positions until the formation of a national unity 
government in September 1984 where he served as Minister of Defence. During his 
tenure as Defence Minister, Rabin oversaw a major restructuring of the army and the 
IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon. According to his political biographer, Yitzhak Rabin 
adopted a realpolitik outlook on international affairs from an early age. 1, He 
emphasized the military power as the most important factor in world politics governed 
by a realist concept of 'self-help. ' Like Ben Gurion, Rabin believed that Israeli military 
strength was a precondition for survival in the face of Arab enmity and that Israel 
could not afford to lose a war. Rabin viewed the military built-up not only as a 
guarantee for survival but also as a prerequisite for negotiations with Israel's Arab 
neighbours. He believed that Israel's military superiority could serve the purpose of 
18 See Inbar, E., Rabin and Israel's National Security (Washington, D. C., The Woodrow 
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moderating Arab political expectations in the conflict. Unlike other Israeli leaders, 
Yitzhak Rabin "never indulged in expressive use of force and ... he never mentioned 
revenge or national honour as a reason for using military force. "19 Following the 
footsteps of Clausewitz, whom he occasionally praised in military forums, Rabin 
perceived the use of force as a means to achieve a desired political goal. 
The Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories taught the then Defence 
Minister Rabin the limits of force. In 1987, Rabin ordered tough measures to be used 
against the rebelling Palestinians. Yet, neither the beatings and shootings nor mass 
arrests and deportations solved the problem. Rabin realised that 1.7 million 
Palestinians under occupation could not be ruled by force. Based on of a more 
optimistic evaluation of the regional environment Rabin operated a significant shift in 
Israel's strategic thinking. Back in office as Prime Minister in 1992 he prepared the 
Israeli public for compromise with the Palestinians. In August 1993 Rabin announced 
mutual Israel-PLO recognition and his government began negotiations towards a 
peace settlement with the Palestinians and with Israel's Arab neighbours. The 
agreement with the PLO was followed by a peace treaty with Jordan and the 
beginning of ties with various Arab countries including Morocco and Tunisia. The 
Arab countries eased their economic boycott of Israel and the latter's international 
standing - tarnished by its response to the Intifada - improved. For his efforts toward 
regional peace, Rabin received the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize, together with Shimon 
Peres and Yasser Arafat. At the same time that they were viewed favourably by a 
large number of Israelis, Rabin's concessions aroused considerable opposition in the 
right-wing bloc. The anti-Rabin vilification reached its climax on November 4,1995, 
when a young nationalist Israeli, Yigal Amir, assassinated the Prime Minister as he 
was leaving a mass peace rally he had addressed in Tel Aviv. 
I'll Inbar, E., Rabin and Israel's National Security p. 85. 
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Conclusion: Holocaust Education For The Israeli Defence Forces 
Those who survived the holocaust, those who see pictures of a father and a 
mother, who hear the cries that disturb the dreams of those close to them, 
those who have listened to stories - know that no other people carries with it 
such haunting visions. And it is these visions which compel us to fight and yet 
make us ashamed of our fighting. 12' 
A brief overview of the Holocaust education offered to IDF officers, cadets, 
and soldiers brings to a close the discussion on Israeli security. Organised by the 
Yad Vashem Centre in cooperation with the educational staff of the officer-candidate 
school, the Holocaust awareness seminars are offered as an integral part of the 
cadets' training. Since its creation in 1985,33,000 cadets have taken part in this 
Holocaust educational program. The objectives and didactic goals of the one-day 
seminars include: 
> To impart Holocaust consciousness ... by enhancing knowledge and 
understanding. 
¢ To emphasise the uniqueness and historical significance of the 
Holocaust on the national and human level. 
To convey identification with the fate of the Jewish people around the 
world.... 
> To emphasise the importance of the creation and existence of the 
State of Israel to the entire Jewish people.... 
> To understand the connection between the IDF and the Holocaust and 
the cadet's role not only as a soldier but as an Israeli, a Jew, and a 
human being. ` Z' 
The programme of the seminars starts with a clip from the film Der Ewige Jude (The 
Eternal Jew) and a lecture on The Uniqueness and Historical Significance of the 
Holocaust. " Der Ewige Jude is the most famous Nazi propaganda film, created to 
legitimise the exclusion and ultimately the destruction of the Jewish people. 
Produced at the insistence of Joseph Goebbels, the film depicts the Jews of Poland 
120 Muki Tzur quoted in "When Soldier-Poets Remember the Holocaust: Anti-War Poetry in 
Israel" in Young, J. E., Writing and rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences 
of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) p. 136. 
121 Shehori, F., "Holocaust Education and the Israeli Defense Forces" (October 14,1999) p. 
4. Courtesy of Yad Vashem. 
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as corrupt, filthy, lazy, ugly, and perverse: they are an alien people which have taken 
over the world through their control of banking and commerce, yet which still live like 
animals. The lecture that follows the film stresses the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
and discourages any comparison with other "horrots taking place in the present. 10122 It 
furthermore paints the scope of destruction and the significance of the Holocaust. 
The latter is assessed primarily with reference to "the critical harm to the biological 
future of the Jewish people ... the destruction of the eastern European Jewish 
biological pool which had the highest rate of natural increase. " 123 The lecture is 
followed by testimonies by Holocaust survivors and another lecture - "Difficulties in 
Creating a Fighting Consciousness in the Polish Ghettos. " The latter presentation 
addresses the "collective accusations made in Israel after the Holocaust" 124 by means 
of depicting the near-impossibility to resist the Nazis. Quite expectedly, the last part 
of the seminar establishes the connection between the IDF and the Holocaust. The 
film "In the Name of the Later Generations" is followed by a discussion led by 
company commanders. The film documents a visit by cadets, trainee pilots, and 
marines of the IDF to the extermination sites in Poland. According to the Yad 
Vashem description, the film represents "an emotional encounter of the present with 
the past, of free people in IDF uniforms - future officers - with the Holocaust. " It also 
"emphasises the strength of the State of Israel and of the IDF as factors that may 
prevent the recurrence of the Holocaust. "125 The concluding discussion is "intended to 
examine the feelings that the cadets are assumed to have and the conclusions that 
emerge from the discussion. " The feelings that the cadets are expected to have 
acquired during the day are the following: 
> Anger at the Germans (for murdering the Jewish people ... ), at the 
world (for its silence) and at the Jewish people (for going 'like sheep to 
the slaughter'). 
>A desire for political and personal revenge ... 
¢A sense of pride in being part of the Jewish people, which survived 
despite it all, founded the State of Israel, ... 
>A sense of public and personal mission ... 
122Shehori, F., "Holocaust Education" p. 4. 
123 Shehori, F., "Holocaust Education" p. 4. 
124 Shehori, F., "Holocaust Education" p. 5. 
125 Shehori, F., "Holocaust Education" p. 6. 
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The conclusions and recommendations of the seminar summarise the Israeli Army's 
lessons of the Holocaust: 
Feelings of anger, fear, and indignity can be resolved in the strong need for a 
safe refuge for the Jewish people. Therefore Israel must be strong. The 
physical strength of the State of Israel is dependent on its army.... The IDF 
fights for the existence of the Jewish people against all enemies, despite its 
small size. It wins its battles because it is motivated by unique factors.... 
Because IDF is a unique army, its officers are unique too. All the commanders 
should feel a sense of mission and should be motivated by the knowledge 
that their military service ... is enabling their nation to survive.. By means of 
Holocaust education, the officers will be able to foster in their soldiers a sense 
of identification with and belonging to the nation and state. '-16 
The programme of the Holocaust seminar designed for the IDF cadets includes all 
the elements of the Jewish prism described in the first part of this chapter. Not 
surprisingly, the Zionist lesson, combined with a strong sense of isolation, lies in the 
centre of the message: the strong need for a safe refuge can only be provided by a 
strong Israel. Concurrently, pessimism and fatalism pervade the discourse: another 
Holocaust appears to be kept away from the Jewish people only by the strength of 
Israel and the unique inspiration of its soldiers. Undoubtedly, the feelings of revenge 
and anger provoked by such seminars are channelled to improved performance and 
heightened motivation of the IDF via an expressivist use of force. Although the 
humanistic message of the Holocaust may be downplayed by the particularistic ones, 
Chapter Six and the Conclusion of this thesis show that the Israeli soldiers were in 
certain circumstances very receptive to the universalistic lessons of the Holocaust, 
which they applied to the situation at hand according to their best judgement. 
I 26 Shehori, F., "Holocaust Education" p. 7. 
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Chapter Three 
INDIVIDUAL HEALING AND COLLECTIVE TRAUMATISATION 
Introduction 
Trauma is contagious. ' 
The preceding two chapters surveyed the symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder in various groups of Holocaust survivors, intergenerational transmission of 
trauma, and the impact of the Holocaust on the worldview of those not directly 
effected, including Israeli leaders. The purpose of this and the following chapter is to 
survey the integration of Holocaust survivors and their traumas into Israeli society. 
The interdependent yet desynchronised processes of physical survivors' healing on 
one hand, and collective `traumatisation' on the other, unfolded gradually across the 
decades. This chapter surveys the period between the end of World War II and the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. This first period of Israel's dealing with the Holocaust 
is characterised by a unique situation in which the physical survivors tried to rebuilt 
their lives as "a new, extremely dynamic and enthusiastic community made demands 
on the newcomers for cooperation, effort, and rebuilding, which never before had 
been made on a group of such deeply traumatized persons. "2 On the other hand, the 
Jewish community in Palestine showed the first signs of collective traumatisation 
described by Erikson in chapter one: a stage of euphoria that a remnant survived, 
followed by a denial, and disidentification with survivors. 
Based on trauma literature the first part of the chapter begins with a 
description of individual healing following a massive traumatisation. As mentioned 
beforehand, given the scope and nature of Holocaust trauma, individual healing was 
inevitably framed within a broader, collective response to the murder of European 
Jewry. Thus the first section examines the incidence of initial collective response 
(euphoric) on the healing process of physical survivors. It does so with reference to 
Zionist rescue and state-building efforts epitomized in the famous journey of Exodus. 
Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 140. 
2 Eitinger, L., "The Concentration Camp Syndrome and Its Late Sequelae" in Dimsdale, J. E., 
Survivors, Victims p. 157. 
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Three features of this episode of Zionist history are significant: first, the Zionists 
consciously manipulated the survivors' tragedy for political ends and thereby 
generated power of the powerlessness; second, by joining forces with the survivors, 
the Palestinian Jews identified with the victims vis-ä-vis the Gentiles and acted as 
rescuers vis-ä-vis the survivors; and third, both the Zionists' manipulation of 
survivors' suffering and their ambiguous position as both victims and rescuers, were 
in more than one way beneficial to the survivors' process of healing. 
The second section describes the second phase of collective response to 
trauma - alienation and rejection. As the initial euphoria evaporated, solidarity with 
survivors collapsed in favour of arrogance and discomfort. The transition from 
euphoria to estrangement is illustrated with reference to the key moment in Israeli 
collective traumatisation - the physical encounter between survivors and the 
Palestinian Jews on the shores of Palestine. The popular image of "young men of the 
Zionist collective carrying the Holocaust survivors on their backs to the shores of the 
homeland"3 has symbolised the Zionist dichotomy, the old and the new, Diaspora and 
Israel, death and life. Statements of Zionist leaders and excerpts from Israeli popular 
literature from that period are used to reconstruct the Palestinian Jews' perception of 
themselves and their representation of the remnants of the European Jewry. The 
Zionist's leadership's efforts to impose their vision of 'new Jew' on Holocaust 
survivors are examined in relation to the survivors' need to reconstruct their shattered 
identities. 
The public reconstruction of the Holocaust did not take place until the 
Eichmann trial in 1961. Section three seeks to account for fifteen years of absence of 
public discourse on the greatest tragedy in modern Jewish history. Based on both the 
literature on trauma and the Zionist history the section demonstrates that a 
reconstruction of trauma did not take place within that time frame for two major 
reasons: firstly, the political enterprise of building a state in extremely difficult 
circumstances' did not leave any room for such painful soul-searching, and secondly, 
3Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 7. 
" In the first year of its existence, Israel waged a war against five regular Arab armies (Egypt, 
Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq), and absorbed 250.000 immigrants (representing 50 
percent of its population at the time). Immigration figures are taken from Segev, T., 1949, 
The First Israelis, (New York: The Free Press, 1986) p. 95. 
94 
the non-directly affected Israelis' refusal to listen to the survivors was an attempt to 
dissociate themselves from the catastrophe and its consequences. This apparent 
lack of interest and inability to hear their experiences somehow impeded the 
survivors' process of healing. 
Euphoria: Clandestine Immigration And Exodus 
In those difficult and trying days they [members of the Haganah and the illegal 
immigrants] all came together in a true partnership. Together they stood 
against their common enemy, together they fought and struggled, and 
together they participated in bringing about the birth of the State of Israel. 5 
'Disaster is power' is a slogan coined by Ben Gurion° conveying the idea that 
the Jewish disaster could represent "a kind of steam power that could be harnessed 
for political and military purposes, "7 that is, for the creation and preservation of the 
Jewish state. It goes without saying that this concept never implied that a disaster 
should be created in order to glean an advantage from it. Rather, the concept reflects 
Ben Gurion's belief that "since the Jews were unable to prevent the disaster from 
befalling them, they should at least employ it as best they could in their defence. "" 
Thus, instead of lamenting the suffering, Ben Gurion saw the latter as a source of 
political power, as the following excerpt illustrates: 
Disaster is power if we know how to channel it in a productive direction; the 
whole trick of Zionism is its ability to turn our disaster not into depression and 
helplessness, as has happened once in the Diaspora, but into a fountain of 
productivity and exhilaration. " 
Ben Gurion pronounced these words only weeks before the information about 
the existence of the death camps was confirmed. When the scope of the disaster 
became known, the concept fell out of use, and it was only at the last stages of the 
Holocaust that Ben Gurion returned to his formula. Before the Holocaust, the aim of 
Zionism was to convince Jews to come to Palestine. The purpose of immigration was 
5 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair. Holocaust Survivors and the Struggle for Palestine 
(London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1998) p. xiv. 
6 Teveth, S., Ben Gurion and the Holocaust, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996) 
p. xli. 
7 Teveth, S., Ben Gurion and the Holocaust p. xlii. 
8 Teveth, S., Ben Gurion and the Holocaust p. xli. 
9 Teveth, S., Ben Gurion and the Holocaust p. xlvi. 
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to establish a Jewish majority and thereby 'resolve' the Arab problem. It was believed 
that a combination of those two factors would lead to the establishment of a Jewish 
state in Palestine. Zionists welcomed the hardships inflicted upon the Diaspora to the 
extent that they brought Jews to Palestine. As Ben Gurion put it in 1933: 
From an abstract Zionist perspective ... there is no need at the moment to 
make propaganda for Palestine. Jewish life in the Diaspora provides the 
strongest propaganda, and this propaganda is produced by the destruction ... 
of all possibility for existence for great masses of Jews ... Jews by the 
thousands are charging at Palestine's gates. "' 
In 1936, he suggested that Hitler should be exploited for the Zionist purpose: "It is in 
our interest that Hitler should be wiped out, but as long as he remains we are 
interested in exploiting his presence for the building up of Palestine. "" The Holocaust 
changed the parameters completely - after the Holocaust both the immigration and 
the establishment of the Jewish state took on a different sense of urgency. Most 
important of all, after the Holocaust the Gentiles become major players in the Zionist 
project. If before the Holocaust Zionism appealed to the Jews' sense of insecurity in 
order to bring them to Palestine, the aftermath of the Holocaust saw the Zionist use 
their 'weapon of suffering' against the Gentiles. The remnant of European Jewry 
hardly needed to be convinced that Europe was a dangerous place, and although the 
survivors might not always be as keen to go to Palestine as the Zionists argued, a 
great majority of them went. The list of priorities on the Zionist agenda changed 
however; the establishment of the state became the first priority, followed by mass 
immigration that would create the Jewish majority. In order to get the state, the 
Gentiles had to be persuaded that the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine 
is vital for the survival of the Jewish people. To that end, Zionists appealed to the 
Gentiles' guilt feelings by displaying the survivors' suffering. 
The survivors of Nazi concentration camps played a vital role in post war 
Zionist schemes - as both propaganda and "human material"12 for the Jewish state; 
10 Teveth, S., Ben Gurion: The Bunning Ground (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987) p. 678. 
" Ben Gurion quoted in Teveth, S., Ben Gurion and the Holocaust p. xlv. 
12 Expression commonly used by the Zionists to design the potential immigrants to Palestine. 
See for example Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 120. 
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propaganda, because the 'remnant' of the European Jewry were a (barely) living 
proof that the Jews needed a state of their own if they were to survive as a nation; 
and human material because the Jewish state needed the Jews in order to survive as 
a Jewish state. With Zertal describes this dual role of the survivors in the following 
passage: 
The great human potential for clandestine immigration and the most efficient 
instrument for carrying out the Zionist political design were one and the same 
and were located in the DP camps. 13 
In order to fulfil their role as 'human material', the remaining European Jews had to 
come to Palestine. The crucial question, however, was related to the manner in 
which they were to come. If the propaganda part was to be fully exploited, the 
journey itself of the Holocaust survivors to Palestine had to be used as a weapon 
against the British; a point put forth by With Zertal: "Yishuv ... needed the clandestine 
immigration extravaganzas for its own political purposes. "" The part of the Holocaust 
survivors in the clandestine immigration drama consisted of "persuad[ing] the world 
of the link between the fate of the Holocaust survivors and the creation of a Jewish 
state in Palestine, "'s Related to the concept of "disaster is power", is a concept of 
"immigration war" defined "not a war for immigration, but a war through immigration 
... not a secret immigration 
in order to maximise the number of Jews in Palestine, but 
immigration as a means of political warfare that will keep the English government 
under pressure. "1e No other episode in the history of clandestine immigration to 
Palestine has captured more attention and generated more sympathy than the epic 
journey of Exodus 1947. Also Exodus stands apart form other clandestine 
immigration actions because of its visibility and publicity that surrounded it. Idith 
Zertal described Exodus as "the quintessence of the Jewish clandestine immigration 
movement in terms of the use of refugees for political and propaganda purposes. "" 
13 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 79. 
74 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 80. 
15 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 244. 
16 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 157. 
11 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 135. 
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On July 10,1947, some 4,500 Jews boarded the Exodus 1947 at a French 
port of Sete, where they set sail for Palestine. Having discovered the Haganah's18 
plans for the ship, the British reacted by sending its destroyers to escort the ship and 
prevent its passengers from disembarking in Palestine. A week later, the Exodus 
passengers entered a fight with eight battleships of the Royal Navy outside the 
territorial waters of Palestine. The passengers threw bottles and cans at the British 
soldiers, attacking them with iron rods and hatchets and trying to spray them with 
boiling oil. 19 The three-hour battle resulted in death of three Jews and three British, 
with two hundred Jews wounded, seventy seriously. The British eventually prevailed, 
and the passengers were forced onto three British ships for transfer back to Europe 
"before the very eyes of the members of UNSCOP [United Nations Special 
Committee for Palestine]. "20 The battle on the ship close to the shores of Palestine 
where "thousands of Holocaust survivors [were] being denied access to the shores of 
their 'national home' through the use of British force"21 had a tremendous political 
effect. French authorities gave permission for the Jews to re-enter France if they 
wished to do so. In spite of a heavy British pressure, the French refused to 
disembark the passengers by force. The official French position communicated to the 
British read: "The French government wish to make known to the immigrants who 
were on board of Exodus 47 that they will not force them to disembark, but will give 
refuge to all who disembark voluntarily. "22On the other hand, the refugees refused to 
leave the ship. Only a hundred and thirty passengers, most of them ill, old, or women 
in the last months of pregnancy, disembarked. The drama lasted for three weeks and 
the Zionists made the most of it. Journalists from around the globe were dispatched 
to the port. "The world had not been swept by such a wave of sympathy for Jewish 
suffering since the day the first reporters entered the concentration camps. "23Weeks 
later, the ships sailed again, this time for Hamburg. Yishuv did nothing to prevent this 
transfer. "In a way, " argues Zertal, "the sending of the refugees to Germany was, for 
18 Haganah (defence, in Hebrew) represented the Yishuv (Jewish settlement in Palestine) 
underground armed forces, in charge of the Mossad (Zionist organisation responsible for 
clandestine immigration). 
19 Segev, T., The Seventh Million pp. 130-31. Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 88 provides 
an exhaustive list of the pitiful arsenal of arms used against the British: metal poles, tent 
pegs, screws, nails, buckets, bottles, potatoes, food tins, etc. 
20 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 84. 
21 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 83. 
22Paris to Foreign Office, 25 July 1947, quoted in Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 114. 
23 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 131. 
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the Zionists, an additional and unexpected - if cruel - propaganda windfall. "24 In 
September 1947, two months after leaving France, the passengers found themselves 
on the German soil again. There, two of the ships surrendered, while the third 
resisted being forced back into Germany. The refugees finally arrived to the British 
zone of Germany where camps were prepared for their arrival. Later, most 
passengers passed through to the American zone of Germany. From there most 
were eventually able to make it into Palestine. 
What was Exodus supposed to achieve in the Zionist scheme? Contrary to 
other rescue missions, nothing about Exodus was secret. Journalists were invited to 
cover the story, "which included ceremonies and celebrations preceding the sailing . "21 
The ship purchased in the United States and initially called President Warfield "had 
been the subject of a 'great stink' of publicity and media attention from the instant of 
its departure from the United States [and] the British had doggedly trailed it 
everywhere it went. "" In other words, had the aim of the Zionists been the 
immigration of the passengers, the chances of success of that operation would have 
been nil. But as Zertal argued "the Zionists have never intended to actually bring the 
4,500 refugees onto the shores of Palestine. "27 The sailing of Exodus was intended 
as a "public-relations tool for the Zionist movement. "28 Or, as Zertal put it: "Exodus 
was a show project from its inception. "-9 Exodus was supposed to arouse the 
sympathy of the world and thereby force the arm of the British with the aim of 
creating a Jewish state in Palestine. As Halamish put it: 
The operation [of illegal immigration] was not a struggle over the opening of 
the gates of Palestine ... The issue was the foundation of a state. It was 
meant to prove the Jews' desire to immigrate to Palestine, no matter what ... 
to keep the headlines and world public opinion busy with the problem of 
Jewish DPs who were rotting away in Europe. "30 
24 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 91. 
25 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 130. 
26Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 53. 
27 Zertal, I, From Catastrophe to Power p. 83. 
28 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 130. 
29 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 83. 
11 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 265. 
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Ben Gurion's personal envoy to Europe expressed belief in the unique political power 
of the Holocaust survivors if only Zionism would hurry to make correct use of them. 31 
Shaul Meirov, head of the Mosad le Aliyah-Bet (Organisation for illegal immigration), 
described illegal immigration as "the exploitation of the indefatigable power of the 
immigrants. ... a 'grass root power ... of people who had no choice. And, in the final 
analysis, we depended on the existence of this non-surrending power. "32 The main 
weapon used by the Zionists was the image of the survivors themselves - "wretched 
Jews ... who have lost everything but their lives; "33 exhausted people; old people, 
women, and children. Although there is no evidence that the Exodus' passengers 
were chosen on any particular criteria, the fact that there were pregnant women, 
hundreds of infants, 34 and even handicapped people, 35 certainly served the Zionist 
purpose. When the first baby was born on board, the news was telegraphed to the 
entire world. 31 As the affair dragged on and people were living on the British prison 
ships in unbearable conditions for weeks the moral accusation embodied in the 
image of survivors became increasingly insistent. A letter addressed to the French 
government and transmitted from the boat to the shore represents one of the many 
articulations of this moral pressure: 
We thank France for its generosity and its willingness to receive us, but we 
repeat that the decision we made three weeks ago not to descend to the 
European shore has grown even stronger. We are living in inhuman 
conditions and the rains have made conditions unbearable. And this is after 
what we have endured in the camps. We are convinced that the French 
government is not interested in having this suffering continue. But the 
suffering is continuing. We demand that the British remove us from here and 
return us to Palestine. 37 
The second powerful image used by the Zionists was the grotesque imbalance 
of forces: the mighty British Empire attacking the survivors of the Nazi camps armed 
31 Minutes, Jewish Agency Executive, 24 February 1946, CZA. 
32Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 264. 
33Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 79. 
3' Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 130. 
35Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 44. 
16Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 130. 
37 Quoted in Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 89. Italics added. 
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with bottles and cans with eight destroyers of the Royal Navy. As Zertal observed: 
"without the spectacles of violent clashes between Jewish refugees, with only sticks 
and cans of food for weapons, and uniformed British soldiers with firearms, the 
events surrounding the ships would have been much less attractive to the media ... 
the concept of resisting with of hands, sticks, and bottles ... was a deliberate choice 
[with] the intention to elicit of moral outrage produced by any David vs. Goliath 
battle. "38 This pitiful battle of the refugees was instigated by the Zionists for two 
reasons: to create an `immigration martyr' for the Gentiles' consumption, but also to 
create a `new Hebrew, ' from the wretched mass of refugees for the internal 
consumption, that is for the Palestinian Jews. The author of an unsigned article that 
appeared in the Palmach Newsletter admitted: "the true purpose of resistance was 
the transformation of the refugees character. After all, the article said, when one 
retreats - that is, when one does not fight deportation even if the fighting is without 
practical consequence and involves casualties - one 'turns into human sheep. '"39 
The last episode that was exploited to the full was the British Government's ill- 
conceived decision to deport the Holocaust survivors back to Germany. The Jewish 
Agency Executive not only did nothing to prevent the deportation to Germany, but it 
went so far as to obstruct every possibility of sparing the refugees the trip to 
Germany. From London, Chaim Weizmann tried to prevent this outrageous 
deportation but "he was vehemently rebuffed by Ben Gurion"40 who also "vehemently 
refused to accept the British compromise to quietly return the refugees to France, 
which would have spared them the horror of returning to Germany. "" The 
compromise to send the refugees to Denmark was equally sabotaged by the Jewish 
Agency. 42 The Danes were asked "not to lend themselves to be a party to forcing 
those sorely tried people to land anywhere save in the country of their free choice. "43 
All this shows that the Jewish Agency "had an interest in the sentimental and 
symbolic aspects of deportation to Germany. "44 In other words, Ben Gurion wanted to 
I Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 139 and 143. 
39 The Palmach Book, Vol. 1 p. 839. Quoted in Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 149. 
40 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 91. 
41 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 251. 
42 See Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 251. 
43 Jewish Agency Executive in Zurich to the Prime Minister of Denmark, 26 August 1947. 
Quoted in Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 201. 
44Segev, T., The Seventh Million pp. 131-132. 
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"take advantage of the unexpected moral dimension in the media offered by the 
nightmarish aspect of the deportation of the Holocaust survivors back to Germany. "" 
And indeed the concluding chapter of the visible Exodus episode - the forced 
disembarkation in Hamburg with British paratroopers dragging Jewish kids from the 
boat, "twisting their arms behind their backs, beating them on the head and back and 
bending their legs"46 "was ... truly the media apotheosis. "" 
The timing of the Exodus affair was also significant - the whole affair was 
taking place at the same time as the team of the United Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine (UNSCOP) was touring the country in search for a solution to the 
Palestinian question. It was no coincidence that members of the UNSCOP were 
present in Haifa as the refugees were being loaded into the British ships and sent 
back to Europe. They had been specially invited to assist at that sad spectacle by the 
passengers from the ship. The message read: 
Dear Sirs, we implore you to visit us ... to witness for yourselves the live 
testimony of the refugees ... see with your own eyes - our ship, our suffering 
and the efforts we are making to reach the safe haven of our homeland. 
Witness for yourselves the cold-heartedness of the British as they try to expel 
us from the shores of our homeland in order to incarcerate us behind barbed 
wire, in concentration camps, which ... remind us all the time of those 
concentration camps in which we were interred during the days of Nazis.... 
Come to Haifa! See the evil! ' 
They did come; and they assisted at the fuss involved in transferring the 
immigrants from Exodus to the British deportation ships. Golda Meir later wrote that 
by their behaviour the British made a notable contribution to UNSCOP's final 
recommendations. 49 The latter were made during the 'Hamburg chapter' of the 
Exodus affair. Commenting upon this state of affairs in August 1947, Moshe Sneh, 
the Head of the Aliyah-Bet Departement in the Jewish Agency Executive, said: "I am 
convinced that the immigrants of the 'Yetzi'at Eiropa' [Exodus] are going to save the 
's Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 253. 
48 Gamuz, Y., Yearning and Turmoil, (Tel Aviv: Misrad ha-Bitachon, 1985) p. 283. 
" Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 137. 
'' Ha-Clam, 24 July 1947, quoted in Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 100. 
'9 Meir, G., My Life, (London: Imprint Futura Publications, 1975) p. 169. 
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Zionist struggle before Zionist diplomacy saves the immigrants. "50 Although the later 
accounts of the illegal immigration efforts gave extra credit to the Palestinian 
emissaries, downplaying the role of the immigrants, their part in the establishment of 
the State of Israel is historically established. ., 
What remains to be assessed is the significance of these efforts for the 
survivors' process of healing. Before examining the effects of the Exodus affair on 
the survivors, however, the main stages of healing from trauma are briefly discussed. 
Healing unfolds in the following stages: establishment of security, reconstruction of 
trauma and mourning, and reconnection with the wider community. It goes without 
saying that recovery does not follow such a clearly delimited linear course. However, 
"it should be possible to recognise a gradual shift from unpredictable danger to 
reliable safety, from dissociated trauma to acknowledged memory, and from 
stigmatised isolation to restored social connection. "51 
The first stage of healing is establishing safety. Survivors need to first 
recover their sense of security. When the survivors' community was persecuted as 
an ethnic minority in their country of citizenship, its quest for security will often require 
an establishment of an autonomous political entity or at least a security zone, where 
the survivors feel safe enough to start reconstructing the narrative of their trauma, the 
next stage of recovery. In that respect, the Zionist and survivors' interest for 
establishing a Jewish state fully coincided. In the second stage of healing, the 
survivors reconstruct the full story of trauma, in depth and in detail. The 
reconstruction of trauma allows the survivors to reclaim their earlier history, 
integrate the experience of trauma into their life-story and thus reconstitute a sense 
of continuity with the pasta This stage of healing is by far the most important 
because it represents a point where meanings, lessons, and understandings are 
assigned to the traumatic event. As Chapter Four demonstrates, the assignment of 
meanings is particularly crucial in an event of massive trauma, where the lessons 
and understandings of individual traumas determine the outlook of people who were 
50 Moshe Sneh quoted in Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 148. 
S1 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 155. 
Danieli, Y., "Treating Survivors and Children of Survivors of the Nazi Holocaust" in: 
Ochberg, F. (ed. ), Post-Traumatic Therapy and Victims of Violence, Brunner / Mazel, New 
York, 1988 p. 286. 
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not directly affected by the trauma. Survivors therefore not only transmit their 
interpretation of trauma to their children, as the Chapter One showed, but once learnt 
and transmitted those lessons become part of the community's collective identity. 
Reconstruction of trauma is followed by mourning of the loss that trauma inevitably 
entails. Analysed in more detail in Chapter Six, mourning is both the most necessary 
and the most frightening step towards healing. It cannot be bypassed and it cannot 
be hurried. It usually takes longer than any other stage of recovery because survivors 
resist confronting their traumatic memories and descent into grief. The last stage is 
the stage of re-integration into the wider community. The victims, who by the time 
they arrive to this stage will have reconstructed their sense of safety, integrated the 
story of trauma into their life-stories and into that of their community, mourned the 
loss, and will be ready to learn how to trust again. Reintegration into the wider 
community involves three steps; learning to fight, reconciling with oneself, and 
reconnecting with other. 5' Learning how to fight is based on the assumption that the 
survivors, having arrived at that stage, will understand "that their post-traumatic 
symptoms represent a pathological exaggeration of the normal responses to 
danger. "1' They have to thus learn how to assess the threat and respond accordingly. 
In other words, instead of responding to any threat only by extreme reactions, 
survivors need to relearn both the gradation of threat and the gradation of 
appropriate responses to it. They have to re-introduce all the shades of grey into their 
black and white image of the world and of their security in it. Because massive 
trauma also shatters the victim's sense of self, as Chapter One showed, the crucial 
step in reintegration is the rebuilding of an identity. In this process the survivors draw 
upon aspects of their pre-traumatic identity, from the experience of trauma, and from 
the process of healing. The survivors must acknowledge and "'let go' of those 
aspects of themselves that were formed by the traumatic event. "55 This letting go 
allows them to overcome their shame of being helpless, of not having been prepared, 
of not having done more to prevent the trauma, and to forgive themselves. The 
recovery is achieved when "compassion and respect for the traumatised, victim self 
join with a celebration of the survivor self. " 
"This typology follows the one developed by Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery, Chapter 
10. 
1' Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 197. 
65 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 203. 
16 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 204. 
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The literature on trauma provides three closely associated factors that can 
account for the incredible endurance and courage demonstrated by the survivors on 
board of Exodus: guilt, shame, and mission. In the aftermath of a traumatic event, "as 
the survivors review and judge their own conduct, feelings of guilt and inferiority are 
practically universal. "5' The failure to act or feel in ways that would have been 
compatible with the victims' image of themselves elicits shame, defined as a 
"response to helplessness, the violation of bodily integrity, and the indignity suffered 
in the eyes of others. *58 Survivors' mission belongs to the realm of the survivors' 
struggling for meaning, but also to that of guilt and shame. Survivors feel that the fact 
that they survived while others died makes them responsible towards the dead. A 
mission offers them the possibility of giving meaning to the tragedy and loss and also 
to somehow atone for having survived. Survivors' mission can take many forms of 
public activity, usually bearing witness and keeping the memory alive. In the late 
forties and early fifties in Israel, however, the chief activity of the survivors was the 
building-up of the Jewish state. The Jewish state endowed the otherwise 
meaningless death with a meaning - they did not die for nothing; they died, but from 
their ashes Israel would rise again. The survivors saw it as their mission to do 
everything in their power to contribute to the creation of the state and thereby make 
themselves worthy of having survived, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of the 
others. 
The Zionists drew heavily on all the above-mentioned emotions, and "of 
course such survivor emotions have been politically used in various ways. "59 The 
survivors' feelings of guilt for having been helpless, guilt for having survived; their 
feelings of shame for not having behaved in a way they would have chosen to had 
there been a choice; their desire to make their lives worthy of being lived and their 
deaths of their beloved meaningful - all those emotions have been used by the 
Zionists to achieve the establishment of the state. Despite ruthless pragmatism of 
this approach, Zionist manipulation of survivors' emotions was largely beneficial for 
the survivors' process of recovery. Resistance against the British - no matter how 
67 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 53. 
Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 53. 
b9 Lifton, R. J., "The Concept of the Survivor, " p. 123. 
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difficult, and at times both pointless and costly - restored in the survivors a sense of 
agency and power; it gave meaning both to their lives and to their deaths; and last 
but not least, it gave them the opportunity to rebuilt a self that they themselves could 
be proud of, but also one that the Palestinian Jews would respect. As Halamish 
argues "the Exodus affair changed the immigrants' image for the better and the 
Yishuv was swept away on a collective catharsis of admiration toward them. "' 
Related to the above, resistance also gave the survivors a sense of belonging, as 
well as of security. The Haganah people 
worked hard to convince the immigrants that they were taking care of them. " 
During the waiting period in France, for example, they "sailed boats close to 
the deportation ships, offered encouragement ... promised them that the 
Yishuv ... was 
firmly behind them, and swear that they would indeed 
immigrate to Palestine. "61 
The attitude adopted by the Haganah undoubtedly bore fruit - the refugees felt safe 
(from the memoirs of an immigrant: "No need for concern. The Haganah are with us. 
... They are our security. 
"62). Disembarking in France would "mean a severance of 
ties with the Haganah, abandoning its protective auspices and even relinquishing the 
right to immigrate to Palestine. "63 Maybe even worse, landing in France would bring 
upon the refugees contempt and ostracism of the others -a threat embodied in 
Roseman'sTM speech which said that "anyone who wanted to could disembark, but 
everyone would spit in their face, as would the entire Jewish race. "65 
Although the issue of identity will be dealt with in the next section, the above- 
quoted excerpt from Roseman's speech raises an issue that would become a major 
obstacle to the survivors' healing later on - the Palestinian Jews' acceptance of the 
survivors was conditional upon the latter's ability to adopt a new identity, that of the 
60 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 271. 
61 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 261. 
62Gamuz, Y., Yearning and Turmoil p. 144. 
63 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 261. 
1' Mordechai Roseman held various positions within the Zionist movement (with the Bricha 
organisation, in the DP camps, he had been head of Ha-Shomer ha -Tsa'ir movement in 
Germany); on the Exodus he held a position in the secretariat and as a communication link 
between immigrants and Hebrew-speaking escorts. 
65 From the Exodus Diary, 21 August 1947, quoted in Halamish, A., The ExodusAffairp. 182. 
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'fighting Jew'. In other words, the survivors had to come toward the Yishuv, had to 
make themselves worthy of being part of the Jewish community in Palestine, lest the 
"entire Jewish race spits in their face. " As Halamish put it "the illegal immigration was 
... a bridge between the 
Yishuv and the Diasporar a tool of national solidarity. "' 
Quoting Allon, s' Zertal stated: "continuing resistance on the ships was the best 
guarantee that the Yishuv will find a way to identify with the refugees. "68 Fighting for 
the establishment of the Jewish state, in other words, became the survivors' mission 
which they carried out with incredible commitment and bravery, both because they 
'owed' it to the dead, and because it presented them with the opportunity to play a 
heroic part in the great historical project of re-establishing a Jewish state in Palestine 
and thereby restore their own self-worth. The Exodus veterans' behaviour in the 
British camps in Germany provides a superb illustration of the newly acquired self- 
worth, which, as it is often the case, went hand in hand with "a touch of 
condescension. "69 Like other fighting survivors described in the first chapter, the 
Exodus immigrants did not see themselves as ordinary survivors. Therefore they 
refused to mix with other DPs and they also refused to take part in any of the 
institutions set up by and for the Holocaust survivors. They "were full of self-worth, 
aware that they were bearing the flag of the Jewish national struggle, a shining halo 
of heroism above their heads. "70 
Identity Conflict: Encounter And Its Aftermath 
A shadow passed between the tribes ... The links were broken ... What has happened cannot be undone. " 
Based on Kai Erikson's analysis in Chapter One, the previous section 
described the initial phase of communal response to trauma - euphoria, and the 
influence of this response on the physical survivors' process of healing. This section 
examines the second stage of communal response - division and distancing. Erikson 
observed that after the initial euphoria, traumas often divide the larger community 
66Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 265. 
67 Yigal Allon was the commander of the Palmach. 
68Yigal Allon, quoted in Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 150. 
69 Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 226. 
'o Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 235. 
71 Alterman, N., "Michael's Page, " in: Alterman, N., City of the Dove (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz 
Hameuchad, 1962) pp. 25 - 27. 
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along the already existing fault lines. 72 The heroic halo of the Holocaust evaporated 
as soon as they reached the Promised Land, and so did the admiration of Palestinian 
Jews. Once the immigrants fulfilled their historical role prescribed by the Zionist 
scenario, they had to face a very different reality from what they expected. The fault 
line that burst when the survivors finally made it to pre-state Israel was that of 
identity. 
This division is best portrayed with reference to the undertext of the popular 
images used to describe the encounter that took place 'on the shores of the 
homeland. ' Better than any other source, those images reveal the essential traits of 
the Zionist attitude towards the survivors of the European Diaspora. An analysis of 
two of the most popular literary works / historical documents describing the physical 
encounter between the Palestinian Jews and the survivors reveal the identity conflict. 
Yitzhak Sadeh's "My Sister on the Beach" and Nathan Alterman's "Michael's Page" 
belong to, as Zertal put it "the basic scrolls of Zionist revival narrative and were 
constitutive in the shaping of Israeli collective identity in the county's first decades of 
independence. "73 Both authors belonged to the Zionist power elite close to the central 
political leadership. Sadeh was a general and the first commander of the Palmach, 
and Alterman was the most respected national poet of the first statist period - "Ben 
Gurion's poetic alter ego. "" 
Here is Sadeh's "My Sister on the Beach": 
Darkness. On wet sand, my sister stands before me: filthy, tattered, wild- 
haired, her feet are bare and her head bowed. She stands and weeps. 
I know. Her flesh is branded: 'For Officers Only. ' 
My sister weeps and says: 
Friend, why am I here? Why did they bring me here? Am I worthy that young 
healthy boys risk their lives for me? No, there is no place for me in the world. I 
should not live. 
I embrace my sister, embrace her shoulders and tell her. 
72 Erikson, K., A New Species of Trouble p. 236. 
73 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 263. 
74 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 270. 
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You have a place in the world, my sister, a very special place. Here, in our 
land you should live, my sister. Here you have our love to you. Dark and 
comely art thou, my sister. Dark, because seared by suffering, but comely, 
more beautiful to me than all other beauty, holier than all holiness. 
Darkness. On wet sand my sister stands before me, filthy, tattered, wild- 
haired, her feet bare and her head bowed. 
I know: evil people have tortured her and made her barren. And she weeps 
and says: Friend, why am I here? Why did they bring me here? Am I worthy 
that young healthy boys risk their lives for me? No, there is no place for me in 
the world. I should not live... 
I embrace my sister, embrace her shoulders and tell her. 
You have a place in the world, my sister, a very special place. Here, in our 
land. And you should live, my sister. Your feet have trodden the road of 
suffering, and tonight you have come home, and here with us is your place. 
We love you, my sister. All the glory of motherhood you carry within you, all 
the beauty of womanhood is in you. Our love is for you, you will be a sister to 
us, you will be our bride, our mother. 
Before these sisters I kneel, I prostrate myself in the dust at their feet. And 
when I rise to my feet, straighten my body, raise my head upwards, I sense 
and I know: 
For these sisters -I am strong. 
For these sisters -I am brave. 
For these sisters -I will also be cruel. 
For you everything - everything. 75 
Which images are articulated in Sadeh's poem and what do they reveal? The 
encounter is taking place on the beach, in the darkness. On one side stands a group 
of "young, healthy boys", on the other side a lone refugee girl. A group of young, 
healthy, and strong native-born Israeli men is facing a single, uprooted, filthy, beaten, 
and weeping woman. The setting is described by Zertal as "male power in the plural 
opposite female weakness in the singular - in short, strong, rooted, and brave Israeli 
75 Sadeh, Y., "My Sister on the Beach", in: Zerubavel, G. (ed. ), The Palmach Book, Vol. 1 
(Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1953) p. 725. 
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Zionism facing a defeated, despairing Diaspora longing to die ("No, there is no place 
for me in the world. I should not live. ") It is Zionism as an organised discourse of 
manliness and power built on and emerging from Jewish catastrophe. "For these 
sisters I am strong. ... I am brave. ... I will also be cruel. "7e It is not surprising that the 
Diaspora should be symbolised by a woman and the Yishuv by a man - this 
metaphor was "a continuation of a common stereotype that depicted the Exile as 
weak, feminine, and passive, and the Yishuv as strong, masculine and active. "" Also, 
the girl in the poem has not only been tortured but made barren - the European 
Diaspora after the Holocaust is barren and thereby condemned to death. 
Sadeh provides an additional, gratuitous, piece of information, which reveals 
"the moral judgement passed by the Zionist / Israeli community, which would later 
become the basis of Israeli society's hegemonic discourse, at least until the 1960s 
about the survivors who arrived at Israel's gates. ""' The girl's flesh is branded "For 
Officers Only. " The text thus states, very much in accordance with the popular 
wisdom of the time, that the girl only survived because her body served the Nazi 
officers. The same moral judgement is contained in a number of public statements. 
Ben Gurion for example was quoted saying: "Among the survivors of the German 
concentration camps were those who, had they not been what they were - harsh, 
evil, and egotistical people - would not have survived, and all they endured rooted 
out every good part of their souls. "79 A Ha'aretz journalist wrote: "We have to see 
things with open eyes. ... The few that remain to us in Europe are not necessarily 
Judaism's best. The nation's jewels were destroyed first" and many of the survivors 
"are suspected of low morality. "80 As Zertal correctly observed "this judgement ... is 
double-edged. Those who survived committed some kind of moral sin through which 
they were saved. Those who did not survive, however, are not absolved either, 
because they ... went'like sheep to the slaughter. '"81 
'B Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 266. 
" Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 180. 
78 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 269. 
79 Ben Gurion, quoted in Segev, T, The Seventh Million p. 118-19. See also Dobkin, E., 
Immigration and Rescue during the Holocaust Years, (Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 1946) p. 
144. 
80 Gelblum, A., "Fundamental Problems of Immigrant Absorption, " in Ha'aretz, 28 Sept. 1945 
p. 3. 
81 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 269. 
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What follows here are two verses from Alterman's long poem - "Michael' 
Page": 
At the night of unloading, with the star watching us 
As we shoulder those who arrive in the dark, as we carry their lives on our 
backs 
We sense the fear in their breathing and the moaning of their tortured and 
outcast bodies 
But also their hands closing on our throats. 
The people will multiply in this land. Not as a sect of converts 
Will they wander among its masses. But a war of two 
Unseen and unbridled, will crawl through like a thread, 
from outside and from within 
To resolve whether its millstones will grind the grain 
Or the grain grind the millstones. 82 
Like Sadeh, Alterman's encounter is taking place in the dark. In both texts darkness 
provides a screen between the survivors and the Palestinian Jews. Occluded vision 
was a defence mechanism employed by the Zionist collectivity when confronted with 
the survivors, "as if the horrors of the Holocaust could only be watched in the dark, 
that is in the state of non-seeing, of blindness. ... This was apparently the only way 
... that the community 
in Palestine was able to 'mobilise' in order to 'see' the 
remnants of the Holocaust and overcome the petrifying terror that they aroused. 1183 
The report sent in from the DP camps by. Eliahu Dobkin of the Jewish Agency 
Executive expresses the revulsion evoked by the sight of the Holocaust survivors: 
"I have seen the Tehran children, I have seen other refugees, but I have 
never seen a picture as horrifying as this one. ... These are torn and broken 
shadows of men, plagued by lice and boils and eye diseases. ... God's own 
horror. "" 
12Alterman, N., "Michael's Page" pp. 25-27. 
83Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 273. 
84 Dobkin, E., quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 19. 
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The terror provoked by the Holocaust and its survivors is palpable in Alterman's 
poem - "We sense the fear in their breathing and the moaning of their tortured and 
outcast bodies. / But also their hands closing on our throats. "81 The same 
apprehension is expressed further in the poem: ' "But a war of two ... to resolve 
whether the millstones will grind the grain of the grain grind the millstones. "88 The war 
that Alterman anticipated was a war between the old and the new, the Diaspora and 
the Eretz Israel, the exile Jew and the Sabra; and the winner of this struggle will 
shape the Israeli collective identity. This is a sad but crucial piece of information: 
those people, who had survived the Holocaust, and who for the past two or three 
years had been dragged through detention camps, quarantines and political displays, 
who had played a major role in the immigration wars and thereby significantly 
participated to the creation of the Jewish state - those people were seen as a threat 
to the Zionist collective, a threat which had to be countered by all means. One may 
want to ask though how could the "tortured and outcast bodies" of the survivors 
possibly threaten "the new, young, healthy men, moulded and created in the image of 
the new land and under its skies? "87 
The danger was a moral one. There were those who said that the survivors 
were liable to poison Zionism, democracy, and progress and to obliterate the 
country's socialist agricultural foundation, until it became "one big Tel Aviv. "88 These 
fears were based not only on the survivors' experience in the camps, but also on 
what was called a 'Diaspora mentality. ' One should keep in mind that for the Zionists, 
Diaspora stood for everything they disliked; their aim had been to "transform the 
'shtetl Jew' into a 'new Jew' in Palestine, no longer a shop keeper or a broker, but a 
worker, a creator of material goods, preferably a pioneer, a farmer, and a socialist. "89 
No wonder that the envoys to the DP camps were shocked to see that "the survivors 
are not willing to work ... [that] some of them leave the camps, marry German 
women, and open stores or do business in German black market ... [and] allow 
themselves luxuries, specifically jewellery and silk dresses. "90 According to another 
85Altenpan, N., "Michael's Page". Italics supplied. 
86Alterman, N., "Michael's Page". 
87 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 271. 
81 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 120. 
89 Teveth, S., Ben Gurion and the Holocaust p. xxxii. 
10 Segev, T, The Seventh Million p. 118. 
112 
report "young people tried to eject old ones from their berths ... the girls went around 
with sailors and soldiers and showed no sense of virtue. "91 In the eyes of the Zionists, 
the survivors were diminished, not only physically and psychologically, but also 
morally. They "had lost their self-respect, all faith in their fellowman and in altruism, to 
the point of cynicism, nihilism, and lawlessness. "92 Poet Leah Goldberg said: "This 
people is ugly, impoverished, morally unstable and hard to love. "93 Put bluntly: 
"concentration camps bred a mean lot. "9' The survivors were seen as a threat to the 
Zionist project of emancipation and redemption - first as the Diaspora Jews with their 
'exile mentality', and second as survivors of massive psychic trauma with their 
'concentration camp mentality. ' It goes without saying that both of the above- 
mentioned mentalities were antithetical to Zionist ideals and as Sternhell put it: "no 
one was more disgusted with their people, more contemptuous of its weaknesses 
and its way of life, than the founders. ... [They] described exiled Jews in terms that at 
time resembled those of most rabid anti-Semites. "95 For example, the immigrant had 
been described upon arrival as "human dust, a refugee, a creature of the Diaspora, 
inferior human material resistant to change, evader of agricultural work, with illegal 
dollars hidden in his belt. "116 Nevertheless, the Zionist collective "felt morally and 
ideologically responsible for the survivors. Everyone knew that, without them, there 
was no chance of achieving statehood. "" According to Zertal, the prevalent opinion 
was that "the Jews of the Diaspora should be helped not for their own sake, for what 
they are, but because tomorrow they will be Israel. "98 
As Alterman's poem demonstrated, the Zionists were afraid that the survivors 
might spoil their 'new Jew' by infusing it with their 'Diaspora mentality. ' Therefore, 
everything reminiscent of Diaspora had to be eradicated. For the second time within 
a very short time span, the survivors found themselves stripped of their identity and 
given a new one; after having been 'Diaspora Jews' and 'Holocaust survivors', they 
s' David Shatiel, later an Israeli Army general, quoted in Segev, T, The Seventh Million p. 
118. 
92 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 117. 
93Quoted in: Segev, T., 1949: The First Israelis p. 138. 
94Uris, L, Exodus p. 123. 
as Sternhell, Z., The Founding Myths of Israel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) 
p. 47. 
96Segev, T., 1949: The First Israelis p. 117. 
97 Segev. T., The Seventh Million p. 119. 
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now had to become Hebrews. "They must learn to love their homeland, a work ethic, 
and human morals ... They should be given the first concepts of humanity ... they 
should be re-educated. "99 They were encouraged to Hebraise their names, speak 
Hebrew, became sun-tanned, settle the land, and learn how to hold a spade. Those 
who failed to adopt the new identity were bullied. Novelist Aharon Appelfeld wrote 
about a Polish boy who was mistreated and beaten by his native comrades because 
he had not become sun-tanned like them. He swore that he was trying to darken his 
skin and the response he got was that had he really wanted to, he would have done it 
long ago. 70° "The Sabra represented a national ideal and the Holocaust survivor its 
reverse"101 and the gap between the "pure sons of the land" and the "Exile Jews" had 
to be bridged by the latter alone. "Not both parties to the encounter, but only the 
Diaspora must fundamentally and unilaterally change and cease to be what it is, and 
in this way fulfil its function in the Zionist scenario. "102 
The natives were permeated with a deep feeling of their superiority over the 
newcomers. As the author Yehudit Hendel observed: 
To put it bluntly, there were almost two races in this country. There was one 
race of people who thought they were gods. These were the ones who had 
had the honour and privilege to being born in Degania, or in the Borochov 
neighbourhood of Givataim. ... And there was, we can certainly say, an 
inferior race. People we saw as inferior had some kind of flaw, some kind of 
hunchback, and these were the people who came after the war. I was thought 
in school that the ugliest, basest thing is not the Exile but the Jew who came 
from there. 103 
"The attitude of the first Israelis toward the newcomers was complex and self- 
contradictory, charged with emotions and infused with prejudices, reflecting their self- 
images as Jews and as Israelis. "104 There were those who blamed the European 
1 Various Mapai (leading party) officials, quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 158. 
101 Appelfeld, A., Searing Light (Tel Aviv: Hakibbuts Hameuchad, 1980). 
101 Segev, T, The Seventh Million p. 180. 
102 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 270. 
103 In the film Cloudburst, produced by Oma Ben-Dor-Niv and Daphna Kaplanski, first 
broadcast on Israeli television in June 1989. 
104 Segev, T., 1949: The First Israelis p. 117. 
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Jewry for its own extermination. Menachem Begin was quoted saying that the "age- 
old inexcusable utter defencelessness" of the Jewish people in Europe "was a 
standing invitation to massacre. "105 Ben Gurion's rhetoric was similarly accusatory, 
"placing responsibility for what happened, at least partially, on the survivors 
themselves, making a moral judgement by way of comparison to the Yishuv. "105 Time 
and again the survivors were asked: Why did you not rebel? Why did you go like 
sheep to the slaughter? Yoel Palgi, one of the paratroopers that were parachuted to 
Hungary during the World War II, said in June 1945: 
I realised that we were ashamed of those who were tortured, shot, burnt. 
There is a kind of general agreement that the Holocaust dead were worthless 
people. Unconsciously, we have accepted the Nazi view that the Jews were 
subhuman ... History 
is playing a bitter joke on us: have we not ourselves put 
the six million on trial? "'07 
Another bitter joke of History and the cruellest expression of the natives' contempt for 
the survivors can be found in Hebrew slang - the word sabon (meaning 'soap') came 
to be used to refer to the Holocaust survivors, and it is still used to describe a coward 
or a weakling. Palestinian Jews thus re-positioned themselves vis-ä-vis the survivors. 
On the shores of the homeland, the Palestinian Jews dissociated themselves from 
the victims and positioned themselves as rescuers. The fact that the heroes of 
yesterday became today's burdens is also reflected in Israeli historiography of the 
clandestine immigration, which attributed the survivors a passive role. The official 
accounts of the Exodus affair, for example, "gave extra credit to the emissaries from 
Palestine, downplaying the part of the immigrants. "108 Similarly poets and writers did 
their share to "glorify 'bearing their nation on their shoulders' thereby deflecting 
attention from the true heroes of the immigration campaign - the refugees 
themselves. "709 
105 Begin, M., The Revolt p. xii. 
106 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power p. 221. 
107 Palgi, Y., A Great Wind Comes, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1978) p. 243. 
108 Reference to Bracha Habbas' account. Halamish, A., The Exodus Affair p. 269. 
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In the late 1940s, at the height of the immigration, the Yishuv was preparing to 
face a very different enemy - the Arabs. And for that enemy, they needed fighters 
and labourers, not the agonising mass of wretched Jews that proved itself so useful 
in the immigration wars. The political situation dictated the rules: the Jewish state 
needed fighters, and the newcomers had to adjust to the needs of the state and 
transform into warriors practically overnight. About two months before the declaration 
of independence, Ben Gurion wrote to one of the immigration envoys: "The war 
depends on immigration, because the manpower in Israel will not suffice. ... 
Immigration that is not directed entirely, from start to finish, to the war's needs is no 
blessing. ""' Following Ben Gurion's orders the envoys in the DP camps presented 
enlistment as a duty to every men or woman. Haim Yahil wrote that there was "an 
atmosphere of enlistment in the camps ... parents of enlistees won respect, and 
evaders were publicly disgraced. A young man who did not sign up had trouble 
walking through the camp. ""' According to Professor Emmanuel Sivan"2 of the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, close to half of the 104,000 Jews who enlisted in 
the War of Independence were newcomers to Israel, many of them Holocaust 
survivors. Approximately 5,682 Jews died during the War of Independence. 35 
percent (1,462) were immigrants who arrived in the country no earlier than the start 
of World War II. Most of the newcomers killed were Holocaust survivors. They could 
not speak Hebrew and therefore could not be assigned to the administrative roles in 
the rear. Thus, they were sent to the front. Some of them received basic military 
training before arriving, but most were drafted immediately after their arrival, with no 
prior training and no knowledge of the land they were going to defend. They did not 
have time to search for their relatives and neither did they know what would become 
of them after their service in the army. They were often thrown in with Sabras and 
others who had no idea what the survivors had been through or what they were 
expecting. Here, too, of course, the Sabras's sense of superiority interfered with the 
survivors' healing process . 113 "Low-ranking commanders often humiliated and insulted 
the new recruits, who had a reputation for being melancholic, cowardly soldiers, 
110 Ben Gurion quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 177. 
"' Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 177. 
112 Interview with the author. 
113 See Yablonka, H., Survivors Of The Holocaust: Israel After The War (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999) p. 134. 
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prisoners of their past. "114 The newcomers were held responsible for demoralisation 
of other soldiers and many felt that they were used as 'cannon fodder', a widespread 
expression at the time. 115 As a young non-commissioned officer in 1948, Ariel Sharon 
commanded a number of Holocaust survivors. He, said: "Songs weren't sung for 
them. They weren't spoken of around the bonfires. Many of them came as 
unknowns, and some [died] as unknowns. ""6 
Both the resistance against the British, and the war against the Arabs 
benefited the survivors in some respect; for example, it gave them part in the victory 
and a certain sense of belonging, but "it did little to advance the immigrants' social 
integration. ""' After the war was over, the immigrants faced "a barrier of blood and 
silence and agony and loneliness. """ 
Estrangement: Wall Of Silence 
The absence of an empathetic listener, or more radically, the absence of an 
addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of one's memories and 
thus affirm and recognise their realness, annihilates the story. 119 
As the first section showed, at a crucial junction of struggle for the Jewish 
state, the political interests of the Zionists coincided with the survivors' emotional, 
psychological, and physical vulnerability. Thus the latter provided their agony, their 
Holocaust credentials, and their desperate courage, and the former - following the 
slogan 'disaster is power' - transformed the survivors' suffering into a powerful 
weapon against the guilt-ridden Gentiles. Suddenly, the survivors gained central 
importance in the Zionist project, and under that spotlight they quickly regained a 
feeling of self-worth, which had been previously shattered by the traumatic 
experience. In that respect, the Zionist use of survivors' emotional state for the 
purpose of achieving statehood was valuable. However, as the second section 
showed, the survivors' self-worth was extremely short-lived. Upon arrival to the 
'promised land' the survivors were looked down upon; they were expected to 
"' Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 178. 
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abandon their pre-concentration camp identity ('Diaspora mentality' in Zionist 
terminology) and transform into workers and fighters, as well as to eradicate all post- 
traumatic disorders caused by the experience of the concentration camps (what 
Zionists would call to 'learn some humanity'). In short, the survivors had to become a 
healthy fibre of the Zionist collective, and that by their own means. A vow of silence 
was imposed on the survivors. 
Yet, many survivors felt that they had a moral and historical duty to tell what 
had happened to them. In the post-war months many felt "as though they were the 
last living Jews, who alone knew what had happened to their communities. "120 They 
had a responsibility to preserve the memory of those who died, but they also needed 
to reconstruct their own individual traumas in order to start the process of healing. 
The survivors soon discovered, however, that people did not always want to, or could 
not, listen to them; they "had trouble finding a sympathetic audience"t21 and often 
their stories were simply not believed. In a well-known film called The Eighty-first 
Blow, 122 Michael Goldman narrates how, as a seventeen-year-old boy, he was 
whipped and beaten by the commandant of the camp where he was prisoner. 
Goldman fainted and when he woke, the commandant continued beating him - 
eighty lashes, until Goldman broke. His back was torn, but he was alive. He survived 
and came to Israel after the war. When he recounted his story to his relatives they 
did not believe him. They were convinced that he "was imagining things or 
exaggerating. 'That disbelief was the eighty-first blow, ' Goldman later said. "123 
Describing early days of Israel through a child's eyes in his novel See Under. 
Love, David Grossman conveys the atmosphere of tension, silence and impossibility 
to face the Holocaust. The survivors soon realised, as Lifton put it, "that others view 
them as in some way carrying the taint of the Holocaust - as persons to be feared 
and avoided as though they and the taint were contagious. "124 The language itself 
consigned the survivors to another planet. They came from "Over There, " as 
120 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 155. 
721 Niewyk, D. L. (ed. ), Fresh Wounds p. 2. 
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Grossman's nine-year old character, Momik, explains, "a place you weren't supposed 
to talk about too much, only think about in your heart and sigh with a drawn-out 
krechtz, oyyyy, the way they always do. "125 People sincerely feared meeting the 
survivors face-to-face, with all their physical and, psychological handicaps, their 
anguish, suffering, and terror. As Segev put it: "The Holocaust survivors came from 
another world and, to the end of their days, they were its prisoners. "'-'6 One day, 
Momik's grandfather was brought to the house in an ambulance, wearing blue- 
stripped pyjamas. The "oldest man in the world"127 in Momik's eyes was introduced 
with: "Ten years he's been with us at the insane house in Bat Yam and you never 
know what he is talking to himself ... and he doesn't hear what you say ... and nu, 
we don't even know in which camp he was ... there came people in worse condition, 
you should see, no, better you shouldn't see. "128 When Momik tried to penetrate the 
secret of his grandfather's story, his questions were met with silence and sometimes 
anger, which led him to conclude: "whatever it was that happened Over There must 
have been really something for everyone trying so hard not to talk about it. "'" 
This incapacity or refusal to listen, fear, revulsion, and disgust at the survivors' 
conduct, scepticism of their stories, and contempt for their weakness, reflected the 
mechanism of denial, defined as "the wish not to have these terrible events be true, 
not to have them touch us, not to be too closely aware of what took place. "130 Like 
Grossman's character Momik, "there can be hardly a child who grew up in Israel in 
the 1950s and 1960s who does not recall a lost soul in the neighbourhood, a mad 
person, a meshugene [Yiddish for mad person] from 'there'. "131 The images of those 
grotesque characters combined with fragments of stories that children sometimes 
succeeded in extracting from adults, haunted little Israelis like Momik. And "who does 
not remember waking up to a neighbour's nightmare screams piercing through the 
darkness - frightening behaviour which neighbourhood common sense and 
compassion attributed to the horrors experienced in the camps. "'32 In those 
125 Grossman, D., See under. Love (London: Picador, 1991) p. 13. 
121 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 158. 
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circumstances only emotional, and sometimes physical, distancing from the survivors 
allowed the Palestinian Jews to "maintain their own beliefs in personal 
invulnerability"133- one of the fundamental assumptions about oneself in the world. 
According to Kai Erikson, the process of those not touched dissociating themselves 
from those touched is an inevitable phase of collective response to trauma. Only by 
holding the victims responsible for their own fate, were the Palestinian Jews able to 
pretend that it could not have happened to them. Because they were different: they 
would not be slaughtered in their synagogues (to paraphrase Ben Gurion), they 
would resist, they would die upright and fighting, they would not go like sheep to the 
slaughter. 
The Holocaust might have proved Zionism right, but it also represented its 
failure. "Each new arrival, " wrote Segev, "was a reminder that the Zionist movement 
had been defeated in the Holocaust. "'3' Nothing could change the fact that the Yishuv 
had been helpless. Furthermore, the Zionist collective in Palestine depended on the 
willingness and ability of the Holocaust survivors to settle the land and defend it 
against the Arab threat. The silent accusations were coming from both sides. Zionists 
blamed the Diaspora mentality of the victims for the tragedy that had befallen them, 
whilst many survivors resented and blamed the Yishuv. "You danced the hora while 
we were being burned in the crematoriums" said a DP leader at Bergen-Belsen. '35 
Holocaust survivors also reminded the Palestinian Jews of their own vulnerability as 
Jews. They "imposed on the earlier immigrants a past that many of them had not yet 
succeeded in putting aside. "1 The return of the Holocaust survivors represented a 
horrifying return of the repressed Diaspora. The latter could only be suppressed 
again by imposing silence and a new identity on the survivors. European Diaspora 
had been destroyed, entire historic areas of Jewish life had vanished forever, and 
last remaining Diaspora Jews were forced to eradicate whatever might have been left 
intact from their pre-concentration camp identities in order to become new men and 
women, moulded according to the Zionist ideal. 
133Janoff-Bulman, R., "The Aftermath of Victimisation°p 27. 
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Repression of trauma and the almost solid silence surrounding it, made the 
survivors' healing process a very lonesome and difficult task. Although the Israeli 
government did everything it could in given circumstances to absorb and provide for 
all the refugees, material assistance was not matched with adequate psychological 
and social support. The scarcity of sympathetic listeners and the absence of public 
acknowledgement of the survivors' suffering during the first decade of statehood 
represented the major obstacle to their healing. This is because the reconstruction of 
the narrative is a critical stage of recovery, without which trauma cannot be 
integrated into the survivors' memories and identities. Since the survivors were 
discouraged from speaking about their experience, they could not process the 
trauma. Many survivors them repressed their memories; they never talked about it, 
not even to their children and friends. Some had undergone plastic surgery to have 
their blue tattooed numbers removed, while others just kept it hidden. They could not 
and did not integrate the experience of the Holocaust into their identity, but the 
repressed pervaded their lives: 
They suffered from anxieties, nightmares, and attacks of depression, fury, and 
apathy; from suspicion of strangers, introversion, overwhelming worries about 
their personal, economic, and professional security, great fear and great 
aspirations for their children. ... Holocaust anxieties could suddenly break 
onto daily life, triggered by routine events at home or at work or on the news. 
An illness, losing a job, or a border incident - everything took them back to 
'there'. For many, the past continued to intrude. 137 
The awareness of the Holocaust's effects on survivors and their families was 
almost non-existent, even among those in caring professions. Rare survivors who 
approached therapists "were treated with nothing more than drugs: there was no 
attempt to touch the past. "138 Today, psychologists and counsellors who work at 
Amcha (National Israeli Centre for Psychosocial Support of Survivors of the 
Holocaust and the Second Generation) are constantly facing survivors who had been 
in and out mental care institutions without any mention of their Holocaust 
137 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 159. 
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experiences in their medical files. 139 Silence surrounding the murder of European 
Jewry may have been preferred by some survivors, but for many it was a painful and 
difficult experience. Some survivors talked about it excessively to those who would 
listen, usually their children and spouses. Because they were unable to reconstruct 
their traumas, Holocaust survivors could not mourn their losses either. They could 
not let go of something they had not yet had the opportunity to appropriate. Only after 
the reconstruction of trauma and mourning, can the survivors of massive psychic 
trauma rebuild their identities, drawing both on their pre-traumatic identities and the 
lessons of the traumatic experience. Holocaust survivors in Israel could not draw 
upon their pre-traumatic experience because the latter had been in conflict with the 
prevailing ideology. But neither could they integrate the traumatic experience into 
their identities because the trauma had not been reconstructed. In other words, they 
had no internal sources to build their new identities from. On the contrary, they were 
given an identity before they were able to deal with their traumas and they were re- 
integrated into the wider community before having integrated the story of trauma into 
their own life stories and mourned the losses. 
Conclusion: Breaking The Silence 
Thank you for having liberated the tears which remained welled up in me 
since the day in 1942 when, as a girl of nine, I was separated from my 
parents, never to see them again. 110 
Two events occurred in the 1950s that brought the Holocaust to the centre of 
public discussion: the reparations agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany 
(hereafter FRG) in 1952, and the Kastner affair in 1954. Although the fundamental 
change of attitude did not take place until the Eichmann trial in 1961, the reparations 
agreement and Kastner trial represented important steps towards full reconstruction 
of trauma almost a decade later. 
The opening of negotiations leading to the reparation agreement with the 
Federal Republic sparked heated debates and created much disagreement in Israel. 
139 Fox, T., Inherited Memories p. 100. 
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"Passions were aroused as though a religious war had erupted, "+4' Ellie Wiesel 
reported in his memoirs. The Israeli public was divided between those who - like Ben 
Gurion and Nahum Goldman - maintained that Israel should accept the German 
reparations money, and those who opposed this pragmatic approach with a series of 
moral, emotional, and even Biblical arguments. Among the latter were the leaders of 
the opposition - most prominently Menachem Begin - but also the majority of 
survivors condemned the reparations agreement. The opponents to the agreement 
circulated petitions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and held daily demonstrations. Lobbies 
and pressure groups appeared in every corner. Posters on the walls and 
advertisements in the newspapers sought to rally the public to one side or the other. 
Most of the daily newspapers were opposed to the agreement, and the poll carried 
out by a daily Ma'ariv showed that 80 percent of those who responded were against 
direct negotiations with the Federal Republic. 142 
On 7 January 1952, the day of the debate on whether to empower the 
government to start negotiations with Germany in the Israeli Knesset, Begin made a 
speech from the balcony of a hotel overlooking the Zion Square in Jerusalem. 
Thousands of people gathered there, wearing yellow Stars of David, like the ones the 
Jews in the ghetto were forced to wear. Begin threatened the Ben Gurion 
government with a civil war if he accepted war reparations from Germany. Haber, 
Schiff and Yaari reported Begin's speech: 
There is no sacrifice we will not make. We will be killed rather than let this 
come about. This will be a war for life or death. A Jewish government that 
negotiates with Germany can no longer be a Jewish government.... Before 
Hitler came to power, the German people voted for him. Twelve million 
Germans served in the Nazi army. There is not one German who did not kill 
our fathers. Every German is a murderer. Adenauer is a murderer. +3 
Demonstrators stormed the Knesset, throwing stones at the members of Knesset. 
The army had to be called out to prevent the mob from entering the building. 
t41 Wiesel, E., Tous les fleuves vont ä la mer (Paris: Seuil, 1994) p. 292. 
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Hundreds were wounded and dozens had to be hospitalised. Four hundred people 
were arrested. When the vote took place two days later, the Knesset was surrounded 
by policemen and armed soldiers. The majority voted in favour of negotiations with 
Germany. The reparation controversy was important,, both because it mobilised large 
numbers of survivors, but also because it made the Holocaust a topic of debate in 
Israeli society. However, the reparations episode created a division within the Israeli 
society between the 'heroes' and the 'collaborators', a division that was further 
aggravated by the Kastner affair. 
Rudolf Israel Kastner worked with a Zionist rescue committee in Budapest 
from 1942 onwards. He conducted negotiations with Adolf Eichmann to exchange 
Jews for goods (million Jews for ten thousand trucks). He succeeded in rescuing 
1,685 Jews from death, among them the members of his family and friends. Two 
years after the liberation of the camps, Kastner immigrated to Israel and became an 
active politician. In 1953, a Hungarian Jew Malchiel Gruenwald accused Kastner, in a 
widely distributed newsletter, of collaboration with the Nazis, indirect murder of 
Hungarian Jewry by means of concealing information about the true destination of 
Hungarian Jews (Auschwitz), partnership with and defence of a Nazi war criminal - 
Kurt Becher - at the Nuremberg trials, and of saving friends and fellow party 
members at the expense of many more Jewish lives. Kastner, who at that time was 
serving as press spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, sued 
Gruenwald for libel. During the course of the trial, in which he was the plaintiff, 
Kastner in fact became the accused and had to defend himself against the 
allegations that the defence attorney made against him. The judge's verdict endorsed 
the defence. "In accepting the [Nazi] offer, " ruled judge Halevy, "Kastner sold his soul 
to the devil. "'µ Kastner's verdict was not only a verdict against an individual but 
against Ben Gurion's party - Mapai, and even more so against the victims and 
survivors of the Holocaust and their Exilic mentality. The dichotomy before the proud, 
fighting Israeli, and a submissive, weak Diaspora was a recurrent motive during 
Kastner trial, and the attorney of the defence Tamir even asked one of the witnesses 
if it was correct to say that it was the Diaspora mentality that made Jews "accept the 
reality of the Exile and the need, in time of trouble, to resort to bribery and special 
'"4 The verdict of the Jerusalem District Court, quoted from the original in Segev, T., The 
Seventh Million p. 283. 
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pleading. "» The government appealed the verdict to the High Court, and in January 
1958, the Court reversed the original judgement. The decision came too late for 
Kastner who was assassinated in March 1957, by three right-wing extremists. 
Like the reparations agreement, Kastner's trial aroused passions around the 
subject of the Holocaust. The trial forced the Israeli public to reflect on a number of 
difficult issues surrounding the Holocaust: adequate response to the Final solution, 
behaviour of the Jewish leadership under Nazi occupation (Jewish Councils or 
Judenräte) and in Palestine, conflicting Jewish identities (Diaspora vs. Sabra). 
Kastner's trial brought to the public debate issues that had not been previously talked 
about. However, the assault on the behaviour of the European Jews and their 
leadership during the war, and the clear dichotomy between two Jewish responses to 
the Nazis - resistance and the Judenräte - conveyed by the trial and the verdict, 
"proved once more that it was wise for the survivors to keep a low profile about the 
Holocaust in Israel, unless one had been a ghetto fighter or a partisan. "1+e 
145 The verdict of the Jerusalem District Court, quoted from the original in Segev, T., The 
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RECONSTRUCTION OF TRAUMA AT THE TRIAL OF ADOLF 
EICHMANN 
Introduction 
Only during this terrible trial, as the witnesses from over there continued, one 
by one, to go up to the witness stand, these strange and anonymous 
individuals who passed by on countless occasions now joined together until 
we had the clear and sudden understanding that these individuals were not 
only a public of individuals but ... an ineradicable part of the quality and form 
of the living nation to which we belong. ' 
Sixteen years after the end of the Second World War, the trauma of the 
Holocaust was finally reconstructed within a framework of a great historical trial. 
Unlike the Kastner trial, discussed in the conclusion of the preceding chapter, the trial 
of the Nazi official in charge of the Final Solution, Adolf Eichmann, was "intended 
from its very outset to be a celebrated educational affair. "2 The event was framed as 
one of great historical significance in which for the first time in history, the entire 
Jewish nation (by means of Israeli state), undertook to try one of its worst 
persecutors, Adolf Eichmann, and by extension, Nazism itself. The testimonies of 
survivors and the material evidence presented were supposed to educate the Israeli 
public, who were deeply ignorant about the Holocaust. 3 The silence that surrounded 
the murder of European Jewry in the 1950s hardly prepared the Israelis for such a 
momentous confrontation with the past. When the people learned about the 
Mossad's successful capture of Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires, they were stunned. 
Israeli poet Nathan Alterman described the surreal scene in a Tel Aviv street after the 
announcement was made: "A Jewish woman walking down the street was surprised 
to see people standing together reading newspapers fresh off the presses. The entire 
street seemed to be still, everyone reading something from hastily grabbed pages - 
Natan Alterman quoted in Weitz, Y., "Holocaust Memory in Israel During the 1950s" in 
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as when war is declared. She approached one of the groups and saw what was 
written in large letters at the head of the page. Adolf Eichmann has been captured 
and is already in Israel. She saw it. She stood for a moment, wavered, and fell in 
faint. "4 One of the national newspapers wrote: "It is hard to remember any other 
instance of emotion and shock like the one that hit us this week. "5 The sudden 
announcement of Eichmann's arrest set off an 'emotional explosion' and released an 
unbearable anxiety over what the trial would reveal. 
After reviewing the principal steps towards reconstruction of trauma on 
individual and collective levels in the first part, this chapter examines the way in 
which the trauma of the destruction of European Jewry was reconstructed during the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. The first section briefly situates the trial in its 
political context and identifies the principal aims of the trial while the second section 
examines how and to what extent those aims had been realised. The analysis of the 
two voices which shaped the Holocaust discourse in Israel for years to come - that of 
the prosecution, and that of the prosecution's witnesses - is based on three sets of 
documents: documents related to the question of the Court's jurisdiction, which 
established the link between the Jewish victims of the Holocaust and the State of 
Israel; the Attorney General's opening speech codifying the traumatic experience; 
and prosecution witnesses' testimonies, which confirmed and legitimised the formal 
codification. The concluding part assesses the psychological impact of the 
Eichmann's trial on the survivors and the Israeli Jewish community. 
4 Alterman, N., "The Scales of Justice" in The Seventh Column (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz 
Hameuchad, 1981), 2: 497. 
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Individual And Collective Dimension Of Trauma Reconstruction 
Personal Reconstruction of Trauma 
lt is very difficult to strike a balance between consciously remembering these 
things and being possessed by them. ' 
In the second stage of healing, survivors reconstruct the narrative of their 
traumas by transforming the traumatic memory into a linear chronological narrative. 
Before the reconstruction of trauma is completed, the survivors live, as it were, in two 
different worlds: the realm of trauma and the realm of everyday life. Isabella L., a 
former Auschwitz inmate, explained this condition when she said: 
You have one vision of life and I have two. I- you know -I lived on two 
planets. After all, I was - it seems to me that Hitler chopped off part of the 
universe and created annihilation zones and torture and slaughter areas. You 
know, it's like the planet was chopped up into a normal part ... and this other 
planet, and we were herded onto that planet from this one, and herded back 
again, while having ... virtually nothing in common with the inhabitants of this 
planet. 7 
The aim of trauma reconstruction is the collapsing of the two worlds into one and the 
assimilation of the traumatic wound into the individual's life story. Reconstructing the 
narrative begins with a review of the survivor's life before the traumatic event. 
According to Yael Danielli the commitment to reclaiming the survivor's earlier history 
is crucial for a successful restoration of a sense of continuity with their past. 8 In the 
second step towards integration of traumatic memory, the survivors piece together 
the succession of facts. As therapeutic practice demonstrated, the narratives of the 
survivor's pre-traumatic past and a barren recounting of facts in chronological order 
belong to the realm of everyday memory, and are therefore relatively easily 
accessible. The same cannot be said of the narration of traumatic memory, which 
represents the crucial, the most difficult, and for that reason, the most resisted part of 
the reconstruction process. At this stage, the survivors need to retrieve and verbalise 
6Testimony of Peter C. in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 173-74. 
Testimony of Isabella L., quoted in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 53. 
8 Danielli, Y., "Treating Survivors" p. 286. 
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their feelings, bodily sensations, and describe traumatic images that haunt them.,, 
The description of emotional and physical responses to traumatic stimuli pushes the 
survivors to the limits of narration: the more they approach the realm of the 
traumatised memory, the more they find it difficult to find words to match their 
feelings. This is because, unlike everyday memory, traumatic memory is inscribed in 
the uncontrollable and inaccessible part of the survivor's body and psyche in form of 
a static series of indelible still snapshots. As such, it cannot be recalled at will or 
represented. Instead, traumatic memory makes claims on the person's present: it 
intrudes in forms of flashbacks, reenactments, severe anxiety, and dreams. The 
traumatic images and sensations literally possess the one who experiences them. 
Again, Isabella L. 's testimony is instructive: 
I feel my head is filled with garbage: all these images, you know, and sounds, 
and my nostrils are filled with the stench of burning flesh. And it's ... you can't 
excise it, it's ... like there is another skin beneath this skin and that skin is 
called Auschwitz. 70 
B. A. van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart defined traumatic memory as "the 
unassimilated scraps of overwhelming experiences, which need to be integrated with 
existing mental schemes, and transformed into narrative language. "" The task of 
organising and distilling the traumatic imagery into the survivors' life stories is both 
necessary and daunting. As Michael Roth observed, "a trauma is a part of one's past 
that seems to demand inclusion in any narrative of the development of the present 
but that makes any narrative seem painfully inadequate. "12 Because the traumatic 
event is by definition outside the normal realm of the individual's experience, it 
cannot be assimilated without filtering it through existing mental and emotional 
apparatus. Thus a successful reconstruction of the story of trauma robs it of its 
unique traumatic substance and inevitably leads to a relativisation of the traumatic 
past in relation to the rest of one's life. The survivors often resist the verbalisation of 
trauma because it can only be achieved at the expense of the very quality that makes 
9 McCann, L. and L. Pearlman, Psychological Trauma and the Adult Survivor. Theory, 
Therapy, and Transformation (New York: Brunner / Mazel, 1990). 
10 Testimony of Isabella L., quoted in Langer, L., Holocaust Testimonies p. 53. 
" Roth, M. S., "Hiroshima Mon Amour" in Rosenstone, R. A. (ed. ), Revisioning History: Film 
and the Construction of a New Past (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 94. 
12 Roth, M. S., "Hiroshima Mon Amour" p. 94. 
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the experience traumatic. This 'loss' can be felt "as a cure and as a betrayal, a 
sacrilege. "13 A transformation of the traumatic memory into a narrative also confronts 
the past with the forces of forgetting. Even the most intense traumatic experiences 
lose their potency and detail when they are remembered and shared, unlike for 
example, the flashbacks that rush into consciousness without warning. "If something 
is unforgettable, " wrote Roth, "this is, paradoxically, because it could not be 
remembered or recounted. ... It is through an acknowledgement of the powers of 
forgetting that one can live with (and with losing) the past. "14 
A reconstruction of the traumatic narrative is completed when the survivors 
reconstitute the belief system that makes sense of their suffering, examine the moral 
questions of responsibility and guilt, and develop a full understanding of the trauma. 
The reconstruction of trauma integrates traumatic events into the existing mental 
schemes, and in doing so, the overwhelming aspects of trauma are configured into 
something that can be told. The abstractions and omissions that allow the 
assimilation of the traumatic past into the survivors' present are not accidental. They 
usually reflect the survivor's need to justify her survival, draw some useful lessons 
from the event, compensate for the loss, ascribe guilt, and above all, rebuild the 
shattered assumptions about meaning, order, and justice in the world. On the other 
hand, the survivors' reconstruction of trauma does not take place in a social and 
political vacuum. The traumatic narrative therefore inevitably bears the mark of the 
external environment. Thus for example, the societal and institutional 
acknowledgment of trauma, communal support, secondary knowledge about the 
traumatic event (and the benefit of the hindsight), the expectations or sensitivities of 
the audience, and one's own sense of entitlement, to name just a few factors, can 
configure the story in distinct ways. As the next section shows, the external 
pressures on the trauma narrative are particularly pervasive on the collective level. 
13 Roth, M. S., "Hiroshima Mon Amour" p. 99. 
14 Roth, M. S., "Hiroshima Mon Amour" p. 98-99. 
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Collective Codification of Traumatic Narrative 
The speech of survivors ... is highly politicised., The battle over meaning of a traumatic experience is fought in the arena of political discourse, popular 
culture, and scholarly debate. The outcome of this battle shapes the rhetoric 
of the dominant culture and influences future political action. 15 
Integration of personal trauma into the survivor's life story represents an 
unavoidable step towards individual healing. In the same way, a collective trauma 
needs to be incorporated into the community's narrative record. A collective 
reconstruction of trauma follows the same sequence as the one observed on the 
individual level: reclaiming of the earlier history of the community, recollection of facts 
in chronological order, reactivation and verbalisation of emotional and bodily 
sensations of trauma, reconstruction of value and belief systems that give the trauma 
a meaning and yield lessons for the future. As is the case for individual survivors, the 
first two steps towards reconstruction are comparatively easy to access. The socio- 
cultural history of the community prior to the traumatic event plays an important role 
in the final narrative that emerges from a collective trauma reconstruction. Similarly, 
the ascriptions of guilt and responsibility, as well as the formulation of meanings and 
lessons, are moulded in relation to the community's present needs. A collective 
reconstruction of trauma alters the group's identity, principles of its boundedness, 
and the way in which it relates to those outside the group. As Kai Erikson argued 
"trauma can create community [and] a trauma shared can serve as a source of 
communality in the same way that common languages and common backgrounds 
can. " 16 Because of all those implications, public reconstruction of trauma inevitably 
becomes a site of struggle over the narrative and its meaning. 
As the discussion of the Eichmann trial in the next section shows, on the 
collective level the external pressures intervene at various stages of reconstruction 
outlined above. Like individual survivors, the community can control and manipulate 
the pre-traumatic history, the factual narrative, and the reconstruction of a belief and 
value systems. The only step that is unpredictable is the confrontation with the 
15 Tal, K., Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) p. 7. 
16 Erikson, K., "Notes on Trauma and Community", in Caruth, C. (ed. ), Trauma: Explorations 
in Memory, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995) p. 185-186. 
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traumatic memory. On the collective level, the latter is represented by the testimonies 
of the physical survivors, which, like still snapshots in a traumatised person's mind, 
invade, disturb, and sometimes overwhelm the community. Individual stories of 
death, escape, bravery, and pain must all become part of the collective narrative of 
the event through a public recounting of the survivors' experience. In that process, 
the connection between the individual traumas and the collective representations of 
the collective event is crucial, both for the survivors and their community. As has 
been established earlier, reconstructing the story of trauma is a necessary and 
crucial stage of recovery. It helps survivors to reconnect with the past and thus re- 
establish the flow of continuity in their life. It also represents the first step towards 
rebuilding their identity. The survivors who have only recently reconstructed their own 
personal traumas can sometimes benefit from the opportunity to bear witness. As 
explained in Chapter Three, bearing witness is an important part of the survivor's 
search for the meaning and purpose of their survival. However, a public exposure at 
an early stage of survivors' recovery is helpful only if their testimony is met with 
understanding and support of the wider community. 
Apart from the paramount importance it represents for the survivors' process 
of healing, the reconstruction of trauma is also important because the narrative of 
trauma that emerges from survivors' testimonies determines what is going to be 
remembered and which lessons should be drawn from the event. The representation 
of traumatic experience shapes the framework within which the collective entity is 
going to define itself and its world: its security, its friends and foes, its values, and its 
fears. Therefore, any attempt to incorporate the traumatic event into the collective 
history requires the active participation of individual survivors. Given that the 
survivors' stories can greatly disturb the community's everyday functioning, a 
successful integration of communal traumatic memory into the collective history 
demands a carefully monitored retrieval of individual survivors' stories. The 
community needs to restore order and in doing so, the physical, political, and social 
implications of the catastrophe, which are of central importance of the group, may 
conflict with the highly personal needs of the individual survivors. The ceaseless 
negotiation of a safe passage between the need to avoid the community's collapse in 
grief, and the need to face the past is extremely delicate because it touches upon the 
individuals' and the societal fundamentals. It goes without saying that reconstructing 
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a story of massive trauma on the level of the collective unit is always performed 
within a socio-political context of competing interests. The process of telling the story 
of trauma thus represents a very complex battleground over meanings, lessons, and 
identities. The collision of multiple interests affects, all of those involved; first and 
foremost the survivors, but also members of the community who have not been 
directly injured, bystanders, resisters, perpetrators, and those born later. Each one of 
those actors may have a very different political agenda with regards to the trauma. "If 
`telling it like it was' threatens the status quo, " noted Kali Tal, "powerful political, 
economic, and social forces will pressure survivors either to keep their silence or to 
revise their stories. If the survivor community is a marginal one, their voices will be 
drowned out by those with the influence and resources to silence them, and to 
trumpet the revised version of their trauma. "» 
Eichmann's Trial And The Emergence Of The Holocaust Narrative 
Political Background of the Trial 
The sudden sharp voice of the bailiff announced -members of the court! ' and 
thus the trial began. This common official announcement... this time ... had a 
ring which it had never had before ... when upon hearing the two Hebrew 
words, `the court', the head of the destroyers of the Jewish people ... got up 
on his feet and stood in attention. 18 
Adolf Eichmann was born in Solingen in the Rhineland on 19 March 1906, and 
as a child moved with his parents to Linz, Austria. After unfinished studies of machine 
building, he was a blue-collar worker, salesman and a representative of a petrol firm. 
In 1932, he joined the Austrian Nazi Party and volunteered for service in the SS a 
few months later. When the Nazis established the Third Reich, Eichmann left Austria 
for Germany. In 1934, he went to serve the Central Office for Reich Security where 
he dealt with Jewish matters. After the Anschluss in March 1938, Eichmann returned 
to Austria, where he was regarded as an expert with practical experience in Jewish 
affairs. In Vienna, he built up the Department for Jewish Emigration, the only official 
office which was allowed to grant Jews exit permits from Austria and later from 
Czechoslovakia and the whole of the Third Reich. Eichmann devoted himself to the 
task of forced emigration with great zeal and soon his achievements were brought to 
" Tal, K., Worlds of Hurt p. 7. 
18 Alterman, N., "The First Day" in Hatur Hashevi'i, 2 (Tel-Aviv, 1973) p. 501. Quoted in 
Weitz, Y., "Holocaust Memory in Israel" pp. 140-41. 
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the attention of the Ministers of the Reich as "the model to follow. "19 Eichmann was 
then transferred to the RSHA and took over the department IV D4 (since 1942 IV B 
4) for "Jewish and clearance affairs". From 1941, his department organised the mass 
deportations of the European Jewry to the extermination camps. In January 1942, 
Eichmann took part in an interdepartmental meeting in Wannsee to discuss the 
organisation of the extermination program, known as the Final Solution. Executing 
the deportation, Eichmann always acted completely without emotion, though he 
never had been a fanatic anti-Semite and kept repeating that he personally had 
nothing against Jews. His eagerness was shown by his steady complaints about the 
difficulties in fulfilling the death-camp quota. Before the end of the war, when even 
Himmler was becoming less ferocious, Eichmann ignored his order to stop the 
gassing, as long as his direct superiors covered him. By the end of the war Eichmann 
held a rank of Obersturmbannführer, an equivalent (in the US Army) of lieutenant 
colonel. He was not the most senior official in the program, but he was the highest 
Nazi official who had direct contact with the Jewish leaders. After the war, Eichmann 
was interned in an American army prison camp, but he escaped before his identity 
was discovered and fled to Argentina. After receiving information about Eichmann's 
whereabouts from the chief prosecutor of the West German state of Hessen, a 
German Jew Fritz Bauer, the Israeli Secret Service undertook a complicated and 
dangerous mission of kidnapping Eichmann and bringing him to Israel. 
Two hours after Eichmann's arrival to Israel, on May 23,1960, Ben Gurion 
made "the most dramatic announcement the Knesset had ever heard"20: 
It is my duty to inform you that a short time ago the security services 
apprehended one of the most infamous Nazi criminals, Adolf Eichmann, who 
was responsible, together with the Nazi leadership, for what they called 'the 
final solution to the Jewish problem' - in other words, the extermination of six 
million of Europe's Jews. Adolf Eichmann is already imprisoned in this 
country, and will soon be brought to trial in Israel under the Nazi and Nazi 
Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950.21 
19Rosenne, S. (ed. )., 6.000.000 Accusers: Israel's Case Against Eichmann, (Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem Post, 1961) p. 55. 
20 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 326. 
21 Ben Gurion, 23 May 1960, Knesset Papers, Vol. XXIX p. 1291. 
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What was the Israeli political leadership hoping to achieve by bringing Adolf 
Eichmann to trial in Jerusalem? The aims of the trial were crucial for the decisions 
regarding the format of the trial, the scope of charges and the selection of witnesses 
for the prosecution. The combination of all those factors gave shape to the story of 
the Holocaust. On the basis of the reports regarding the general situation in the 
country at the time prior to the trial, as well as interviews22 and memoirs23of the key 
actors, the following objectives of the trial have been identified for the purpose of this 
discussion: 
> To recount the story of Hitler's attempt to destroy the Jewish people "in its full 
magnitude and horror, "24 
> To enable the ruling party - Mapai - to reassert its control over the heritage of 
the Holocaust and expunge the leadership from the historical guilt which had 
been attached to it since the Kastner trial in 1950's, 
> To "impress the lessons of the Holocaust on the people of Israel, especially 
the younger generation, "25 
> To remind the countries of the world "that the Holocaust obliged them to 
support the only Jewish state in the world, "o 
> To unify Israeli society after the mass immigration of Jews from Islamic 
countries who "had no idea what was being done by Hitler"27 and were 
therefore unaffected by the Holocaust, 
> To do all of the above without embarrassing the Federal Republic of Germany. 
By the early 1960s, Israeli public was considerably more ready to hear the full 
story of the Holocaust than it had been in the earlier decades, primarily due to the 
debates over the reparations from Germany and the Kastner trial, discussed in 
Chapter Three. In contrast to all previous approaches to the Holocaust, the 
Eichmann trial had a unifying, rather than a dividing, effect on the Israeli public. 
22 "The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben Gurion", New York Times Magazine, 18 Dec 1960 p. 
7 and 62. 
" Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1967). 
24 Segev, T., The Seventh Million (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993) p. 329. 
25 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 327. 
26Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 327. 
27 Ben Gurion, quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 328. 
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Yechiam Weitz's review of the Holocaust memory in Israel during the 1950s, 
confirmed the lack of political consensus regarding the Holocaust at that time, and 
observed a tendency of the then leadership to view the destruction of European 
Jewry through political lenses. "The memory of the, Holocaust and its victims was 
accompanied by unending political strife, " 28 he wrote. The Holocaust served as a 
weapon to attack any political opponent. Thus, the Israeli Communist Party and 
Menachem Begin's right wing Herut sought to delegitimise the centrist party in power 
- Ben Gurion's MAPAI - by accusing it of collaboration with the Nazis and thereby of 
partial responsibility for the annihilation of European Jewry. This charge was 
particularly virulent after the MAPAI member Kastner was found guilty of 
collaboration in 1954. The Zionist left also accused the leaders of the Jewish Agency 
including Ben Gurion of an anaemic response to the Nazi assault on the European 
Jews. The Zionist left, and especially the Kibbutz movements with which it was 
connected, positioned itself entirely within the heroic tradition of the Holocaust and 
saw itself as the only legitimate representative of the resistance. The Kibbutz and 
youth movements held separate ceremonies that commemorated only those 
members of the underground connected with a specific movement. Last but not least, 
the ultra-orthodox accused all Zionists across the spectrum for interfering with the 
divine plan of redemption and thereby bringing God's wrath upon the people of Israel. 
Given the fragmentation of the Holocaust remembrance and a lack of a 
national understanding of the greatest modern Jewish tragedy, the leadership had 
good reasons to stage a "national saga that would echo across the generations. "29 
The immediate aims of the trial thus consisted of mitigating the damage caused to 
the ruling party by the Kastner trial and reassuring the public that In spite of its ties 
with Germany, despite the reparations agreements and the arms deals - the Ben 
Gurion administration was not insensitive to the Holocaust. °ao However, as Ben 
Gurion explained in an interview in 1960, the trial was also meant to convey two 
messages to two different audiences - one to the world and one to the Israeli youth. 
Regarding the former, Ben Gurion told the New York Times that the world must learn 
28 Weitz, Y., "Holocaust Memory in Israel" p. 130. 
29 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 336. 
30 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 328. 
136 
from the trial where hatred of the Jews had led - and then it must be made ashamed 
of itself. 31 In a similar tone, the Communist Knesset member Moshe Sneh declared: 
The trial is not necessary for this defendant, with, whose name we need not 
soil our mouths by pronouncing it too often ... This trial is necessary because 
we need to remind the world of what happened during World War II, 
something many would like to consign to oblivion. 32 
Reminding the world of its guilt - either by commission or by omission - was one of 
the principal aims of Eichmann's trial. The major purpose of exposing the passivity of 
the Allies in the face of Nazi assault on the Jews was to prove the Zionist ideology: 
that the Enlightenment failed to resolve the Jewish problem and that only a Jewish 
state could guarantee the survival of the Jewish people. In other words, now that the 
Jews have a state of their own, the world must join forces and do what it failed to do 
during the war - to protect and support the State of Israel. Based on Ben Gurion's 
postulate that the enemies of the State of Israel were the enemies of the Jewish 
people, the message to the world was obvious: "supporting Israel was equivalent to 
fighting anti-Semitism. "33 
The other objective, equally important in Ben Gurion's eyes, was to teach the 
young generation that "the Jews are no sheep to be slaughtered but a people who 
can hit back - as Jews did in the War of Independence. " Like Ben Gurion, Attorney 
General Hausner thought about affecting younger people. He stated in his memoir: 
It was imperative for the stability of our youth that they should learn the full 
truth of what had happened, for only through knowledge could understanding 
and reconciliation with the past be achieved ... The teenagers of Israel, most 
of them born into statehood or during the struggle for it, had no real 
knowledge and therefore to appreciation, of the way in which their own flesh 
and blood had perished. There was here a breach between the generations, a 
possible source of an abhorrence of the nation's yesterday. 35 
31 Interview with Ben Gurion "The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben Gurion" 
32 Moshe Sneh, quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 333. 
33 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 328. 
m Interview with Ben Gurion "The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben Gurion" 
35Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 292. 
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The chasm however, did not only exist between the younger and older generations of 
Israelis, but even more so between the Israelis of European descent (Ashkenazim) 
and those originating from Arabic and Asian countries (Sephardim). The latter came 
to Israel shortly after the Holocaust survivors, mainly in the 1950s. In 1959, for the 
first time since their arrival in Israel, Sephardim revolted against the Ashkenazi 
establishment. From a poor neighbourhood in Haifa, inhabited mostly by immigrants 
from Morocco, the riots spread to other locations. Something was required to unite 
Israeli society - "some collective experience, one that would be gripping, purifying, 
patriotic, a national catharsis. "3s The Holocaust was foreign to Sephardic immigrants, 
and as Ben Gurion remarked: "we have to explain the thing [Holocaust] to them 
[Sephardim] from square one. "-v 
The other issue lurking in the background of the trial were discussions relating 
to German-Israeli relations. Shortly after Eichmann was arrested in May 1960, 
Adenauer contacted Ben Gurion and asked him to ensure that the trial did not 
provoke a wave of anti-German sentiment in the world. -m The Federal Republic had 
grounds for fears because the German Democratic Republic and the countries of the 
Eastern bloc sought to exploit the trial in order to delegitimise the FRG by identifying 
it with the Nazis. Adenauer was particularly concerned about one of his close 
advisors - Hans Globke - who had been employed by Interior Ministry of the Nazi 
Germany and had written "one of the authoritative interpretations of the Nuremberg 
statutes. Together with Eichmann's men, Globke had a hand in the deportation of 
Germany's Jews and the expropriation of their property. "39 During the trial, Hausner 
avoided drawing attention to Globke's role. Instead, he gave great prominence to the 
testimony of a German Protestant priest, Heinrich Gräber, who helped Jews and 
even went to Eichmann to plead for their lives. In the end, he was arrested and sent 
to a concentration camp. "At the trial, he represented the good German. "° 
References to other "good Germans" were also brought to the forefront by the 
"I Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 328. 
31 Ben Gurion, quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 328. 
3" Gilad, Y., Israeli Public Opinion on Israel-West German Relations 1949-1965. Dissertation. 
(Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1984) p. 370. 
39 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 340. 
40 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 341. 
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Attorney General's guiding of the witnesses during their testimonies. Last, but not 
least, a special attention was being paid to refer to Nazi Germany and Nazis, as 
opposed to abbreviated 'Germany' and 'Germans. ' 
Construction of the Holocaust Narrative 
Together, their stories told the saga of European Jewry from the thriving 
communities of the 1920s, through Hitler's rise to power, Anschluss, 
Kristallnacht, the Wansee Conference, the ghettos, the Gentiles who did help, 
the search for ever more efficient methods of mass killing, the medical 
experimentations, the gas chambers, the Jewish resistance, the mountains of 
eyeglasses, gold teeth, shoes neatly piled. " 
The trial of Adolf Eichmann was intended to play a political, historical, and 
educational role. In order to meet the above-outlined objectives, the trial required a 
specific format, a careful selection of witnesses, and of issues to be presented to the 
public. In his memoirs, Attorney General Gideon Hausner, who served as 
Eichmann's prosecutor, described his preparations for the trial as a much bigger 
project than it would have been necessary to convict Eichmann in court. The legal 
case prepared by the special police division which had interrogated Eichmann 
(Bureau 06) was "good, from a legal point of view. "42 Following the model of 
Nuremberg trials, the major part of the prosecution was based on documents. The 
great advantage of this approach was that "whatever it [the written proof] has to 
convey is there in black on white. There is no need to depend on the retentive 
memory of the witness, especially many years after the event. Nor can a document 
be browbeaten or broken down in cross examination. "43 To convict Eichmann, it would 
have been sufficient to present the documents, "a fraction of them would have 
sufficed to get Eichmann sentenced ten times over. "++ In spite of the undeniable 
advantages of a restricted charge, limiting the evidence to the incidents immediately 
relevant to Eichmann's guilt would, according to the Attorney General, "miss the point 
of the trial: the covering of the whole Jewish disaster. "+5 Therefore, in order to achieve 
41 Lahav p., Judgement in Jerusalem: Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1997) p. 148. 
42 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 337. 
43 Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 291. 
44Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 291. 
11 Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 298. Italics added. 
139 
the aims of the trial, the latter had to take a format that "would shock the heart"46, or 
as Hausner put it, "a living re-creation of a gigantic human and national disaster. "47 In 
other words, from the outset of the trial, the focus was not on Eichmann's deeds but 
on Jewish suffering. Hausner thus decided to present broad charges, covering the 
entire story of the Final Solution including crimes against Jews throughout the Nazi- 
occupied lands, and not only those which were directly related to Eichmann's guilt. 
Once the decision on the scope of charges had been taken, the question of content 
arose: What should be included and what excluded? Which episodes should be 
emphasised and which ones downplayed? Which interpretation should be privileged 
when it comes to controversial issues? 
David Ben Gurion and the Attorney General Hausner wanted the trial to tell 
both the story of Jewish misery and of "Gentile frigidity. "48 The task of telling the story 
fell on two actors: Israeli state embodied in its Attorney General, and Holocaust 
survivors represented by witnesses. As far as the government of Israel was 
concerned, the Attorney General's opening speech, which was delivered over three 
sessions of the Court, was meant to be "the fundamental declaration of Israel's 
official attitude toward the Holocaust. "49 Therefore Ben Gurion inspected Gideon 
Hausner's speech after it had been completed and he requested some corrections in 
content and wording. Unusual from a legal perspective, this procedure demonstrated 
a tight control over the formation of the Holocaust narrative in Israel. "Here was a 
leader dictating historiography of his people, "50 commented Segev. The final version 
of the speech opened with the following words: 
When I stand before you here, Judges of Israel, to lead the Prosecution of 
Adolf Eichmann, I am not standing alone. With me are six million accusers. 
But they cannot rise to their feet and point an accusing finger towards him 
who sits in the dock and cry: 'I accuse. ' For their ashes are piled up on the 
hills of Auschwitz and the fields of Treblinka, and are strewn in the forests of 
Poland. Their graves are scattered throughout the length and breadth of 
I Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 338. 
47 Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 291. 
48 Lahav p., Judgement in Jerusalem p. 147. 
49 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 346. 
50 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 346. 
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Europe. Their blood cries out, but their voice is not heard. Therefore I will be 
their spokesman and in their name I will unfold the awesome indictment. 51 
The first paragraph of the opening speech established the legitimacy of the State of 
Israel to prosecute Eichmann in the name of the six million murdered European 
Jews. One of the preliminary objections advanced by the Defence was that the Nazis 
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, on the basis of which Eichmann was 
accused, is invalid because it lays down the law regarding persons and acts which 
took place before the establishment of the State of Israel, outside its borders, and 
against persons who were not citizens of the State of Israel. This objection was 
rejected after a legal argument and the competence of the Jerusalem court was 
established. 
Although Hausner tried to set the extermination of Jews apart as a singular 
crime, the destruction of European Jewry was integrated into the Jewish history as 
the culmination of anti-Semitic persecutions. 
The history of the Jewish people is steeped in suffering and tears ... Pharaoh 
in Egypt decided to afflict them with their burdens and to cast their sons into 
the river; Haman's decree was to destroy, to slay and to cause them to perish; 
Chimielnicki slaughtered them in multitudes; they were butchered in Petlura's 
pogroms. Yet never, down the entire blood-stained road travelled by this 
people ... has any man arisen who succeeded in dealing it such grievous 
blows as did Hitler's iniquitous regime and Adolf Eichmann as its executive 
arm for the extermination of the Jewish people. 52 
This view of earlier Jewish history coincided with Zionist view and "undoubtedly found 
favour with the Germans. " It even led the Attorney of the Defence to suggest that 
anti-Semitism might derive from "some kind of metahistorical law, dictated from 
above. "T` The trial hardly touched upon the factors that had led to the Nazis' rise to 
power, the nature of the regime, or the causes that led millions of Germans to 
51 Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers p. 29. 
52 Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers. 
53 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 348. 
5' Wistrich, R. S., "Israel and the Holocaust Trauma" p. 18. 
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support Hitler. Neither has the prosecutor analysed the characteristics of Nazi racism 
or addressed the "ambiguities and dilemmas posed by the need to obey the law 
versus the responsibility to disobey 'manifestly illegal' orders. "-'5 These omissions 
were dictated by Ben Gurion's concern for Germany's image. According to Segev, 
Ben Gurion demanded three corrections after having read the draft of the opening 
speech: firstly, an abbreviation Germany for Nazi Germany and Germans for Nazis 
should be abandoned in favour of a rigorous distinction between the two; secondly, 
Ben Gurion suggested omitting the thesis that Nazism in Germany was inevitable 
because it may weaken the prosecution and lead to a debate over developmental 
trends in German history or ever over the German national character; lastly, Hitler's 
guilt should be given precedence over the collective guilt of the German people. 
Hausner went on to describe the new kind of killer -'the murderer behind the 
desk - and proceeded to speak about the rise of anti-Semitism", the role of Nazi 
organisations in the Final Solution, " and Eichmann's life and career. 59 The remaining 
hundred and twelve pages60 were consecrated to the misery of the Jewish people, 
and not to Eichmann's deeds as one would expect. The general description of the 
Final Solution was followed by the story of the extermination in Poland and the mass 
killings by the Einsatzgruppen in the areas governed by the Soviet Union. Next day, 
Attorney General proceeded with a review of events in Northern, Western and 
Southern Europe, dwelling in greater detail on the story of Dutch Jewry. Hausner 
continued with Hungary, where Eichmann's role was particularly important, before 
describing some of the death camps. The penultimate section reviewed the 
flourishing of Jewish life in Europe before the Holocaust, including in the East 
European shtetels, "the home of millions of Jews ... where the Jewish spirit was 
nurtured till the last generation and the tradition of Jewish family was preserved in the 
typical small home, a stronghold of piety, tradition and yearning for the coming of the 
55 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 348. 
Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 347. 
51 Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers pp. 32-43. 
Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers pp. 44-53. 
59 Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers pp. 54-62. 
60 Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers pp. 63-175. 
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Messiah - which was no more. "87 In the last section, the Attorney General reviewed 
the charges and the evidence against Eichmann. He concluded with the words: 
I am afraid that even after submitting all the evidence and material which is in 
our possession, we shall not be able to do more than give a pale reflection of 
the enormous human and national tragedy which beset Jewry in this 
generation. 112 
The scope and content of the trial were chiefly determined by the aims of the 
trial, outlined earlier, but the role of conveying the message and of "recreating this 
national and human disaster" fell on the witnesses of the prosecution. For the first 
time, the simple survivors who were neither heroes nor traitors were offered a 
possibility of publicly telling their stories, and thereby gain the long-delayed 
legitimacy. They could "tell what they had seen with their own eyes and what they 
had experienced on their own bodies. "63 However, like the individual mental 
apparatus distils traumatic images into a narrative through a process of selection and 
abstraction, the witnesses' testimonies also had to be chosen from a list of hundreds 
of Holocaust stories. M The choice depended on the objectives set in advance, but it 
also largely determined the character of the trial and therefore the narrative of the 
trauma that emerged in the end. Witnesses were chosen according to a certain 
number of criteria: first of all, their experience under the Nazi rule, but also age, 
profession, eloquence, and so on. Hausner recounts that the prosecution wanted to 
tell what happened to every area under the Nazis and it wanted "the story told by a 
broad section of the people: professors, housewives, artisans, writers, farmers, 
merchants, doctors, officials and labourers. "65Young people were preferred because 
the Israeli youth could more easily identify with them and survivors who had already 
put their experiences on paper were given priority because, as Hausner explained, 
"writers were usually equipped with good powers of observation and [they] carefully 
checked their facts before publishing them. "66 
61 Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 325. 
61 Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 Accusers p. 175. 
Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 293. 
64 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 338. 
65Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 296. 
m Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 296. 
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The prosecution wanted to reconstruct the full story in all its horror. Yet, the 
experience of prolonged and repeated trauma creates so many traumatic incidents 
that it is impossible and futile to approach each as a separate entity. Instead, a 
reconstruction of prolonged traumas is often based upon paradigmatic incidents that 
stand for many others. 67 Therefore, Rachel Auerbach - historian, survivor, and 
advisor to the prosecution - proposed focusing immediately on the extermination 
itself. Following her suggestion, the witnesses were led to emphasise the particularly 
monstrous treatment imposed on Jews by the Nazis, events that would underline the 
latter's "odiousness and satanic cruelty. "68 Therefore, witnesses who saw the horrors 
with their own eyes painted a universe that made the audience's hair stand on end: 
eight people were put in a barrel of water and froze to death, 69 twenty religious men 
were soaked in kerosene and set on fire alive, 7a a boy of fifteen was hanged twice 
because the rope had broken the first time, » a woman was shot and her intestines 
spilled all over a little girl standing next to her, n babies were smashed against the 
wall or thrown our of the windows to save ammunition,, n and so on. Furthermore, 
given the structure of Attorney General's charges, each country occupied by Nazi 
Germany was represented by one or more witnesses, respecting the proportion of 
destruction afflicted upon the community in question. For example, only one or two 
witnesses described the suffering of Jews in each West European country, compared 
to more than twenty witnesses which took the stand to recount the destruction of the 
Jewish community in Poland. The major extermination camps were equally 
represented by those who miraculously survived them. 
Humiliation, abuse, and slaughter, however, was only one part of the story that 
the prosecution wanted to recount through the medium of witnesses, the part 
destined at the 'world. ' The Israeli youth had a different lesson to learn -a lesson of 
heroism and revolt. 'The Jews did not go like sheep to the slaughter and even when 
they did they did it because they had no other choice' was a message to the Israelis. 
67 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 187. 
68 Auerbach, R., "Witnesses and Testimony at the Eichmann Trial, " Yediot Yad Vashem 28 
(Dec. 1961). 
69 Testimony of Hugo Ya'akov Kratky, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, session 20. 
70 Testimony of Ada Lichtman, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 20. 
" Testimony of Moshe Beisky, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 21. 
72 Testimony of Leon Weliczker Wells, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 22. 
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Again, the witnesses fulfilled the role of providing evidence. An exceptionally high 
proportion of witnesses had been either members of the Jewish underground or 
partisans. Also, many of the witnesses had been very young during the war, and that 
choice was also deliberate. Many years later Attorney General Gideon Hausner said 
in an interview with a daily Ma'ariv: "I wanted testimony about the fate of young men 
and women, so that our own young people would hear what happened. " He believed 
that young people could more easily identify with those of their own and he wanted 
the Israeli youth to see themselves in the place of the victims. 74 The witnesses who 
had belonged to the underground repeated again and again that they "would not go 
like cattle to the slaughter. "75The Warsaw Ghetto uprising was given a prominent 
place in the trial, although the Jewish heroic resistance had nothing to do with 
Eichmann and in spite of the fact that "Hausner's attempts to convince the Court that 
the story of Jewish resistance was part of the story of Jewish extermination were only 
partially successful. "76 Those who did not have their own heroic stories to tell, told of 
heroes they had known. n Others still were challenged to explain why did they not 
revolt. This was the question in the air, the question that Sabras were asking, and it 
was the role of the Attorney General to provide them with an answer. Repeatedly, the 
witnesses were faced with situational questions of the kind: 
When you thought that it [the train] was likely to go to Belzec [extermination 
camp], why didn't you resist, why did you board the train? 7e; 
15.000 people stood there, and opposite them hundreds of guards. Why didn't 
you attack them, why didn't you revolt? 79; 
Now tell me - there weren't many guards for 2000 people: why did all these 
people go to be shot - why didn't they try at least, to injure the murderers 
before they were killed? 80 
" Strassman, G., "What did the Eichmann Trial Give Us? " Ma'ariv, 11 Dec. 1981 p. 27. 
75 Testimony of Rivka Kuper, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 26. See also the 
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The answers to those questions varied in style but they all pointed in the same 
direction: resistance in the early stages was impossible because there was always 
someone or something to lose -a friend, a member of the family, or simply, hope; 
later, when everything was lost, there was no strength nor will to live or fight left. And 
there was fear, of course. In the words the witness Moshe Beisky: 
I can no longer ... describe this sensation of fear ... After all this thing is 
ultimately a terror inspiring fear. People stand facing machine guns, and the 
mere fact of gazing upon the hanging of a boy and his cries - and then, in 
fact, no ability remains to react. 81 
The trial thus emphasised both "the inability of Jews to resist their murderers and 
their attempts to rebel. "u The two were given almost the same weight in the trial, and 
for a long time Holocaust and Heroism stood side by side in the Israeli collective 
memory of the destruction of European Jewry -a fact clearly illustrated by Yad 
Vashem, which still today bears an official name of Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' 
Remembrance Authority. This is a straightforward example of a teleological bending 
of a narrative from within' to fit a certain belief system, in this case the Zionist 
ideology. 
A crucial absence from the Holocaust story as conveyed by the Attorney 
General and his witnesses was the issue of the Jewish Councils (Judenräten) and 
their co-operation with the Nazi authorities, which had been at the centre of the 
Kastner trial. "Hausner would almost completely ignore the Judenräten"83 and Hannah 
Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, where she drew attention to the issue of Jewish 
role in the execution of the Nazi plans, attracted venomous criticism from the Jewish 
public. The episode of Jewish collaboration was excluded from the official story of the 
Holocaust and became the taboo subject for decades to come. The court's dealing 
with the issue of Hungarian Jewry is illustrative of this type of restriction. Hausner 
wrote in his memoirs that he appealed to the witnesses not to touch upon the thorny 
e' Testimony of Moshe Beisky, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 21. 
Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 348. 
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issue of Kastner's collaboration with the Nazis. "The Hungarian case was 
painstakingly prepared and every prospective witness was considered from all 
possible angles, " reminisced Hausner in his memoir, "we could not call any witness 
who might use the platform for a pro-Kastner or' anti-Kastner demonstration. Two 
witnesses were disqualified by this criterion. "84 Equally absent from the reconstructed 
narrative was the issue of Jewish revenge after the war. The testimonies collected in 
1946 in the DP camps where the survivors talk openly about the actions they had 
undertaken to avenge their dead against the Germans immediately after the 
liberation of the camps, had not been published until 1998.85 Even in the 1990s 
however, the Jewish public is not willing to examine the issue of revenge critically. A 
book addressing the question of Jewish revenge was widely criticised and de- 
legitimised as revisionist literature when it was published in 1995.86 Both the story of 
Jewish revenge and that of Jewish collaboration were set as taboo issues, a 
forbidden territory for the researcher to venture into. 
The story of destruction of European Jewry that had been reconstructed 
through joint efforts of the survivors and the Israeli leadership of the time was 
disseminated widely. The Eichmann trial had incredible media coverage for the early 
1960s: hundreds of journalists arrived to report the trial and the court had authorised 
the entire proceedings to be broadcast on the radio and filmed for television "so that 
the whole world could watch. "87 The Israeli government invited foreign countries and 
central legal bodies to send their observers to Jerusalem. The press and important 
visitors were provided with portable transistor radios and earphones through which 
they could receive simultaneous translation of the proceedings into Hebrew, English, 
French and German. Within the first month of the trial over five hundred special 
foreign correspondents covered the sessions. Two hundred more joined them in the 
course of the proceedings. Special telecommunication services were provided in the 
court building in the large press hall and the radio provided a very wide coverage of 
the trial, often broadcast directly from the courtroom. A survivor child who was eight 
or nine at the time of Eichmann's trial recounts: "I remember, but not so much 
because I listened ... but because the whole country was one big loudspeaker.... 
"" Hausner, G., Justice in Jerusalem p. 341. 
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Wherever you went, whatever you did, from all the windows ... And as a child, you 
played and heard Eichmann, ate lunch and heard Eichmann.... "111 
Through the process of telling and retelling the story of the Holocaust, the 
collective traumatic memory stored in individual testimonies was gradually 
incorporated into the everyday Israeli and Jewish history. Once the traumatic 
experience is appropriated, that is, codified and transmitted, it somehow freezes in 
time. It becomes an untouchable and unchallengeable property of the traumatised 
individual or community. At this stage before mourning various strategies are used by 
the self-appointed 'guardians' of the narrative to control and limit its repetition, 
reification, and 'authentic' representation. In other words, the resistance to the 
inevitable consequences of trauma recollection, that is, exposure to forgetting and 
banalisation, reappears in form of resistance to mourning after the story is 
reconstructed. Although mourning is discussed in detail in Chapter Five, a brief 
illustration of the resistance to 'normalisation' of traumatic history is appropriate here. 
Ever since the creation of the Holocaust studies as an independent academic 
discipline in the late 1980s, conservative circles have undermined the legitimacy of a 
scientific approach to the Holocaust. Yehuda Bauer, one of the most prominent 
Israeli scholars and a Holocaust historian, warned already in 1977 "against the 
creation of 'Holocaustology' and the careerism of 'Holocaustologians. '"ao Four years 
later, Robert Adler was similarly worried that presenting the fathomless and 
bottomless evil of the Holocaust in the detached, dispassionate environment of a 
university lecture hall would have, in his words, the "unhappy effect of naturalising 
the horror. "° As recently as 1998, Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, 
observed the realisation of Adler's and Bauer's fears - the 'naturalisation' of the 
Holocaust and the appearance of 'Holocaustlogians' such as Harvard Professor and 
author of Hitler's Willing Executioners, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Schoenfeld was 
particularly distressed by chiefly two developments in Holocaust studies: the 
increasing tendency to regroup Holocaust studies together with other genocides, 
Testimony of Naftali Kupfer in Fox, T., Inherited Memories p. 119. 
89 Yehuda Bauer quoted in Schoenfeld G., "Auschwitz and the Professors" Commentary, 
June 1998. 
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peace studies, or even human rights, and even more so, by feminist approaches to 
the Hoiocaust. 91 
Conclusion: Political And Psychological Consequences Of The Trial 
could almost smell the lethal gases and the stench of burnt flesh. As the 
witnesses tonelessly gave their testimony, we relived the nightmare with 
them. D2 
Adolf Eichmann was found guilty on all fifteen counts against him. He was 
convicted by the district court on December 15,1961 and condemned to death. His 
conviction sparked heated debates in Israel about the appropriate method of 
punishment for a murderer like Eichmann. There were people, like Martin Buber, 
sought to prevent his execution "for the sake of the country and for the sake of our 
people. "93 In a letter addressed to President Ben-Zvi, Buber and his circle wrote: 
"Carrying out a death sentence will make it possible for them [the haters of Israel] to 
claim that the crime of the Nazis has been paid for, that blood ransom has been paid 
to the Jewish people for the blood that was shed. "9' Others felt that putting Eichmann 
to death was too lenient as a punishment. After his own request for clemency was 
rejected, Eichmann was hanged in the Ramla prison in the evening hours of May 31, 
1962. His body was cremated and his ashes scattered at sea, outside Israel's 
territorial waters. 
Despite deep divergences of opinions, most scholars and commentators 
agree that Eichmann trial marked the turning point in the history of Israel's attitude 
towards the Holocaust. All short-term political aims of the trial were met successfully: 
the story of the Nazi assault on European Jewry was told, as comprehensively as the 
political interests allowed, Ben Gurion's party reasserted its control over the narrative 
of the Holocaust, and the world was reminded of its guilt without a parallel 
resurgence of hostile feelings against the Federal Republic of Germany. On the 
contrary, it was the Eichmann trial that "moderated anti-German sentiment in Israel. "95 
91 See Schoenfeld G., "Auschwitz and the Professors" Commentary, June 1998 and the 
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With regards to the impact of the trial on the young Israelis, on the Sepharadim, and 
above all, on the Holocaust survivors, the balance sheet is less straightforward. The 
trial failed entirely in its educational purpose to the extent that the event was not 
accompanied by discussions in schools or a propQr school curriculum that would 
allow students to start grasping with the broader issues. As the first chapter of this 
thesis demonstrated, Holocaust education was virtually non-existent in Israel before 
the 1970s. That means that the trial's 'education' of Israeli youth and Jews of non- 
European origin consisted mainly of eliciting a strong emotional response without a 
parallel understanding of historical context in which the events took place. Those who 
were children at the time remember mostly the sounds blasting from the 
loudspeakers and the fear they provoked: "And there were these smothered, choking 
sounds which terrified me: I was convinced these were the sounds from the war - or 
the sounds of the dead... "116 Even later, the cassettes of the Eichmann trial were 
played to the children on Holocaust Remembrance Day without explanation. "We 
would be sitting quietly, " remembered Yaron, "lots of children ... There was a stack of 
cassettes and a booming loudspeaker. And we would sit ... in the shelter: black, and 
memorial candles ... Booming: 
I wouldn't listen to the words but the tones, the 
shrieks ... "97 And "when children are not told things clearly and repeatedly, " explained 
Tamar Fox, "they make up their own explanations, devise their own conclusions and 
proceed to deal with them. "' 
Not surprisingly, such an arsenal of fear and confused emotions was nearly 
impossible to control. As Hannah Arendt shrewdly observed: "Manipulations of 
opinion, insofar as they are inspired by well-defined interests, have limited goals; 
their effect, however, if they happen to touch upon an issue of authentic concern, is 
no longer subject to their control and may easily produce consequences they never 
foresaw or intended. "99 Whilst the initial aim of the ruling generation was simply to 
bend the youth's arrogance and shame of the nation's past, the trial affected young 
Israelis way beyond the expectations: "Rather than generate feelings of pride in 
Israel's newfound strength, which had atoned, as it were, for the shameful impotence 
of the `submissive generation', it aroused Israeli Jews, and the youth in particular, to 
96 Testimony of Oma Ben-Dor, in Fox, T., Inherited Memories p. 118. 
97 Testimony of Yaron, in Fox, T., Inherited Memories p. 120. 
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99 Arendt, H., Eichmann in Jerusalem (London: Penguin Books, 1994) p. 283. 
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increased feelings of identification with their tortured and slaughtered brethren in the 
Diaspora. "10° The terrifying stories that emerged from silence and were continually 
transmitted on the national radio "touched upon an issue of authentic concern" as 
Arendt put it. The latter does not imply that Eichmann's trial uncovered a repressed 
trauma in all Israelis independently of their experience during the war, but rather that 
the unexpected level of identification by most Israelis With the Holocaust victims and 
survivors created an acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability, comparable to that of 
the survivors themselves. Through the process of identification young Israelis 
became empathetic 'survivors' and developed symptoms of indirect / collective 
traumatisation described in Chapter One. Similarly, the aim of uniting Israelis of all 
origins behind the European Jewry's tragedy was a success that came with a price 
tag. Sephardi Jews, who came to Israel from the Middle East in the 1950s, identified 
with victims of Nazi persecution by assimilating their own suffering in the Arab lands 
into the Holocaust narrative. This move was facilitated by the Arab - Nazi 
collaboration in the person of Haj Amin al-Hussein, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, 
who entertained contacts with Eichmann and even met Hitler once. The link between 
Arabs and Nazis made with the purpose of including the Seprahdi Jews into the 
narrative allowed a transposition of the Holocaust into the Arab-Israeli conflict - 
undoubtedly one of the more worrying consequences of the trial. 
Apart from fear, confusion, and sense of vulnerability, Eichmann's trial also 
created a sense of isolation and tilted the balance between universalism and 
particularism in favour of the latter. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) 
Law on the basis of which Eichmann was tried distinguishes between three types of 
offences (in the order that follows): crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. 1 ' Four out of fifteen counts against Eichmann were crimes 
against the Jewish people, and six were crimes against humanity. The fact that the 
law posits crimes against the Jewish people above and apart from crimes against 
humanity enhanced the feelings of specialness and separateness from the rest of 
humanity. After the trial Israelis were "perceiving themselves as special: a special 
target for genocide and special in their right to ignore international norms in pursuit of 
10° Don-Yehiya, E., "Memory and Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust" in 
Studies in Contemporary Judaism: An Annual, 9 (1993) p. 149. 
101 See "Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law" in Rosenne, S. (ed. ), 6,000,000 
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justice. "102 Reconstruction of the Holocaust gave all Israelis the poisonous gift of 
victimhood. As Pnina Lahav observed: "Popular hubris was growing, nurturing a 
victim mentality, a sense of self-righteousness and excessive nationalism, 
threatening to weaken the already shaky foundations of universalism in Israeli 
political culture. "103 In a similar vein, Idith Zertal argued that the trial boosted Israeli 
militarism and "stressed the 'sacredness' of the army, conceived of now as the 
venerated, holy executor of the Six Million's last will. ... [and] gave a new meaning to 
the fight against the Arab 'enemy' ... Defence of one's country became a sacred 
mission endowed with the weight of the ultimate catastrophe. "10' 
For the survivors, on the other hand, the trial meant a painful confrontation 
with the past. In the beginning, the prosecution found it difficult to convince witnesses 
to testify: "Many Holocaust survivors feared the encounter with the unspoken terrors 
of the past, some also feared they would not be believed. " 105 Yet, as the trial 
approached, "the urge to tell began to overwhelm the need to remain silent. " 106 
Survivors who did not testify listened to the proceedings, either on the radio or in the 
courtroom. A child recounts the effect the broadcastings had on her survivor mother: 
"I was very scared. My mother listened. ... She became unwell. ... I was terrified. ... 
As if -I thought it was going to happen again. To my mother. "107 Other children 
reported similar experiences: My father went once - to the trial - and ran away 
because he couldn't be there. " 108 Many found out for the first time what had 
happened to the family they left behind in Europe, to their colleagues, neighbours, 
and parents. Many spoke about their own experiences for the first time, even to their 
children and friends. Eichmann's trial brought survivors the recognition they had 
hoped for since the end of the war. As a result of the trial, the survivors were no 
longer an anonymous group of Jews living in Israel; they became individuals with 
names and biographies. They could now really begin their process of recovery. 
102 Lahav P., Judgement in Jerusalem p. 150. 
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Chapter Five 
REACTIVATIONS OF TRAUMA: SIX-DAY AND YOM KIPPUR 
WARS 
Introduction 
The Eichmann trial swept through Israel's language and images. Everything 
was now discussed anew in relation to the Eichmann trial: Israeli politics, 
Israeli youth, world Jewry, Holocaust Remembrance Day, the teachings of the 
Holocaust, the Arabs, and the security of Israel. ' 
Chapter Four outlined only the most salient features of the psychological 
impact of the revelations at the Eichmann trial on the Israeli population. It is the aim 
of this chapter to examine the influence of the Holocaust-permeated Jewish prism 
described in Chapter Two on perception of Israel's strategic environment in general 
and on the assessment of threat in particular. If the Eichmann trial represented the 
first major attempt to draw some useful lessons from the tragedy of European Jewry, 
the Six-Day war was the first notable occasion to put these lessons into practice. 
Known as 'the Holocaust that did not happen, ' the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war was an 
exceptional event, not only because of the spectacular performance of the IDF 
resulting in the conquest of territories that in six days more than quadrupled Israel's 
land mass, 2 but above all because of the level of discrepancy between the "sense of 
impending existential danger of the Holocaust proportions"3 preceding the war and 
the extent of Israeli victory. The first part of this chapter traces the origins of the 
unprecedented fear of annihilation that marked the waiting period before the war, to 
the imagery of the Holocaust generated by the Eichmann trial. The discussion begins 
with an analysis of the influence of the equation established at the trial between 
Nazis and Arabs for the evaluation of strategic threat. It proceeds with a description 
of the key junctures of the Six-Day war: the three week waiting period preceding the 
outbreak of war and its immediate aftermath. The analysis of the June 1967 war 
exposes the weakness of the mainstream international relations analysis when it 
1Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 111. 
2 Israel's territory before June 5,1967 was 20,700 km2. During the June war, Israel occupied 
67,850 km2 of land, including Golan Heights, Sinai, West Bank and Gaza. 
3 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 17. 
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comes to non-rational factors in foreign and defence policy. The study of the Six-Day 
war within the trauma framework also challenges Idith's Zertal's account, which 
opposes the elite and mass perceptions of the threat, by collapsing the boundary 
between the elite and the masses. The section 'thus seeks to identify the major 
factors that contributed to such inadequate threat assessment in June 1967. 
Whilst the Six-Day war was characterised by an excessive overestimate of 
threat, the outbreak of Yom Kippur war in October 1973 came as a surprise to the 
majority of Israelis, including its defence and intelligence establishment. Although 
Israel won the war, it did so at the cost of a great number of casualties, loss of 
territory, self-confidence, and certain level of independence of action. Commonly 
referred to as 'something that went wrong' (mehdal in Hebrew), Yom Kippur war was 
the most traumatising of Israeli wars and the one most often compared to the 
Holocaust. The near defeat on both fronts at the early stages of the war engendered 
the worst existential fears since the establishment of the state and, in spite of Israel's 
victory, the aftermath of the war was characterised by a strong sense of failure. The 
second part of this chapter explores the shock of Kippur and the bitter victory after 
eighteen days of combat. Yom Kippur war demonstrated that Israel is not a secure 
haven for Jews and thereby contradicted the central message of Zionism. The 
following section therefore examines the role of the Yom Kippur war in the integration 
of Israel into 'normal' Jewish history: that of isolation and persecution. 
Six-Day War: A Holocaust That Did Not Happen 
Arab-Nazi Equation 
They [the Arabs] could slaughter us tomorrow in this country ... We don't want to relive the situation that you [Holocaust survivors] were in. We don't want 
the Arab Nazis to come and slaughter us. ' 
The tendency of the founding fathers' generation to perceive Arab enmity as 
one of the avatars of anti-Semitism, comparable to all other expressions of anti- 
Jewish hatred across the ages, was articulated at the wake of the Eichmann trial in 
form of an equation between Arabs and Nazis. As Zertal put it: "There was rarely a 
Ben Gurion to Mapai Central Committee, 13 December 1951. Quoted in Segev, T., The 
Seventh Million p. 369. 
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mention of Eichmann's - and other Nazi criminals' - deeds without adding the Arab- 
Nazi dimension to it. "5 The transference of the Holocaust into the Middle East reality 
was operated in several ways: by frequent references to the presence of Nazi 
scientists and advisors in Egypt and other Arab countries, to the ongoing relations 
between Nazi and Arab leaders, and to the Arab-Nazi plans to annihilate the Jewish 
state. In an interview with the New York Times, Ben Gurion talked about his 
expectations of the forthcoming trial. "It may be, " he said, 
that the Eichmann trial will help ferret out other Nazis - for example, the 
connection between Nazis and some Arab rulers. From what we hear on the 
Egyptian radio, some Egyptian propaganda is conducted on purely Nazi lines. 
... I have no 
doubt that the Egyptian dictatorship is being instructed by the 
large number of Nazis who are there. 
Similarly, Hugh Trevor-Roper, the British historian and the Sunday Times 
correspondent in Jerusalem during Eichmann trial, wrote: 
Nazis are far more alive to Israel than to us. Like the Jews, their enemies too 
have now gone east. If several Nazi war criminals escaped to South America 
... many more 
have escaped to the Arab countries, to put their Nazi anti- 
Semitism and their German efficiency at the disposal of the new nationalist 
rulers of the Near East, who also have their'Final Solution' for the Jews who 
have settled in their midst. 6 
On the other hand, the Nazi connections of the former Grand Mufti of 
Jerusalem were insistently mentioned in all Israeli media and public speeches. 
Already during the preparations for the trial, Israeli press repeatedly stressed 
Eichmann's ties with the former Mufti of Jerusalem, "a fanatic Jew hater, who 
belongs among the biggest Nazi war criminals, "7 as one paper described him. The 
press inflated the Mufti's role in the Final Solution and one Israeli newspaper even 
insinuated that it was the Mufti who actually inspired the Nazi murder of European 
Jewry. "Various certificates and documents found in archives in Europe after the Nazi 
5 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 108. 
6 Trevor-Roper, H., "Behind the Eichmann Trial" in Sunday Times (London), 9 April 1961. 
Segev, S., "Eichmann on the Mufti" in Ma'ariv, 5 June 1961. 
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defeat, " said Ma'ariv, "have proven that Hussein! [Grand Mufti], the most extreme 
leader the Israeli Arabs have ever had, was one of the most important collaborators 
of Adolf Eichmann. Those documents indicate that the physical extermination of the 
Jews of Europe began at the end of 1941, close to the Mufti's visit to Berlin in 
November 1941. "8 The trial revealed that the Mufti indeed "sought help and advice 
from the Nazi leadership and found solace in their murderous actions in World War 
II. "9 Although the documents presented to the court failed to sustain the claim that the 
Mufti was a major contributor to the Nazi murder of European Jews, "the Israeli 
prosecutor insisted on inflating the Mufti's role in the design and implementation of 
the Nazi crimes, devoting many hours in court to the issue, and the Israeli press 
followed diligently. "10 
As Chapter Four showed, the prosecution's insistence on the Mufti's role in 
the Final Solution was motivated by the desire to include the Jews from Islamic 
countries in the narrative of national trauma. However, the transposition of the World 
War II situation to the Middle East context resonated also with other empathetic 
'survivors' whose anger and revenge thus found a readily available outlet in the Arab 
enemy. Anne Roiphe attributed this Arab-Nazi equation to a frustrated anger and 
transference of revenge: 
Anger with the enemy runs high not just because he is this enemy but 
because of what the last Jewish enemy had done. Anger in the Jewish mind 
grows cumulatively from anger with Haman, to anger with Syrian and Roman 
conquerors, to anger with Spanish Inquisitors, to anger with cossacs and 
czars and Austrian Grafs until we reach Hitler and Goebbels and Eichmann 
and Mengele, and the weight of the anger we bear causes us to stumble and 
to brim over with hate, and who can we hate but the Arab who stands now in 
the way of our power, our national expansion, our well-earned, long-delayed, 
deserved gratification. " 
e Segev, S., "Eichmann on the Mufti" in Ma'ariv, 5 June 1961. 
9 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall" p. 109. 
10 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall" p. 109. 
11 Roiphe, A., A Season for Healing (New York: Summit Books, 1995) p. 175. 
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Fighting against the Arab enemy and the possibility of death in such a fight acquired 
a new meaning after the Eichmann trial. It became "the belated vindication of the 
fathers' helplessness in the face of the Nazi enemy. ... Defence of one's country 
became a sacred mission endowed with the weight of the ultimate catastrophe. "" 
The Waiting Period 
Only a nation haunted by the memory of mass extermination could plan so 
meticulously for the next holocaust. " 
On 15 May 1967, Israel celebrated its nineteenth anniversary of 
independence. Two hundred thousand people watched the military parade in the 
streets of Jerusalem. Towards the end of the parade it was noticed that Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol leaned over to his Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and whispered 
something in his ear: "News had just been received from Cairo about Egyptian troop 
concentrations. "14 According to Laqueur's account, only routine measures were taken 
initially: a state of alert was declared and the southern border was reinforced. The 
intelligence assessment indicated that the Egyptian concentration of troops was 
nothing more than a demonstration of solidarity with its Syrian ally, whose six aircraft 
had been shot down by Israeli air force following an exchange of provocations in 
early April 1967. On May 12 1967, the Soviet Union announced that Israel was 
mobilising to attack Syria and the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
replied that "peace in the area depended on the cessation of terrorist activities. "15 But, 
as Laqueur noted, "such exchanges were routine; there was no long discussion. "1e 
On the 17 May the cabinet received news that Nasser demanded immediate 
withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF), which served as a 
buffer on the border between Israel and Egypt. The next day the situation was newly 
reappraised and further reinforcements were sent to the Israeli forces in the south. In 
the evening of the same day while Prime Minister Eshkol and Chief of Staff Rabin 
were in session, news was received from the United Nations that its Secretary 
12 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall, " p. 112. 
13 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 389. 
14 Zimuki, A. in Yediot Aharonot, 16 June 1967. Quoted in Laqueur, W., The Road to War 
1967 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969) p. 109-110. 
15 Mr. Levavi, quoted in Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 111. 
16 Mr. Levavi, quoted in Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 111. 
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General U Thant was about to order the withdrawal of the UNEF. On the same day 
two Egyptian MiG 21s made a brief high-altitude reconnaissance flight over the 
Israeli nuclear installation in Dimona. " During the day of 19 May the mobilisation 
order came into effect. On 21 May General Rabin informed the cabinet that about 
80,000 Egyptians were massed at the border, compared to 35,000 at the beginning 
of the crisis. Prime Minister Eshkol called on the great powers (US, UK, France, and 
the Soviet Union) to exert their influence in Cairo and Damascus in order to lessen 
the tension and to protect the freedom of shipping through the Straits of Tiran, but to 
no avail. At four in the morning of 23 May, Eshkol was informed that Nasser had 
announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran, the entrance from the Red Sea to the 
Gulf of Eilat. Neither Israeli ships, nor foreign vessels carrying strategic cargo 
(including fuel) to Israel, would be allowed to reach the port of Eilat. For Israel the 
closure of the Straits clearly represented an act of war. On 26 May, the Ministerial 
Defence Committee was informed of the second reconnaissance flight over Dimona. 
Like the closure of the Straits of Tiran, "an aerial attack against Dimona would be a 
reason to go to war. ""' To make matters worse, on 30 May President Nasser signed a 
defence agreement with Jordan, which complemented the 1966 military alliance with 
Syria. Iraq agreed to send reinforcements and contingents arrived from other Arab 
countries including Algeria and Kuwait. Israel was encircled and confronted by an 
Arab force of some 465,000 troops, over 2,880 tanks and 810 aircraft. 
Egyptian manoeuvres were accompanied by Nasser's "harsh and blunt threats 
to annihilate Israel, which were broadcast daily on Hebrew programs of Egyptian 
national radio, heard in Israel and reproduced in the press. ""' The'Voice of the United 
Arab Republic' "reported daily that ships of the U. S. Sixth Fleet were standing ready 
to evacuate Jews from Israel and predicted that those who remained would be 
slaughtered. "20 Similarly, caricatures in the Arab press were unambiguously hostile, 
depicting for example, a long-nosed Jew with a goatee at the edge of a springboard, 
sweating and trembling for his life, with eight tank muzzles pointing at him, 21 or a pile 
17 Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb p. 269. 
18 Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb p. 269. 
19 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall, " p. 114. 
20 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 389. 
21 "The Tank Muzzles of Eight Arab States: Sudan, Algeria, United Arab Republic, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon" in Al Jarida, 31 Mai 1967. 
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of skulls and bones marked with Stars of David in front of ruined houses. 22 Nasser's 
choice of words and the aggressiveness of their delivery "undoubtedly played a 
crucial role in intensifying the anxiety of Israel's population. "23 The withdrawal of the 
UNEF evoked in some the state of affairs in 1938-39, "then too there was a slight lull 
after each of Hitler's conquests. 1' Like Hitler, "Nasser, " it was claimed "cannot be 
pacified by Israeli concessions. " 25 An editorialist of a popular Israeli newspaper wrote: 
"For the time being, everything goes according to the Munich pattern: encouraging 
the strong at the expense of the weak ... and the absence of a warning to muzzle 
Nasser. And on the horizon a Chamberlain-like declaration of 'peace of our time' 
once we are erased off the map. "26 When Nasser started interfering with Israeli 
shipping and closed the Straits of Tiran, the military urged immediate action. Yet 
members of the Government hesitated. They predicted great casualties and 
destruction of Israel's cities. They also feared that the Egyptian army had significantly 
built-up since the last confrontation in 1956, and maybe even acquired a secret 
weapon. Last but not least, the Eshkol government feared the reaction of the Soviet 
Union. The army commanders and the military intelligence chiefs "showed growing 
impatience: they vigorously criticised the over-anxious comments and the dire 
predictions. 9'27 In another editorial, Rosenblum wrote on 26 May: "While Hitler had 
power, those facing him were physically powerless, but those crawling on their bellies 
today are armed to their teethl Weil? "28 
Despite the public's and the army's discontent, the Eshkol government 
launched a round of diplomatic initiatives. On 24 May Foreign Minister Abba Eban 
flew to Paris, London, and Washington to secure the great powers' support for the 
Israeli cause. Although De Gaulle was "not unfriendly, "' he clearly stated that France 
opposed any Israeli military action. For years France's support had been almost 
taken for granted in Jerusalem: France had been Israel's closest ally. As Laqueur put 
22 "Barricades in Tel Aviv" in Al Djundi Al Arabi, 6 June 1967. 
23 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall" p. 115. 
24 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 121. 
25 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 121. 
26Rosenblum, H., "Editorial" in Yediot Aharonot, 23 May 1967. 
27 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 124. 
28 Rosenblum, H., "Editorial" in Yediot Aharonot, 26 May 1967 
29 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 133. 
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it: "Not even the greatest pessimist in Israel had been prepared for this letdown. "30 
France's abandonment went beyond political support: three days before the outbreak 
of the war, Israel's major arms supplier ordered a disruption of arms shipments to the 
Middle East, including Israel. 31 Eban's reception 'in London was cordial but non- 
conclusive. Prime Minister Wilson expressed his disapproval of Egyptian interference 
with Israeli shipping without however committing his country to any action beyond 
verbal protest. Eban arrived in Washington on 25 May and he saw President 
Johnson the next day. The president was in favour of helping Israel, but beyond 
Johnson's friendly disposition, "the meeting in Washington was ... indecisive. "32 
Against the background of American involvement in Vietnam, the Pentagon was 
totally opposed to any unilateral US action in the Middle East. But, as Laqueur 
stated, "precisely because the Pentagon was so strongly opposed to American 
intervention, and because it realised that something ought to be done, it took a more 
lenient view of any possible military action by Israel. "m 
In the meantime, the tension and anxiety in the country grew. By the second 
week of the crisis, Israel's citizens' army was mobilised, and most cars and trucks 
had been taken over by the army. The period called Konenut (preparedness) began: 
school children were enlisted as mailmen, milkmen and newspaper deliverers. 
Shelters were cleaned up and schoolchildren filled hundreds of sandbags or dug 
trenches where there were no shelters. The morale was high and "the readiness to 
volunteer and to help shown by every section of the population. ' Laqueur listed 
examples of children under military age or over age adults, disabled persons, and 
even foreign nationals who insisted on joining the army; companies and private 
individuals who paid income tax ahead of schedule; workers and employers in every 
locality who gave cash or gave up their annual holiday and donated money to the 
Ministry of Defence; and even the ex-convicts who asked the police to temporarily 
restore their driving licences so that they could drive trucks for the army. 35 From 24 
May onwards, volunteers started arriving from abroad: members of Jewish youth 
30 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 134. 
31 See Hazan p., La Guerre des Six Jours: La Victoire Empoisonn6e (Paris: Editions 
Complexe, 1989) p. 32. 
32 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 137. 
33Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 136. 
34 Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 130. 
31 See Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 130-31. 
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movements, ordinary people who wanted to help in whatever way they could, and 
even some famous men - musicians, writers (among them Elie Wiesel), and 
scientists. Elierzer Don-Yehiya described this period as "a time of unprecedented 
feelings of identification between Israelis and Diaspora Jews who agonised together 
about Israel's fate. "36 
Apart from high morale and civic courage, Konenut was also characterised by 
mass anxiety and panic. People emptied supermarket shelves as if preparing for a 
siege. Some fled the country while a unit of Chevra Kadisha (the funeral service) 
surveyed the city's parks, basketball courts, and vacant lots and sanctified them as 
cemeteries. 37 Talk about Auschwitz, Majdanek, and a new holocaust "grew louder 
and more strident. "311 Day after day, in articles, editorials, and news analysis in major 
Israeli newspapers "the sense of an impending existential danger of the Holocaust's 
proportions was accumulating. "39 Parallels were drawn insistently between Hitler's 
phony war and Nasser's endeavours during the waiting period. Thus an article written 
by Ha'aretz's military correspondent claimed that Nasser's intentions were the same 
as Hitler's: "It is bewildering to what degree a people who experienced the Holocaust 
in World War II, is willing to believe and take risks a second time ... Nasser declares 
his intentions to annihilate Israel ... and he will try to realise his plans. °40 Another text 
pleaded with the Government to learn from the past and take the Arab threat more 
seriously: 
The Jewish people cannot sustain another blow. We can accept no consoling 
and comforting advice. We shall pay the full price. The others will express 
sorrow for our disappearance. The sincerity of his [Nasser's] repetitive and 
empathetic declarations, that he wishes to annihilate Israel, cannot be 
doubted. It will be an irresponsible folly not to believe what Nasser has been 
writing and saying for the last twelve years. " 
I Don-Yehiya, E., "Memory and Political Culture" p. 150. 
37 Ha'aretz, 2 June 1967. Quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 389. 
38 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall, " p. 116. 
39 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall, " p. 117. 
ao Schiff, Z., "The Sand Clock" in Ha'aretz, 29 May 1967. 
41 Livneh, E., "The Return of Hitlerite Danger" in Ha'aretz, 31 May 1967 p. 2. 
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The same author said bluntly: "For us, Abd-al-Nasser is Hitler. "42 Ben Gurion also 
warned that Israel faced a severe trial: "A war of annihilation. None of us can forget 
the Holocaust that the Nazis brought on us. And if some Arab rulers declare day and 
night that Israel must be annihilated - this time referring not to the entire Jewish 
people in the world, but to the Jews living in their land - it is our duty not to take 
these severe statements lightly. "43 
"Public opinion became increasingly dissatisfied with the way Eshkol's 
government was handling the crisis, " wrote Laqueur, "the Government continued to 
waver, seeming always to trail after events. "" Sunday, 28 May was a decisive day 
both for Levi Eshkol and for the war. After a lamentable live broadcast address to the 
nation in which the Prime Minister "stuttered and fumbled, "'1 he met with the army 
command. Eshkol's speech had a devastating effect on the nation; it came to 
"symbolise the weakness and uncertainty of the Government. " The meeting with the 
army command was "unprecedentedly stormy"47 and after bitter exchanges with the 
generals, Eshkol left. The domestic crisis provoked by the loss of confidence in the 
government eventually led to the establishment on 1 June of a national unity 
government which included the opposition leader Menachem Begin. Retired General 
Moshe Dayan replaced Levi Eshkol as the Minister of Defence. 
Levi Eshkol was seventy-two when the crises broke out. Born Levi Shkolnik in 
the Ukraine, Eshkol had a traditional Jewish upbringing before he immigrated to 
Palestine in 1913 as an eighteen-year old. During the First World War, Eshkol 
volunteered for the Jewish Legion of the British Army and later joined the group that 
founded one of the earliest collective settlements, kibbutz Degania Bet. He was 
among the founders of the Israeli General Federation of Labour - the Histadrut, but 
also Secretary of the Zionist Settlement Department in Berlin (1933-36), Secretary of 
the Tel Aviv Labour Council (1944), Treasurer of the Jewish Agency (1950), Minister 
of Agriculture and Development (1951), and a Minister of Finance (1952-1963). 
42 Livneh, E., "The Return of Hitlerite Danger" p. 2. 
43 David Ben Gurion, quoted in "Ben Gurion Declared: Our Behaviour and Leadership Will 
Determine Our Fate, " in Yediot Aharonot, 30 May 1967. 
44Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 133. 
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When Ben Gurion retired from politics in 1963, Levi Eshkol succeeded him both as 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Although Eshkol lacked Ben Gurion's 
charisma, he was popular. The decade when he served as Finance Minister was 
characterised by "unprecedented economic growth despite the burden of financing 
immigrant absorption and the 1956 Sinai Campaign. "48 His approach was pragmatic, 
common sense, and conciliatory. His critics considered him to be too willing to 
compromise (the joke went that when asked: 'Tea or coffee, Sir? ' Eshkol would reply: 
'Oh, better give me half and half... '). He lacked the toughness that the younger 
generation of Israelis expected from their national leader. "The Eshkol government, " 
wrote Zertal, "was considered weak, Diasporic more than Israeli in its diplomatic, 
lobbying ways. "49 The generational gap was such that someone even said during the 
domestic crisis: "Our main enemy is not Nasser, but the Second Aliyah - the 
generation of men who had reached Palestine before 1914 and still dominated Israeli 
politics. "50 
News of Dayan's appointment "calmed the country in one fell swoop. "" 
Contrary to Eshkol, "Dayan was a symbol of military strength and confidence. "52 In 
the eyes of the public, Dayan was "a man of exceptional fighting spirit and great 
personal charm. "53Although it is arguable that Israel would have won the war even 
without Dayan, the psychological impact of his appointment was tremendous, 
"reflecting an almost mystical belief that the 'victor of Sinai' could save Israel. " 5' The 
ground for war was prepared and on Sunday 4 June, the cabined approved plans for 
a pre-emptive strike. Although the army was more optimistic in their predictions of 
Israeli losses, "Dayan shared the general feeling that should there be a conflict, it 
would be costly in terms of casualties. "" On 5 June at 7: 45 am Israeli time, the 
aircraft of the Jewish state attacked Egyptian aircraft and installations on the ground. 
'8 Government of Israel, "Levi Eshkol, " Biographic outlines published by Israel's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Internet edition at: http: //www. israel-mfa-gov. ii/mfa/go. asp? MFAH00frO. Last 
accessed on 18 September 2001. 
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50 Unidentified person quoted in Laqueur, W., The Road to War 1967 p. 147. 
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Within three hours sixteen airfields were destroyed and "nothing but a souvenir 
remained of the Egyptian air force, " I once the biggest air fleet in the Middle East. 
From Auschwitz to Jerusalem 
The people plunged suddenly into the unreal, outside the realm of time and 
thought. ... At times they seemed to be reliving the trials and triumphs of the Bible ... At other times, they 
felt themselves thrust into a far away messianic 
future. 57 
In six days of the June 1967 war, the Israeli army not only repelled the enemy 
in a sweeping victory, but also occupied 67,850 km2 of Arab territories, including East 
Jerusalem and the Western Wall, the holiest place in Judaism. Despite the dire 
predictions of the analysts (40,000 dead5), Israeli casualties were very low compared 
to losses anticipated: 679 dead and 2,500 wounded. -69 Unlike the aftermath of the 
Yom Kippur war, which was characterised by repeated self-incrimination for threat 
assessment failure, the 'seventh day' brought nothing of the kind. On the contrary, 
Israel's spectacular victory, and the concurrent capture of Jewish holy sites, was 
framed as both "a war of rescue from a great catastrophe" and "a war of redemption 
of the ancient land. "60 The six days of war were often compared to the six days of 
creation: "The feeling for many was of zero hour ... It was as if the Zionist history had 
begun all over again . "M The parallel action of 'rescuing' Israel from seemingly 
imminent annihilation and 'liberating' sacred Jewish sites, embodied in the June 1967 
war, converted the latter into the symbol of "the recurring Jewish historical pattern of 
national revival as the outcome of destruction. "62 
As the previous section briefly illustrated, 1967 war was experienced as a 
"matter of survival of the Jewish people. "63 In the minds of Israelis, to the extent that 
those were reflected in the media, letters to the editors, and individual recollections of 
the general mood at the time, all the elements of the Holocaust setting were present 
prior to the war: Hitler-like enemy ready to 'exterminate Israel' (the phrase that 
Hazan p., La Guerre des Six Jours p. 36. 
57 Wiesel, E., "At the Western Wall" in Hadassah Magazine, July 1967 p. 4. 
58 Hazan p., La Guerre des Six Jours p. 33. 
59 Hazan p., La Guerre des Six Jours p. 59. 
60 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall, " p. 113. 
61 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 392. 
62Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall to the Wailing Wall, " p. 113. 
63Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 11. 
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everyone used at the time); indifference of the world (letdown of the allies - namely 
France, silence of the Vatican, and irresponsible behaviour of the UN Secretary 
General U Thant); and a weak leadership seen as too willing to compromise in the 
face of mortal danger. "Israel was a ghetto again, * Ellis summarised the mood, "and 
the war recalled the uprising of the Jewish survivors in Warsaw. "64 Describing the 
atmosphere during the last week of the `waiting period, ' Laqueur noted: 
Many Israelis spent worried hours and sleepless nights ... and some 
considered whether they should ... send their wives and children to Europe or 
America, but the great majority were not even willing to consider this step. 
This was the end of the line; Israel was their country, here they would live and 
if necessary die. ... With all their apprehensions they were resolved to sell 
their homes and their lives very dear. Memories of the Second World War ... 
were still fresh: never again were Jews to be conducted like sheep to the 
slaughter. 65 
Once the war started, the soldiers' motivation and fighting spirit were very high, a fact 
that was also partially attributed to the Holocaust. As Wiesel described this poetically: 
"Two thousand years of suffering, longing, and hope were mobilised in the battle, as 
well as the millions of the Holocaust victims. "66 Israeli soldiers saw it as their historical 
responsibility towards the victims and the Jewish people as a whole, to preserve and 
defend the only Jewish state in the world. Uri Ramon, a young officer at the time 
explained: "Two days before the war, when we felt that we were at a decisive 
moment ... I came to the 
Ghetto Fighters Museum ... I wanted to pay my respects to 
the memory of the fighters ... I felt clearly that our war began there, in the 
crematoriums, in the camps, in the ghettos, and in the forests. " He left the museum 
"pure and clear and strong for this war. "67 Thus, "the enemy lost the war also because 
of the Holocaust, that is, due to the expressions he used. Not knowing that there are 
words that cannot be expressed in our generation, in regard to the Jewish people ... 
"Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 10. 
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He hastened to threaten the annihilation of Israel, and that was one of his biggest 
mistakes. "61 
Immediately after the war, a group of young kibbutz members recorded and 
edited a collection of testimonies entitled The Seventh Day69 in which the soldiers 
reviewed their thoughts and fears before and during the war. In a discussion 
animated by Abba Kovner, a group of soldiers talked about the war as seen through 
the Jewish / Holocaust prism that had been constructed in the preceding decade in 
Israel. "The Jewish aspect of the war applied to each one of us, " said Yariv. 
"Something in our education has made us very conscious of this Jewish tragedy. The 
war was a link in a chain of actions that derive from this tragic feeling. "10 Listening to 
young Sabra soldiers, Abba Kovner - Holocaust survivor and partisan leader - 
expressed his surprise at the parallels drawn with the Holocaust. Kovner understood 
the tendency of the older generation, who experienced anti-Semitic persecution 
themselves, to interpret 1967 situation with reference to the Holocaust, but he was 
perturbed by the reactions of the younger generation. "I'm amazed, " Kovner said, 
"that Sabras could see what was happening as a beleaguerement. " "Did you 
seriously see things in terms of the ghetto and the danger of annihilation? "" he asked 
the youth surrounding him, as if in disbelief. 
Identification with the Holocaust victims was not confined to the youth 
moulded by the Israeli educational system. "Suddenly, " Ellie Wiesel wrote, "all Jews 
had again become children of the Holocaust. "72 Israeli interpretation of the 1967 war 
was that of a Holocaust-like situation in which Jews were given a 'second chance': to 
act differently and by doing so not only avert the catastrophe, but also attract divine 
intervention and heavenly reward according to the motto 'help yourself and God will 
help you. ' Contrary to the anaemic response of the world Jewry to the Nazi assault 
on European Jewry, the Jewish Diaspora mobilised all its forces to 'rescue' Israel in 
1967, as if she also wanted to atone for her past failings. "A few words from Nasser 
611 Elie Wiesel quoted in Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 114. 
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sufficed to turn this event into a war of the entire Jewish people, "" said Wiesel. He 
described the unprecedented solidarity of world Jewry in the following passage: 
University students flooded embassies to enlist' for the fight; the Hassidim of 
Williamsburg declared days of fast and prayer; youngsters from assimilated 
homes organised fund raising drives and joined in protests; millionaires cast 
aside their businesses and took off for Jerusalem; community leaders went 
sleepless night after night because of their great efforts and profound anxiety. 
Never was the Jewish people so united, never so moved and anxious, never 
so ready and prepared to offer and sacrifice everything it had, its 'might, heart 
and soul. 14 
The perceived "possibility of being wiped out"' materialised in Jewish minds 
during the 'waiting period' and the degree of fear was such that even after Israel's 
victory, its Foreign Minister was able to declare at the UN Special Assembly: "There 
would have been no Jewish refugees had Israel lost the war. There would have been 
two million corpses added to the six million Holocaust victims. "76 Because of this 
anguished conviction, the victory was sanctified as "a miracle"" and a fruit of divine 
intervention, which had been absent in the death camps a quarter of a century 
earlier. The capture of the Old City of Jerusalem "transformed the 1967 war into a 
religious transcendental experience and turned land and stones into sacred beings. "78 
The return to the Western Wall and other Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, Hebron and 
elsewhere "enveloped the victory in a halo of national-spiritual redemption and led to 
a sudden emotional outpouring of Jewish identification, to the point of ecstasy and 
messianic mysticism. "79 The victory came to represent a journey of the Jewish people 
from destruction to redemption with Auschwitz and Jerusalem symbolising "the 
suffering of the Jewish people in Europe and the miracle of empowerment in Israel, 
the innocence of the Jewish people and the redemptive aspects of Israel. "80 Thus the 
French Academy member, Thierry Maulnier wrote in Le Figaro: "The struggle was as 
73 Ellie Wiesel quoted in Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 114. 
''` Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 11, 
75 Wistrich, R. S., -"Israel and 
the Holocaust Trauma" p. 17. 
76Abba Eban quoted in Ma'ariv, 27 June 1967. 
" Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 10. 
78 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 112. 
79 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 392. 
80 Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 12. 
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if crowned by the light of a great miracle, receiving its significance, at least partially, 
from the depth of history ... In one generation only, almost 
in one stroke, the Hebrew 
people have completed the Journey from the Warsaw Ghetto to the praised Zion, 
from Auschwitz to Sinai. "81 The unexpected victory also represented the return of God 
to the history of the Jewish people, because "Israel's faith in God of History demands 
that an unprecedented event of destruction be matched by an unprecedented act of 
redemption. "82 
Two features of the June 1967 war are significant: first, the fact that Israel was 
able to perceive itself to be in imminent danger of mass destruction on the eve of the 
war; and second, the fact that even after Israel's swift military victory the inaccurate 
representation of the pre-war situation was maintained. One of the leading Israeli 
`new historians' and Senior Lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya and 
Adjunct Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, With Zertal critically 
examined the pre-1967 situation and attributed the initial exaggeration of threat to a 
collective anxiety or hysteria. Defined as a "peculiar combination of conscious elite 
contrivance and spontaneous and largely unconscious mass response, " political 
hysteria involves "an extreme loss of customary political self-control and a very high 
degree of misperception -a passionate crusade to eliminate an imaginary threat. "' 
The author acknowledged that "collective anxiety can never be a product of an elite 
invention or manipulation by itself, " and noted that "discursive manoeuvres of this 
kind become effective only when they respond to deep and genuine social 
concerns. "" Identifying those concerns, Zertal focused on immediate social and 
economic factors, such as recession, high unemployment, social unrest, a general 
sense of depression, and emigration. I All these elements undoubtedly helped 
creating a climate that was "receptive to the manipulations of hysteria, "86 but they do 
not explain the roots of the fear that haunted Israel in May 1967. 
81 Quoted in Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 120. 
82 Greenberg, I., "The Interaction of Israel and the Diaspora after the Holocaust" in Davis, M. 
(ed. ), World Jewry and the State of Israel (New York: Ayer, 1977) p. 32. 
83 Levin, M. B., Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression (New 
York: 1977), quoted in Zertal, I., "From the People's" p. 118. 
11 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 118. 
85 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 118. 
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Furthermore, Israel's stunning victory does not automatically compromise 
Israeli leaders' good faith prior to the outbreak of the war, as Zertal's argument 
implies. The author misleadingly projects the post-victory awareness of the June 
1967 real balance of forces and knowledge about the fate of the occupied territories 
on the leaders who had to make decisions about the war in May 1967. Her analysis 
reveals an understanding according to which, because the victory proved that the 
pre-war factual situation had been favourable to Israelis, Israeli leadership must have 
deliberately misled the public into believing it was not. In other words, Zertal's 
approach assumes that the Israeli leadership held an accurate interpretation of the 
actual strategic and military situation and consciously manipulated the Israeli public 
into an unnecessary pre-emptive war. This view is even more apparent in Zertal's 
analysis of the reasons for the Israeli leadership's continued misperception and 
misrepresentation of the pre-war threat long after the victory. Zertal claimed that "the 
Holocaust discourse [was] created prior to the war for ... the vindication of a first 
Israeli military strike, and then to aggrandize and mythify the victory, sanctify its fruits 
and legitimise further political practices. "87 
In the light of the analysis of the Holocaust trauma and the Jewish prism of 
Israeli leaders, from the first two chapters of this thesis, I would argue that the elite 
itself was caught in the same panic and anxiety as those whom they were supposed 
to manipulate. Tom Segev confirmed this belief when he reported that the "fear that 
Israel was in imminent danger of being obliterated was ... widespread among the 
cabinet ministers, most of whom were European-born. "88 "Anxiety also plagued 
Israeli-born Chief of Staff Rabin, " wrote Segev, "who was tormented by a sense of 
guilt for not having prevented the current threat. Tension, plus an overdose of 
nicotine, overcame him. "89 Although "the threat of extermination had not ... been real 
... the 
fear of it had been real, " noted Segev. "More than any other factor, fear had 
prompted the war - the same fear that had contributed to mass immigration in the 
1950s and to the Dimona project. Its roots lay in the Holocaust. "90 The question of the 
generalised fear and misinterpretation, both before and after the war, is much more 
complex than the 'elite manipulation / public hysteria' thesis would suggest. 
87 Zertal, I., "From the People's Hall" p. 120. 
88 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 391. 
89 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 391. 
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Yaron Ezrahi drew attention to the fact that until the 1967 victory, Israeli Jews 
had always perceived force "from the point of view of victims rather than of fighters 
equal or superior to their adversaries. "91 Although Israelis eventually won the 1948 
war, they did so with a staggering number of casualties: 6,000 fell for Israeli 
independence at the time when Israeli Jewish population was only 600,000. The war 
was remembered as "a defensive action waged by a persecuted minority resisting 
the threat of annihilation ... in which weakness and inexperience were compensated 
for by great courage, self-determination, solidarity, and intelligence. 92 Between 1948 
and 1967, Israeli Army grew into one of the most powerful armies in the Middle East. 
According to the Pentagon intelligence assessment on the eve of the 1967 war 
"Israel would win a war not only against Egypt but against any alliance of Arab 
states. "' Israeli intelligence was also confident that Israel would ultimately win but it 
predicted tens of thousands of victims. Despite predictions that conventional war 
would end with Israeli victory, a few days before the outbreak of the war, Israel 
"'improvised' two deliverable nuclear explosive devices, " 9' which were ready, if 
necessary, for launching. Cohen noted that given the pressures and anguish 
experienced by the leadership in the last days of May 1967, "it would have been 
unthinkable for those in charge not to have placed Israel's most fateful system on 
operational alert. " 95 Cohen also reported that "there were individuals in Israel, 
particularly Shimon Peres, who thought and even proposed, that under the 
circumstances Israel should make use of its nuclear capability. " 98 When Shimon 
Peres' family emigrated to Palestine, his grandfather stayed behind in Poland and 
was burned alive when the Nazis shut him and other Jews in the synagogue and set 
it aflame. According to Segev, during his childhood, young Shimon "had loved no one 
as much as he did his grandfather. "97 
91 Ezrahi, Y., Rubber Bullets: Power and Conscience in Modem Israel (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1998) p. 188. 
92 Ezrahi, Y., Rubber Bullets p. 187-1$8. 
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As the previous chapter indicated, the awareness of the Holocaust and 
identification with its victims that resulted from the Eichmann trial created in the 
majority of Israelis an acute sense of vulnerability. The latter was enhanced by 
Nasser's rhetoric and the fatalist narrative of the Jewish condition, which attributed to 
the Arabs Nazi-like motivations and vices. The fact that the Israeli leadership 
considered even the use of nuclear weapons in 1967, shows that fear and anxiety 
totally obscured the real balance of forces. It is therefore understandable that, in a 
crisis that, for Israelis, represented a Holocaust-like situation, prudence required a 
response applicable to such an assessment of threat. Yariv, an Israeli soldier who 
fought in Six-Day War explained in The Seventh Day. 
It's true that people believed that there we would be exterminated if we lost 
the war. They were afraid. We got this idea - or inherited it - from the 
concentration camps. It's a concrete idea for anyone who has grown up in 
Israel, even if he personally didn't experience Hitler's persecution, but only 
heard or read about it. Genocide - it's a feasible notion. There are the means 
to do it. This is the lesson of the gas chambers. 98 
Whilst the waiting period was characterised by Israeli public's and leaders' anxiety 
"because the impending battles appeared hard to win and were sure to be costly, "the 
aftermath brought a "rare taste of sufficient, even surplus force. "99 Yet, after the 
victory in June 1967, the tensions between particularism and universalism inherent to 
the Holocaust discourse generated first doubts about the use of force and about the 
occupation of the captured territories, issues that would divide the country in the 
1980s during Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Intifada. 
In The Seventh Day, soldiers spoke of "tensions they had felt between the 
high, symbolic-expressive meanings attached to their conquests, the elevation of 
their deeds by a lofty, inspiring historical narrative, and the depressing, sometimes 
nauseating, shattering subjective experiences most of them had while fighting. "100 
Thus a soldier named Aharon describes his feelings when his unit entered the Old 
City of Jerusalem. His indifference when the Chief IDF Rabbi appeared "running 
98 Yariv, quoted in Shapira, A. (ed. ), The Seventh Day p. 181. 
11 Ezrahi, Y., Rubber Bullets p. 188. 
100 Ezrahi, Y., Rubber Bullets p. 189. 
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around blowing the shofar" was contrasted by Aharon's intense experience at the 
sight of four adult Arab men and one woman who walked out of the Old City through 
the Lion's Gate carrying the body of a little girl in a blanket. They walked quietly to a 
site nearby outside the wall, where they dug a hole, lowered the girl's body, and 
covered it. 101 Some said that the heritage of the Holocaust made it difficult for them to 
act as military occupiers, 102 while others felt that "the ambiguity of the arguments for 
waging such a war was accentuated by the monumental dimensions of victory. "103 
Although such doubts were hardly reflective of the jubilant mood in the wider Israeli 
society, their appearance among Israel's elite (soldiers from the kibbutzim) is 
significant. The victory therefore made it difficult for some Israelis to sustain the self- 
identification as victims and at the same time act as conquerors and military 
occupiers. Sociologist Charles S. Liebman, the Yehuda Avner Professor of Politics 
and Religion and Director of the Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish 
people at Bar Ilan University, suggested that the only way to mentally square the 
circle was to identify with the victim and interpret one's upper hand in the situation as 
both anomalous and temporary. In his analysis, which is presented in the next 
section, Prof. Liebman argued that the 1973 concerted Arab attack on Israel on the 
Day of Atonement re-confirmed Israel's identity as a lone victim for another decade 
and retrospectively integrated the 1967 victory as an extraordinary and short-lived 
anomaly in the narrative of Jewish historical experience. 
101 Aharon, quoted in Ezrahi, Y., RubberBullets p. 192. 
102 Shapira, A. (ed. ), The Seventh Day, pp. 160,173. 
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Yom Kippur: A War That Went Wrong 
The Earthquake 
And so we parted, he to the war and Ito the synagogue. 104 
Although Israeli intelligence noted a build-up on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts 
already in September 1973, its assessment was that these indications were just 
routine major exercises. The appraisal was partially based on a conviction that the 
Arab armies were not yet ready for an all-out military confrontation with Israel. The 
week preceding the outbreak of war was marked by the crisis that Austrian 
Chancellor Kreisky had provoked with his decision to close the Schönau Castle 
transit camp for emigrants from the U. S. S. R. en route to Israel. Four days before 
Yom Kippur, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Golda Meir, left for Vienna in an 
endeavour to persuade Chancellor Kreisky to reconsider his decision, but to no avail. 
On the evening of her return to Israel on 3 October the sole subject of discussion at 
the Cabinet meeting was the crisis with Austria: "Not even once, the situation at the 
borders was mentioned. "105 Similarly, the headlines were dedicated to Golda Meir's 
aborted trip to Vienna. On Friday, 5 October, Prime Minister Meir received 
intelligence about the departure of Soviet families from Egypt and Syria. 706 This, 
coupled with the very heavy concentrations of troops along the borders of Syria and 
Egypt, indicated that a very serious situation had developed. In her autobiography, 
Prime Minister Meir recalled that although she herself had been alarmed by the 
departure of the Soviet families, her Minister of Defence, the Chief of General Staff 
and the Head of Intelligence services reassured her that an outbreak of hostilities 
was unlikely and that she would be informed in time should the danger of war arise. 101 
A Cabinet meeting was called for midday on Friday 5 October in Tel Aviv, but apart 
from minor unit mobilization, preparations in the standing army, and cancellation of 
leave in the army generally, no other measures had been taken. Apart from deeper 
reasons, which are summarized in the next section, the government's reluctance to 
order full mobilisation was also reinforced by a precedent: in the spring of 1973, 
104 Former Chief Justice Simon Agranat describing his son's departure for Yom Kippur war. 
Quoted in Lahav p., Judgement in Jerusalem p. 224. 
105 Derogy, J. et J-N. Gurgand, Israel: La mort en face (Paris : Robert Laffont, 1975) p. 38. 
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Israeli forces were placed on alert when intelligence sources detected the 
mobilisation of the Syrian and Egyptian armies. After a few weeks the alert was 
called off, giving rise to much criticism of the Israeli government for an unnecessary 
alert. 
Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) is the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. As it 
is customary for Jewish holidays, and particularly on Yom Kippur, from one sunset to 
the next, everything stops. Even non-practicing Jews respect the tradition of Kippur 
and rest at home. Religious Jews do not use the phone or the car on that day, and 
many non-practicing Jews refrain from driving in the religious areas out of respect. 
Even a secular chain-smoker like Prime Minister Golda Meir abstained from smoking 
at the height of the Kippur crisis. On 6 October 1973, the day of Yom Kippur, the 
phone rang at Moshe Dayan's apartment in Tel Aviv: the Mossad confirmed beyond 
doubt that a combined attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces was expected before the 
end of the day. At 10 am, total mobilisation of the Israeli armed forces was ordered. 
Throughout the holy day of Yom Kippur, Israel mobilized its forces. The irony was 
that the Arab choice of timing greatly facilitated Israeli mobilization - everybody was 
available either at home or in the synagogue. Although the Israeli intelligence 
sources predicted that the attack would take place at 6 pm, the Syrian and Egyptian 
armies simultaneously invaded Israel in the south and in the north at 2 pm. The 
attack, even though not unexpected, "surprised the Israelis and caught them 
completely off their guard. "108 
In the first few days of combat the Israeli army suffered heavy losses and was 
forced to retreat on both fronts. Unlike in the 1967 war, the Egyptian and Syrian 
armies in 1973 represented a better-equipped and better-organised enemy to deal 
with. "The Egyptians and the Syrians, " recalled General Moshe Dayan in his 
memoirs, "were not the Arab armies we had known in 1967. They were good troops 
using good equipment and fighting with determination. "109 The efficiency of the 
Egyptian and Syrian missile system inflicted "horrific damage" to the Israeli Air Force: 
"35 Israeli planes were shot down in the first twenty-four hours of the war. "10 
108 Bregman, A., Israel's Wars: 1947-93 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) p. 93. 
109 Dayan, M., Story of My Life p. 576. 
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Similarly, Israel suffered a heavy loss of tanks thanks to the Egyptian anti-tank guns, 
comparatively small and handy, which were "pushed out ahead of their own tanks to 
positions from where they could get close to the Israeli tanks and hit them. ""' 153 out 
of 290 Israeli tanks in Sinai were "soon hit and put out of action. "12 
The Israeli defence line in the Sinai collapsed under the Egyptian assault in 
the first few hours of the war. The 505 Israeli troops on the Bar-Lev line were mostly 
ill-trained low-grade troops who "found themselves in desperate straits and could do 
little to stem the Egyptian troops who surged across the [Suez] Canal like a tidal 
wave and had immense numerical superiority""' of some 70,000 troops. To make 
matters worse, the entire Egyptian operation was carried out under cover of a dense 
antiaircraft missile system, which caused heavy casualties to the Israel Air Force. 
The antiaircraft missile system forced the Israel planes to fly low to avoid the missiles 
and thereby brought them within range of the conventional antiaircraft guns. The 
Israel forces that attempted to reach the units besieged in the fortifications of the Bar- 
Lev line in order to relieve them suffered very heavy casualties. 114 
On the northern front the battle began with Syrian air attacks and a heavy 
artillery bombardment. Israel's 180 tanks could barely hold the line against Syrian 
armoured forces - "some 1,400 tanks. "115 After the successful air strikes, 
overwhelmingly superior Syrian forces "crashed through the Israeli lines along the 
entire front and penetrated into the Golan Heights. """ By the nightfall of the second 
day, Syrians had reached the descent of the Jordan River and their advance 
elements came within 800 meters of the moshav of El Al overlooking the Sea of 
Galilee. Syria's rapid advance towards the Sea of Galilee and Israel's northern 
settlements unleashed a fear that has been hard for Israel to ever forget. The 
situation was so critical that even General Moshe Dayan was said to have predicted 
"' Bregman, A., Israel's Wars, 86. 
112 Bregman, A., Israel's Wars, 86. 
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destruction. "' As the Deputy Chief of Staff, Yisrael Tal later confirmed, all that Israelis 
were interested in at that stage was "to put an end to the war ... this is the truth. ""' 
The tide of the war began to turn a few days later, on 10 October when the 
Syrian forces had been driven entirely from the Golan Heights, with Israel's forces 
closing in on the cease-fire line along its entire length. On the following day, Israel 
launched a successful counter-attack into Syria. The Soviet Union responded to 
Israeli advances by sending arms supplies by air and sea to Damascus and Cairo. 
To counter this massive Russian airlift the United States mounted an airlift to re- 
supply the Israelis on 12 and 13 October. 
Israeli forces closed the Syrian front on 22 October holding the strategic 
heights of Mount Hermon which dominate the entire area between the battlefield and 
Damascus and positions as far eastward as Tel Shams, in an area which placed the 
outskirts of Damascus within range of Israel artillery. This was the situation when the 
Syrian command finally agreed to a cease-fire as requested by the Security Council 
on Monday 22 October. All parties accepted the cease-fire, but by the time it came 
into effect, Israelis encircled and cut off the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of 
the Canal opposite the town of Suez. By 24 October, the Third Army - some 45,000 
men and 250 tanks - was completely cut off and it was only under Soviet threats to 
send its troops to Egypt and the ensuing American pressure that Israel accepted a 
second cease-fire on 25 October 1973. It refused, however, to return to the 22 
October lines: when the war finally concluded, Israeli forces stationed within 101 km 
of Cairo and 45 km from Damascus, occupying some 1,600 km2 of territory inside 
Egypt. The loss of life in the Yom Kippur War on both sides was heavy: IDF lost 
2,687 men, with 7,251 wounded and 314 taken prisoner and it is estimated that 
15,000 Egyptians and 3,500 Syrians were killed. 119 
Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 394. 
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The Aftermath 
Until then [Yom Kippur War] we believed in the pairing of the words Holocaust 
and heroism and identified ourselves with heroism. The war made us realise 
the meaning of the Holocaust and the limitations of heroism. 120 
The 1973 Yom Kippur war "was a watershed event in Israeli political history 
and in the development of its national security outlook. "'"' Although the IDF repelled 
the Egyptian-Syrian invasion and mounted a successful counteroffensive, which 
forced the two countries to demand a cease-fire, "the war did not provide Israel with a 
sense of victory. " "I Judging by the way in which the event is remembered on the 
anniversary of its outbreak, Yom Kippur war still "arouses an uncomfortable feeling 
among Israeli Jews" and is primarily referred to as "a disaster or a calamity. "123 Unlike 
the pre-war period in 1967, the surprise attack in 1973 allowed the Israeli public no 
time to evaluate the situation and express their views: "all Israelis could do was to 
join their units and be mobilised to the front to repel the attackers. "124 In the first days 
of the war, the medical teams were overwhelmed by the psychological state of shock 
and combat traumas of the soldiers. Thrown into the battle without any mental 
preparation and having to fight a defensive war on one's own territory, Israeli soldiers 
reacted with intense fear and serious hysterical crises provoking even motoric 
paralysis and amnesia. Out of 1,500 soldiers evacuated in the first three days, 900 
were in such a state of shock, without physical injuries. 125 Nobody ever taught Israeli 
soldiers how to fight in retreat with enemies that spring up from the back; and nobody 
taught Israeli officers how to take care of crying men on the verge of hysteria. 
Despite victory, the aftermath of the war found Israelis in a state of deep 
collective shock, "a collective nervous depression"'e as one psychiatrist suggested. 
What was objectively a victory was collectively perceived as failure, and "this'misery 
120 Colonel Ehud Prayer quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 395. 
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of the victors' represents the most peculiar feature of the war. "127 Military experts 
from around the world, after having examined the situation at the cease-fire agreed 
that Israel had achieved a great victory, even greater than in 1967: Israeli Defence 
Forces, surprised by the attack and inferior in armaments and manpower, turned the 
tables and in eighteen days recovered all the territories and inflicted substantial 
damage to the enemy. 121 Yet, the sense of defeat remained. 
Charles S. Liebman, a renowned Israeli sociologist studied the reasons for 
recalling the war as a calamity. A significant contribution of Liebman's analysis lies in 
the fact that the author considered both the rational and the mythical arguments for 
framing the Yom Kippur war as a defeat. After examining the four most often cited 
rational arguments - high number of casualties, loss of territory, intervention of 
superpowers, and surprise nature of the attack - Liebman proceeded to study the 
mythical arguments. He concluded that, unlike all previous Arab-Israeli wars, the 
Yom Kippur war was mythologized as a defeat, against any combination of rational 
arguments. This section scrutinises the most often cited reasons for terming the Yom 
Kippur as a 'mishap, ' while the next section, based on Liebman's scholarship, 
suggests that this conceptualisation of the 1973 war served an inner need of the 
great majority of the Israeli public that was then both unable and unwilling to confront 
the reality of Israel's power and its consequences. 
The Israeli casualties during Yom Kippur War were indeed higher than in Six- 
Day War (2,687 as opposed to 679), but they were also ten times lower than in the 
1948 War of Independence when the Israeli population represented one fifth of that 
in 1973. Furthermore, unlike the War of Independence, which is "widely celebrated in 
Israeli memory, "'-29 there were no civilian casualties in the October 1973 war. As far 
as the surrender of territory argument goes, Liebman noted the contrast between 
the cessation of Sinai following the 1956 and the 1973 wars. In the 1956 campaign 
IDF had captured the Sinai desert but was forced to evacuate the peninsula as well 
as the Gaza strip under intense Soviet and American pressure. In exchange, only 
one of Israeli the security demands was met: troops of the United Nations 
127 Derogy, J. et J-N. Gurgand, Israel: La mort en face p. 240. 
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Emergency Force (UNEF) were posted on the Egyptian side of the frontier and at 
Sharm el-Sheikh to guarantee free passage of Israeli vessels through the Straits of 
Tiran. Although Israel had to surrender territory without securing a demilitarisation of 
Sinai and other guarantees it had demanded, and thereby suffered a diplomatic 
defeat, the 1956 war "is not overlaid with a sense of tragedy and despair. "130 The 
surrender of Sinai following the Yom Kippur war, on the other hand, was part of the 
peace treaty with Egypt, "a treaty which overwhelming majority of Israelis 
acclaimed. "131 Yet, the Israeli society was reluctant to credit the war with the 
achievement of having brought peace with Egypt. The Intervention of the 
superpowers again demonstrated that "Israel could never inflict a blow of such 
magnitude on its enemies that they could no longer threaten its security. "132 The June 
1967 victory generated a belief in the minds of the Israelis (including the political and 
military elites) that Israel was nearly invincible, and that the Arabs had understood 
that as well. 
The surprise attack on 6 October 1973 shattered the illusion that "Israel had 
achieved some permanent security"133 in 1967. The surprise nature of the attack 
had three consequences for the public perception of the Yom Kippur war: first, it 
destroyed public confidence in the leadership and thereby "ushered in a younger 
generation of Israeli leaders, "1 ' second, it undermined the general sense of security, 
leading to a period of "extremely high threat perception, "131 and third, the lack of fear 
and trepidation preceding the war minimized the sense of victory. The country felt 
secure before the outbreak of Yom Kippur War and although the dread of the first few 
days when the war was not going well was overwhelming, the reversal of the tide of 
the battle did not bring a sense of relief or gratitude for successful completion of the 
war. On the contrary, the aftermath of the war was characterized by public anger at 
their leadership. "The more people learned about the war, the more indignant they 
became, " 136 noted Pnina Lahav. Anger and indignation manifested themselves as a 
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demand for accountability: How could such a disaster have happened? Who was to 
blame for Israel's failure to foresee the attack, and what price should they pay? 
The most obvious targets of public discontent were Prime Minister Golda Meir 
and Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. At the time of Yom Kippur War, Golda Meir was 
a 75-year-old woman, with a long political career behind her. Born Golda Mabovich in 
Kiev (Ukraine) in 1898, the future Prime Minister of Israel immigrated to the United 
States at the age of eight, with her family. She was raised in Milwaukee (Wisconsin) 
and after marrying Morris Myerson left for Palestine at the age of 21. Golda Myerson 
became active in the Histadrut and even replaced Moshe Sharett as acting head of 
the Political Department of the Jewish Agency from 1946 (when the British arrested 
all the leaders of the Yishuv) until the establishment of the state. In June 1948, Golda 
Myserson was appointed Israel's first ambassador to the Soviet Union and she 
served as Minister of Labour and National Insurance from 1949 to 1956 when she 
occupied the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and changed her name to Meir. 
During her decade as a Foreign Minister, Golda Meir "became a famous figure on the 
international scene and displayed an extraordinary capacity to convey, in public and 
in private talks with foreign statesmen and representatives, the moral aspect of 
Israel's vital interests. "137 Meir's greatest achievement as a Foreign Minister was 
establishment of friendly relations with the newly independent nations of Africa. Upon 
the death of Levi Eshkol in 1969, Meir was chosen to succeed him as the party's 
candidate for Prime Minister, a post that she had obtained after having led the party 
to victory, and held until 1974. Meir's iron will, warm personality and grandmotherly 
image, combined with a simple but highly effective rhetoric, secured an 
unprecedented measure of financial and military aid, including the American airlift of 
arms during Yom Kippur War. 
Nevertheless, the public blamed Meir's government for the casualties due to 
unpreparedness of the army, and demanded its resignation. The protest movement 
following the war was precipitated "by the alleged failures of the government in 
handling the war ... What was especially resented was that no cabinet members or 
137 Syrkin, M., "Golda Meir, " in Encyclopaedia Judaica, CD-Rom Edition Version 1.0 (Israel: 
Judaica Multimedia, 1997). 
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senior officials were willing to assume responsibility for the failures and to resign their 
posts. "138 Golda Meir described the protesters' demands in her autobiography: 
The storm of protest did not demand only my own and Dayan's resignation; 
everyone who could be made responsible in any way, for what happened, 
should resign. New people should rule the country, people whom no one can 
blame for having led the nation down the wrong path. It was an extreme 
reaction to the extreme situation in which we found ourselves, and even if the 
reaction was painful for us, it was understandable. 139 
Only Minister of Justice Jacob S. Shapiro submitted his resignation, "after failing to 
persuade Dayan that he should assume responsibility and resign. "10 The political 
crisis precipitated the appointment, by the cabinet, of a commission of inquiry to 
conduct investigations regarding the responsibility for the mistakes that preceded the 
war. The Agranat Commission, named after its president Chief Justice Shimon 
Agranat, concluded that neither Prime Minister Meir nor Defence Minister Dayan 
were negligent in the discharge of their official duties and therefore exonerated both 
from direct personal responsibility. Most of the blame fell on the military officers in the 
Intelligence branch of the army, four of whom were relieved of their duties, and on 
the senior command level, namely on GOC Southern Command Major General 
Shmuel Gonen and on Chief of Staff Lieutenant General David Elazar, whose term in 
office was terminated upon recommendation of the commission. Although Golda Meir 
still led her party to victory in the December 1973 elections, she bowed to the 'will of 
the people' and resigned on 11 April 1974. On the appointment of the new 
government under Yitzhak Rabin, on 3 June 1974, Golda Meir also resigned her seat 
in the Knesset and retired into private life. She died in December 1978 at the age of 
80. 
138 Etzioni-Halevy, E. and R. Shapiro, Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration 
among Israeli Jews (New York: Praeger, 1977) p. 117. 
t39 Meir, G., Mein Leben p. 478. 
140 Lahav p., Judgement in Jerusalem p. 227. 
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Conclusion: Reaffirmation Of Victimhood 
Now it is clear and it is a bitter truth that we cannot live like other nations. 141 
Three weeks of anxiety and intense concern for Isreal's security preceded the 
June 1967 war. Holocaust imagery dominated the representation of the situation in 
the media and despite the military superiority over the enemy forces people identified 
with the desperate fighters of the European ghettos. The stunning victory of Israeli 
Defence Forces, the total destruction of the Egyptian air force, capture of the Sinai 
and the Golan Heights, but particularly, the conquest of East Jerusalem and other 
places with deep historical associations, "generated a sense of euphoria ... and a 
new set of perceptions and expectations about Israel "142 
The kontzeptzia (conception) as this new outlook was commonly called in 
Israel involved three realms of Israeli life: security, immigration, and economic 
prosperity. The security conception posited that Israel "no longer had to fear military 
threats from its neighbours"143 because Egypt would not go to war until its airpower 
matched Israel's and that other Arab countries would not go to war without Egypt. 
Furthermore, "given Israel's post-1967 expanded borders and its military superiority, " 
the reasoning went, "the regular army could absorb an attack quite efficiently until its 
reserves were mobilised. "14 Added to these assumptions was "an almost religious 
faith in the ability of the intelligence branch to give the chief of staff adequate 
warning. " 145 With regard to immigration and economic prosperity, Israelis expected 
that the 1967 victory would incite Diaspora Jews to immigrate to Israel and attract 
foreign capital. Beyond those expectations, the 1967 victory endowed Israelis with a 
new image - no longer terrified Jews trembling for their lives, Israelis felt self- 
sufficient and capable of any achievement. The Jerusalem Post columnist David 
Krivine expressed these feelings when he wrote in June 1967: 
141 Golda Meir quoted in Derogy, J. qt J-N. Gurgand, Israel: La mort en face (Paris : Robert 
Laffont, 1975) p. 240. 
142 Liebman, C. S., "The Myth of Defeat" p. 408. 
143 Liebman, C. S., "The Myth of Defeat" p. 408. 
74 Lahav p., Judgement in Jerusalem p. 230. 
145 Lahav p., Judgement in Jerusalem p. 230. 
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It may be said that the Jewish State underwent its Brit Mila [circumcision] in 
1948 and its Bar-Mitzva [the ceremony marking the first reading from the 
Torah at the age of thirteen] in 1956. Today it has achieved its majority. Israel 
is no longer a ward of the benevolent powers of the UN which acted as 
mediators between herself and the countries around. From now on, any 
talking about Mideast problems concerning Israel is done with Israel. Her 
power is unquestioned in the zone. 148 
On the other hand, the 1967 victory was confusing: ever since the Eichmann 
trial in 1961, Israeli Jews increasingly identified with the persecuted Diaspora Jews 
and began to think of themselves as a continuation rather than a rupture with the 
Jewish history, especially the Holocaust. The capture of Jewish holy sites enhanced 
their associations with Jewish religious symbols but at the same time, Israeli status 
as a victorious conqueror was fully incompatible with traditional Jewish paradigm. 
The latter is defined by the following key assumptions: hatred of the non-Jews ("the 
fate of the Jew is to be despised by the non-Jew and suffer thereby""'), innocence 
and isolation of the Jews ("the Jewish people in the world is 'the lamb among seventy 
wolves'" 11), and Divine protection of His chosen people. The view of the world 
through Goliath's prism instead of David's was troubling, because, as Liebman 
observed, "there is no way in which the victory of the Six Day War, the display of 
Israeli might, the conquest of territory, the subjugation of the Palestinians, and the 
supreme confidence in the future could be squared with historical Jewish 
paradigms. "149 Uri, an Israeli soldier who had fought in 1967 described this ambiguity 
of victory: "Following the war, we became the strong ones as opposed to the'ideal' of 
the weak, yet just party ... Suddenly you see a parallel between yourself and other 
conquerors who came here. It creates the discomfort of guilt. "50 Only two segments 
of Israeli Jewish public were entirely untroubled by this contradiction: those secularist 
who were not elated into religious fervour at the sight of the Wailing Wall and 
continued to feel total alienation from the Jewish tradition, and the ultra-nationalist 
religious messianists who believed that the victory in the June 1967 war signalled the 
146 Krivine quoted in Gonen, J., "The Israeli Illusion of Omnipotence Following the Six Day 
War" in Journal of Psychohistory, 6 (Fall 1978) p. 249. 
147 Liebman, C. S., "The Myth of Defeat" p. 409. 
148 Liebman, C. S., "The Myth of Defeat" p. 409. 
149 Liebman, C. S., "The Myth of Defeat" p. 410. 
150 Uri, quoted in Ezrahi, Y., Rubber Bullets p. 193. 
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imminence of Divine redemption and the ensuing establishment of a messianic 
kingdom in which traditional Jewish paradigm would become obsolete. 
The Yom Kippur War shattered the strategic 'conception' that had emerged 
after the Six-Day War and, as the previous section showed, the military command 
paid dearly for having read the writings on the wall through the rose tinted glasses of 
newly acquired Jewish self-confidence. One of the reasons why the Yom Kippur War 
has been framed as defeat by the Israeli society undoubtedly resides in the fact that 
the optimistic promise of the Six-Day War proved false. On the other hand, viewed as 
disaster, the Yom Kippur War resolved the tensions in self-representation created by 
the 1967 victory: the war re-affirmed the eternal Jewish condition of a persecuted and 
isolated victim and thereby facilitated the reintegration of Israel into traditional Jewish 
historical paradigms. Not surprisingly, "comparisons between the Holocaust and the 
Yom Kippur War were common in the period immediately following the war, ""' just as 
they were in the period immediately preceding the Six-Day War. The anomalous 
departure from the Jewish historical paradigm that started in 1967 was thus 'rectified' 
with the 'defeat' of Kippur in 1973. The aftermath of Yom Kippur War was marked by 
the petrol crisis and subsequent Israel's international isolation. When the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the November 1975 anti-Zionist resolution, 
calling Zionism 'a form of racism', the first Israeli Sabra Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
expressed the renewed identification with the traditional Jewish paradigm when he 
said: "The whole world is against us - when was it not sol"I-52 
151 Liebman, C. S., "The Myth of Defeat" p. 409. 
'52 Yitzhak Rabin quoted in Rosenblum, D., "The 1000 Days of Rabin" in Ha'aretz Magazine, 
6 May 1977. 
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Chapter Six 
MOURNING: INVASION OF LEBANON AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Introduction 
A wounded people is ... dangerous and potentially 
destructive to either itself 
or others, against whom its rage is directed. ' 
The waiting period preceding the June 1967 war and the aftermath of Yom 
Kippur War were characterised by exceptionally high threat perception and an 
intense collective identification with the fear and helplessness associated with the 
Holocaust. As noted in the previous chapter, the Six-Day War represented a 
reactivation of trauma and an attempt to master it by making the 'right' choice (which 
usually means fighting back). The Israeli response in 1967, albeit exaggerated with 
the benefit of the hindsight, was crowned with success. In terms of a collective 
healing process, the Israeli victory in 1967 embodied Jewish empowerment, and 
thereby created the necessary conditions for the next stage of recovery, the 
reconciliation and reconnection with the world. 'The promise of 1967, ' discussed in 
the previous chapter, can be likened to a state of euphoria that follows the first 
successful response to a reenacted threat. The role of trauma reenactment, however, 
is not necessarily to win in a confrontation with one's fears, but to re-learn "the 
gradations of fear"2 and to restructure "the survivor's maladaptive social ... 
physiological and psychological responses to fear. "3 The surprise nature of the attack 
on Yom Kippur 1973 shattered the euphoria and revived existential fears, to the 
extent that final victory was totally obscured. 
Beyond the gratifying sense of superiority, Jewish empowerment in 1967 
brought about the first crisis of the victim identity. Instead of relinquishing "survivor's 
`specialness'"4 through a process of mourning, and confronting the reality of power - 
1 Montville, J. V., "Complicated l Aogming and Mobilisation for Nationalism" in Braun, J., 
Social Pathology in Comparative Perspective: The Nature and Psychology of Civil Society 
(London: Praeger, 1995) p. 172. 
2 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 199. 
3 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 198. 
4 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 235. 
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initiatives that would stimulate recovery - the majority of Israelis chose to interpret 
the 1973 victory in a way that their self-representation as victims could be sustained 
- that is, as a defeat. The concept of victimhood was further reinforced since the 
Yom Kippur War, and reached its peak with Menachem Begin's ascension to power 
in 1977. Since then, observed Don-Yehiya, "there has been a growing tendency to 
apply Holocaust-related imagery to events affecting Israeli security. "5 Although the 
previous chapters showed that the Holocaust imagery had been present in the Israeli 
collective conscience all along, it is true that under Begin's leadership, the Holocaust 
was explicitly made into "a cornerstone of the basic creed of the State of Israel and 
the policies of its government. " B According to Tom Segev, Menachem Begin had 
always been a "great populariser of the Holocaust. " Already as a leader of the 
opposition, he played a decisive role in involving Sephardi Israelis in what had until 
the 1970s been a solely Ashkenazi birthright: the Holocaust consciousness. While in 
office, he encouraged Holocaust education in Israeli schools and sponsored 
educational trips of the Israeli youth to the extermination camps in Poland. During 
Begin's two terms in office, the Holocaust was "a cornerstone of the basic creed of 
the State of Israel and the policies of its government. "e As the brief biographical 
outline in Chapter Two showed, Begin's personal Holocaust heritage was coupled 
with an ideology of nationalist Revisionist Zionism (hereafter Revisionism), developed 
and promoted by Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the impact of the Holocaust on the 
radicalisation of Revisionism under Begin's leadership, and argues that the future 
Prime Minister blended the ethical code of Revisionism and his own Holocaust 
trauma into an irrefutable ideological justification for his personal revenge fantasy. 
Defined as "a mirror image of the traumatic memory, in which the roles of perpetrator 
and victims are reversed, " revenge fantasy is "one form of the wish for catharsis. The 
victim imagines that she can get rid of the terror, shame, and pain of the trauma by 
retaliating against the perpetrator. The desire for revenge, " pursued Herman, "also 
5 Don-Yehiya, E., "Memory and Political Culture" p. 152. 
6 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 397. 
Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 397. 
11 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 398. 
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arises out of the experience of complete helplessness. In her humiliated memory, the 
victim imagines that revenge is the only way to restore her own sense of power. "° 
Begin's revenge fantasy was directed against the composite 'Arab-Nazi' 
enemy embodied by the PLO guerrillas in Lebanon. The focus of the mini case study 
is restricted to the background of the Israeli crisis of victim identity, hence the reader 
will not find in the narrative details of internal Lebanese issues leading to Israeli 
involvement, nor other aspects of the war. Begin's militant ideology favoured the 
expressivist use of force. His self-representation as a victim, on the other hand, made 
this use of force morally justifiable. As Thomas Friedman put it in a nutshell: 
He [Begin] lived for the chance to correct the indignities that he and his 
forefathers had suffered for centuries. Begin loved the idea of Jewish power, 
Jewish generals, Jewish tanks, Jewish pride. ... He needed a war to satisfy 
his deep longing for dignity and to cure all his traumas about Jewish 
impotence. Begin ... needed a chance to 
lead 500,000 Jewish soldiers in a 
battle against Arafat, who for him was only the latest in a long line of anti- 
heroes who had risen up to slaughter the Jews. ... But what made Begin even 
more dangerous was that his fantasies about power were combined with a 
self-perception of being a victim. Someone who sees himself as a victim will 
almost never morally evaluate himself or put limits on his own actions. "10 
What ultimately led to a personal and national tragedy in Lebanon, was the fact that, 
unlike most survivors with revenge fantasies, Prime Minister Begin had the real 
means to act them out: one of the most powerful armies in the world, and a Defence 
Minister with his own desires of power and grandeur. 
Although the Prime Minister's fantasy of revenge found positive resonance 
among many, especially within his traditional underprivileged electorate, the ranks of 
dissenters grew proportionately with the intensity and the perceived uselessness of 
the continuous Israeli assault on Beirut, reaching its climax after the news of the 
Sabra and Shatilla massacres had been received. Unlike the first crisis of victim 
9 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 189. 
10 Friedman, T., From Beirut to Jerusalem: One Man's Middle East Odyssey (London: 
Fontana/Harper and Collins, 1990) p. 143-144. 
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identity in 1967, the public outcry following the 1982 'loss of innocence' and the 
subsequent self-criticism could not be appeased. Like the trial of Adolf Eichmann, 
which represented the critical turning point in Israel's dealing with the Holocaust 
trauma by hosting its collective reconstruction, the war in Lebanon, and especially, 
the brutal siege of Beirut and the Israeli army's complacency in the Sabra and 
Shatilla massacres, triggered in a segment of the Israeli collective a descent into 
mourning, which could not be reverted. The process of mourning started by a refusal 
to accept the Holocaust as a blanket justification for any Israeli military action, a 
rejection of Israel's victim identity, and an increasing awareness of the need to take 
responsibility for recovery and reconnection with the world. Interestingly, but not 
surprisingly from the point of view of post-traumatic reactions, the most radical fringe 
of the opposition to the war used the same imagery and had the same emotional 
quality to it as did Begin's discourse of justification. Revolted by the fantasy of 
revenge, the most radical segments of the Israeli left-wing intelligentsia and civil 
society swung to the other extreme - the fantasy of compassion. This fantasy aims to 
exorcise the trauma by a defiant act of compassion and concurrent excessive self- 
incrimination. The critical Holocaust discourse driven by a fantasy of compassion 
assimilated the Palestinians to former Jewish victims and the Israelis to their former 
victimisers. Both fantasies represent attempts to escape the process of mourning the 
real loss through either transposed anger or transposed compassion. The second 
part of this chapter thus studies the emergence of the critical discourse in the Israeli 
army and among its intellectual and cultural elite as the beginning of an unavoidable 
process of mourning the loss and letting go of the victimhood. The concluding section 
examines the twin processes of radicalisation and polarisation of the Holocaust 
lessons and understandings with reference to the emergence of Jewish racism and 
anti-Arab extremism as a political force under Rabbi Meir Kahane. 
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Resistance To Mourning: Torment And Tragedy Of Revenge Fantasies 
Menachem Begin: Holocaust and Revolt 
The world does not pity the slaughtered. It only respects those who fight. " 
After the 1977 elections, Israel's main opposition party - the Likud (Unity) - 
came to power for the first time in the history of the Jewish State. The leader of 
Likud's largest component, Herut (Freedom) party, Menachem Begin, was the first 
Israeli Prime Minister who did not belong to the Labour movement. Formed in the 
bourgeois nationalist tradition of the Revisionist Zionist movement led by Vladimir 
(Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, Begin was also the first Prime Minister who was a survivor of the 
Holocaust. Although Jabotinsky's influence on Begin's ideology was undeniable, his 
experience during the war in Europe radicalised his views even beyond the teachings 
of his mentor. 
Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940) was a Russian-born Zionist leader who, 
dissatisfied with the acquiescence of the World Zionist Organisation to what he 
believed to be unsatisfactory policies of the Palestine mandatory administration, 
gathered a group of educated and assimilated Zionist emigres from Russia and 
founded the World Union of Zionist Revisionists in Paris, in 1925. "The sources of 
Revisionist thought, " wrote Sasson Sofer in his study of Zionism, 
were eclectic in the extreme. Although it had something in common with 
continental nationalism, it cannot be understood without recourse to its 
essentially Jewish roots. In many respects it bears a close resemblance to 
European Fascism, as indicated by the hierarchy of leader vis-ä-vis masses 
and the revolt against the tradition of the Enlightenment, and militarism, as 
well as its criticism of the subservience of liberal democracy. Additional 
elements were the cult of youth as the motivating force of history, the 
apotheosis of the nation and deep hatred of Marxism and the Labour 
Movement. " 
" Begin, M., The Revolt p. 36. 
12 Sofer, S., Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 201-202. 
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According to Sofer, three concepts distinguished Jabotinsky's worldview: 
avventura, Hadar, and monism. The concept of avventura represents "Jabotinsky's 
realism combined with the romantic and the heroic ... an expression of heroism and 
daring ... action which 
involved taking great risks, where the chances of failure 
exceeded those of success. "13 Awentura dictated taking the offensive as the 
appropriate approach in difficult times, a strategy that militant Revisionism had 
consistently pursued. Hadar is a Hebrew concept denoting splendour, dignity, pomp, 
and magnificence, as well as physical beauty, chivalry, good manners and nobility of 
the soul. Like most founding fathers, "Jabotinsky criticised the physical and mental 
features which had come to characterise Jews, making them objects of scorn and far 
from what fighting men and statesmen should be. "" He saw the Revisionist youth 
movement Betar (to which belonged young Begin) as "the ultimate expression of the 
'new Jew, ' one who was characterised by splendour, discipline and militarism. "'s 
Jabotinsky believed in the importance of military training and was fascinated by 
military ceremony, although he remained "ambivalent about the use of force. "16 The 
concept of monism relates to "the absolute supremacy of the nation and national 
considerations, regarding the national will as the highest motivating force in history. "" 
Another view links monism with the corporate aspect of Revisionism, according to 
which social and economic interests are subordinated to the interests of the nation. In 
that respect, Jabotinsky "was approaching the corporate model of Italian Fascism. "18 
In Jabotinsky's formulation of the ultimate national interest of the Jewish people, 
monism represented absolute loyalty to the aim of achieving "a state with a Jewish 
majority on both sides of the River Jordan. "" The monistic view deeply influenced the 
younger generation of the Betar movement, including Menachem Begin, educated 
according to Jabotinsky's ideology. According to Sofar, "monism prevented 
Revisionism from perceiving the factors moulding historical processes in a balanced 
and comprehensive way. ... The mood was that of an offensive, and everything was 
13 Sofer, S., Zionism p. 209-210. 
" Sofer, S., Zionism p. 210. 
15 Sofer, S., Zionism p. 210. 
1e Sofer, S., Zionism p. 211. 
Sofer, S., Zionism p. 211. 
16 Sofer, S., Zionism p. 211. 
19 Sofer, S., Zionism p. 212. 
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subordinated to the need to attain the aim [Israeli independence]. ... Monism's fatal 
outcome was that Revisionist education was devoid of any universal ideas. "" 
In the 1930s, Jabotinsky was almost alone among the Zionist leaders who saw 
the disaster threatening the European Jewry. Pointing to events in Hitler's Germany 
and elsewhere in Europe, he argued that European Jewry faced "a catastrophe of 
unimaginable proportions. "21 In 1935, at the Founding Convention of the New Zionist 
Organisation established after the Revisionists' secession from the World Zionist 
Organisation, Jabotinsky said: "We apparently live on the threshold of the last portal 
to hell, on the eve of the final holocaust in the global ghetto. "22 According to Isaac and 
Isaac, "Jabotinsky had an almost physical sense of approaching doom of European 
Jews. "23 Out of this concern for the fate of the European Jewry was born an 
impractical evacuation plan for one and a half million European Jews. Jabotinsky 
argued already in 1937 that the Jews needed to leave Europe immediately: 
I assure you that you face here today in the Jewish people with its demands, 
an Oliver Twist who has, unfortunately, no concessions to make. What can be 
the concessions? We have got to save millions, many millions. I do not know 
whether it is a question of re-housing one-third of the Jewish race, half of the 
Jewish race, or a quarter of the Jewish race; I do not know; but it is a question 
of millions-24 
As an answer to the impending catastrophe, Jabotinsky "called upon the Jews 
to put aside their passivity and take up arms. "25 He believed that the fate of the 
Jewish people depended upon their ability and willingness to defend themselves: "As 
with other nations also with us our national future depends on arming oneself, and 
life compels us again to put forth the demand for defence, self defence is at the 
20 Sofer, S., Zionism p. 212. 
21 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 48. 
22 Isaac, E. and R. J. Isaac, The Impact of Jabotinsky on Likud's Policies" in Middle East 
Review, 10: 1 (Fall 1977) p. 43. 
23 Isaac, E. and R. J. Isaac, "The Impact of Jabotinsky" p. 43. 
24 Jabotinsky, V., "Evidence Submitted to the Palestinian Commission (1937)" in Hertzberg, 
A. (ed. ), The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader (New York: Antheneum, 1977) p. 
560. 
25 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 48. 
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centre of our political struggle. "' Jabotinsky also took concrete steps towards Jewish 
re-appropriation of the nation's long-forgotten military tradition: he founded both the 
Haganah and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and through the youth movement tried to teach 
young Jews pride and courage. According to his biographer, Jabotinsky "told the 
youth that they - the poor, persecuted, miserable, underprivileged boys and girls of 
the Jewish ghettos in Poland, Rumania, Lithuania - were the heirs to the Kingdom of 
David, to the spiritual values of the prophets and to the proud, heroic tradition of the 
Maccabees and Bar Kochba. "27 
For young Begin, as for many other Eastern European Jews, "Jabotinsky 
served as a prophetic figure who pointed the way to the salvation of the Jewish 
people. "28 When Begin took over the command of the Irgun in 1944, he based his 
program largely on Jabotinsky's ideology. Similarly, the parties that grew out of the 
Revisionist movement (Herut, Gahal, and later the Likud) bore a distinct mark of 
Vladimir Jabotinsky. As Begin's biographer explains: "For ... [Begin] the writings 
Jabotinsky left behind him rank with the volumes that describe Moses leading the 
Children of Israel to the Promised Land. "-29 Despite his admiration for his teacher, 
Begin's views in a number of areas were more radical and less flexible than 
Jabotinsky's. Thus at the Betar World Convention, held in Warsaw in September 
1938, young Begin challenged his mentor: he questioned Jabotinsky's method of 
diplomacy and expressed his despair at the conscience of the world. Begin neither 
shared Jabotinsky's faith in the British administration of the Palestinian mandate, nor 
his "grave doubts about the value of military force as a means of forcing the British to 
recognise a Jewish state. "30 At the 1938 Betar Convention, Begin proclaimed a new 
stage in Jewish history: "We are on the verge of the third era of Zionism, after 
practical Zionism and political Zionism, and it is military Zionism. "31 Professor Judas 
Magnes, former Rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem sadly commented on 
-1 Isaac, R. J., Party and Politics in Israel: Three Visions of a Jewish State (New York: 
Longmans, 1981) p. 139. 
27 Schechtman, J. B., Fighter and Prophet: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story: The Last Years 
(New York: Thomas Yoselof, 1961) p. 411. 
28 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 50. 
29 Haber, E., Menachem Begin p. 26. 
30 Isaac, E. and R. J. Isaac, The Impact of Jabotinsky" p. 34. 
31 Menachem Begin at The Third World Convention of Betar, Warsaw, 11-16 September 
1938, quoted in Sofer, S., Zionism p. 226. 
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this attitude a few years later: "The new Jewish voice speaks through the muzzle of 
guns ... Such is the new 
Torah of the Land of Israel ... May Heaven guard us from 
shackling Judaism and the people of Israel to this madness. "12 
In 1939, Begin lost contact with Jabotinsky who at the time was active in 
Britain and the United States in the hope of establishing a Jewish army to fight side 
by side with the Allies against Nazi Germany. On 4 August 1940, while visiting the 
Betar camp in New York, Jabotinsky died of a heart attack. After the Nazi invasion of 
Poland, Begin and his wife attempted to flee Nazi-occupied Europe but were caught 
in Vilna, in Russian-occupied Poland. There, Begin was arrested by the Soviet 
authorities and convicted for espionage and other anti-Soviet activities. He was 
sentenced to eight years of hard labour in the Arctic region. After serving a little over 
one year in Soviet prisons and labour camps, he was released in the summer of 
1941 as a result of an agreement between the Free Polish government and the 
Soviets regarding the Polish citizens. Begin joined the Free Polish army of General 
Anders in its fight against Nazism. He was assigned to a unit of Anders' army that 
took a route, which began in Central Asia and passed through Persia and the 
Arabian Desert. He reached Palestine in May 1942. Shortly after his arrival to 
Palestine, Begin became commander of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and "drastically 
changed the Irgun's policy from cooperation to conflict with the British . "33 According to 
Rowland, "the proximate cause for this change in policy was the holocaust. "3' 
The news about the systematic killings of Jews in Nazi death camps gradually 
became known in Palestine from the late 1942 onwards. With the awareness that 
"millions of men and women were shot, or drowned, or burned, or gassed or buried 
alive"31 while the entire world stood by idly, came "an overpowering need to do 
something, anything, to fight the Nazis. "36 Yet, the Palestinian Jews were frustrated in 
their efforts to relieve their suffering brethren in Europe, not only because of their 
own helplessness but also because of British intransigence with regards to Jewish 
32 Excerpt from Judas Magnes' opening address at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 
1946, in Bentwich, N., For Zion's Sake: Biography of Judas Magnes (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1954 p. 131). 
1 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 52. 
1 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 52. 
31 Begin, M., The Revolt p. 36. 
36Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 52. 
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immigration into mandatory Palestine. The grievances against the British included 
their indifference about the Holocaust of European Jews, denial of immigration 
permits to the persecuted Jews, failure to set up a significant Jewish Army, and 
failure to bomb the death camps. "In the light of these failings, " noted Rowland, 
"Begin and the Irgun decided to act. If they could not fight the Germans directly, they 
could at least fight the British who seemed to be aiding the Germans. "37 
It was against this background that the Jewish revolt in mandatory Palestine 
broke out in February 1944. "The two fundamental facts - the campaign of 
extermination of the Jews in Europe and the barred gates in the very days of that 
campaign - were the immediate causes of its outbreak, "38 explained Begin in his 
memoirs. Begin's justified for the revolt against the mandatory government by stating 
that it was the Holocaust that required military action, a recurrent validation of the use 
of military force throughout Begin's public life: "Blood too brought the revolt to life. 
The blood of our people cried out to us from the foreign soil on which it had been 
shed, fired revolt in our hearts and gave the rebels strength. "39 The revolt against the 
British was the first of Begin's many transpositions of Nazi enmity upon another 
obstacle on the way to Jewish sovereignty and power. "We fight, therefore we are°40 
expresses the deep inner need in many Jews, especially survivors, to affirm and 
justify their own survival by avenging yesterday's and preventing tomorrow's 
Holocausts. Thus Begin wrote: "We were not spared in order to live in slavery and 
oppression and to await some new Treblinka. We were spared in order to ensure life 
and freedom and honour for ourselves, for our people, for our children and our 
children's children. We were spared in order that there should be no repetition of 
what happened there... "" The Holocaust energised the revolt through the four years 
of struggle against the British administration in Palestine. 
Although the primary target of the revolt was the British administration, Irgun 
had to face two other adversaries as well: the Arabs, and the official Jewish 
organisations who opposed conflict with the British. Begin's strategy towards the 
37 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 52. 
1 Begin, M., The Revolt p. 38. 
39 Begin, M., The Revolt p. 40. 
40 Title of chapter four of Begin's memoirs, The Revolt. 
41 Begin, M., The Revolt p. 42. 
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Arabs is particularly relevant because "the approach of the Irgun in responding to 
Arab violence is still present in current [1980s] policies of the Israeli Defence Force 
responding to PLO terrorism. "42 With regards to the Arabs, Begin adopted a policy of 
retaliation. Whenever Arabs killed Jews, Irgun retaliated, even when they knew that 
innocent people would be killed. Thus for example, Irgun threw bombs into crowds of 
Arabs, some of whom were completely innocent. " If those responsible for attacks 
against Jews could not be located, someone else was punished for the attack in their 
stead. As Rowland put it: "From the perspective of the Irgun, this loss of life was 
unfortunate, but unavoidable. "" They retaliated because "their ultimate aim was to 
prevent another Holocaust. And the only way to fight the Holocaust was through 
strength and instant retaliation. "41 The policy of retaliation, for which Israel became 
famous, is more than just an effective strategy of deterrence. It is an expressivist use 
of military force originating from a historical trauma and humiliation not yet overcome. 
No other episode in Israel's history illustrates this better than its 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon. 
Israel's Invasion of Lebanon 
feel like I have sent an army to Berlin to destroy Hitler in his bunker. '° 
From 1975 to 1981, Lebanon witnessed persistent internal conflict, fomented 
by wider regional conflict in the Middle East, which resulted in the fragmentation of 
the country, destruction of its infrastructure, and of its social cohesion. In the 1982 
invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli government pursued two goals. The removal of the 
PLO threat to northern settlements was the declared aim and was widely supported 
by the Israeli public. The hidden agenda, however, included a destruction of Syrian 
missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley, the joining and cooperation with the Maronite 
forces in Beirut, and the establishment of a friendly Maronite government that would 
sign a peace treaty with Israel. The first part of this section thus examines the 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon and its impact on Israel's security, while the second 
42 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 57. 
'3 See Bewer, S., "Irgun Bombs Kill' 15 Arabs; 3 of 5 Attackers are Slain" in New York Times, 
8 January 1948, pp. 1,19.1 
`4 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 57. 
45 Rowland, R. C., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 142. 
46 Zimuki, A., "Begin to Reagan: I feel like I have sent the Army into Berlin to destroy Hitler in 
his bunker" in Yediot Aharonot, 3 August 1982 p. 1. 
195 
part briefly reviews the main stages of Israeli progressive realisation of the hidden 
agenda until the tragic reversal of fortune after the assassination of Israel's protege 
Bashir Gemayel and the subsequent massacres in Sabra and Shatilla refugee 
camps. 
After the debacle known as 'Black September' in September 1970, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Yasser Arafat's Al Fatah were expulsed from 
Jordan in 1971. They re-established their organizational and operational centre in 
south Lebanon, and their headquarters in Beirut. The PLO began infiltrating the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and built a new power base and infrastructure 
in their midst. In the decade between the Black September and 1980, and particularly 
after the outbreak of Lebanese civil war in 1975, the PLO essentially created a state 
within a state in most of south Lebanon. Forging an alliance with the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM), a loose confederation of various nationalist and 
progressive Muslim dominated parties, the PLO made inroads among the Shiite 
Muslims in the countryside and the Sunni Muslims chafing under Maronite hegemony 
in the city. According to Schiff and Ya'ari, the PLO had become by 1976 "the sole 
instrument of rule in the western sector of Lebanon stretching from Beirut south to 
the Israeli border. 47 The Palestinians controlled roads, collected customs at the ports 
of Tyre and Sidon, and virtually ran Beirut international airport. 48 
From their Lebanese stronghold, the PLO had coordinated and often carried 
out a number of terrorist attacks against Israel, including some that made 
international headlines. The massacre of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympic Games in 1972, the hijacking of an Air France aircraft on its way from Tel 
Aviv to Paris in 1976, and holding six small children hostage in the Misgav Am 
kibbutz nursery in 1980, are just a few examples of the more spectacular operations. 
In retaliation, Israel usually unleashed powerful air strikes against PLO encampments 
and Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon, where guerrillas were believed 
to be hiding, or carried out assassinations. For example, in response to the Munich 
massacre, in April 1973, forty Israeli commandos conducted an ambitious mission to 
strike at multiple targets and deliver a decisive blow against the PLO in Beirut. Some 
" Schiff, Z. and E. Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (London: Counterpoint, 1986) p. 79. 
48 Schiff, Z. and E. Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 79. 
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of those responsible for the Munich tragedy were killed together with approximately 
one hundred PLO guerrillas. Yet, it was not until Begin came to power in 1977, that 
Israel directed a ground operation against the PLO in Lebanon. Twice during Begin's 
tenure as Israel's Prime Minister, military actions were launched in response to 
Palestinian terrorist acts against Israeli citizens: the 1978 'Operation Litani' and the 
1982 'Operation Peace for Galilee. ' 
On 11 March 1978 eleven Palestinian terrorists stopped two buses on the Tel 
Aviv-Haifa coastal road, crammed all the passengers into one and at gunpoint 
ordered the driver to go to Tel Aviv. After being stopped by Israeli security forces just 
north of Tel Aviv, the terrorists murdered thirty-seven Israelis and wounded seventy- 
six in an exchange of fire, before being themselves either killed or taken prisoner. In 
an address to the press on the following day, Prime Minister Begin called the attack a 
"Nazi atrocity"49 and expressed outrage at the fact that "the remnant of the Jewish 
people" 50 was being massacred in their own land only because they were Jews. He 
proceeded by recalling that "this organization called "Fatah" or PLO" is one of the 
meanest, the basest armed organizations ever in the annals of mankind since the 
days of the Nazis.... They came to kill Jews. They are Nazis, and perpetrated a Nazi 
deed. "51 In his statement to the Israeli Knesset, Begin criticised the governments and 
organizations that spoke of a moderation in the PLO and warned: 
Gone forever are the days when Jewish blood could be shed with impunity. 
Let it be known: The shedders of innocent blood shall not go unpunished. We 
shall defend our citizens, our women, our children. We shall sever the arm of 
iniquity. Under no circumstances, under no conditions will we acquiesce in a 
criminal's hand being raised against a Jewish child, a Jewish woman. 52 
49 "Statement to the press by Prime Minister Begin on the massacre of Israelis on the Haifa - 
Tel Aviv Road, 12 March 1978" in Government of Israel, Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected 
Documents, vol. 4-5 (1977-1979), Document 133. Internet edition at: 
http: //www. mfa. qov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOeztO. Last accessed on 15 August 2001. 
50 "Statement to the press by Prime Minister Begin on the massacre of Israelis on the Haifa - 
Tel Aviv Road, 12 March 1978. "'The remnant' is a biblical expression from Isaiah 53: 10. 
51 "Statement to the press by Prime Minister Begin on the massacre of Israelis on the Haifa - 
Tel Aviv Road, 12 March 1978. " 
52 "Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on the terrorist raid and the Knesset 
resolution, 13 March 1978" in Government of Israel, Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected 
Documents, vol. 4-5 (1977-1979), Document 134. Internet edition at: 
http: //www. mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOezuO. Last accessed on 15 August 2001. 
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The Prime Minister concluded his statement to the Knesset by reiterating his pledge: 
"We shall do what has to be done to defend our people. " 53 
Keeping his promise, the Begin government launched a military operation 
against terrorist bases in Lebanon in early hours of 15 March 1978. Later depicted as 
a rehearsal for the 1982 invasion, the 1978 Litani campaign was the biggest IDF 
military operation since the Yom Kippur War. In seven days of the campaign, the 
7,000 Israeli troops with armour, artillery, and the IAF air support, occupied the entire 
area north of the Israeli border up to the Litani River and destroyed the PLO 
infrastructure. The Litani Operation had limited and only temporary success. The UN 
Security Council called for an international peacekeeping force UNIFIL (United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) to be deployed in south Lebanon and monitor the 
activities of the Palestinian guerrillas. Israel withdrew to its self-designed 'security 
zone' in June 1978. The purpose of this security zone was to create a buffer between 
the Palestinian refugees, whom they had driven north to the suburbs of Beirut, and 
the northern villages of Israel. At the same time, Israel created and financed its own 
proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), to police the region from Lebanon. 
In the years that followed, UNIFIL failed to prevent the PLO from re- 
establishing itself in the south and resuming cross-border attacks against Israel. 
Israel's policy of "preventive measures"M` was intended to keep the pressure on the 
PLO: military fire across the border was a frequent occurrence. For reasons outlined 
in the beginning of this chapter, Begin favoured an active policy: rather than retaliate 
after the other side had already struck, the new strategy aimed to destroy the ability 
of the enemy to strike by inflicting blows "on the murderers in their own bases. "55 
Begin's cabinet secretary, Arye Naor, quoted the Prime Minister as saying: "We go 
out to meet them (the PLO], we penetrate into their bases ... we no longer wait for 
them to come to us and spill our blood. " m With the resignation of Ezer Weizman from 
53"Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on the terrorist raid and the Knesset 
resolution, 13 March 1978. " Internet edition at: 
http: //www. mfa. qov. il/mfa/Qo. asp? MFAHOezuO. Last accessed on 15 August 2001. 
-54Bregman, A., Israel's Wars, 1947-93 p. 99. 
15Naor, A., Begin in Power. A Personal Testimony (Tel Aviv, Yediot Aharonot, 1993) p. 253. 
511 Naor, A., Begin in Power p. 253. 
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the Defence Ministry in May 1980, Israel's policy became "even tougher, for it was 
now designed by Begin, who was not only Prime Minister but also Defence 
Minister. "57 The fact that the hawkish former general, Ariel Sharon, replaced Begin at 
the Defence Ministry on 30 June 1981 did little to moderate the Prime Minister's 
belligerency. After having destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981, the newly 
elected Israeli government increased its pressure on the PLO in Lebanon. On 10 July 
1981, for example, the IAF began a massive bombing campaign against the PLO 
basis in Lebanon. The PLO responded by a massive shelling of Israeli settlements in 
the Galilee, killing six Israelis and wounding thirty-eight. Israel hit back by launching 
an air strike at the PLO headquarters in downtown Beirut. In the attack a number of 
civilians were killed and Israel was condemned by the United States, Egypt and other 
nations. The US-brokered cease-fire came into effect on 24 July 1981 and led to a 
period of relative peace along the border between Israel and Lebanon. 
Unimpressed by the ceasefire - although it was holding well - Begin's 
Defence Minister Ariel Sharon echoed the hawkish views of the Prime Minister when 
he argued that only the total destruction of the PLO in Lebanon would lead to peace 
in Israel and in the occupied territories. Sharon said: "Quiet on the West Bank 
requires the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon. "O Similarly, the then Foreign 
Minister, later Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, stated: "The defence of the West Bank 
starts in West Beirut. "59 In December 1981, Defence Minister Sharon presented the 
Cabinet with plans for a military operation against the PLO. According to the former 
Israeli ambassador to the UK, Moshe Raviv, the proposed plan took the Cabinet 
completely by surprise. In the early 1980s, Israelis were not in the mood for war. 
Israel was in the final phase of a troop pullout in the Sinai desert (part of the bargain 
in the 1979 peace agreement with Egyptians) and Israeli ministers did not think it 
would be wise to invade one Arab country while pulling out of another. Furthermore, 
they correctly estimated that Lebanon would be a slippery target: a civil war between 
the PLO-Lebanese National Movement (LNM) alliance and Maronite Christians, was 
further complicated by Syria's involvement alongside the PLO-LNM Muslim block. 
The ministers' overriding concern was that any such Israeli operation would lead to a 
57 Bregman, A., Israel's Wars, 1947-93 p. 99. 
'8 Quoted in Schiff, Z., "Op-Ed" in Ha'aretz, 23 May 1982. 
59 Quoted in Marcus, Y., "The War is Inevitable" in Ha'aretz, 23 May 1982. 
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clash with Syrians stationed in the Bekaa valley and risk a full-blown war with Syria. 60 
Undeterred by the cabinet's scepticism, Ariel Sharon started rallying political support 
in Washington. US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig warned Sharon than "nothing 
should be done in Lebanon without an internationally recognised provocation, and 
the Israeli reaction should be proportionate to that provocation. ""' Fearing that his 
remarks to Sharon were not clear enough, Haig later wrote a personal letter to Prime 
Minister Begin in which he expressed concern about "possible future Israeli military 
actions in Lebanon, which regardless of size, could have consequences none of us 
could foresee. "' Typically, Begin rebuked him with the following words: "Mr. 
Secretary, my dear friend, the man has not yet been born who will ever obtain from 
me consent to let Jews be killed by a bloodthirsty enemy. "63 
The benefit of hindsight sheds additional light on the extent to which Ariel 
Sharon misled the Cabinet into believing that they were invited to consider a limited, 
Litani-like campaign, in which troops would only penetrate to a depth of 45 kilometres 
into Lebanon. In fact, the Israeli operational plan, known to the Israeli army 
commanders and to the allied Maronite leadership, was hidden from the Israeli 
ministers. After the authorisation to invade had been issued, the Cabinet lost control 
over the events and was only occasionally asked to authorise post-hoc what had 
already been carried out on the ground. " Like during the days of the revolt against 
the British, Begin "sanctioned the actions of his soldiers without being able to control 
them. "65 Given the lack of governmental and public overview during the later stages 
of the war, only the decision to attack and the first stage of the operation - war 
against the PLO (6-9 June 1982) are examined in some detail here. Those two 
moments in the Lebanon war could still be made compatible with Israeli self- 
representation and were supported by the public. The later stages of the war, 
however, especially the merciless siege of Beirut culminating in the news of the 
60 Raviv, M., Israel at Fifty: Five Decades of Struggle for Peace: A Diplomat's Narrative 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998) p. 207. 
61 Alexander Haig, quoted in Bregman, A., Israel's Wars, 1947-93 p. 102. 
82 Ball, G. and D. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel: 1947 
to Present (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992) p. 123. 
Ball, G. and D. Ball, The Passionate Attachment p. 123. 
84 For a detailed discussion of Sharon's manipulation of the Cabinet see Schiff, Z. and E. 
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65 Sofer, S., Zionism p. 236. 
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Sabra and Shatilla massacres, provoked a collapse of consensus among the public 
and the army, thus leading to the most serious identity crisis in the history of the 
Jewish state. 
It took a series of incidents to convince the hesitating cabinet ministers about 
the soundness of Sharon's invasion plan. On 3 April 1982 Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, a 
Mossad agent, was shot dead in Paris, and the proposal to invade Lebanon in 
retaliation was made at the cabinet meeting a week later: five ministers opposed the 
plan and Begin decided to postpone it. On 21 April 1982, an artillery officer was killed 
and two soldiers were wounded when their vehicle hit a mine in south Lebanon. The 
IDF retaliated and killed twenty-three PLO guerrillas in Lebanon. In response the 
PLO hit back with rockets and projectiles. Yet, when Prime Minister Begin brought 
the issue of ground invasion up at the meeting, seven ministers still opposed the 
operation. The incident that eventually triggered the war was the attack on Israel's 
Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov on 3 June 1982. The fact that the 
assassination attempt was carried out by a group belonging to the sworn enemy of 
the PLO, Abu Nidal, did not prevent the cabinet from concluding that PLO had to be 
wiped out in response. "Abu Nidal, Abu Schmidal. We have to strike at the PLO, "18 
sneered the Chief of Staff Lt. Gen Rafael Eitan when an intelligence officer brought 
this detail to his notice. At the meeting of the Israeli Cabinet on 4 June, Begin 
declared: "We will not stand for them attacking an Israeli ambassador! An assault on 
an ambassador is tantamount to an attack on the State of Israel, and we will respond 
to it! "67 The following day, the crucial meeting took place at the Prime Minister's 
residence: the Minister of Defence Sharon and the Chief of Staff Eitan sought the 
cabinet's approval for the invasion. The ministers were led to understand that the 
operation would involve a maximum forty-five kilometres penetration into Lebanon 
with the aim of removing the PLO artillery. The Defence Minister explicitly stated that 
Beirut was not involved in the plan and that any clash with Syrians in the Bekaa 
valley would be avoided. He estimated that the operation, baptised 'Peace for 
Galilee, ' would take forty-eight hours to complete. The Prime Minister's explanation 
for this action was entirely within the boundaries of the Jewish/Holocaust field of 
vision: 
66Rafael Eitan quoted in Schiff, Z. and E. Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 98. 
67 Menachem Begin quoted in Schiff, Z. and E. Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 97. 
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You know what I have done and what we have all done to prevent loss of life. 
But such is our fate in Israel. There is no way other than to fight selflessly. 
Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka and we have decided that there will be 
no more Treblinkas. " 
Thus, at 11 a. m. on June 6,1982, a convoy of 80,000 Israeli troops moved 
into southern Lebanon with the publicly declared objective of rousting out the PLO. 
On the third day of the war, on 8 June, the IDF spokesman announced, that the 
Israeli forces have achieved all their objectives ahead of schedule and were currently 
"involved in cleaning up and securing the area [of Sidon]. "69 The declared part of 
Israel's objective in Lebanon having been achieved, the army should have been told 
to stop fighting. Instead, one of the IDF armoured brigades attacked Syrian positions 
in Jezzin. In what became a common procedure, the cabinet was asked post-hoc to 
approve the opening of the Damour-Aley road to relieve the pressure on the division 
held up by the Syrians near Ein Zechalta in the Shouf Mountains. The Israeli army 
had already been fighting the Syrians in Jezzin and in Ein Zechalta without the 
cabinet's permission. The authorisation to destroy the Syrian missile batteries in the 
Bekaa Valley was extracted by the Defence Minister Sharon on 9 June under the 
pretence that the soldiers in the field could not get the air support they so desperately 
needed without first removing the missiles. The first in the series of hidden 
objectives was realised in a spectacular air battle with "some 200 supersonic jets 
targeting, dodging, and firing at each other over an area of approximately 2,500 
square kilometres. "70 According to Schiff and Ya'ari, the Syrian losses were 
"staggering. "" Some 30 planes were destroyed and about a half of Syria's combat 
pilots were killed in the battle. Even when the 11 June ceasefire between Syria and 
88 Naor, A., Government At War. How The Israeli Government Functioned During The 
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Israel came into effect in the eastern sector of Lebanon, "the war, as it turned out, 
was barely under way. " 
On 13 June 1982, the IDF linked up with the Phalangist forces in the outskirts 
of Beirut and, headed by the Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, entered the Christian section 
of the city. At that stage, the government overview of IDF's activity was virtually non- 
existent. Thus Schiff and Ya'ari reported that Begin and the cabinet learned about the 
presence of Israeli troops in Beirut from the hourly news bulletin airing a live report 
about Beirut streets being jammed with Israeli vehicles, just after Begin's own 
statement - denying that IDF was in Beirut at all - had been broadcast on the Israeli 
radio. 73 Despite his agreement with the Israelis, the Christian Maronite leader, Bashir 
Gemayel, refused to send his men to clear Beirut of the PLO guerrillas who dug in 
and mingled with the civilian population. Unwilling to send his own troops into Beirut, 
Sharon ordered his military command to tighten the noose around the city, bomb 
incessantly the areas where the PLO was hiding, cut water and electricity, and stop 
the food supplies from reaching the population. The aim of this brutal policy was to 
press the local population and the Lebanese government into demanding that Arafat 
and his men leave the city and thereby spare the civilian Lebanese population further 
hardships. The siege of Beirut went on for two months and was highly unpopular 
within the ranks of the IDF and with the Israeli public, as the next section examines in 
more detail. After weeks of saturation bombing of the city from ground, air, and sea, 
and massive air attacks on the Palestinian refugee camps, the PLO finally agreed to 
leave Beirut. On 21 August at 3 pm, the first contingent of PLO evacuees left the city 
by sea. Over the course of twelve days, 14,398 Palestinian and Syrian fighters 
departed from Beirut, leaving the elderly, women and children behind in the 
Palestinian refugee camps. 74 
Two days after the PLO began its exit from the Lebanese capital, Israel's 
favourite candidate Bashir Gemayel was elected president. His inauguration was 
'2 Schiff, Z. and E. Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 180. 
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scheduled for 23 September. The Israeli government, particularly Sharon and Begin, 
were now highly pleased with this development. Begin sent Gemayel a warm cable of 
congratulations and made it public. In an article, written for the New York Times, the 
Defence Minister assessed the Lebanese campaign and expressed confidence that 
Israel's peace treaty with Lebanon would create "a new triangle of peace - 
Jerusalem, Cairo, Beirut. "7"Sharon's dream was shattered on 14 September 1982 
when a member of the pro-Syrian militia assassinated the president-elect. "The bomb 
that killed Gemayel, " wrote Bregman, "destroyed every reasonable chance that Israel 
and Lebanon could sign a workable peace treaty. "76 To 'restore order', the Israelis 
moved into West Beirut on 15 September in an operation called 'Iron Mind'. Without 
the authorisation of the cabinet, the IDF encircled the refugee camps in Sabra and 
Shatilla. Between September 16-18, while the Israelis were surrounding and 
guarding all entrances to the camps, the revenge-thirsty Phalangists entered the 
camps in coordination with the IDF, allegedly to clean out the 2,000 PLO fighters who 
were believed to be still hiding there. As it turned out later, they proceeded to 
massacre some 700-800" Palestinians and Lebanese civilians, including women and 
children, literally in front of the noses of the Israeli army. Although the Israelis did not 
participate in the killing, they provided the artillery support and the illumination of the 
site. More than anything else, the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the 
massacre that followed symbolised "the total collapse of Israel's disastrous adventure 
in Lebanon in 1982. "78 
As he explained in an interview conducted in 1977, Begin was fighting the 
Holocaust all his life, including in Lebanon: 
So I think I finished saying that the holocaust lives within me. It is the prime 
mover of all that we have done in our generation; for instance, our fight for 
liberation is a result of the recognition that we, in our time, must create 
's Sharon, A., "Gains from the War in Lebanon' in New York Times, 29 August 1982. 
78 Bregman, A., Israel's Wars, 1947-93 p. 115. 
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conditions so that never again will the Jew be defenceless. Our scourge was 
the defencelessness of the Jewish people. And that defencelessness which 
became helplessness was the real provocation for the murderers. They say 
that they can do to the Jew anything they want to. A cruel man is a coward. If 
he sees that there is no resistance that there is no danger to him, then he 
doesn't know any limits ... It lives within me. And I live within it. And I will live 
with it until the last day of my life. 79 
Rowland described Begin's futile struggle against the ghost of the Holocaust with 
considerable candour and sympathy: "The raids in Lebanon might best be 
understood as rituals through which Begin enacted his continuing commitment to the 
myth of the Holocaust and return. Through the raids, Begin could fight against the 
Holocaust and prove to the world that the Jews were not weak. "80 
The author Amos Oz understood what drove Begin's behaviour but warned against 
the danger of entertaining revenge fantasies in a position of power. In an open letter 
to the Prime Minister he wrote: 
Adolf Hitler destroyed a third of the Jewish people, among them your 
parents and relatives, among them my family. Often I, like many Jews, find at 
the bottom of my soul a dull sense of pain because I did not kill Hitler with my 
own hands. I am sure that in your soul a similar fantasy hovers. There is not 
and will never be a cure for this open wound in our souls. Tens of thousands 
of dead Arabs will not heal that wound. But, Mr. Begin, Adolf Hitler died thirty- 
seven years ago. Unfortunately or not, it is a fact: Hitler is not in hiding in 
Nabatea, in Sidon, or in Beirut. He is dead and gone. 
Again and again, Mr. Begin, you reveal to the public eye a strange 
urge to resuscitate Hitler in order to Will him every day anew in the guise of 
terrorists. ... This urge to revive and obliterate 
Hitler over and over again is 
the result of melancholy that poets must express, but among statesmen it is a 
hazard that is liable to lead them along a path of mortal danger. 81 
79 Begin quoted by Breindel, E., "The Many Wars of Menachem Begin' in Rolling Stone, 3 
November 1977 p. 87. 
80 Rowland, R., The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin p. 206. 
81 Oz, A., "Hitler is Already Dead, Mr. Prime Minister, ' in Yediot Aharonot, 21 June 1982 p. 6. 
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As Oz had predicted, the consummated revenge did not bring Begin the personal 
relief he might have hoped for, nor was his later torment ennobled by national glory. 
Instead, his decisions brought upon Israel virulent international criticism and an 
unprecedented internal split. Last but not least, after the Kahane Commission's 
findings about the role of the IDF in Sabra and Shatila massacres were published, 
Menachem Begin himself "became less strident about his defence of the war until he 
withdrew into isolation and complete silence. "82 
Mourning And Identity Crisis: Israel After Lebanon 
Mourning Traumatic Loss 
Okay, I've had enough of walking around like I'd like to brutalise everyone 
who looks at me wrong. I don't have to feel like that anymore. a 
Mourning is, according to Judith Herman, "at once the most necessary and the 
most dreaded task of this stage of recovery. Patients often fear that once they allow 
themselves to start grieving they will never stop. "M' Survivors resist mourning chiefly 
for two reasons: the fear of confronting the pain, and pride. The fear of being 
overwhelmed by grief is particularly discouraging for survivors who have to confront a 
tremendous personal loss. Some refuse to mourn because they refuse to 
acknowledge the reality of an event. Others resist mourning out of pride; they may 
consciously refuse to grieve "as a way of denying victory to the perpetrator. "85 This 
resistance to mourning is even more present in the cases of massive traumas 
because the survivors feel that they must not let themselves mourn those who did not 
survive, lest the future generations forget. As Chodoff put it: 
The stubborn, even prideful refusal to forget displayed by certain survivors ... 
suggests a desperate attempt to rescue their dead from the limbo of 
insignificance to which they have been consigned ... 86 
Schiff, Z. and E. Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 284. 
a+ Quoted in Bass, E. and L. Davis, The Courage To Heal: A Guide for Women Survivors of 
Child Sexual Abuse, (New York: Harper & Row, 1988) p. 163. 
14 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 188. 
85 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 188. 
16 Chodoff p., "The German concentration camp as a psychological stress, " in Archives of 
General Psychiatry, No. 22 (1970) p. 87. 
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When the victims resist mourning, the story of trauma becomes frozen into a timeless 
and untouchable entity. Any attempt to grieve the loss is then interpreted as betrayal 
of those who perished. Mourning is an indispensable stage of recovery because as 
Lifton puts it "unresolved, incomplete mourning results in stasis and entrapment in 
the traumatic process. "87 The latter almost inevitably leads to repeated reenactments 
of trauma, in which the perpetrator is fought in different guises over and over again. 
Since mourning is so difficult, "resistance to mourning is probably the most common 
cause of stagnation ... of recovery. "88 
According to Herman, resistance to mourning takes various disguises. Most 
frequently it takes either, or a combination, of the following fantasies: revenge, 
forgiveness, compensation, and compassion. Each one of these fantasies deflects 
the survivor's efforts from confronting the traumatising loss, and more often than not, 
from the original perpetrator. As the example of Begin's experience of the PLO's 
presence in Lebanon showed, fantasy of revenge seeks to redress the humiliation 
and shame of traumatisation by a demonstration of victim's empowerment. When the 
original perpetrator cannot be targeted, the revenge finds its outlet in another enemy, 
which is inevitably believed to be a direct continuation of the first one. The fantasy of 
forgiveness is equally self-defeating, because true forgiveness before mourning 
"remains out of reach for most ordinary human beings. ... And even divine 
forgiveness is not unconditional. "119 In the fantasy of compensation the victims seek 
to score a victory against the perpetrator and thus erase the humiliation of the 
trauma. A variant of the compensation fantasy seeks rectification not from the 
perpetrator but from the bystanders. In a case of massive trauma compensation 
fantasy would mean that survivors would seek compensation from global humanity. 
Like the fantasy of revenge, forgiveness, and compensation, the fantasy of 
compassion, represents a formidable hindrance to mourning. Although the victim's 
feeling of compassion for another may be "a fragile beginning of compassion for 
herself, "90 it usually leads to a further stigmatisation of the victim. The traumatic 
87 Lifton, R. J., "The Concept of the Survivor", in Dimsdale, J. E. (ed. ), Survivors, Victims p. 
124. 
88 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 189. 
89 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 190. 
90 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 194. 
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response to humiliation and feeling of worthlessness can be clothed in an intense 
awareness of moral superiority: former victims sometimes seek to recover their self- 
worth by establishing a maximum moral distance between themselves and the 
perpetrator, thus imposing upon from themselves a standard of morally 
irreproachable behaviour. The latter is a prominent feature of their 'victim 
specialness. ' On the other hand, for the reasons described in Chapter One, the 
survivors have a tendency to consider most of their actions as provoked by an 
external threat and as such morally justifiable. If, however, the victim realises that her 
behaviour was not morally acceptable according to her own standards, the grandiose 
feeling of specialness, which gives her a sense of worth, collapses. As a result, the 
victim vilifies herself beyond any reasonable measure of self-criticism by immediately 
assimilating her slightest departure from the self-imposed moral standards with the 
evil that had been inflicted upon her. The fantasy of compassion is therefore nothing 
but identification with the hatred of the perpetrator and tacit reconfirmation of the 
victim's worthlessness. 
The process of mourning is usually the longest in the recovery process. It is 
never entirely completed and certain life situations can reawaken the traumatic 
memory. However, after many repetitions of the traumatic narrative and traumatic 
reenactments, the moment comes when the memory of trauma no longer arouses 
quite the same level of emotional intensity as it used to. The victim's story and her 
grief begin to fade in the background and at one point the survivor realises that 
"perhaps the trauma is not the most important, or even the most interesting, part of 
her life story. "91 Herman observed that the major part of mourning is accomplished, 
"when the patient reclaims her own history and feels renewed hope and energy for 
engagement with life. "92After mourning the trauma and her old self, the survivor faces 
a demanding task of rebuilding the self. "Gaining possession of oneself, " wrote 
Herman, "often requires repudiating those aspects of the self that were imposed by 
the trauma. As the survivor sheds her victim identity, she may also choose to 
renounce parts of herself that have felt almost intrinsic to her being. "93 However, 
victimhood carries with it certain privileges - including the right to sympathy and 
91 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 195. 
92 Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 195. 
9' Herman, J. L., Trauma and Recovery p. 203. 
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ethical indulgence owed to those who suffer - and therefore, letting go of the victim 
identity is often resisted. Like any stage of healing, the recreation of the self is never 
completed. It can be considered successful, however, when the victim part of 
survivor's identity is integrated into the new self without dominating it. In other words, 
the survivor is ready to reconnect with the world when victimhood is no longer the 
principal paradigm governing her behaviour. 
On the collective level, both mourning and letting go of the trauma are extremely 
complex and like all threatening processes, are often resisted. An individual trauma 
governs a traumatised person's life and activity and defines her as a victim, until she 
mourns the loss and rebuilds a new self. Likewise, a communal trauma dominates 
the collective identify and determines the parameters of the community's view of the 
world and itself in relation to it. Encoded in the institutional fabric of the society, the 
traumatised outlook and victim identity are cherished as communal heritage and 
transmitted from one generation to another. The community leadership, albeit willing 
to stage a collective reconstruction of the traumatic narrative and establish a 
ritualised collective remembrance, rarely ventured into promoting genuine collective 
mourning and redefinition of collective victim identity. The reasons for communal 
resistance to mourning are usually a combination of the following: 
> Fear that a community may split or collapse in grief once it starts mourning. 
> Concern that in the absence of a continuing trauma, no other source of 
communality could provide a level of social cohesion necessary for the 
community's survival. 
> Anticipation of short-term opportunity costs incurred by abandoning the 
privileges of collective victimhood. 
> Challenge of having to redefine the basis for community's identity as well as 
its internal and external relationships. 
Like individual mourning, the collective grieving and consequent abandonment 
of victim identity, are provoked by an identity crisis resulting from an irresolvable 
antagonism between one's self-perception as a weak, embattled, and innocent 
victim, and the reality of one's power and its consequences, as felt by the outside 
world. Given the difficulty of mourning, and the concurrent resistance to the process, 
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often, such a crisis occurs only when the former victim creates victims of her own 
aggression, usually through a fantasy of revenge or / and compensation. Thus, the 
first part of this chapter outlined the story of one man's resistance to mourning by 
means of enacted revenge fantasy. The latter undoubtedly found positive resonance 
within a considerable proportion of the 70 percent of Israelis who supported the war 
until the end. The fantasy of revenge was accompanied by a fantasy of 
compensation, sought mainly from the bystanders. The fantasy of compensation was 
expressed as a demand that the 'those who stood by then, ' refrain from intervening in 
the victims' 'getting even' (that is, in the enactment of revenge fantasy) with the 
newest avatar of the perpetrator. 
The rationale behind Israel's response to international criticism of the war is 
typically that of compensation: "after the Holocaust, the international community has 
lost its right to demand that Israel answer for its actions. "' The supporters of war 
circulated countless variations on that premise, among them Begin's famous snub of 
the London Times: "A newspaper that supported the treachery of the Munich 
agreement should be very careful in preaching morality to a small nation fighting for 
its life. "95 The last mechanism of resistance to mourning that can be observed in the 
Lebanon war is the fantasy of compassion, which takes the form of extreme moral 
sensitivity and parallel extravagant self-criticism bordering on self-hatred. Unlike 
genuine mourning, the fantasy of compassion does not lead to the relinquishing of 
victim identity and subsequent assumption of responsibility for one's empowerment. 
In the Lebanese context, the fantasy of compassion found its outlet in a 
representation of the war as an inverted Holocaust setting, where the Israelis-Nazis 
humiliate, starve, kill, and brutalise the Palestinians-Jews. Although this extreme 
radical dissent was "rare and was restricted, generally, to the lunatic fringe, "96 it 
nevertheless included some prominent members of the Israeli cultural and intellectual 
elite, including a distinguished professor and recipient of prestigious Israeli prize 
(which he refused), Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who described the war in Lebanon as 
"Judeo-Nazi policy. "97 
9' Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 899. 
95 Menachem Begin, 18 June 1982, in Knesset Papers 10: 2 p. 2973. 
° Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 409. 
91 "Professor Leibowitz Calls Israel's Policy in Lebanon Judeo-Nazi" in Yediot Aharonot, 21 
June 1982 p. 7. 
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Crisis of Israel's Victim Identity 
How can Jews who have themselves been the victims of so much cruelty 
become so cruel? 98 
The Lebanon war was, beyond any shadow of doubt, "the most controversial 
of all Israel's wars. "119 It broke the national consensus on security and provoked a 
number of unprecedented actions and attitudes within the Israeli army and the public. 
While the war was still in progress, eighty-six reservists, including fifteen officers, 
sent a letter to the government, known as the 'Letter of the 100' which stated their 
opposition to the war accompanied by a demand to do their reserve duty within 
Israel, not in Lebanon. 10° Other anti-war movements were formed within the army as 
the siege of Beirut continued. Enlisted men who had fought in Lebanon organised a 
movement called 'Soldiers against Silence, ' which later merged with Shalom 
Achshav (Peace Now). They called for the removal from office of the Defence 
Minister and for an immediate end of the war. By September 1982, over 500 
reservists became members of an organisation called Yesh Gvul (meaning 'there is a 
border / limit'), which became the spearhead of opposition to the war and later a 
support group for conscientious objectors. Yesh Gvul became the strongest of the 
groups, with 2,000 reservists eventually signing a petition not to serve in Lebanon; 
150 of them were court-martialled. Not only the reserve units, but also a number of 
the IDF elite soldiers opposed the war. Thus, all members of the commando that 
carried out the Entebbe rescue operation in 1976, as well as all 22 IAF pilots, signed 
a protest letter against the war, expressing their utter distrust in the Defence Minister 
Sharon and demanding his immediate resignation. 
The anti-war mood in the army reached its climax when on 22 July 1982, 
Colonel Eli Geva, head of an elite armoured brigade asked to be relieved of his 
duties. In a letter sent to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, Colonel Geva 
explained that his conscience did not allow him to take part in the attack on Beirut 
and the harming of innocent civilians. This was the first time that a senior Israeli 
officer had ever resigned in protest during any of Israel's wars. When Prime Minister 
Benjamin Cohen of Tel Aviv University to Pierre Vidal-Naquet on 8 June 1982. Courtesy of 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet. 
9 Bregman, A., Israel's Wars p. 115. 
70° The letter is reproduced in Menuhin, I., and D. Menuhin (eds. ), The Limits of Obedience 
(Tel Aviv: Tenu'at'Yesh gvul', 1985). 
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Begin asked Geva why he had refused to continue in the siege, the high-flying son of 
a reserve general replied that he could see children when he looked through his 
binoculars into Beirut. He was not ostracized as a traitor and was not court- 
martialled. He was discharged of his duties in the army and sent home. 
The growing disillusionment within Israel at the terrible toll being inflicted upon 
Lebanese civilians brought thousands of Israelis to the streets. An estimated 10,000 
had staged a protest rally in Tel Aviv as early as 26 June 1982. Commenting upon 
that event, the Communications Minister in Begin's cabinet said: "It was the first time 
in the history of Israel that such and event had taken place during the course of 
war. "101 A week later, 100,000 attended a peace rally organised by Peace Now. 102 The 
participants, including a group of elite officers who had recently returned from 
Lebanon, demanded the immediate ending of the war and Sharon's resignation. 
Parents of the soldiers serving in Lebanon also organised a group called 'Parents 
against Silence'. But most significantly on the symbolic level, on 6 August 1982, a 
Holocaust survivor began a hunger strike on Yad Vashem's grounds: Shlomo 
Schmelzman, survivor of the Warsaw Ghetto and of Buchenwald, "protested both the 
war and the use of Holocaust to justify it. "103 
Rosh Hashana (Hebrew New Year) is one of the highest holidays in the 
Jewish calendar. According to the oral tradition this day celebrates the creation of the 
world: every year on this day God reviews and judges the deeds of his Creation. It is 
called Rosh Hashana, the 'head' of the Year because, just as the head directs the 
body, so too, God's judgment on Rosh Hashana directs the events of the coming 
year. During Rosh Hashana weekend 1982, while the Israelis were enjoying time for 
reflection and self-evaluation, hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were 
being massacred in Sabra and Shatila. Schiff and Ya'ari describe the shock that the 
news of the massacres provoked in Israel: 
Something snapped ... as hundreds of thousands of Israelis took the hideous 
pictures of slain children and piles of bloodstained bodies as confirmation of 
101 Zipori, M., In a Straight Line, (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1997) p. 305. 
102 Jansen, M., The Battle of Beirut Why Israel invaded Lebanon (London: Zed Press, 1982) 
p. 104. 
103 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 401. 
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most of their suppressed fears. ... The growing shock and revulsion led the 
whole country to take a new, deeply sobered look at the aims of the war and 
the means used to achieve them, and gradually the entire enterprise was 
perceived in a different light; it seemed to have changed the face of Israel and 
debased its cherished rectitude to the point where the government and army 
were implicated in the commission of atrocities. Sabra and Shatilla had 
become synonymous with infamy. t " 
Further press revelations disclosing the circumstances surrounding the massacres, 
combined with the government's "clumsy attempts to cover Israel's tracks in 
everything related to the hideous affair"t05 fuelled the public outcry for an 
investigation. Only after a record 400,000 people had gathered in Tel Aviv 
demanding an independent commission of inquiry into the role of the IDF in the 
massacres, Begin finally agreed to appoint Chief Justice Yitzhak Kahan to head a 
state commission of inquiry. The Commission published its report on 9 February 
1983. It stated that while the Phalangists had done the actual killing, the IDF 
Regional Command that controlled the area and allowed the Phalangist forces into 
the camps was indirectly responsible. The Commission strongly criticised the 
Minister of Defence and recommended his removal from office. Yet, Begin could not 
"summon up the political and personal fortitude to fire him. "t06 The country was in 
uproar again and while a demonstration demanding Sharon's removal, organised by 
Peace Now, was taking place in front of the Prime Minister's office, a fanatical 
Sharon supporter tossed a hand grenade into the dispersing crowd, killing one 
demonstrator and wounding another. Begin resigned in September 1983, to be 
succeeded by Yitzhak Shamir, and Sharon stayed in the Cabinet as minister without 
a portfolio. 
Over the summer 1982 and especially after the Sabra and Shatila massacres, 
countless Israelis experienced a deep crisis that marked the beginning of the 
mourning process and rebuilding of new identity. In the aftermath of the war in 
Lebanon, Israel's progressive Left from among the ranks of intellectual and cultural 
elites, began a thorough re-examination and redefinition of same basic and often 
'a Schiff, Z. and E., Ya'an, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 280. 
105 Schiff, Z. and E., Ya'an, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 281. 
106 Schiff, Z. and E., Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon Warp. 284. 
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quasi-sacred, historical and sociological concepts. Although the Israeli 'new 
historians' and 'new sociologists' have also committed certain excesses and 
mistakes, they indicated a decisive step in the right direction. As the conclusion to 
this thesis shows, the critical dissent in the Israeli academia undertook a challenging 
task of reconstructing a new system of meanings and beliefs and a new, non-victim, 
identity. Together with the parallel step of taking responsibility for one's own power, 
the relinquishing of victimhood as prime focus of identity made mourning and 
therefore, healing, a real possibility. 
Conclusion: Radicalisation And Polarisation Of The Holocaust Legacy 
But in the marrow of my bones, / feel that disaster loomsf0' 
The conclusion to the Chapter Two briefly reviewed the main features of the 
Holocaust education seminars organised in 1985 for the IDF cadets. A few years 
later, during the Intifada, a decision was made to discontinue the special Holocaust 
study courses for soldiers because of the effect that those courses had on the 
soldiers' morale. "The soldiers make comparisons, and ... some leave as supporters 
of Kahane others ... as refusniks. 108 This anecdote epitomises the role of the 
Holocaust as the catalyst of polarisation and radicalisation of the Israeli society in the 
1980s, and the two ideal-types - Kahanist [supporters of a quasi-fascist racist rabbi 
Meir Kahane], and refusnik [someone who refuses to serve in the occupied 
territories] - symbolise the depth of this division. 
In 1984, Rabbi Meir Kahane was elected to the Israeli Knesset on the extreme 
anti-Arab ticket. Although Kahane was initially dismissed as "an eccentric 
troublemaker, "109 by mid-1980s he headed the quickest growing political party in 
Israel's history. The polls predicted that, had it not been outlawed, his militantly anti- 
Arab party - Kach (meaning, 'Thus')- could have won as much as 12 seats in the 
1988 Knesset elections, making it into the third largest party in Israel. 10 His influence 
107 Kahane, M., NeverAgain! A Program for Survival (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971) p. 
250. 
108 Don-Yehiya, E., "Memory and Political Culture" p. 159. 
109 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 405. 
110 To facilitate comparison it is worth recalling that in the 1988 elections, the third largest 
party - Shas - had 6 seats, whereas Likud had 40 and Labour 39.12 seats would require 
approximately 10 percent of the total votes. 
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was considerable and Kahanism spread through Israel and gained power, especially 
among the youth. "Kahane's violent anti-Arab, antidemocratic nationalism and 
religious extremism, " wrote Segev, "won most of their support in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, nourished by a complex of social frustrations, xenophobia ... fears 
for survival, and vague anxieties that Kahane knew how to stir up. ""' 
Born in New York City in 1932, Meir Kahane, joined the Revisionist Betar 
youth movement as a child. He studied at the Mir Yeshiva in Brooklyn and received 
his rabbinic ordination in 1956. That same year, Rabbi Kahane graduated from New 
York Law School and obtained a masters degree in International Relations from New 
York University. When he founded the militant Jewish Defence League (JDL) in 
1968, Kahane announced that it would be necessary for the organization to use 
violence to gain its ends. Over the years the JDL has acted out the fantasies of its 
leader to leave behind it a trail of bombings, arson and intimidation, which finally led 
to its ban in the United States. Kahane immigrated to Israel in 1971 and founded 
Kach. Kach was most famous for its platform calling for the forcible removal of the 
Arab population from Israel and demanding the annexation of all the territories 
occupied in 1967 and unlimited Jewish settlement there. Kahane failed his 1976 and 
1980 Knesset bid, but he was successful in winning his seat in the 1984 elections. 
Meir Kahane was assassinated in New York City in November 1990, but "his place 
was filled with other Kahanists, who knew how to express their demand for the 
deportation of the Arabs in acceptable language. ""2 Other political parties (for 
example Tehiya, Tsomet and Moledet) advocated the transfer of Arabs to 
neighbouring countries, a project that has become a legitimate subject of discussion 
in the Israeli Knesset and has increasingly gained importance in the mainstream 
parties and the Israeli public. Thus, according to a survey conducted in 1998 by the 
Israeli daily Ma'ariv, 65 percent of Jewish Israeli respondents supported the idea of 
expelling Arabs to other Arabic countries if Israel is not subjected to international 
condemnation because of that. "' Kahane's ideas were also articulated by parts of the 
Israeli and American religious hierarchy (including former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi 
"' Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 405-6. 
112 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 407. 
113 See Ma'ariv poll, 20 September 1998. 
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Shlomo Goren), and the settlers' movements, most notably Gush Emunim (meaning 
Bloc of the Faithful). 
Rabbi Kahane's ideology represents the mast extreme expression of revenge 
fantasy. His writings are full of biblically supported calls for revenge. In his 1971 book 
entitled NeverAgain! "', which his critics often equate to Hitler's Mein Kampf, Kahane 
offered a distinctly radical interpretation of the Holocaust lessons. After virulently 
criticising the passivity of the Jewish leadership in the United States vis-ä-vis the 
dangers threatening the Jewish people in America (where the biggest threat is 
assimilation) and abroad (especially in the USSR and in the Arab countries), Kahane 
proceeded: 
The lesson is clear. In the end, for the Jews, there is no ally except the Jews. 
That which our brothers and sisters learned in Europe we must learn here. 
Their Polish and Lithuanian and Czech and German friends deserted them in 
their hour of need. ... When the State of Israel was proclaimed and the Arab 
armies swarmed across the borders to exterminate the Jewish population, 
there was no one who came to help. No Berlin airlift was mounted for the 
besieged Jews of Jerusalem. ... It was only Jewish blood and Jewish funds 
and Jewish support that preserved Jewry from yet another holocaust. ... Let 
us cease fooling ourselves ... The death of six million Jews has in no way 
lessened the thirst of a world for Jewish blood. ... Never again. Never again 
must we make the same tragic error of refusing to believe that a Holocaust 
can sweep up the Jews wherever they may be and that hatred of the Jew is a 
thing that flourishes in all types of climates and regions. ... '"s 
In this program for Jewish survival Kahane called for action. "Let us not fear 
`overreaction', " he wrote, "Quite the contrary; the Jewish curse is underreaction as 
we learned so painfully in Germany. """ As a Member of the Knesset, Meir Kahane 
put his words into practice. He demanded the expulsion of Israel's Arab citizens and 
Arab residents of the occupied territories, and advocated establishing Jewish 
religious law as the law of the land. 
"' Kahane, M., Never Again! 
'"'Kahane, M., NeverAgain! p. 224-8. 
16 Kahane, M., NeverAgain! p. 98. 
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In September 1984, Kahane introduced two bills to the Knesset. The first one 
would have restricted Israeli citizenship to Jews whereas non-Jews would have the 
status of 'stranger' as defined by the Jewish law. As 'strangers', non-Jews would 
have only personal, but no political rights, and would therefore not be allowed to vote, 
hold public office, or reside in the city of Jerusalem. The second bill was called the 
'Law to Prevent Assimilation between Jews and non-Jews and for the Holiness of 
Israel. ' As the name indicates, this law - if accepted - would terminate all contact 
between Jews and non-Jews. There would be separate schools, summer camps, and 
beaches for Jews and non-Jews. Jewish children would not be allowed to visit Arab 
children in their homes or villages and they would also not be permitted to stay with 
non-Jewish families abroad. Non-Jews would not be allowed to live in Jewish 
neighbourhoods without the agreement of the majority of the Jewish residents. 
Jewish citizens and residents would not be allowed to marry non-Jews, neither in 
Israel nor abroad. Intermarried couples would be forced to separate immediately. Any 
sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews would be punishable with a 2-year 
prison sentence (5 years for a homosexual relation or intercourse with a Jewish 
prostitute). A Likud MK, Michael Eitan, compared the proposed legislation with the 
Nuremberg laws and found many points of similarity. Initially, the Knesset presidium 
refused to allow Kahane to bring the bills to the debate, but the Supreme Court 
reversed that decision because of lack of jurisdiction. "' Consequently, in 1985, an 
amendment (section 7a) was added to Basic Law: The Knesset, according to which 
candidates can be prevented from participating in the Knesset elections if their 
purposes or deeds express incitement to racism. "" Section 7a served as the basis for 
the disqualification of Kach in the 1988 elections. Rabbi Kahane was not allowed to 
stand at the 1988 Knesset elections, and Kach and its offshoot Kahane Chai 
(meaning 'Kahane lives') were outlawed in 1994,19 after Baruch Goldstein, a member 
"' See Cohen-Almagor, R., "Disqualification of Lists in 1988 and 1992: A Comparative 
Analysis" in Karsson, M. M. (ed. ) Law, justice and the state: essays on justice and rights: 16th 
World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy: Reykjavik, 26 May-2 June, 1993 (Stuttgart F. Steiner Verlag, 1995), pp. 88-103. 
'"The amendment was passed by the Knesset on 31 July 1985 and published in Sefer Ha- 
Chukkim No. 1155 of 7 August 1985 p. 196. The Basic Law: Knesset is also available on the 
Internet: http: //www. israel-mfa. gov. il/mfa/go. asp? MFAHOOh8O. Last accessed on 3 
September 2001. 
19 See the Cabinet Decision to outlaw Kach. 
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of Kach, shot 29 worshippers wounding 60 in the Ibrahim Mosque in the Hebron's 
Cave of the Patriarchs. 
Assessing the impact of Kahanism on the Israeli soldiers, education-corps 
officer Col. Ehud Prayer recalled that in the wake of Kahane, an increasing number 
of soldiers exposed to the history of the Holocaust "were planning all sorts of ways to 
exterminate the Arabs. "120 There were reports that "events in the occupied territories 
had elicited extreme reactions from the soldiers: some had concluded from what they 
saw in the Holocaust museum that brutality like that of the Nazis was the way to deal 
with rioters. "'"' In the summer of 1989 the press revealed that a group of soldiers 
calling itself the Mengele unit had plotted to kill Arabs. Similar stories emerged of 
units called 'Auschwitz platoon' and 'Demjanjuks. ' The army first tried to prevent 
publication of these stories and later explained that the "idea was no more than black 
humour on the part of the soldiers. "22Nevertheless, Prayer confirmed that "too many 
soldiers were deducing that the Holocaust justifies every kind of disgraceful action . "121 
Appalled by the Israeli society's distinct shift to the right, culminating in the 
appearance of Jewish racism that invoked the Holocaust as its main source of 
legitimacy and moral weight, segments of the Israeli Left also radicalised in the 
1980s. The outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987 plunged the country's left-wing 
elites further into self-criticism initiated in the wake of the Lebanon war. 
Concurrently, a growing number of Israelis declared themselves unwilling to serve in 
the territories and put down the Palestinian uprising. Thus the trend, which had 
begun in the Lebanon war, continued. To mention just a few examples: by the end of 
December 1987 sixty-six high school students about to become eligible for the 
military service had sent letters to the then Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 124 
declaring their intention to refuse to serve in the occupied territories. Also in 
December 1987,160 reservists, including several officers, refused to participate in 
Internet edition at: http: //www. ict. org. il/counter ter/law/Iawdet. cfm? lawid=2 Last accessed on 
3 September 2001. 
120 Col. Ehud Prayer quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 407. 
121 Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 408. 
122 Sagir, D., in The Battalion They Knew That We Were A Killer Company" Ha'aretz, 31 July 
1989 p. 11. 
123 Col. Ehud Prayer quoted in Segev, T., The Seventh Million p. 407. 
124 Josephs, B., "Pubios say refusal campaign is growing' in Jerusalem Post, 23 October 
1987 p. 2. and Galil, L., "16 other 12-graders wrote to Rabin" in Ha'aretz, 30 December 1987 
p. 5. 
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the suppression of the lntifada. 125 In February 1988, Yesh Gvul announced that 
further 260 reservists had made know their intention not to carry out any orders to 
beat the Palestinians. "126 Tom Segev noted that the phenomenon was probably more 
widespread then it was publicly disclosed because, individual cases were handled 
informally within each unit. Although the figures may seem small compared to the 
number of conscientious objectors in other Western democratic states, they are 
extremely significant in the Israeli context where "service in the army had always 
been seen not only as a necessity but also as a pillar of the personal and collective 
identities of the Israeli people. "127 The refusals to perform military service were 
accompanied by a critical assessment of the Holocaust lessons among the Israeli 
and the American Jewish left-wing intellectuals who denounced the existing 
understandings of the Holocaust as inadequate and warned that the misuse of the 
Holocaust for political purposes is pregnant with dangers: social, cultural, moral, 
economic, political, and even physical. 
125 Court, A., "160 reservists say they won't serve in occupied territories" in Jerusalem Post, I 
January 1988. 
126 Galil, L., "260 reservists announced" in Ha'aretz, 15 February 1988. 




The hardships of the mountains are behind us / 
Before us lie the hardships of the plains. ' 
In the introduction to this thesis, I asked the following questions: Is the 
Holocaust a collective trauma of the Israeli Jews? How does it deploy its effects 
within the Israeli society? What is the impact of the Holocaust on Israel's making of 
security? The body of this thesis has demonstrated that the Holocaust severely 
traumatised the Jewish people in Israel and that this traumatisation had a profound 
impact on the young nation's conception of its security. 
Chapter One showed that the Holocaust traumatised the Israeli Jews both 
individually and collectively. The distinction made between the individual and 
collective traumas emphasised the long-term implications of the difference in the 
immediacy of traumatic experience of trauma, and the consequent controllability of its 
impact on the survivor. I have demonstrated that the immediacy of trauma and ability 
/willingness (agency) to act upon it are locked in an inverse ratio and argued that this 
fact is crucial because it ascribes specific roles to different groups of survivors and 
defines the relationships between them. The systematisation of the Holocaust-related 
traumas into a typology of survivors' groups determined the traumatic syndromes of 
each group, based on its experience during and after the Second World War. The 
juxtaposition of the ratio between immediacy and agency on one hand, and the 
typology of survivors' groups and symptoms on the other hand, identified the most 
likely agents of trauma and their post-traumatic symptoms. 
On the basis of the findings in the first chapter, Chapter Two established the 
link between trauma and security as it translates into the Israeli reality. I have shown 
that the post-traumatic symptoms observed in all four survivors' groups, particularly in 
empathetic 'survivors' group, which included the majority of the Israeli leadership, are 
reflected in the traumatised view of the world, the Jewish prism. The analysis of the 
1 Die Mühen der Gebirge liegen hinter uns 1 Vor uns liegen die Mühen der Ebenen. Brecht, 
B., "Wahrnehmung' in Hundert Gedichte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), p. 153. 
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key elements of this worldview explained the distortion of reality observable In Israel's 
perception of threat and the lack of gradation of response in its reaction to the 
perceived threat. In the composite and individual portraits of Israeli leaders I have 
detected the key elements of the Jewish prism in'their perception of the world and 
Israel in relation to it. Furthermore, I have shown that the Jewish prism is transmitted 
to the IDF cadets by means of Holocaust education seminars, which articulate the 
meanings and lessons of the Holocaust. 
In the Chapters Three and Four I outlined the process of collective 
traumatisation in four steps: euphoria, encounter, estrangement, and reconstruction 
of trauma. I have established that the collective traumatisation in Israel spread across 
almost two decades, until the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961, which marked the 
beginning of the collective recovery process. On the individual level, the timetable 
was slightly different. Already traumatised by the time they arrived in Israel, the 
physical survivors were met with a negative reaction that characterised the third 
phase of collective traumatisation (estrangement). They were essentially alone in 
dealing with their personal traumas until the Eichmann's trial provided them with an 
opportunity to publicly recount their stories and thereby contribute to the collective 
reconstruction of trauma. Chapter Four also showed that the unprecedented level of 
identification with the Holocaust survivors during and after the trial marked the final 
step towards collective traumatisation of the staggering majority of Israeli Jews, 
Ashkenazim as well as Sephardim. 
In the wake of the Eichmann's trial, the personal and collective narratives of 
trauma coincided and the process of collective recovery slowly began. The recovery 
process consists of four major steps: establishment of safety, reconstruction of 
trauma, mourning, and reconnection. The first phase of healing was accomplished 
with the creation of the State of Israel, which received the majority of the Holocaust 
survivors, before the community as a whole was traumatised through increased 
awareness of the damage, contact with survivors, and exposure to their stories at the 
Eichmann's trial. The second stage was completed in 1962 with the closure of the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. The period between the reconstruction of 
trauma and mourning is marked by 'active victimhood. ' After having told the story of 
trauma publicly once, the survivor (either as an individual or as a collective entity) 
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acquires the identity and status of a victim. The former represents a non-controllable 
imprint of traumatisation and is therefore characterised by the post-traumatic stress 
symptoms. The latter governs the victim's interactions with the outside world and is 
marked by a profound sense of entitlement and self-righteousness. Trauma can be, 
and usually is, manipulated during the period that precedes mourning. Yet even the 
manipulation of trauma is an integral part of recovery process. It represents one of 
the expressions of resistance to mourning, compensation fantasy. Other types of 
resistance are: revenge fantasy (which usually translates in expressivist use of force), 
fantasy of forgiveness, and fantasy of compassion. The combination of the 
uncontrollable and controllable factors thus lead to a specific type of behaviour, 
which largely results from trauma but may appear exceptionally manipulative and / or 
aggressive. 
Chapters Five and Six analysed the practical implications of the Holocaust 
trauma for Israel's security. Chapter Five focused on the influence of the Holocaust- 
permeated Jewish prism that emerged from the Eichmann trial on the leaders' 
perception of Israel's geo-strategic environment during the Six-Day and Yom Kippur 
Wars. I have shown that both the exaggeration of threat during the 'waiting period' in 
1967 and the mystification of victory afterwards originate from the traumatised 
worldview informed by the lessons of the Holocaust. I have also suggested that the 
Six-Day War could be seen as a reactivation of the original trauma where the Israeli 
leaders sought to apply the lessons of the Holocaust and use what was constructed 
as the 'second chance' to secure a positive outcome. After reviewing the seeming 
incongruity between the extent of victory after the Arab surprise attack in 1973 and 
the subsequent representation of the Yom Kippur War as a calamity, I established 
that such conceptualisation of the 1973 war was needed in order to sustain the victim 
identity and status. I also suggested that this need was a reflection of the Israeli 
public's inability to confront the reality of Israeli power and its consequences. 
In Chapter Six I analysed the effects of a coincidence between personal and 
collective traumas during Prime Minister Begin's two terms in office. After 
establishing that Begin's personal experience as a Holocaust survivor reinforced the 
particularistic elements of the Jewish prism, I showed that Begin's (and by extension, 
Israel's) behaviour during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was a clear expression of 
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revenge fantasy. I have also shown that some extremely radical left-wing critics 
engaged in the opposite strategy of resistance, that is, fantasy of compassion. Most 
importantly, I determined that approximately a third of Israel's population descended 
into genuine mourning (characterised by a willingness to undertake a process that 
will result in relinquishing of the victim identity) in the wake of Israel's excesses in 
Lebanon. As a result of this partial descent into mourning, Israeli society split and 
radicalised in the 1980s. 
This conclusion seeks to answer two main questions: How does this thesis 
contribute to a better understanding of Israel's security and foreign policies? How can 
the findings of this thesis assist the critical efforts towards normalisation and 
resolution of trauma within Israel? 
The first part of this conclusion reviews the critical contributions by Israeli and 
American Jewish academics and commentators, which in my view represent a 
genuine and constructive attempt to move beyond victimhood and the triumphalism 
of pain to establish a new Israeli cultural identity. Their criticism focuses on two 
trends: Jewish monopolisation of the Holocaust via an ahistorical representation of it, 
and Israel's continuous use of the Holocaust for the sake of immediate political gains. 
Reconceptualised according to the trauma paradigm presented in this thesis, the 
Jewish monopolisation and ahistorical representation of the Holocaust are both a 
reflection of a victim identity. Consequently, the advantageous manipulation of the 
victim status is a strategy of resistance to mourning, known as compensation fantasy. 
This thesis showed that both trends are only partially controllable, which contradicts 
the assumption of the Zionist leaders' conscious and deliberate manipulation of the 
world and the Israeli public that pervades the critical contributions. 
As a response to their observations, the commentators repeatedly asked for a 
critical investigation of history aiming to revise the existing understandings of the 
Holocaust. The call for new Jewish history is multi-layered: it demands that the focus 
of study be directed on different issues in Jewish history, but also, more 
fundamentally, that the essentially ahistorical and providential theological conception 
of the Jewish history as destiny be replaced with modern secular historical analysis. 
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However sound these suggestions may be in a normal context, it must be 
noted that on the trauma timeline, a secularisation and revision of pre-traumatic and 
traumatic history, represent the first step of rebuilding new identity and new system of 
belief. Put differently, a radical re-examination of 'history should only intervene after 
the completion of the mourning process. It is therefore fully understandable that the 
critics' demand for new history is met with vehement opposition. This is because it 
touches upon the core of the victim identity, which those who still identify themselves 
as survivors, either individually or collectively, are neither willing nor able to 
relinquish. These observations by no means seek to frustrate the effort of 
normalisation undertaken by the new generation of Israeli intellectual and cultural 
elites. Quite the contrary: I am convinced that the project of transformation of Israeli 
society known as 'post-Zionism' holds a unique potential to resolve trauma. However, 
in order to be successful, the makers of the new historical narrative should not 
dismiss the opposition lightly, but address every issue presented to it with the utmost 
care and attention, lest it repeats the very Zionist mistakes that it abhorres. 
Implications for the Israel's Foreign and Security Policies 
Whichever way you look at it, the ghost of the Holocaust appears self- 
perpetuating and self-reproducing. It made itself indispensable to too many to 
be easily exorcised. 2 
Three years prior to Meir Kahane's election to the Knesset, Boaz Evron wrote 
that the lessons learned from the Holocaust "have in themselves become a danger to 
both the Jewish people and the State of Israel. "3 In the article mentioned in Chapter 
Two, Boaz Evron denounced the non-historical interpretation of the Holocaust, which 
according to the author, led to mystical and pseudo-religious understandings of the 
event. "A Holocaust is something indefinite, " wrote Evron, "it can be an earthquake or 
a plague, something that seems to hit you suddenly, out of any historical context. 
You are exempted from attempting to understand it. "4 Evron's description of the 
Holocaust corresponds to the collective narrative of the trauma with the corroborating 
set of lessons that emerged from the Eichmann's trial. As I discussed in Chapter 
Four, a traumatic event is remembered as something outside of history until it is fully 
integrated in the individual or the collective life story. The reconstruction of trauma is 
2 Bauman, Z., "The Holocaust's Life as a Ghost" in Tikkun 13: 4 (July /August 1998), p. 37. 
3 Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 16. 
4 Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 16. 
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only just the beginning of the healing process, during which the story is repeated 
again and again until the trauma can be mourned in the next stage of recovery. 
Evron's and other commentators' call for a historical understanding of the Holocaust 
reveals their own readiness and a willingness to 'let go' of trauma as the prime 
definer of the collective identity. However, like integration of traumatic memory into 
the everyday memory of the individual survivor, which can be completed only after 
mourning, the historicisation of a collective trauma is possible when the prevailing 
majority is already well advanced in the process of mourning. 
In his contribution, Evron observed that the non-historical presentation of the 
murder of European Jewry, by depicting the Jews as almost-exclusive victims of the 
Nazi assault, and the Holocaust as a unique crime in human history, separated the 
Jews and the Holocaust from the rest of humanity, its history and its laws. Similarly 
Phillip Lopate, one of the foremost American Jewish essayists, warned that the 
Jewish insistence on the uniqueness of the Holocaust contains a dangerous element 
of mystification, and repudiated the "self-dramatising theological ambition to portray 
the historic suffering of the Jews during World War 11 as a sort of cosmic storm 
rending the heavens. "5 In the author's eyes, such mystification diminishes or even 
demeans the mass slaughters of other peoples. Boaz Evron expressed a concurrent 
concern that the identification of Nazism with anti-Semitism, resulting from Jewish 
emphasis on their unique fate under the Nazis, may bring non-Jews to consider Nazi 
activities as 'a Jewish matter and therefore not as a danger to themselves. 
Moreover, the author warned that the Jewish, and particularly Israeli, disconnection 
from humanity may cause certain Jews in a position of power to treat others as 
subhuman, thereby repeating the racist attitudes embodied in Nazism. The 
appearance of Jewish pornographic racism in the person of Kahane just a few years 
later confirmed Evron's fears. 
As I have shown in this thesis, trauma by definition separates its survivors 
from the rest of humanity. It shatters all the former frames of reference and locks the 
survivors in a separate world, until they undertake the last stage of recovery and 
reconnect with humanity. The non-historical understanding of the Holocaust was 
s Lopate, P., 'Resistance to the Holocaust' in Tikkun 4: 3 (May/June 1989) p. 56. 
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therefore the only way in which this trauma could be confronted at the time. 
However, Evron is correct in warning that victimhood coupled with power is 
dangerous, as the discussion of Begin's revenge fantasy in Chapter Six amply 
demonstrated. Following Evron's line of argument, ' Israel's reconnection with the rest 
of the world depends on a prior historical reappraisal of Jewish history and the 
Holocaust within it. The new history of the event would have to demonstrate that the 
mass murder of European Jewry was neither the only, nor the worst crime of 
genocide, and that the Jews were not the only group targeted by the Nazi assault. 
Much of the critical literature called for such historical reassessment, denouncing 
both the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the Jewish monopolisation of the event. A 
thorough historical reassessment of the Holocaust is indeed a necessary prerequisite 
for Israel's successful normalisation. However, if it should intervene before the 
completion of the mourning process, it must be gradual and as non-threatening as 
possible. 
After presenting the staggering figures illustrating the magnitude of other 
genocides, Lopate reiterated his call for a relative perspective in the study of the 
Holocaust before attacking the Jewish appropriation of death and suffering as "simply 
another opportunity for Jewish chauvinism. "" Lopate defined Jewish chauvinism with 
regard to the Holocaust as a variation on the theme of the Chosen People: this time 
God's people have been chosen for extraordinary suffering. To do justice to that 
concept it is important to situate it within the theological explanations of the 
Holocaust, especially since the ultra-Orthodox response to the Holocaust is 
mentioned at a later stage. From a Chassidic perspective, all which emanates from 
God is chesed (meaning goodness), though its understanding can be hidden from 
man's finite perspective. Suffering must be therefore accepted with love and personal 
sacrifice on the basis of faith and unquestioning trust in God's ultimate justice. In this 
light, the Holocaust is also a supreme test of faith, a modern sacrifice of Isaac. Thus 
even in Treblinka, Rabbi Israel Shapira told his disciples: "We should not question 
God's actions. If it is indeed destined that we shall serve as a sacrifice for Hevlei 
Mashiach [literally meaning 'the birth pangs of the Messiah, ' that is the period of 
6 Lopate, P., 'Resistance to the Holocaust' p. 61. 
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suffering which heralds the messianic era'] during this period of redemption, and thus 
be consumed in the flames - how fortunate then that we have been privileged for this 
purpose. "" I would argue that more than chauvinism, the notion that the Jewish 
people was singled out for a Christ-like sacrifice that would precipitate the redemption 
of the world, is an attempt by the ultra-Orthodox Jews to grapple with the meaning of 
God's failure to intervene on behalf of His people during the Holocaust. 
Some of Lopate's analysis of the Jews' reluctance to surrender the role of the 
victim is either purposefully provocative ("There is something so testy, so vain, so 
diva-like about this insistence that we always get the top billing in any rite of 
mourning. " 9) or too specifically American ("Sometimes it almost seems that 'the 
Holocaust' is a corporation headed by Elie Wiesel, who defends his patents with 
articles in the Arts and Leisure section of the Sunday Times. "10). Nevertheless, the 
author called attention to two issues that make the surrender of victim identity both 
urgent and costly: the use of the Holocaust for political purposes, and the erosion of 
Jewish traditional sources of communality in favour of victimhood. While the 
immediate price of 'letting go' of traumatic identity in general, and the Holocaust in 
particular, is easily deduced from the gain secured by it, the long-term costs of 
holding on to victimhood are more difficult to evaluate. Almost without exception, this 
calculus accompanies other reasons underlying the resistance to mourning and 
rebuilding a new identity among trauma survivors. Therefore, as Chapter Six 
concluded, criticism that focuses specifically on these concerns is more likely to have 
a positive impact than criticism that is itself a form of resistance to mourning (fantasy 
of compassion). 
Thus Boaz Evron shrewdly argued that the political manipulation of the 
Holocaust damaged first and foremost the Israeli interests. Evron traced the practice 
of Holocaust politics to the Eichmann's trial, which forced Germany to apply to Israel 
a special preferential relationship and thereby act against its own interest, which at 
the time would have dictated avoiding establishing open diplomatic relations with 
See Jeremiah 30: 7 and Daniel 12: 1. 
8 Rabbi Shapira quoted in Hass, A., The Aftermath: Living with the Holocaust (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 145-6. 
9 Lopate, P., "Resistance to the Holocaust" p. 59. 
10 Lopate, P., "Resistance to the Holocaust", p. 56. 
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Israel in order not to risk its relations with the Arab world. The asymmetrical system 
of relations with Germany represented a blueprint for relations between Israel and 
other guilt-ridden states of the Christian West, especially the United States. These 
relations were not based on objective common iriterest, but on a widespread guilt 
feeling towards the Jewish people. According to Evron, the results of this system of 
relations are the following: the special treatment accorded to Israel, including 
unconditional economic and political support, cut Israel off from global economic and 
political realities. Furthermore, the Jewish prism presented the Israeli leaders and the 
public with such Manichean and unrealistic choices - Holocaust or victory - that they 
immediately exempted the Jewish State from any moral restrictions when relating to 
the outside world. The fact that Israel has never needed to face the real forces 
operating in the world and adjust to the international rules of the game accordingly, 
made the Jewish state dependent on foreign aid, political support, and most 
significantly - on the perpetuation of the moral pressure of the Holocaust. According 
to Evron, it was precisely the reliance on the victimhood status that prevented the 
normalisation and locked Israel in an ahistorical existence where the past juxtaposed 
the present without the necessary distance. Furthermore, the dependence on the 
guilt consciousness of the Western Christian world has made Israel extremely 
vulnerable because, as Evron put it "guilt consciousness ... 
has its own limits. It is a 
bank account continuously reduced by withdrawals. ... The world gets tired of it 
[mentioning the Holocaust], we get tired of it. "" 
Indeed, critical reviews of various mechanisms of pressure employed by Israeli 
governments when dealing with the Christian world and the American Jewish 
Diaspora have burgeoned since Begin's promiscuous use of the Holocaust in the 
early 1980s, culminating in the recent debates surrounding the publication of Norman 
Finkelstein's controversial The Holocaust lndustry. 12 According to the critics, the "fine 
art" of using the murder of European Jewry for political purposes is based on both 
cultivation and exploitation of guilt feelings. A continuous reminder of the world's 
failure to intervene on behalf of the Jews during the Second World War (cultivation) is 
inevitably accompanied by an extension of an opportunity to do better the second 
" Evron, B., "The Holocaust" p. 22. 
12 Finkelstein, N., The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering 
(London: Verso, 2000). 
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time round (exploitation). Thus every important non-Jewish visitor to Israel is taken, 
as a matter of course, to Yad Vashem "even before he has had time to leave off his 
luggage in his hotel, 1013 as Avishai Margalit sarcastically pointed out. The children's 
room in Yad Vashem, a pitch-black room with tape-recorded voices of children crying 
out in Yiddish, 'Mame, Tate, ' is meant, according to Margalit, to deliver a message to 
the visiting foreign dignitary that "all of us here in Israel are these children and the 
Hitler-Arafat is after us. " " The guilt feeling is manipulated in several ways, noted 
Evron: firstly, Israel presents itself to the world as the symbolic 'survivor' of the 
Holocaust: the remnant of the European Jewry that survived the Nazi carnage and 
the heir to the Holocaust legacy. Secondly, Israel claims to be in permanent danger 
of annihilation. Similarly divorced from reality, according to Evron, is Israel's 
concurrent assessment that every one of its wars represents a danger to the actual 
existence of the Jewish State. Thirdly, the Christian Western states are called upon 
to assuage their guilt by economically and politically supporting Israel and thereby 
'preventing another Holocaust. ' Fourthly, Israel has used the Holocaust to silence the 
criticism of its policies with a Begin-like argument: those who stood silent then, 
cannot teach a small and vulnerable state what it ought to do to defend itself from 
another Holocaust. Lastly, Israel exploited the loss of any other focal point to the 
American Jewish identity to control the Jewish Diaspora in the United States. With 
regards to the latter, Phillip Lopate concluded that the growing importance of the 
Holocaust for assimilated Jews in America and for secular Jews in Israel was 
inversely related to the erosion of Jewish religion and tradition. In the absence of 
Jewish rituals, ceremonies, cuisine, and Yiddishkeit, that used to be transmitted from 
generation to generation, the Holocaust and common history of persecution remain 
the only source of Jewish communality among secular Jews. "There is a danger, " 
warned Lopate, "that, in effect, the Holocaust will swallow up Judaism. "15 
In the wake of Kahanism and the Intifada, the critics concluded with one voice 
that Israel's cultivation of guilt feelings and exploitation of the Holocaust for the sake 
of political interests, especially in combination with the growing erosion of other 
sources of communality among the Jewish people, is damaging, and ultimately 
13 Margalit, A., The Kitsch of Israel, " in New York Review of Books, 24 Nov. 1988. 
14 Margalit, A., "The Kitsch of Israel" 
75 Lopate, P., "Resistance to the Holocaust", p. 64. 
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dangerous to Israel and the Jewish people as a whole. To thwart this menace and 
make normalisation possible, the commentators pleaded for radically new 
understandings of the Jewish history and identity, as well as a more inclusive and 
realistic concepts of ethics. From the point of view of trauma and recovery, the next 
section evaluates the work that has already been done in the direction of 
reconnection and draws attention to some significant challenges to this process, 
which in my view, the critical literature has so far overlooked. 
Implications for the Resolution of Trauma 
The Jews ... need to remember not only how they died, but also how they lived. 18 
In an excellent . article, 
David Biale, the director of the Centre for Jewish 
Studies at Berkley, declared that the therapy for traumatic past lies in a critical 
investigation of all periods of Jewish history. "The task of history, " wrote Biale, "is ... 
to integrate each event, no matter how catastrophic, into the whole; to put trauma into 
perspective and make it possible to remember without being overwhelmed. "" 
Reiterating the concerns of the critics reviewed previously, Biale called for a secular 
and historical reappraisal of Jewish exilic existence, as opposed to the dominating 
theological and ahistorical view of Jewish history. Such critical examination of the 
entire Jewish history would, according to Biale, allow the Jews today to see both the 
past and the present through a realistic lens and thereby secure "the health of the 
Jewish people. ""' The discussion that follows returns to some of the key elements of 
the Jewish prism described in Chapter Two in order to examine the transformative 
potential of history with regards to the way in which Jews perceive the world and 
themselves in it. It must also be noted that the outlines of Jewish ancient, medieval, 
Zionist, and 'new' history are purposefully sketchy because they only support or 
introduce the arguments. 
The cardinal components of the Jewish prism, fatalism and isolationism, lie at 
the very heart of the Jewish traditional conception of history as both unique and 
providential. In an influential study of Jewish history, the historian Yosef Yerushalmi 
16 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity and the Legacy of the Holocaust, " in Tikkun, 2: 1 (January- 
February 1987) p. 73. 
17 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 70. 
18 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 73. 
230 
described the Jewish consciousness of the past as uniquely ahistorical. 19 Yerushalmi 
observed that during the nearly fifteen centuries after the death of the famous Jewish 
historian Josephus, throughout the entire period when the Talmudic commentary 
flourished, there were no Jewish historians. He attributed this phenomenon to the 
rabbis' belief that the Bible already contained all the patterns of Jewish historical 
existence. Combined with a traditional Jewish notion of time as being cyclical and not 
linear, this belief led to an ahistorical history in which all events are cyclical 
recurrences of the ancient archetypes. As Biale put it: "The exile from Spain conjures 
up the memory of the exile form Judaea, the pogroms of the Crusaders are 
repetitions of the slaughter of the martyrs by Antiochus Epiphanes. "20 The concept of 
the Chosen People, with a unique fate and purpose that remain largely hidden from 
men, demanded a total faith in God's providence in order to sustain itself. In turn, the 
limitless trust in God is based on a Covenant, in which the Jewish people is an equal 
partner: in return for a rigorous execution of His commandments, God has an 
obligation to actively intervene in the historical destiny of His Chosen People and 
protect it. God therefore represents the ultimate causal factor of the Jewish history. 
The rabbis of the Talmudic times interpreted the Exile as a punishment for the 
sins committed by Jews. In the Middle Ages, the survivors of the Crusader pogroms 
similarly understood their suffering as a way of atonement for the sins of the 
generations. Thus a great Spanish Jewish poet and philosopher, Yehuda Ha-Levi, 
further suggested that the suffering of the Jews was a sign of God's continued 
election. After the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C. E., when the Jews lost 
political sovereignty for almost two millennia, they became a spiritual people and 
powerlessness became a virtue. From the point of view of Jewish historical memory, 
the Exile was a vale of tears, a tale of a tortured, persecuted, stateless and 
powerless God's Chosen People, "an eternal people, a people outside of history. "21 
Today's ultra-Orthodox interpretations of the Holocaust remain faithful to this 
representation of history and therefore provide an excellent illustration of fatalism and 
isolationism that embody the uniqueness of the Jewish existence. Based on the 
premise that God punishes his people for its sins, embodied in the concept of the 
19Yerushalmi, Y. H., Zakhor. Jewish History and Jewish Memory (New York: Schoken Books, 
1987). 
20 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 68. 
21 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 69. 
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mipenei hata'einu (meaning 'because of our sins we were punished'), a number of 
ultra-Orthodox rabbis asserted that Zionism and assimilationism had aroused God's 
wrath and allowed Germans to strike at God's people. According to this account 
Israel was sinful and Auschwitz is her just retribution. The second explanation is 
based on the special mission of the Jewish people: Israel is the 'sacrificial lamb, ' the 
'suffering servant' (Isaiah 53) who redeems the world and atones for the sins of 
others through suffering. In the third interpretation, again God intervenes, to test the 
faith of His people. The Holocaust, in this account is a modern sacrifice of Isaac. 
When all other theological explanations fail, God is simply inexplicably absent from 
history or unaccountably chooses to turn His face away. According to one of the 
greatest modern Jewish philosophers, Martin Buber, the eclipse of God, like the 
eclipse of the sun means that for a moment God may not be seen, but in the end He 
would be visible. 22 
Although secular Zionism vigorously rejected the ultra-Orthodox explanations 
of the Holocaust, it reproduced the same theological logic in its own account of the 
Jewish historical existence. A number of critics including the aforementioned Charles 
S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, observed that instead of secularising the 
historical narrative of the Jewish people, Zionism only adjusted the traditional 
theology by replacing the Jewish God with the Jewish State. 23 Thus, Zionism 
accepted the traditional view of Jewish history as a unique history, marked by 
suffering, passivity, and powerlessness. One of the foundational texts of Zionism, 
Haim Hazaz's The Sermon, provides a representative interpretation of the Zionist 
portrayal of Jewish history. In this short story, Hazaz depicts the Zionist ideal of the 
negation of the Exile through a sermonic monologue of his protagonist Yudka, who 
declares at a general assembly of his kibbutz his 'opposition to the Jewish history': 
First, I will begin with the fact that we have no history at all. That's a fact.... 
Because we didn't make our own history. ... Just think ... what is there 
in it? 
Oppression, defamation, persecution and martyrdom. And again oppression, 
22 See Buber, M., The Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between Religion and 
Philosophy (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998). 
23 See for example Liebman, C. S. and E. Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional 
Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1983). 
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defamation, persecution and martyrdom. And again and again and again, 
without end. ... We love suffering, for through suffering we are able to be 
Jews; it preserves us and maintains us ... In fact, the more we are degraded, 
the greater we think is our honour ... The Exile, , that is our pyramid, and it has 
martyrdom for a base and Messiah for its peak. 24 
Biale rejected this mystification of the Jewish history on two accounts: first of all, 
Jews have never been entirely powerless, and secondly, they have never been 
apolitically passive. The author sketched a timeline of the Jewish period of the Exile 
that showed that the Jewish people survived, not because God wanted it to, but 
because the Jews acquired "an extraordinary ability to maneuver between a quest for 
full sovereignty and apolitical passivity. "25 To illustrate this claim briefly, Biale drew 
attention to the period after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C. E. when 
the rabbinical government, far from retreating into the study of the Torah, constituted 
a powerful political leadership that preserved its inner authority and regulated the 
relationship to the host state. Similarly, the Middle Ages was not a period of retreat 
into otherworldliness. In a groundbreaking monumental study of Jewish social history, 
Professor Salo Barony showed that the medieval Jews regarded themselves as free 
people who were not subjected to serfdom and had full citizenship rights in many 
medieval cities. For substantial periods during the Middle Ages, Jews carried arms 
and defended the cities in which they lived. To cut a long story short, Biale 
concluded: "Rather than subsisting on the fringes of society as an impotent and 
marginal people, the Jews were close to the centres of power and it was this 
proximity to power, as much as anything, that attracted the animosity of their non- 
Jewish neighbours. "27 Although the Jews were in danger of expulsion and did not 
always possess sufficient power to defend themselves against the popular forces, 
they were neither powerless nor without allies or powerful defenders. The Jewish 
history that transpires from a secularised account is characterised by a wide 
spectrum of persistent and ongoing attempts to achieve some measure of political 
24 Hazaz, H., "The Sermon" in Mendes-Flohr, P. and J. Reinharz (ed. ), The Jew in the 
Modem Worid: A Documentary History (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), pp. 619-21. 
25 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 70. 
0 Baron, S. W., Social and Religious History of the Jews (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983). Vols. 9-18. 
27 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 70. 
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power. This image departs considerably from the theological representations of 
Diaspora history as a series of persecutions and massacres unleashed upon the 
Jews by enemies from Haman, to the Romans, to Spanish Inquisitors, to Cossacks 
and czars to Hitler and Goebbels, until we reach Arafat as the latest incarnation of 
perennial anti-Semitism. Divorced from the Jewish traditional metanarrative of 
election and persecution, the history of the Jewish people becomes a fragmented 
history of individual Jewish communities with their own experience, customs, and 
pattern of interaction with the local Gentiles. 
On the basis of the historical fallacy of Jewish powerlessness and national 
unity across the ages, the Holocaust was interpreted as a culmination of the Exile 
and its inevitable outcome. Like the religious Jews, the secular Zionists often 
concluded that it was the Jews who had brought the Holocaust upon themselves 
through their passivity. Thus Menachem Begin, in the introduction to The Revolt 
attributed the Holocaust to the "age-old inexcusable utter defencelessness of the 
Jewish people, " which he defined as "a standing invitation to massacre. "28 In the 
secular account, the Jews were being punished for the sin of weakness. Jewish 
empowerment thus became 'a commandment that rose from the camps' and the 
Zionists executed it as diligently and scrupulously as the traditional Jews followed the 
613 of God's commandments. The injunction 'Never again would the Jews be 
powerless' has the same religious urgency to it as does 'Never again would the Jews 
sin against God. ' Zionism and expressivist use of force are the two facets of the 
Jewish prism that respond to the construct of the Holocaust as the result of Jewish 
powerlessness. Zionism replaced the abnormal condition of Jewish exilic existence 
with statehood and the victimised Diaspora Jew its diametric opposite: an armed 
hero. Yet, since the Zionist conceptions of power, revolt, and retribution are 
indissolvably tied with the metaphor of the victim, Israel as the symbol of Jewish 
power remains tied to the Holocaust as its anti-thesis. Moreover, the Holocaust was 
sometimes mystified as the destruction that preceded redemption, a secular version 
of Hevlel Mashiach. Thus the sacrifice of the six million innocent Jews precipitated 
the secular Messiah - Zionism - that re-established the State of Israel. In order to 
demystify that claim, the historical account that refutes Jewish powerlessness and 
28 Begin, M., The Revolt, p. xii. 
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political passivity during the period of the Exile must pay special attention to the 
history of the Zionist movement and place it within the secular Jewish history of quest 
for political autonomy and power, and the broader historical context of the 19th 
century European nationalism. ', 
The critics also often pointed out that the Zionist interpretation of the 
Holocaust as the outcome of Jewish powerlessness rather than Nazi ideology, 
encouraged an unrestrained and self-righteous use of force. Situating the Holocaust 
within its proper historical context of the 1930s Europe and the Nazi totalitarian 
ideology would discredit the thesis that Jews went like sheep to the slaughter, the 
great historical shame that again and again energised the Israeli use of power. The 
Zionist efforts towards absolving the victims of this shame have so far required a 
degree of historical inaccuracy that, according to critics like Evron, is neither needed 
nor desirable. The Zionist overemphasis on the few instances of Jewish armed 
resistance sets the desperate fight of the Warsaw Ghetto rebels, for example, as the 
ultimate model of behaviour in times of crisis. The discussion of a new Jewish ethics 
in the last section explores in more detail the dangers inherent in such model for 
action within the context of Israel's reality of power. In spite of the fundamental 
change of circumstances represented by the establishment of the Jewish State in 
1948, the Zionist depiction of Israel's subsequent historical and material reality 
continues the legacy of the Chosen People -a people that, besieged and isolated, 
'stands alone, uncounted among the nations. ' Oscillating between imminent threats 
of annihilation and miracles of redemption, the modern Zionist view of Israeli history 
remains essentially mythical. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, a new generation of more open-minded and 
critical historians started to reconsider the founding tenets of Zionism and Israeli 
nationalism. In contrast with the traditional cyclical history of destruction and 
redemption that blurred all difference between all wars and enemies across 
generations, the body of literature that has conveniently been termed 'new history, ' 
sought to break away from the traditional concepts of Jewish history by refocusing on 
social, economical, and cultural history of a particular period or issue. These 'new 
historical' accounts, the building bricks of new Israeli history, offered new insights into 
the circumstances surrounding the creation of the State of Israel, a reappraisal of the 
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War of Independence29 and the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, 30 a critical evaluation 
of Zionist rescue efforts31 and Israel's attitude towards the Holocaust and its 
survivors, 32to name just a few examples. 
The revised account of Israeli history that emerged from these critical 
investigations emphasised that the pre-state leadership in Palestine had not done 
enough to rescue Hitler's victims during World War 11. In The Seventh Million Tom 
Segev also wrote that the Zionist movement used the Holocaust to advance its 
political goals, arguing that political groups in the Yishuv viewed the destruction of 
European Jewry as a historic opportunity to morally pressure the Western states into 
the creation of the Jewish state. When the survivors came to Palestine, the story 
goes, the Yishuv did nothing to welcome them to their new homeland and help them 
assimilate. Idith Zertal's From Catastrophe to Power studied the Zionist rescue efforts 
and emphasised the arrogant and insensitive attitude of the Sabras toward the 
survivors of the Holocaust who immigrated to Palestine in the years right after 1945. 
The Sabras charged with saving and absorbing the refugees treated them with 
contempt and harshness. As to the founding of the Jewish state and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the 'new historians' shattered a number of old Zionist myths. Contrary to the 
David and Goliath 'myth' of Israel's precarious existence in the face of a powerful 
enemy, some critics claimed that Israel had never been in serious military danger and 
that the Jews had always been stronger than the Palestinians and the Arab armies, 
even in 1948. Historian Benny Morris further argued that Israel had forcibly expelled 
the Arabs from their houses during the 1948 war thus countering the official Israeli 
version, according to which the Arabs left Palestine out of their own will or were 
called on to do so by the leaders of the neighbouring Arab states. 33 Similarly, 
historian Avi Shlaim wrote that during November 1947, King Abdullah of Jordan and 
Golda Meir reached an agreement whereby each of their sides, Israel and Jordan, 
2' Rogan, E. L. and A. Shlaim, Rewriting the Palestine war. 1948 and the history of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
30 Morris, B., Righteous Victims: A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1881-1999, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2001); Shlaim, A., The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: 
Norton W. W., 2001). 
31 Zertal, I., From Catastrophe to Power. 
Tom Segev, The Seventh Million. 
33 Morris, B., The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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would annex parts of the land allocated to the Palestinians. 34 A revision of the crucial 
episodes in Israel's history was accompanied with a reassessment of Jewish and 
Zionist historiography. 35 Like David Biale, historian Moshe Zimmerman advocated an 
interpretation of Jewish history based on a methodological rejection of a priori 
distinctiveness of Jewish history. Instead, Zimmerman proposed a universal history, 
which, he claimed would significantly change the appearance of Jewish history within 
it. 36 A study of Jewish history from the universalist point of view, concluded 
Zimmerman, would relativise and contextualise Jewish persecution in the Middle 
Ages, Enlightenment and assimilation, anti-Semitism, Zionism, and the Holocaust. 
Such a historical analysis would facilitate Jewish reconnection with the rest of 
humanity by showing that "the history of the Jews has always been subject to the 
same laws as the histories of other peoples. "37 
The reception that the `new historians' received in Israel and the arguments 
used against it are significant because they show the scope of post-Zionist 
penetration into Israeli society, define the issues at stake, and identify the pitfalls that 
a critical revision of history must avoid. In June 1994, Aharon Meged, one of Israel's 
most renowned authors and a leading figure of the Israeli Left, wrote a lengthy 
polemic entitled "Israel's Urge to Suicide, " which signalled the beginning of a powerful 
backlash against post-Zionism. 31 In this contentious article, Meged accused Israel's 
intellectual and cultural elites of undermining Israel's national and moral right to exist. 
He also argued that post-Zionism strengthens anti-Israeli claims and weakens 
Israel's morale and basic beliefs. According to Yoram Hazony, the author of a widely 
publicised critical evaluation of post-Zionism, Meged's essay sparked "a volcanic 
outpouring of accusation, justification, rationalisation, and counter-accusation that 
continued to appear in the media in the years that followed. "39 The opposition to the 
34 Shlaim, A., The politics of partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921- 
1951(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
35 See Kimmerling, B., "Academic History Caught in the Cross-Fire: The Case of Israeli- 
Jewish Historiography, " in History and Memory, 7: 4 (1995) pp. 41-65. 
36 See Zimmerman, M., "Israels Umgang mit dem Holocaust" in Steininger, R. (ed. ) Der 
Umgang mit dem Holocaust: Europa-USA-Israel (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar. Bölhlau 
Verlag, 1994), pp. 387-406. 
37 Biale, D., "Power, Passivity" p. 70. 
1 Meged, A., "Israel's Urge to Suicide" in Ha'aretz Weekend Supplement 10 June 1994. 
39 Hazony, Y., The Jewish State: The Struggle for Israel's Soul (New York: Basic Books, 
2000), p. 4. 
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post-Zionism project (or ideology, as the critics call it) of Israel's transformation from 
an ethnic to a civil state was inevitably also directed at the'new historians, ' who gave 
a historical justification to this claim. The 'new historians' were accused primarily of 
undermining the legitimacy of the Jewish State and of factual inaccuracy (or even 
fabrication of facts). 40 Although the two are related, neither the purpose nor the scope 
of this discussion allows for a review of the debate over historical facts. With regards 
to the ideological issue, Hazony, who was a former advisor to Binyamin Netanyahu, 
depicted post-Zionism as "a cultural threat. "" The author interpreted the critical 
historical investigations as being ideologically motivated, purposefully picking on the 
crimes and errors of the Zionist movement with the intent to delegitimise Zionism and 
thereby call into question the morality of having a Jewish state. Hazony also 
denounced the post-Zionist trends in the contemporary Israeli literature, regretting the 
lack of pride in their country and love for their people expressed by the country's 
most prominent authors - Amos Oz, A. B. Yehoshua, David Grossman, and Meir 
Shalev. 
The most informative part of Hazony's account is his evaluation of the 
'damage' (or success, depending on the point of view) that has already been done. 
The opponents of post-Zionism seem to be particularly concerned by "the undeniable 
fact that the ideology of the intellectuals, which had been considered so irrelevant for 
so long, had in the end succeeded in undermining - and then reversing - the 
worldview of the political leadership. "42 What seem to be both surprising and 
infuriating to the likes of Hazony is the sudden and unprecedented political influence 
of the 'cynical clique of the literati whose opinions have so far never left the narrow 
confinement of the tiny cartel of universities and the Ha'aretz weekend supplement, ' 
as the author scornfully described Israel's intellectual and cultural elite. Hazony dated 
the 'sickening tottering of the perennial theory of the political impotence of Israel's 
intellectuals' to the beginning of the peace process. The Oslo agreement, which he 
called "the branja's [Yiddish for experts] most spectacular political achievement ... 
was in fact only the tip of an iceberg. "43 
40 For a pedantic assessment of 'new history's' factual (in)accuracy, see Karsh, E., 
Fabricating Israeli History: the 'new historians' (London: Frank Cass, 2000). 
41 Hazony, Y., The Jewish State p. 6. 
42 Hazony, Y., The Jewish State, p. 5. 
41 Hazony, Y., The Jewish State, p. 5. 
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Since then, post-Zionism had grown impressively, spreading from the 
academia into the broader walks of Israeli life. Not only have the post-Zionist currents 
gained a particular hold on the Israeli literature, observed Meyrav Wurmser, but also 
'infiltrated' the media and even the political and military establishment. 44 Wurmser 
thus regretted the fact that on the occasion of Israel's fiftieth anniversary jubilee, the 
official Israeli television channel broadcast of a special documentary called 
Resurrection, which criticized Israel for forcibly evicting the Palestinians in 1948 and 
for employing violent methods against the Palestinians during the Intifada. 
Furthermore, Wurmser recorded an alarming number of indicators that post-Zionism 
has also worked its way into Israel's political and military establishment. The 
inventory of post-Zionist utterances made by Israeli politicians include Micha 
Goldman's (former Deputy Minister of Education) proposal to replace Israel's national 
anthem and flag so that they reflect Palestinian nationalism, 45 Ehud Barak's (former 
Prime Minister) statement in a television interview that if he was a young Palestinian 
he would be a terrorist too, °G and Shulamit Aloni's (former Minister of Education) call 
for a stop to all visits of Israeli high-school students to the Nazi concentration camps, 
because after such trips they become "too nationalist. "" Moreover, the absence of 
any reference to either Zionism, Judaism or the love of the land in the new ethical 
code The Spirit of the IDF adopted by the Israeli military in 1994 caused great 
distress to the opponents of post-Zionism. Even more significantly, Hazony noted a 
fundamental change of attitude in the Israeli school curricula. According to the 
author, more and more young Israelis now receive a post-Zionist education, informed 
by the findings of 'new history. ' Whereas Israeli education curricula used to strive to 
promote Jewish national identity, Hazony finds that the new civics textbook does little 
to promote the idea of Israel as a Jewish state, the new archaeology curriculum has 
abandoned the traditional emphasis on historical Jewish ties to the land of Israel, and 
new history texts de-emphasize Jewish history, the Holocaust, and Zionism in favor 
of a more "universal" focus. 
4° Wurmser, M., "Can Israel Survive Post-Zionism? " in Middle East Quarterly 6: 1 (March 
1999), pp. 3-15. 
45 Goldman quoted in Haaretz, 13 April 1995. 
°G Ehud Barak quoted in Wurmser, M., "Can Israel Survive Post-Zionism? " p. 6. 
47 Aloni quoted in Ha'aretz, 25 September 1992. 
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"How long can a country survive if its intellectuals are working to debunk the 
basic culture the country is built on? " Hazony asked in a recent interview. 48 This is an 
interesting question for a Zionist to ask, because Zionism itself broke with almost two 
thousand years of Jewish history including the 'unresolved Holocaust trauma. It 
denied the entire Diaspora culture without ever worrying about the consequences of 
such a rupture. Turning away from the traditions it abhorred, Zionism ended up 
reproducing its most cardinal myths in its own analysis: seeking to normalise Jewish 
existence in an independent Jewish state, it turned the Jewish state into a ghetto and 
repudiating the subservience of the Jews in the Diaspora, it made Israel dependent 
on the guilt of the Christian West. The contemporary criticism justifying critical 
historical investigation has been very successful in showing some of the effects of the 
Zionist ideology of rupture with the past. The extension of this criticism, the post- 
Zionist scholarship ('new history' and 'critical sociology') represents in my view an 
important and genuine attempt to put Israel's history and the Jewish identity on 
different foundations. In doing so, however, makers of the new narrative need to be 
extremely careful not to reproduce Zionism's biggest mistake: rupture. 
A successful transition to normalcy will require a healed leadership holding a 
woridview devoid of post-traumatic burdens. Put differently, the Israeli critical 
intelligentsia has to be realistic in their assessment of the situation and in their 
expectations. It needs to consider two issues as a priority: 
> Reality of Israeli power and its impact on ethical possibility 
> Reality of Israeli traumatisation and its impact on the pace of 
normalisation 
In his reflections on the ethics of Israeli power, Rabbi Irving Greenberg took 
upon himself a task of charting "a path beyond the innocence of powerlessness and 
within the reality of Jewish empowerment. "49 The author began his account by 
establishing that the move from powerlessness to power represented a decisive 
change in the Jewish condition. This movement is for Greenberg historically and 
'Quote in Tobin, J., "Post-Zionist Headache" in Jewish World Review, 5 May 2000. Internet 
edition: http: //www. iewishworldreview. com/cols/tobinO5O500. asp. Last accessed, 25 
September 2001. 
49 Ellis, M. H., Beyond Innocence And Redemption p. 18. 
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morally inescapable in the face of the Holocaust, because powerlessness is no 
longer compatible with Jewish survival. However, Greenberg warns that 
empowerment is pregnant with moral challenges: 
Many people are devastated when they see Jewish hands dirtied with the 
inescapable blood and guilt of operating in the world. The classic Jewish self- 
image - the innocent, sinned-against sufferer - is being shattered. The 
traditional Jewish conviction of being morally superior which has sustained 
our self-respect throughout centuries of persecution is being tested. Who 
imagined the day that to re-establish order, Jewish soldiers would deliberately 
beat Arabs on the hands? Or smash arms and legs of some civilians, not just 
terrorists? ... Some recoil and wish Israel away; some lash out and blame 
particular leaders. Many yearn for an alternative to regain lost innocence. The 
truth is more painful and must be faced. 50 
The truth is, according to Greenberg, that "power corrupts, absolute power corrupts 
absolutely, but absolute powerlessness corrupts even more". 51 The real test of 
morality therefore no longer resides in an upholding of a moral superiority stemming 
from powerlessness, but in a responsible use of power. Since the moral challenges of 
power are entirely different from the idealistic absolute moral codes ('slave morality' 
in Nietzsche's terminology-2) developed by Judaism in the exile, the ideal standards 
cannot be used to judge Israel's actions. Not surprisingly, "the higher standard of 
ethics has increasingly come into conflict with the morally compromising situations 
that Israel has entered. "53When the conflict had developed into a crisis in the 
aftermath of the Lebanon war, the window of opportunity was created for establishing 
a moral code compatible with the exercise of power. In his text, Greenberg proposed 
a classical version of an ethics of responsibility. 54 A responsible leadership must face 
the inescapable fact that in "an unredeemed world ... any exercise of power, no 
matter how well intentioned, will have inescapable 'immoral' side effects. "' The true 
political morality must therefore strike a healthy balance between the best results and 
I Greenberg, I., "The Ethics of Jewish Power, " p. 1. 
51 Greenberg, I., "The Ethics of Jewish Power" Perspectives (New York: National Jewish 
Centre for Learning and Leadership, 1988), p. 1. 
52 See Nietzsche, F., Zur Genealogie der Moral (Munich: Goldmann Verlag, 1988). 
1 Greenberg, I., "The Ethics of Jewish Power, " p. 4. 
'See Weber, M., Politik als Beruf (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1992). 
55Greenberg, I., "The Ethics of Jewish Power, " p. 5. 
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the least morally compromising processes. Rabbi Greenberg provided the Israeli and 
the American Jewish communities with a moral compass, which, he hoped would 
guard the Jewish intelligentsia from "undermining Israel or abandoning it through 
excessive criticism and faulty judgements - or betraying Israel by giving it a moral 
blank check and uncritical love. "56 
The excessive criticism of some currents within the Israeli intelligentsia that 
Greenberg observed leads us to the reality of traumatisation. Even within the 
segment of the Israeli population that is most advanced in the recovery process, 
resistance to mourning is still found. Thus some contributions of post-Zionist 
scholarship still reflect the presence of the fantasy of compassion, whereby the 
former victim vilifies herself beyond any reasonable measure of self-criticism by 
immediately assimilating her slightest departure from the self-imposed (higher) moral 
standards with the evil that had been inflicted upon her. From the point of view of 
trauma, the fantasy of compassion represents the same obstacle to recovery, as 
does the fantasy of revenge, the occurrences of which are so fiercely denounced by 
this scholarship. The fantasy of compassion is relatively easily distinguished from real 
compassion: the former is characterised by a systematic imbalance of empathy in 
favour of other than oneself; the latter is a reflection of compassion for one's own 
victimised self. A psychological and historical understanding of Israel's traumatisation 
can help turn the fantasy of compassion into reality. Thus for example a reappraisal 
of certain Zionist leaders and actions in the light of the findings of this thesis would 
nuance their mistakes or flaws by situating them within the usual parameters of 
trauma response rather than see them as a proof of exceptionally manipulative 
characters or evil design. Such analysis not only does greater justice to the Zionist 
leaders but also maintains its connection to the nation's founders, thus avoiding the 
Zionist mistake of breaking with the past. 
The critics need to be constantly aware of the ways in which their own 
traumatisation (to the extent that it may not yet be resolved) influences their 
scholarship and potentially compromises the project of collective normalisation. 
Furthermore, the architects of Israel's normalisation have the responsibility toward 
56Greenberg, I., "The Ethics of Jewish Power, " p. 4. 
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their project to do everything to avoid exclusion of those who are unable (and that 
often rhymes with unwilling) to follow their lead at the same pace. Although a 
segment of the Israeli Jews has almost completed the process of recovery from 
trauma, this is far from being a generalised occurrence. For the majority of Israelis 
the prospect of relinquishing their victim identity is threatening, and this reluctance 
should be handled with understanding and support rather than dismissed as alarmist 
rhetoric. Those Israelis who see the attack by intellectuals on Israeli nationalism and 
Jewish particularism as a threat to the Jewish state and the Jewish nation are afraid 
of what will happen to their own identity which is entirely embedded in the shared 
history of destruction and redemption. Victim identity is indeed, as Michael S. Roth 
wrote, "painfully empty when attempting to establish a cultural identity. "s' Yet, to a 
trauma survivor who has not completed the process of healing, this is the only 
identity she has or knows. Therefore, attacking it, no matter how sensibly and how 
legitimately, will only reinforce her pessimism, increase her isolation, and ultimately 
prolong the healing process. 
Whilst resistance to mourning and normalisation represent a significant 
frustration to the post-Zionist revolution, a potentially even greater challenge comes 
from the ultra-Orthodox community, which has only recently acknowledged their 
traumatisation and there is no way of knowing how they will deal with it. The ultra- 
Orthodox community suffered the worst devastation during the Holocaust: their 
centres of learning, the famous yeshivot (religious seminaries) in Poland, Lithuania, 
and Hungary were destroyed, their rabbis and other communal leaders killed, their 
synagogues and shtetles burned down, and close to three million of their members 
were exterminated by the Nazis. Despite, or possibly, because of this extensive 
destruction during the Holocaust, the ultra-Orthodox community has avoided the 
subject that until now had been too painful and too threatening to the community's 
beliefs. They excluded themselves from the collective reconstruction of trauma at the 
Eichmann trial in 1961 and they rejected the Zionist narrative of destruction and 
rebirth that emerged from the trial. According to Menachem Friedman, Bar-Ilan 
University sociologist and expert on ultra-Orthodox society, for the ultra-Orthodox 
community, the Holocaust and the Zionist victory represent two interlocking 
I Roth, M. S., "Victims, Memory, History" in Tikkun, 9: 2 (March / April, 1994), p. 59. 
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tragedies. " The ultra-Orthodox consider the creation of the State of Israel by secular 
Zionists a sin because it interferes with the divine plan to re-establish the Kingdom of 
Israel when the Messiah comes. The majority of ultra-Orthodox continue to shun 
Israel's main Holocaust memorial institutions. However, recent years have seen an 
important change of attitude: a steady rise in interest in Holocaust studies among the 
ultra-Orthodox, the introduction of the Holocaust as a history subject in ultra- 
Orthodox high schools, and participation of 400 teachers at Yad Vashem seminars, 
are just a few examples of this shift. The ultra-Orthodox youth is more interested in 
the survivors' stories and the latter have recently begun to publish memoirs. Although 
these developments are still relatively marginal, it is conceivable that an ultra- 
Orthodox narrative of the destruction of their communities may in the future dispute 
the existing narrative of the Holocaust, as the community is becoming increasingly 
politicised as well as more willing to confront its past. 
Post-Zionism has scored a tremendous success with the introduction of its 
message into the school curricula and the army, because that way, the school 
system and the military will stop perpetuating the traumatised view of the world and 
thereby reproducing the group of empathetic 'survivors' at the critical juncture marked 
by the gradual disappearance of the physical survivors. With regards to all those in 
Israel who still see themselves primarily as Holocaust survivors or who may be still in 
the process of emerging as a survivors' group, the leaders need to include them in 
the project of normalisation and assist them by adopting an attitude that transpires 
patience, compassion, understanding, and respect. 
58 See Gross, N. C., "Why Did God Do This To Us? Ultra-Orthodox Jews Finally Grapple with 
the Holocaust" in The Jerusalem Report, 8 May 2000, pp. 18-21. 
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